It seems to me that many people have intuitions in the direction of "it's extremely hard to know with any confidence anything about the eventual consequences of our actions". The place these intuitions are coming from provides some support for at least two problems for trying to do good in the world:
- (1) Maybe we just have so little idea that even in principle the idea of trying to choose actions aiming at getting good eventual consequences is misguided.
- (2) The massive amounts of uncertainty around consequences mean that doing good is a very hard problem, and that a key part of pursuing it well is finding strategies which are somewhat robust to this uncertainty.
In some sense (2) is a weaker version of the concern (1), and it only looks attractive to address conditional on concern (1) not biting.
What should these be called? I think (1) is almost always called cluelessness, and (2) is sometimes called cluelessness, but it seems like it would be helpful to have distinct terms to refer to them. Also on my perspective (1) is a reasonable thing to worry about but it looks like the concern ultimately doesn't stand up, whereas I think that (2) is perhaps the central problem for the effective altruist project, so I'm particularly interested in having a good name for (2).
I suggest that (1) should be called "the problem of absolute cluelessness" and that (2) should be called "the practical problem of cluelessness".
When context is clear one could drop the adjective. My suspicion is that with time (1) will come to be regarded as a solved problem, and (2) will still want a lot of attention. I think it's fine/desirable if at that point it gets to use the pithier term of "cluelessness". I also think that it's probably good if (1) and (2) have names which make it clear that there's a link between them. I think there may be a small transition cost from current usage, but (a) there just isn't that much total use of the terms now, and (b) current usage seems inconsistent about whether it includes (2).
I've mentioned in a different thread that we could refer to them as (1) aleatory versus (2) epistemic.