Proceedings and Addresses of the APA vol. 89 2015
Moral Bias and
Corrective Practices:
A Pragmatist
Perspective
Elizabeth Anderson
UNIVERSIT Y OF MICHIGAN–ANN ARBOR
Presidential address delivered at the one hundred twelfth Central Division meeting of
the American Philosophical Association in St. Louis, Missouri, on February 20, 2015.
1. SOME PRAGMATIST DOUBTS ABOUT DOMINANT METHODS
IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
My topic for this lecture is the epistemology of morality. Here, I focus on
morality in the narrow sense of what we owe to each other.1 It is possible
to infer the implicit moral epistemology of analytic moral philosophy
from its dominant methods. I am particularly interested in the implicit
social epistemology of analytic moral philosophy. Philosophers presume
that they can learn what we owe to each other under the social conditions
in which we practice moral philosophy.
These presumptions can be tested. We can investigate historical cases
in which society implemented moral philosophy’s dominant practices,
and see whether they yielded satisfactory moral conclusions. We can
consider whether alternative practices have done a better job, and why
they might have done so. To adopt more efective practices of moral
inquiry in light of such testing in experience is to adopt pragmatism as
a moral methodology. I will argue that to do so is a more promising path
forward for moral philosophy than to continue our currently dominant
methods.
Let’s irst consider some dominant methods in moral philosophy today.
I’ll focus on two: the ascent to the a priori, and relective equilibrium.
The ascent to the a priori purports to yield “fact free” moral principles—
fundamental moral principles that are true in all possible worlds. G. A.
Cohen spelled out the method as follows. Suppose we begin with a
moral principle that depends on a fact. We ask what makes that fact
21
PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE APA, VOLUME 89
morally relevant. The answer will have to be a normative principle that
does not depend on that fact. If it, in turn, depends on some other fact,
we can iterate the process of abstraction from facts. Each new principle
functions as a stepping stone that takes us further away from contingent
facts, ultimately ascending to a domain of fundamental moral principles
that are true regardless of the facts—true in all possible worlds.2
Here is a slight modiication of Cohen’s example. Suppose someone
advances a principle of freedom of religion, justiied by the fact that
religion is important to people. We ask: Why care about what is important
to people? The advocate might answer: Because people merit respect.
Again, we ask what justiies this principle and receive another appeal
to fact: people are rational beings. We now ask what makes that fact
morally relevant and receive the answer that any rational being merits
respect. That principle depends on no further facts. It is true in all
possible worlds, and so counts as a fundamental moral principle.
The method of relective equilibrium is even more dominant.3 Here
we move between intuitively appealing general moral principles and
intuitions about particular cases. We use each to modify the others until
we arrive at a set of principles that accounts for our moral judgments of
all particular cases. Carried to its logical conclusion, this method can also
lead to moral principles for all possible worlds, as long as we entertain
thought experiments about suiciently bizarre cases to elicit intuitions
against which to modify our general principles.
These do not exhaust the methods used in contemporary moral
philosophy. However, they are illustrative of a common aspiration
embodied in its most important methods. This is to seek fundamental
principles of morality that could, in principle, settle all moral problems
(at least of a particular structure—e.g., regarding saving lives, or
distributing goods) in all circumstances.
I have a pragmatist doubt about this aspiration. Our subject is principles
of moral right, which tell us what we owe to each other. These principles
have a function. They are tools for solving moral problems—problems
that arise from the facts that people need to live together, and need
each other’s assistance and cooperation, to survive and realize nearly
everything worthwhile in life. Because of these facts, we regularly make
claims on one another to act or avoid acting in various ways, and call
upon one another to airm and enforce these claims by applying moral
sanctions and expressing moral sentiments—by praising, blaming,
punishing, and by expressing outrage, disgust, resentment, and other
moral sentiments. The claims we make on each other frequently conlict.
22
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS – CENTRAL DIVISION
Morality supplies principles for adjudicating those conlicts, and for
fairly and impartially evaluating and revising other tools, such as laws,
nonmoral social norms, and bargaining, that we have developed for
managing them. Given that our conlicts are rooted in empirical realities
that difer across societies and ages, there is no particular reason to
think that there is any single fundamental moral tool that would settle all
our conlicts, or even all conlicts of a particular structure, everywhere.
That is no more plausible than to suppose that there is one ultimate tool
that will perform every task needed to build a shelter, no matter the
climate, economic, and social conditions.
If the quest for ultimate, factfree, or at least highly general and abstract
principles of moral rightness is dubious, how else can we advance moral
inquiry? Pragmatists argue that we should replace the quest for ultimate
or highly general principles with methods for intelligently updating our
current moral beliefs. There are two basic types of intelligent updating.
The irst is bias correction. We can empirically investigate whether
certain biases—thought tendencies that we have reason to reject for
purposes of adjudicating moral diferences—have distorted our moral
thinking. Such investigation may also discover methods for blocking
or counteracting these biases. Implementation of these methods may
then yield diferent beliefs, which are more trustworthy for avoiding the
biases in question.
A model of this type of strategy may be found in doubleblind, placebo
controlled, clinical trials of medical treatments. Blinding and placebo
controls block the efects of wishful thinking on observation. When
neither the patient nor the clinician knows whether the patient has
received a drug, their hope that the treatment works will not distort
observations of actual health outcomes. While clinical trials are hardly
guaranteed to generate accurate causal knowledge, we have much
greater reason to trust the evidence generated from doubleblind,
placebocontrolled trials than from other types of evidence in medicine.
Conclusions drawn from less biased methods of inquiry are likely to be
better.
The second basic method for intelligent updating of moral beliefs
consists in experiments in living. We act in accordance with new moral
principles, and see whether doing so solves the problem we wanted
it to solve, better than the old principles, with side efects we can live
with.
I have discussed experiments in living elsewhere.4 Here I focus on bias
correction. Some dominant methods of moral philosophy incorporate a
23
PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE APA, VOLUME 89
limited recognition of the need for bias correction, to bar the distorting
efects of selfinterest on moral judgment. Philosophers typically
use two explicit techniques to correct this bias. (1) In a tableturning
exercise, we regard an action under our consideration not only from
our own point of view, as the agent, but from the point of view of those
likely to experience its efects. We do this through a thought experiment:
we imagine that we are someone other than the agent who is afected
by it—and simulate our responses to the action and its efects. The
Golden Rule, which tells us to do unto others as we would be done by,
in efect directs us to avoid any actions that we would reject in such
a simulation.5 (2) In the veil of ignorance, we consider the impact of
general principles of justice on the assumption that we don’t know our
own identities or social position.6 The veil of ignorance generalizes the
thought experiment of the Golden Rule by asking us to simulate our
responses to the proposed principle from every social position.
Let’s turn our attention to the social conditions of the practice of moral
philosophy. While it is doubtful whether these have been designed to
counteract biases, in practicing moral inquiry under these conditions,
philosophers presuppose that those conditions are not themselves
distorting our moral thinking. Philosophers engage in moral relection
in the “cool hour,” at points and sometimes on whole matters in which
we do not have immediate stakes. Often, philosophers undertake moral
relection monologically, or simulate dialogue in their own minds.
Even when dialogue is actual, it typically takes place around a seminar
table or classroom composed of largely relatively privileged people—
faculty and college students who have leisure to relect, and who are
overwhelmingly white, male, and middle class. The dominant methods
appear to presuppose either that the social position of philosophers
doesn’t matter, or that whatever biases social position imparts are
easily correctable by the tableturning and veil of ignorance thought
experiments.
If moral inquiry were like mathematical inquiry, these conditions might
make sense. With respect to mathematics, it is plausible to suppose that
the social identities of inquirers are irrelevant to how we think about the
subject matter. This idea is harder to credit with respect to moral inquiry.
Moral reasoning is supposed to help diverse people live together, come
to terms with their diferences, and promote peaceful cooperation on
fair terms by supplying mutually acceptable principles for adjudicating
the conlicting claims they make on each other, and for coordinating
our moral sentiments to it the demands of living together. We should
expect that people’s social positions afect the claims they regard as
intuitively legitimate, as well as their moral sentiments.
24
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS – CENTRAL DIVISION
These relections suggest several questions about dominant
philosophical methodologies. First, why should anyone place conidence
in the moral intuitions they have in thought experiments that are very
remote from experience? To generate moral principles that claim to
apply in all possible worlds, or at least at a high level of abstraction
from facts, philosophers often consider bizarre thought experiments.
For example, in exploring the morality of abortion, Thomson appeals to
moral intuitions about scenarios in which people reproduce by means
of “people seeds” that embed themselves in one’s carpets.7 Yet, if this
were how people reproduced, all of the other conditions of social life
would be radically diferent. Why trust our ability to legislate morals for
creatures like that? Why think that what would be reasonable for them
would be equally reasonable for us? Even thought experiments that
seem closer to home, such as ticking time bomb scenarios or trolley
problems, tend to presuppose degrees of certainty that are never
encountered in real life, and omit consideration of how other people
would react to actors in these scenarios.
These doubts about the reliability of moral intuitions about bizarre
cases are reinforced by considering intuitions from a naturalistic point
of view. The standard case in which we entertain moral intuitions arises
in deliberation.8 In every act of deliberation, we conduct a thought
experiment in which we imagine the consequences of actions open to
us, and simulate our evaluative responses to these actions and their
consequences, with a view toward choosing one of the alternatives.
When philosophers elicit moral intuitions about particular cases
in thought experiments, they simulate deliberation, only without
immediate stakes or intention to choose an action on the basis of the
simulation. Such speculation is less serious than planning, since it is
often undertaken merely for the sake of argument. Deliberation is more
reliable when it stays close to past experience. This is not simply because
of diiculties in predicting the objective consequences of actions. It is
also because we are often surprised by our and others’ moral reactions
to actions and their consequences once they are performed. Simulation
does not always track reality, which is why we often feel regret even
when we follow our best judgment at the time. Intuitions elicited in
philosophical thought experiments therefore cannot be more reliable
than deliberation, which is not more reliable than intuitions elicited in
actual experiments in living, when we experience real consequences,
and actual moral reactions to them.
A second question that can be raised about philosophical intuitions
is, why rely on the intuitions of philosophers over the intuitions of
the folk? Experimental philosophers have raised this challenge with
25
PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE APA, VOLUME 89
respect to nonmoral normative intuitions.9 It applies with special force
to intuitions about what we owe to each other. Public opinion polling
consistently inds that people’s views about justice and public policy
are afected by their social identities—in particular, by ethnocentric
bias in favor of groups they ailiate with—independently of the impact
of these principles and policies on their personal selfinterest.10 We
also have theoretical reasons for thinking that important challenges to
morality arise from group interests and perspectives deined by social
hierarchy, independent of selfinterest.11 Bias correction techniques for
blocking selfinterest need not work against ethnocentric biases. This
matters for philosophy because philosophers, as already noted, are
demographically unrepresentative of humanity at large, overwhelmingly
drawn from advantaged social groups. Their professional situation
mostly insulates them from the challenges faced by less privileged
groups, and professional norms promote emotional detachment from
the issues they contemplate. Researchactive philosophers enjoy a
leisure to contemplate that the less privileged lack.
Various rationales for this exclusion and narrowness are suspect. The
traditional Aristotelian view that leisure is needed for rational relection
may be challenged by the thought that direct experience of manual
labor and economic necessity makes salient the importance of certain
claims of justice that the privileged are liable to ignore, dismiss, or
misunderstand.12 Philosophers’ emotional detachment—their conidence
that relection in the “cool hour” yields better understanding—looks
suspect in view of the fact that this was a traditional rationale for excluding
the propertyless from the franchise, who were thought to be too upset
about their poverty. We see the same view relected in complaints that
people of color are “hypersensitive” about racial insults. Cognitive
science suggests rather that emotions help us focus on normatively
relevant features of urgent problems,13 and that the lack of emotion of
the privileged may relect their indiference to the plight of others.14
Against the thought that having practical stakes in the outcome biases
moral thinking, I suggest that lacking stakes—the typical condition of
philosophers when they undertake speculative thought experiments—
may make moral reasoning irresponsible and unaccountable to those to
whom the outcomes matter.
A third question that may be raised about dominant methodologies is as
follows: Why think our moral intuitions are reliable now when past ones
were clearly prejudiced? Consider this intuition advanced by Hastings
Rashdall, the distinguished Oxford philosopher and utilitarian theorist:
“[P]robably no one will hesitate [to agree that] . . . the lower Wellbeing
. . . of countless Chinamen or Negroes must be sacriiced that a higher
26
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS – CENTRAL DIVISION
life may be possible for a much smaller number of white men.”15 This is
not a good start for a moral epistemology that purports to deliver, from
relection on intuitions, moral principles true in all possible worlds.
A fourth closely related question is this: Why think our moral intuitions
are reliable now when they have changed quite radically over time?
Consider the recent dramatic changes in EuroAmerican views about the
morality of LGBT sexuality, divorce, and premarital sex. About a century
ago, beliefs about the morality of killing for honor also changed.
I do not draw skeptical conclusions about the possibility of moral
knowledge from such doubts about the reliability of our moral intuitions.
Nor shall I argue that moral relativism is the best way to explain the
phenomena. Nor do I think that we have some alternative route to moral
knowledge that avoids intuition altogether. Rather, if our instruments
are lawed, the task before us is to discover ways to improve them. This
returns us to the pragmatist strategy of seeking methods for intelligently
updating our moral beliefs.
We can learn from the history of moral change how we might make
progress in improving our practices of moral inquiry. Consider what may
be the most dramatic worldwide progressive change in moral beliefs
that has ever occurred. Three hundred years ago, few people in the
world thought that slavery was morally wrong. Today, almost no one is
willing to defend it. Although still practiced in many parts of the world,
slavery is illegal everywhere. In this lecture, I shall take it as a ixed
point that this change in moral views is progressive—a case of moral
learning.16 By studying how we managed to improve our moral beliefs
about slavery, we can gain insight into how to improve our moral beliefs
more generally. To make this study manageable, I focus on the U.S. case.
2. POWER, MORAL BIAS, AND THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF
DOMINANT PHILOSOPHICAL METHODS
I have suggested that we can improve our moral beliefs by improving
our methods for correcting, blocking, or counteracting biases in moral
thinking. Here I shall focus on a speciic class of biases, rooted in social
inequality—in the ways power and privilege bias our thoughts. Adam
Smith and John Dewey are two philosophers who ofered insights into
such biases.
Smith focused on moral biases of observers, when diferentially valuing
the targets of their moral sentiments according to their social status,
27
PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE APA, VOLUME 89
rather than according to morally relevant features. Much of The Theory
of Moral Sentiments investigates such moral biases. Smith claimed
that “the disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the
powerful, and to despise . . . persons of poor and mean condition, . . .
is . . . the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral
sentiments.”17 It leads observers to have “ten times more compassion”
for the great than for the lowly, when they sufer equally.18 Of those
who have “equal degrees of merit,” “the rich and the great” enjoy more
respect from nearly everyone than “the poor and the humble.”19
John Dewey and James Tufts considered moral biases of the powerful.
They argued that
it is diicult for a person in a place of authoritative power
to avoid supposing that what he wants is right as long
as he has power to enforce his demand. And even with
the best will in the world, he is likely to be isolated from
the real needs of others, and the perils of ignorance
are added to those of selishness. History reveals the
tendency to confusion of private privilege with oicial
status. The history of the struggle for political liberty is
largely a record of attempt to get free from oppressions
which were exercised in the name of law and authority,
but which in efect identiied loyalty with enslavement.20
The applicability of this observation to belief in the justice of slavery,
over which a war had been fought in Dewey’s lifetime, is evident. Not
only slaveholders, but many other whites who identiied with them,
many of whom expected to own slaves, or at least to hold a superior
position to those deemed eligible for slavery, held that slavery was a
just institution. The moral bias Smith observed was also pervasive in the
antebellum U.S. Not only advocates of slavery, but its opponents, too,
despised slaves and free blacks, who occupied a markedly lower social
position in both the North and the South to whites. Racism was endemic
throughout the U.S.
The antebellum conlict over the morality of slavery remains important
for moral epistemology because white abolitionists deployed the same
methods of moral thinking that are so prominent in moral philosophy
today. Their arguments thus ofer a pragmatic test—a test in practice—
of the powers of today’s methods for correcting or counteracting moral
bias.
28
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS – CENTRAL DIVISION
The irst white AngloAmerican abolitionists were Quakers. They held
that the fundamental principle of morality was the Golden Rule. John
Hepburn argued that slavery and the slave trade violated the Golden
Rule and led to the violation of every one of the Ten Commandments.21
His tract is a splendid piece of analytic moral philosophy, packed with
logically rigorous arguments. David Brion Davis, the great intellectual
historian of slavery, writes of Hepburn’s pamphlet that it “anticipated
and answered virtually every proslavery argument that would appear in
the next century and a half.”22
Given his commitment to the Golden Rule, Hepburn used tableturning
arguments—a key method still used to check selfinterested bias.
He challenged slaveholders to consider whether they would want to
be enslaved: “[T[he Tyranizing over and making Slaves of our Fellow
Creatures, the Negroes, every one knows, or may know, this is not the
way they would be done unto.”23 Tableturning enables us to see the
immorality of the slave trade as well.24
Yet proslavery thinkers had a ready answer to tableturning arguments.
Presbyterian preacher James Henley Thornwell argued that the Golden
Rule, as interpreted by abolitionists, reduced morality to the “caprice” of
subjective desire. Of course, slaveholders do not want to be slaves; but
criminals don’t want to be punished, either. The Golden Rule must be
interpreted in light of the unequal social stations ordained by God and
necessary for social order:
If I am bound to emancipate my slave because if the
tables were turned and our situations reverse, I should
covet this boon from him, I should be bound, upon
the same principle, to promote my indigent neighbors
around me, to an absolute equality with myself. That
neither the Jews . . . nor the Apostles . . . ever applied it
in the sense of the Abolitionists, is a strong presumption
against their mode of interpretation. . . . Our Savior
directs us to do unto others what, in their situations,
it would be right and reasonable in us to expect from
them. . . . The rule then simply requires, in the case of
slavery, that we should treat our slaves as we should
feel that we had a right to be treated if we were slaves
ourselves.25
Thornton Stringfellow, Baptist pastor of Virginia, agreed: the Golden
Rule, if interpreted to reject slavery, would require leveling all social
inequalities.26 Properly interpreted, it leaves them intact.
29
PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE APA, VOLUME 89
Abolitionists also used the method of relective equilibrium against
slavery advocates. Yet, for every intuitive wrong charged against slavery,
proslavery thinkers pointed to the intuitive permissibility of the same act
in other domains. Abolitionist arguments were to little avail in a society
where such practices were accepted against other subordinate groups.
For example, abolitionists objected to the chaining of runaway slaves.
James Hammond, former representative and governor of South Carolina,
and soon to be its senator, replied to abolitionist Thomas Clarkson:
“Look to your army and navy.” Soldiers and sailors, too, were put in
manacles if they deserted their posts.27 Abolitionist classics such as
Theodore Weld’s American Slavery as It Is (1839) stressed the shocking
violence of slavery, with its loggings and other physical punishments.
But proslavery writers observed that workers, wives, and pupils were
subject to violent discipline at the hands of bosses, husbands, and
schoolmasters.28 Abolitionists objected that slaveholders forcibly
separated husbands from wives and parents from children when they
sold their slaves to diferent plantations. Proslavery thinkers replied that
impressed seamen were also torn from their families, as were criminals
sentenced to transportation.29 Abolitionists complained of the injustice
of forcing slaves to work for no wage. Proslavery thinkers noted that
fathers had the right to force their children to labor for them without
pay.30 Abolitionists documented the meager food, ragged clothing, and
miserable shelter of slaves. Proslavery thinkers pointed to the misery of
wage slaves in England, who were materially worse of, they claimed,
than American slaves.31 But what of the fact that slaves, even those of
talent, were deprived of all opportunities for advancement? Former
senator of South Carolina William Harper replied, “Females are human
and rational beings. They may be found of better faculties, and better
qualiied to exercise political privileges, and to attain the distinctions of
society, than many men; yet who complains of the order of society by
which they are excluded from them?”32
Today we have no diiculty accepting what were then radical
implications of abolitionist arguments for other subordinate groups.
Many abolitionists, however, were reluctant to carry their arguments so
far. Wives sufered many of the same legal disabilities of slaves, lacking
the rights to own property, make contracts, sue or be sued, or move
about without their husband’s permission, and women generally lacked
opportunities for advancement, but only a few abolitionists questioned
these disadvantages. The patriarch’s right to use violence to discipline
subordinate members of his family was largely uncontested. No
congressional advocate of the Thirteenth Amendment was willing, when
challenged, to argue that it overturned a husband’s right to his wife’s
(or a father’s right to his children’s) labor and wages.33 Of course, slaves
30
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS – CENTRAL DIVISION
sufered more from the abuses abolitionists objected to than other
subordinates. Yet, in their eagerness to point to the genuine distinctions
between chattel slaves and wage slaves, abolitionists undercut their
stress on the material deprivations of slavery, the very point on which
the diferences between chattel slaves and the poorest free laborers
of Britain were smallest. Abolitionists faced a diicult choice between
drawing arbitrary lines in a continuum of abuses against subordinates,
or laying themselves open to proslavery charges that their arguments
led to anarchism, in an era where many kinds of severe authority were
accepted as necessary for social order.34
Relective equilibrium also put abolitionists under pressure because
both sides accepted the Bible as a source of moral knowledge.
Abolitionists such as Hepburn used the Bible to derive abstract moral
principles that put slavery in question. Against this, proslavery thinkers
focused on close, literal readings of the Bible, showcasing dozens of
passages in which God, Jesus, or the Apostles authorized slavery.35 They
also stressed the Christian doctrine of original sin, used since Augustine
to justify slavery, and to postpone the liberating, egalitarian promise of
the Bible to the afterlife.36 Thus, Christian morality exposed diiculties
on both sides. In response to textual evidence that the Bible authorized
slavery, William Lloyd Garrison had to argue that the Bible was written
not by God, but by many fallible humans, not all inspired by God.37 While
most philosophers today would agree with Garrison, his argument sat
uncomfortably with the dominant Christian beliefs of the day.
Above all, racism profoundly distorted whites’ moral intuitions,
whether they favored or opposed slavery. Racism plays multiple
roles in the conlict over slavery. Here I focus on how ideologies of
black inferiority led slavery advocates to a delusional representation
of slaveholders as benevolent paternalists toward their slaves, who
supposedly would perish, like helpless children, without their masters’
support and guidance.38 As preposterous as it seems to us today, and
to abolitionists then, letters and diaries of slaveholders and their wives
testify to their apparently sincere selfimage as dutifully providing for
the welfare of their slaves, even at a burden to themselves.39 This led
to further delusions that their slaves were happy and loyal, and would
stand by them in the event of war against the North,40 and that their
slaves didn’t mind the deprivations of slavery—being denied personal
liberty, rights to live with family members, education, even the honor
associated with having recognized rights against rape and whipping.41
Less delusionally, proslavery thinkers observed that free blacks in the
North were disproportionately represented in the prisons and among
the destitute and unemployed.42 They deployed these facts as proof of
31
PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE APA, VOLUME 89
black inferiority, of their incapacity to manage freedom in competition
with whites. This claim was more diicult for white abolitionists to refute,
since, afected by their own racism, they were reluctant to blame their
own racist practices for these outcomes.
Thus, the moral biases of slavery advocates proved largely immune to
correction by the dominant methods of moral philosophy, which were
deployed by white abolitionists. Ascent to the a priori led to abstract
moral principles—the Golden Rule, the equality of humans before
God—that settled nothing because their application to this world was
contested. Tableturning exercises were inefective for similar reasons.
Relective equilibrium did not clearly favor the abolitionists, given
authoritarian, Biblical, and racist premises shared by white abolitionists
and slavery advocates. No wonder only a handful of Southern whites
turned against slavery on the basis of pure moral argument.43
3. PRAGMATIST METHODS OF COUNTERACTING MORAL BIAS:
CONTENTION AND INCLUSION
Yet, moral beliefs about slavery did change. After the Civil War, while
Southern whites insisted on white supremacy, most came to accept
sharecropping as superior to slavery.44 The practical success of
emancipation led them to drop all of the arguments they had previously
made in support of the supposed necessity of slavery. The full story of
how this change in moral beliefs came about is too complex for this
lecture. Here I stress two major factors. First, to change moral beliefs,
slavery had to be challenged not only in pure moral arguments but in
practical, collective action. Second, slaves and free blacks had to actively
participate in those challenges.
In social theory, “contention” refers to practices in which people make
claims against others, on behalf of someone’s interests. “Contentious
politics” consists of coordinated contention by groups around a shared
agenda, involving governments as “targets, initiators of claims, or third
parties.”45 Contentious practices span a spectrum from pure moral
argument at one end, to riots, war, and other violent acts on the other.
Between pure argument and violence is a wide range of contentious
activities that are more or less disruptive of habitual ways of life, from
petitioning, publicity campaigns, theatrical performances, candlelight
vigils, litigation, and political campaigns, to street demonstrations,
boycotts, teachins, sitins, picketing, strikes, building occupations, and
other forms of civil disobedience. As people move beyond the pure
moral argument pole, they manifest in action and not only words their
32
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS – CENTRAL DIVISION
refusal to go along with the moral norms they are rejecting. Once it
gets beyond pure moral argument, contention consists in the collective,
concerted repudiation of morally objectionable practices by means of
actions that disrupt the routine functioning of those practices, and that
express rejection of the moral authority of people to practice them.
Contention aims to secure the satisfaction of claims by eliciting the
recognition of those in power of the legitimacy of those claims, and
thereby the incorporation into social institutions of an established
recognition of those claims.46 It might seem that violent acts, on this
deinition, could not count as contention, even if they have political
aims. To be sure, political violence used simply to get one’s way by
force, as in cases of genocide and ethnic cleansing, does not address the
victims as agents of whom it is demanded that they respond to claims.
But other kinds of violence do aim at eliciting the practical recognition
from authorities of legitimate claims. For example, the American War of
Independence aimed not simply at obtaining de facto independence
from Britain but at securing recognition from Britain of the United States
as a sovereign nation. The war was a form of violent contention.
I claim that, in some circumstances, practical contention brings about
collective moral learning—learning on the part of societies—that pure
moral argument cannot. We have evidence that moral change induced
by contention counts as learning—as an improvement of moral beliefs—
if the contention blocks, counteracts, bypasses, or corrects cognitive or
moral biases that supported the status quo ante, such that the new moral
beliefs embodied in altered practice are not, or at least less, distorted
by those biases. In such cases, we have similar grounds for claiming that
the new moral beliefs are more reliable as in cases of belief change on
the basis of blinded placebocontrolled clinical trials.
Practical contention, not just individual moral persuasion, is needed to
efect collective moral belief change because collective moral beliefs
are embodied in social norms. Social norms are sustained by reciprocal
expectations of conditional conformity. They involve tacit or explicit
agreements within a society to conform to the norm, on condition
that enough others conform. Collective moral beliefs are embodied
in social norms of discussion, joint deliberation, and claimmaking. A
group shares a belief if that belief shapes discourse within the group:
the group takes it for granted as a premise for further argument, not
needing independent justiication; its truth is treated as a settled
matter; disputing it is regarded as, if not beyond the pale, requiring
a heavy burden of proof; disputants are liable to censure or even
social exclusion for calling such convictions into question.47 For belief
33
PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE APA, VOLUME 89
in a moral principle to be collectively accepted also requires that the
principle regulates interpersonal claimmaking: members are free to
make claims in accordance with the principle and generally do so when
they are victimized by violations of it; other members acknowledge
the legitimacy of such claims; the principle is widely if not completely
obeyed by group members; the group punishes disobedience; members
take steps to transmit the principle to future generations.48
Because collective moral beliefs are sustained by reciprocal
expectations, an individual can privately dissent while still participating
in the practices that sustain the belief for the group. Hence, merely
changing an individual’s mind through moral argument need not change
the collective belief. Furthermore, individuals may resist acting on their
personal conclusions because a belief is held collectively. This is not
simply because they lack the courage of their convictions. They may
wonder whether they have reasoned correctly if they reach conclusions
contrary to the group consensus, and think that the group’s belief is
more reliable than their own reasoning. Pure moral argument may also
lack a certain degree of seriousness, insofar as it is advanced in contexts
outside of interpersonal claimmaking, by people who lack direct stakes
in what they are saying.
Contentious politics avoids these weaknesses of pure moral argument.
In contentious political practices, people advance moral beliefs in the
context of actual claimmaking: the stakes are real and serious. Because
these practices involve mass action in public repudiation of existing
norms, they destabilize the shared expectations that hold those norms in
place, casting doubt on the robustness or authenticity of the purported
consensus around them. Their mass public nature may give courage to
those who privately dissented, proving that their doubts about existing
norms were not merely the product of idiosyncratic reasoning. To
the extent that contentious politics disrupts the routine operation of
challenged norms, it forces genuine practical deliberation about what
to do, not mere idle speculation. In refusing to concede legitimacy to
the enforcement of challenged norms, contentious politics threatens a
loss of honor on the part of those who do enforce them—something that
may inspire the enforcers to reconsider them.49
Contentious politics thus serves to awaken societies to serious practical
relection on entrenched moral beliefs. More is needed, however,
to ensure that the direction their relection takes is less biased.
Many features of contention can play this role. Here I stress one: the
participation of the victims of injustice in challenging the norms that
oppress them.
34
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS – CENTRAL DIVISION
So far I have discussed the moral arguments made by white abolitionists
such as Hepburn, Clarkson, Weld, and Garrison. As we have seen, their
strategies were inefective against the slaveholding culture of the South.
Racism posed powerful obstacles to their eforts. Despite the abstract
commitment of white abolitionists to the equality of blacks before
God, and hence their equal moral considerability, racism biased their
representation of the evils of slavery. They overwhelmingly represented
slaves as victims of cruelty and material deprivation. Weld’s American
Slavery as It Is (1839) (the inspiration for Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle
Tom’s Cabin, which, with Weld’s work, constituted the two most inluential
white abolitionist publications in the U.S.) documents in exhaustive
detail the material deprivations inlicted on slaves and their subjection
to cruel tortures. Notably, these wrongs can be sufered equally much by
animals. By contrast, Weld’s work passes relatively lightly over slavery’s
manifold assaults on slaves’ speciically human, dignitary interests in
their agency and in recognition from others: the deprivation of autonomy,
legal rights, education, and opportunities for selfadvancement; the
theft of the fruits of their labor; the dishonor inlicted on female slaves
through slaveholder rape; the dishonor imposed on male slaves by
denying them authority over family life, powers to protect their wives
and children, and access to avenues for developing and exercising
military virtues. White abolitionists thus tended to cast slaves more as
objects of pity than as subjects of dignity entitled to command respect.
They were notably weak in addressing slaveholders’ claims that blacks
lacked intelligence, talent, foresight, and capacities for selfgovernance,
and so would be unable to compete with whites in a free labor market,
but sink into destitution, vagrancy, and crime if they were freed—key
elements in slaveholders’ patriarchal defense of slavery as necessary for
blacks’ welfare and social order.
Black abolitionists placed greater emphasis on the ways in which slavery
deprived slaves of dignity, honor, and access to distinctively human
rights and achievements. The central theme of Harriet Jacobs’s Incidents
in the Life of a Slave Girl Written by Herself was the vulnerability of slave
women to sexual harassment and rape at the hands of their masters.
The female slave “is not allowed to have any pride of character. It is
deemed a crime in her to wish to be virtuous.” Jacobs rated this injury
as far worse than slavery’s material deprivations or consignment to a life
of drudgery. She hid in a tiny, dark attic for almost seven years to avoid
sexual assault, judging this fate better than slavery, even though she
had never been whipped, beaten, or overworked as a slave.50 Frederick
Douglass agreed with Jacobs’s priorities. Worse than the whip was
slavery’s consignment of slaves to ignorance and incapacity to think
for themselves. Indeed, the fundamental point, and greatest injury,
35
PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE APA, VOLUME 89
of material deprivation and brutal physical punishment was to disable
slaves from aspiring to freedom, to the exercise of rational capacities,
to any kind of estimable activity.51 From this dignitary perspective,
Douglass exposed slaveholders’ boasts of the material indulgence they
granted their slaves on holidays, when they were encouraged to get
drunk and discouraged from any work, as a great fraud, designed only
“to disgust their slaves with freedom, by plunging them into the lowest
depths of dissipation.”52
Black abolitionists’ alternative critique of the evils of slavery led them
to advocate a diferent strategy for bringing about moral change—
one addressed as much to antislavery Northerners as to advocates
of slavery. Their critique identiied racism—the widespread, deeply
entrenched contempt for blacks, based on prejudicial feelings of their
being unit for freedom and equal dignity with whites—as the core
moral bias upholding slavery. To counteract this prejudice, much more
than pure moral argument was required. Blacks needed to demonstrate
in action their interest, capacity, and worthiness for freedom and dignity.
“We . . . wish to see the charges of Mr. Jeferson refuted by the blacks
themselves” for, if blacks fail to try, “we will only establish them.”53
As James McCune Smith, the irst AfricanAmerican to earn a medical
degree, and editor of Douglass’s My Bondage and My Freedom, put the
point:
The real object of that [antislavery] movement is not only
to disenthrall, it is, also, to bestow upon the Negro the
exercise of all those rights, from the possession of which
he has been so long debarred. But this full recognition
of the colored man to the right, and the entire admission
of the same to the full privileges, political, religious and
social, of manhood, requires powerful efort on the part
of the enthralled, as well as on the part of those who
would disenthrall them. The people at large must feel
the conviction, as well as admit the abstract logic, of
human equality; the Negro . . . must prove his title irst
to all that is demanded for him; in the teeth of unequal
chances, he must prove himself equal to the mass of
those who oppress him . . ..54
Without such efort by blacks themselves “to disprove their alleged
inferiority, and demonstrate their capacity for a more exalted civilization
than slavery and prejudice had assigned to them,” whites would
“reconcile themselves” to blacks’ “enslavement and oppression, as
things inevitable, if not desirable.”55
36
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS – CENTRAL DIVISION
This task stood in tension with white abolitionists’ strategy to present
slaves as objects of pity. Douglass grated under their requests that he
merely “give us the facts,” and “we will take care of the philosophy.”
They implored him to speak to audiences with an uneducated plantation
accent, lest Northern whites think he wasn’t really a fugitive slave. They
objected to his establishing a paper of his own, preferring that he
continue to lecture under their sponsorship, oblivious to the importance
Douglass saw in demonstrating blacks’ capacities and inspiring, through
his achievements, other blacks to that call.56
In this dispute, black abolitionists proved to be far keener moral
psychologists than their white counterparts. White abolitionists, in
stressing the pathos of slavery, operated on the assumption that the
core moral bias of slavery advocates was heardheartedness. On that
assumption, the key strategy for counteracting that bias should be to
highlight those facts about slavery that arouse people’s sympathies and
to cultivate social practices that encourage sentimentality and openheartedness, so that people feel free to respond appropriately to those
facts. Black abolitionists identiied the core weakness of this strategy:
“Human nature is so constituted, that it cannot honor a helpless man,
although it can pity him; and even this it cannot do long, if the signs
of power do not arise.”57 If the core moral bias of slavery advocates
was racist contempt, then this can only be counteracted by resisting
subordination and oppression, demanding respect, and seizing it, by
force if necessary, from those who withhold it. To demonstrate worthiness
of respect, one must conduct oneself as entitled to it. Failing that, the
contemptuous will think their targets uninterested in, incapable of, and
hence undeserving of respect.
On this point, black abolitionists were united. Their writings repeatedly
testify to the power of blacks’ standing up for their rights, and the
supreme importance of their doing so. Jacobs “resolved never to be
conquered” and resisted her master’s sexual advances. Escaping North,
she successfully opposed racial discrimination in hotel service by telling
the black servants that they should stand up to oppose it.58 Douglass
admired the unbowed resistance of Nelly to overseer Mr. Servier’s blows,
noting that he never whipped her again.59 This incident preigured his
own triumphant struggle against the slavebreaker Covey, from which
he drew his central insight into the moral psychology of overcoming
oppression: to obtain recognition of one’s respectability from others,
one must manifest selfrespect in action by exacting respect from others.
This call to resistance was the core of David Walker’s Appeal.60 And
resist the slaves did, taking deeds, more than words, as the key to
37
PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE APA, VOLUME 89
progressive moral change. Slaves exploited the legal codes of the South
to extract recognition of rights through innumerable acts of resistance
on the plantations, including, in some cases (astonishingly!), the right
to kill their masters in selfdefense.61 There was no better proof that
slaves desired freedom and repudiated enslavement than the steady
low of fugitives North, without regret or reversal. Toward the end of the
Civil War, the Confederacy, running out of soldiers, debated whether
to draft slaves into the army. Howell Cobb, one of the founders of the
Confederacy, answered, “If slaves will make good soldiers our whole
theory of slavery is wrong.”62 But fugitive slaves demonstrated, in their
courageous service in the Union Army, that slaves did make good
soldiers. They thereby heeded Walker’s call for blacks themselves to
refute Jeferson’s aspersions on their race and shattered the South’s
“whole theory of slavery.” While their actions did not end racism, they
did force a momentous retreat of this profound moral bias. Slavery
advocates were forced to concede that the case for slavery was spurious,
and that blacks were it at least for the autonomy that the emergent
sharecropping economy conceded to them. This was not full freedom
by any means, but it was a giant step up from slavery.
4. SOME PRAGMATIST PATHS FORWARD FOR MORAL
PHILOSOPHY
Let us step back and draw some lessons from this monumental episode
of collective moral learning. Recall that pragmatism replaces the quest
for ultimate criteria of moral rightness, true in all possible worlds or at
least at high levels of abstraction, with methods of intelligent updating.
I argued that one important type of intelligent updating involves
blocking, counteracting, or reducing the inluence of moral biases.
We have reasons to believe that social power biases moral reasoning
in systematic ways. First, as Smith argued, people tend to feel more
sympathy, and more esteem, for the rich and powerful relative to the
poor and powerless, controlling for equal sufering and equal merit. The
latter unjustly sufer contempt. He could have added that such contempt
tends to be rationalized by biased notions of group inferiority. Second,
as Dewey and Tufts argued, the powerful—who shape social institutions
to beneit their social groups at others’ expense—tend to confuse what
they want with what is right so long as they have the power to enforce
their demands.
Faced merely with pure moral argument, we have seen that the powerful,
and their advocates, typically have substantial resources at their disposal,
from the intuitive moral ideas and principles available in their society, to
38
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS – CENTRAL DIVISION
rationalize their side of the debate. Nor does purely speculative, a priori
moral argument typically activate real practical reasoning. Hence, the
powers of pure moral argument to dislodge prejudice and bias tend to
be weak.
Stronger methods are needed to counteract the biases induced by
social power. My case study of a societywide change in moral belief,
from proslavery to abolitionist, focused on two such methods. First,
contentious politics—active, practical, mass resistance to the moral
claims embodied in social institutions enforced by and catering to the
powerful—is needed to activate genuine practical reasoning across all
levels of society. The powerful won’t really listen to reason—that is, to
claims from below—until they no longer have the power to routinely
enforce their desires. Second, the subordinated and oppressed must
actively participate in that contention. They must manifest in deed and
not only words their own interest, capacity, and worthiness for the
rights and privileges they are demanding. For if they meekly submit to
oppression, this tends to make observers—not only the powerful, but
anyone, as Smith held—think that the downtrodden have no interest in
or capacity for uplift and do not deserve it. The oppressed must show
their determination to cast of oppression in order to arouse the esteem
and thereby enlist the support or at least the acquiescence of others.
Walker, Jacobs, McCune, and Douglass understood this. Respect is
obtained from others not by abstract argument but by dignified exaction.
No wonder Douglass lost all patience for abstract moral argument:
[W]here all is plain there is nothing to be argued. . . .
Must I undertake to prove that the slave is a man? . . .
The slaveholders themselves acknowledge it . . . when
they punish disobedience on the part of the slave.
What is this but the acknowledgement that the slave is
a moral, intellectual, and responsible being . . . [I]t is
not light that is needed, but ire. . . . The feeling of the
nation must be quickened; the conscience of the nation
must be roused; . . . the hypocrisy of the nation must be
exposed; and its crimes against God and man must be
proclaimed and denounced.63
In the language of contemporary moral philosophy, Douglass was calling
for a shift from thirdperson to secondperson address, from abstract
impersonal argument to interpersonal claimmaking, founded on an
assertion of authority to demand respect from others.64 To be called to
account, to be addressed as a bearer of duties to the addresser, to be
39
PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE APA, VOLUME 89
upbraided for failure to do what is authoritatively demanded—these
are essential experiences needed to become a morally responsible
being, it for living with others. And these are the experiences to which
slaveholders, holding irresponsible totalitarian power over slaves, were
least exposed before the Civil War. Yet, in the perverse corruption of
moral sentiments Smith identiied, until the enslaved actively repudiated
their subjection, it was the slaves, rather than the slaveholders, who
were thought unit for living freely with others.
From our current moral perspective, it is easy for us to see the errors of
the past, with respect to slavery. A skeptic might wonder whether we are
merely begging the question in favor of our current moral beliefs. The
pragmatist answers that this change can be seen to be progressive, a
case of moral learning, because it was brought about through practices
that tend to counteract or reduce known moral biases rooted in human
psychology. As clinical conclusions reached on the basis of blinded,
placebocontrolled clinical trials are more reliable, due to the ways they
check the biases of wishful thinking, moral conclusions reached on
the basis of practical methods that counteract the biases of power are
similarly more reliable.
This pragmatist perspective suggests an alternative research program
for moral philosophy, reaching beyond the a priori methods to which
we philosophers are so wedded. My point is to expand the tools we
use, and to reduce our excessive reliance on the old tools. Just as a
bolt will turn uselessly without a nut to fasten it, or glued joints will
be weak if they haven’t been clamped, our abstract moral arguments
will spin without conclusion or fall apart uselessly unless they are used
in conjunction with empirically grounded tools. We can make better
progress by working in close conjunction with the social sciences and
history to consider empirically how diferent circumstances, including
social relations, shape our moral thinking. If we discover an inluence on
our moral thinking that we can’t justify, or that experience shows us to
lead to untoward consequences, we have discovered a moral bias. Then
we can seek empirically reliable methods to correct, block, counteract,
or bypass those biases, keeping in mind that pure reasoning may
not be enough. Some methods may be practical, not just speculative
or theoretical, and involve concerted action in the world, sometimes
collective political action.
This alternative research program does not reject intuitions. They are a
basic material of moral thinking; we have no way around them. But we
must be alert to the possibility that our intuitions might sufer from bias
and would be improved under alternative conditions.
40
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS – CENTRAL DIVISION
My case study raises an alarm for philosophy as we currently practice
it. Without active participation of the oppressed and disadvantaged, the
moral views reached by philosophers are liable to be biased—ignorant
of and unresponsive to the concerns and claims of those not present.65
Dewey and Tufts identiied that problem, too. Morality, understood as
what we owe to each other, arises from the need to adjudicate the claims
that everyone makes on everyone else. If the claims of the subordinated
are suppressed, silenced, ignored, or misunderstood, the conclusions
reached on the basis of the subset of claims that are considered are
liable to be systematically biased. My case study indicates that purely a
priori methods of bias correction are unlikely to reliably counteract such
biases.66 There is no reason to think that evermoreelaborate exploration
of the contours of one’s own moral thoughts, or of the thoughts of similarly
situated persons, will capture everyone’s moral concerns. Knowledge of
what we owe to each other can only be generated through processes of
interpersonal claimmaking that include those occupying the full range
of diverse situations in society. For moral philosophy to make progress,
it must practice inclusion of diverse philosophers.
In this lecture, I have focused on bias correction as one basic pragmatist
method. Another is experiments in living. The conclusions we reach
from real experiments in living are likely to be more reliable than the
conclusions we reach from thought experiments. Thought experiments
are at best no more reliable than deliberation. We often ind that our
deliberations have gone astray once we act on them and experience
unexpected results—some of which may inspire us to revise the initial
terms in which we formulated the stakes in our decision.67 Ascent to
the a priori ofers no protection from such revision. We know from the
history of morals that conceptions of value thought to be immutable do,
in fact, change over time.
Just as bias correction requires collaboration with history and the
social sciences, so does assessing the results of experiments in living.
Pragmatism thereby invites us to naturalize moral inquiry at the same
time as expand the range of participants in it. It is high time that we
philosophers expand our toolboxes, as well as our collaborators. In
doing so, we have nothing to lose but our prejudices.
NOTES
1.
Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1998).
2.
G. A. Cohen, “Facts and Principles,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 31, no. 3 (2003):
211–45.
41
PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE APA, VOLUME 89
3.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), §9.
4.
Elizabeth Anderson, “John Stuart Mill and Experiments in Living,” Ethics 102
(1991): 4–26; Elizabeth Anderson, “The Quest for Free Labor,” Lecture 9, Amherst
Lecture in Philosophy. Amherst College, 2014a, http://www.amherstlecture.org/
anderson2014/index.html.
5.
Golden Rule reasoning would also require us to consider the impact of forbidding
the agent from performing the action.
6.
Rawls,A Theory of Justice, §24.
7.
Judith Jarvis Thomson, “A Defense of Abortion,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1
(1971): 47–66.
8.
Discussing with others about what shared principles should govern their
interaction, when decisions are to be made, counts as joint deliberation.
9.
Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich, “Normativity and
Epistemic Intuitions,” Philosophical Topics 29, nos. 1–2 (2001): 429–60.
10. Donald Kinder and Cindy Kam, Us Against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of
American Opinion (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
11. Anita M. Superson, The Moral Skeptic (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press,
2009).
12. John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Education (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916), ch. 19.
13. Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New
York: Putnam’s Sons, 1994).
14. Michael Kraus, Paul Pif, and Dacher Keltner, “Social Class as Culture: The
Convergence of Resources and Rank in the Social Realm,” Current Directions in
Psychological Science 20, no. 4 (2011): 246–50.
15. Hastings Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1924), 23738.
16. The case for this conclusion is not based on begging the question in favor of our
current moral beliefs. Rather, it is vindicated by pragmatist methods themselves,
as I argue in “Social Movements, Experiments in Living, and Moral Progress: Case
Studies from Britain’s Abolition of Slavery,” Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas,
2014b, http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/handle/1808/14787; and “The Quest for
Free Labor.”
17. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macie,
Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1759 [1976]), I.3.3.1.
18. Ibid., I.3.2.2.
19. Ibid.
20. John Dewey and James Hayden Tufts, Ethics (New York: H. Holt and Company,
1932), 226.
21. John Hepburn, The American Defence of the Christian Golden Rule, or An Essay to
Prove the Unlawfulness of Making Slaves of Men (New York(?), 1715).
22. David Brion Davis, Challenging the Boundaries of Slavery, The Nathan I. Huggins
Lectures (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 64.
23.
42
Hepburn,American Defence of the Christian Golden Rule, 2.
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS – CENTRAL DIVISION
24. Ibid., 38.
25. James Thornwell, The Rights and Duties of Masters (Charleston, SC: SteamPower
Press of Walker & James, 1850), 4243.
26. Thornton Stringfellow, “The Bible Argument, or Slavery in the Light of Divine
Revelation,” in Cotton Is King, and Pro-Slavery Arguments, ed. E. N. Elliott
(Augusta, Ga.: Pritchard, Abbott & Loomis, 1860), 47980.
27. James Hammond, “Letters on Slavery,” in The Proslavery Argument as Maintained
by the Most Distinguished Writers (Charleston: Walker, Richards & Co., 1852), 129.
28. William Harper, “Slavery in Light of Social Ethics,” in Cotton Is King, and ProSlavery Arguments, ed. E. N. Elliott (Augusta, GA: Pritchard, Abbott & Loomis,
1860), 573.
29. George Fitzhugh, Cannibals All! or, Slaves Without Masters (Richmond, VA: A.
Morris, 1857), 219; Hammond, “Letters on Slavery,” 130.
30. David Christy, “Cotton Is King: Or, Slavery in the Light of Political Economy,” in
Cotton Is King, and Pro-Slavery Arguments, ed. E. N. Elliott (Augusta, GA: Pritchard,
Abbott & Loomis, 1860), 314.
31.
Fitzhugh,Cannibals All!, 1314; Harper, “Slavery in Light of Social Ethics,” 585–87;
Hammond, “Letters on Slavery,” 122.
32. Harper, “Slavery in Light of Social Ethics,” 554.
33. Lea VanderVelde, “The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment,” University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 138 (198990): 457.
34.
Thornwell,Rights and Duties of Masters, 12; Hammond, “Letters on Slavery,” 160.
35. Stringfellow, “The Bible Argument”; Harper, “Slavery in Light of Social Ethics,”
105–108.
36.
Thornwell,Rights and Duties of Masters, 2728.
37. William Lloyd Garrison, “Divine Authority of the Bible,” in Selections from the
Writings and Speeches of William Lloyd Garrison (Boston, MA: R. F. Wallcut, 1852).
38. Stringfellow, “The Bible Argument,” 520; Hammond, “Letters on Slavery,” 161–63;
Harper, “Slavery in Light of Social Ethics,” 573.
39. Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York:
Vintage Books, 1976), 75–86.
40.
Fitzhugh,Cannibals All!, 17; Hammond, “Letters on Slavery,” 112.
41. Hammond, “Letters on Slavery,” 132; Harper, “Slavery in Light of Social Ethics,”
575–80, 586, 593.
42. Thomas Dew, “Abolition of Negro Slavery,” American Quarterly Review 12
(SeptemberDecember 1832): 236; Stringfellow, “The Bible Argument,” 539.
43. In “The Quest for Free Labor,” I discuss the case of William Henry Brisbane, one
of the rare Southerners who was convinced by abolitionist arguments to give
up his slaves. I show how even in his case, pure moral arguments in the mode
of dominant methods of moral philosophy led to less satisfactory normative
outcomes than pragmatist methods.
44. Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch, One Kind of Freedom: The Economic
Consequences of Emancipation, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2001), 95–97.
43
PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE APA, VOLUME 89
45. Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2006), 4.
46. This is consistent with changing the people in power, as in the case of elections. It
is also consistent with changing structures of power, as in constitutional reforms.
When constitutional change is efected through popular ratiication, the people act
as the sovereign, and they are, collectively, the addressees of contentious politics.
47. Margaret Gilbert, “Modeling Collective Belief,” Synthese 73 (1987): 185–204.
48. Elizabeth Anderson, “The Social Epistemology of Morality: Learning from the
Forgotten History of the Abolition of Slavery,” in The Epistemic Life of Groups:
Essays in Collective Epistemology, ed. Miranda Fricker and Michael Brady (New
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
49. Appiah argues that abolitionists’ threat to withhold honor from the enforcers of
slavery in Britain played a critical role in ending slavery in the British Empire.
He is correct, although the U.S. case shows that under other social conditions,
the threat may lead to the attempted secession and violent resistance of the
dishonored community. Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Honor Code: How Moral
Revolutions Happen (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2010), ch. 3.
50. Harriet Jacobs, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl Written by Herself, ed. L. Maria
Child (Boston, MA, 1861), 25, 104, 137.
51. Frederick Douglass, My Bondage and My Freedom, ed. James M’Cune Smith
(New York: Miller, Orton & Mulligan, 1855a), 427, 263.
52. Frederick Douglass, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave
(AntiSlavery Oice, 1845), 73.
53.
DavidWalker and Henry Highland Garnet, Walker’s Appeal, with a Brief Sketch of
His Life by Henry Highland Garnet (New York: J. H. Tobitt, 1829 [1848]), Kindle loc.
28990, 306307
54.
Douglass,My Bondage and My Freedom, xvii.
55. Ibid., 389.
56. Ibid., 361, 393.
57. Ibid., 247.
58.
Jacobs,Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl Written by Herself, 14, 164.
59.
Douglass,My Bondage and My Freedom, 9495.
60. Walker and Garnet, Walker’s Appeal.
61. James Oakes, Slavery and Freedom: An Interpretation of the Old South (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), ch. 4.
62. Howell Cobb, Letter to J. A. Seddon, Secretary of War of the Confederate States
of America, Macon, GA, 8 January. Published in The American Historical Review
1.1 (Oct. 1895): 97–98.
63. Frederick Douglass, “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?” In My Bondage
and My Freedom, ed. James M’Cune Smith (New York: Miller, Orton & Mulligan,
1855b), 443–45.
64.
Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and
Accountability (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), ch. 1.
65. Charles Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1997).
44
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS – CENTRAL DIVISION
66. As Mills (ibid.) argues, sometimes bias can be built into the very questions we ask,
so even if the answers were unbiased, this would not remove the parochialism of
the concerns built into the questions.
67. Anderson, “John Stuart Mill and Experiments in Living,” 4–26.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anderson, Elizabeth. “John Stuart Mill and Experiments in Living.” Ethics 102 (1991):
4–26.
Anderson, Elizabeth. “The Quest for Free Labor.” Lecture 9. Amherst Lecture in
Philosophy. Amherst College, 2014a. http://www.amherstlecture.org/anderson2014/
index.html.
Anderson, Elizabeth. “Social Movements, Experiments in Living, and Moral Progress:
Case Studies from Britain’s Abolition of Slavery.” Lindley Lecture. University of Kansas,
2014b. http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/handle/1808/14787.
Anderson, Elizabeth. “The Social Epistemology of Morality: Learning from the
Forgotten History of the Abolition of Slavery.” In The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays
in Collective Epistemology, edited by Miranda Fricker and Michael Brady. New York
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
Appiah, Kwame Anthony. The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen. New York:
W. W. Norton & Company, 2010.
Christy, David. “Cotton Is King: Or, Slavery in the Light of Political Economy.” In Cotton
Is King, and Pro-Slavery Arguments, edited by E. N. Elliott. Augusta, GA: Pritchard,
Abbott & Loomis, 1860.
Cobb, Howell. Letter to J. A. Seddon, Secretary of War of the Confederate States of
America. Macon, GA, 8 January. Published in The American Historical Review 1.1 (Oct.
1895): 97–98.
Cohen, G. A. “Facts and Principles.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 31, no. 3 (2003):
211–45.
Damasio, Antonio. Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York:
Putnam’s Sons, 1994.
Darwall, Stephen. The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.
Davis, David Brion. Challenging the Boundaries of Slavery. The Nathan I. Huggins
Lectures. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.
Dew, Thomas. “Abolition of Negro Slavery.” American Quarterly Review 12 (September
December 1832): 189–265.
Dewey, John. Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916.
Dewey, John, and James Hayden Tufts. Ethics. New York: H. Holt and Company, 1932.
Douglass, Frederick. Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave.
AntiSlavery Oice, 1845.
Douglass, Frederick. My Bondage and My Freedom, edited by James M’Cune Smith.
New York: Miller, Orton & Mulligan, 1855a.
45
PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE APA, VOLUME 89
Douglass, Frederick. “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?” In My Bondage and My
Freedom, edited by James M’Cune Smith. New York: Miller, Orton & Mulligan, 1855b.
Fitzhugh, George. Cannibals All! or, Slaves Without Masters. Richmond, VA: A. Morris,
1857.
Garrison, William Lloyd. “Divine Authority of the Bible.” In Selections from the Writings
and Speeches of William Lloyd Garrison. Boston, MA: R. F. Wallcut, 1852.
Genovese, Eugene D. Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made. New York: Vintage
Books, 1976.
Gilbert, Margaret. “Modeling Collective Belief.” Synthese 73 (1987): 185–204.
Hammond, James. “Letters on Slavery.” In The Proslavery Argument as Maintained by
the Most Distinguished Writers. Charleston: Walker, Richards & Co., 1852.
Harper, William. “Slavery in Light of Social Ethics.” In Cotton Is King, and Pro-Slavery
Arguments, edited by E. N. Elliott. Augusta, GA: Pritchard, Abbott & Loomis, 1860.
Hepburn, John. The American Defence of the Christian Golden Rule, or An Essay to
Prove the Unlawfulness of Making Slaves of Men. New York(?), 1715.
Jacobs, Harriet. Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl Written by Herself, edited by L.
Maria Child. Boston, MA, 1861.
Kinder, Donald, and Cindy Kam. Us Against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of
American Opinion. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2009.
Kraus, Michael, Paul Pif, and Dacher Keltner. “Social Class as Culture: The Convergence
of Resources and Rank in the Social Realm.” Current Directions in Psychological
Science 20, no. 4 (2011): 246–50.
Mills, Charles. The Racial Contract. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997.
Oakes, James. Slavery and Freedom: An Interpretation of the Old South. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1990.
Ransom, Roger, and Richard Sutch. One Kind of Freedom: The Economic Consequences
of Emancipation, 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Rashdall, Hastings. The Theory of Good and Evil, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1924.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.
Scanlon, Thomas. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1998.
Smith, Adam. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, edited D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macie.
Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1759.
Stringfellow, Thornton. “The Bible Argument, or Slavery in the Light of Divine
Revelation.” In Cotton Is King, and Pro-Slavery Arguments, edited by E. N. Elliott.
Augusta, GA: Pritchard, Abbott & Loomis, 1860.
Superson, Anita M. The Moral Skeptic. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. “A Defense of Abortion.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1
(1971): 47–66.
Thornwell, James. The Rights and Duties of Masters. Charleston, SC: SteamPower
Press of Walker & James, 1850.
46
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS – CENTRAL DIVISION
Tilly, Charles, and Sidney Tarrow. Contentious Politics. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2006.
VanderVelde, Lea. “The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment.” University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 138 (198990): 437–504.
Walker, David, and Henry Highland Garnet. Walker’s Appeal, with a Brief Sketch of His
Life by Henry Highland Garnet. New York: J. H. Tobitt, 1829.
Weinberg, Jonathan, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich. “Normativity and Epistemic
Intuitions.” Philosophical Topics 29, nos. 1–2 (2001): 429–60.
Weld, Theodore Dwight. American Slavery as It Is: Testimony of a Thousand Witnesses.
New York: American AntiSlavery Society, 1839.
47