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Learning that some person or groupEpistemic deference is the process of people hold certain views may sometimes provide valid grounds for epistemic deference, that is, for updating our ownone's beliefs in response to what others appear to believe, even if we ignoreone ignores the reasons for those beliefs or do not find those reasons persuasive. The question of when, how, and to what extent a rational agent should defer to others has been studied—from somewhat different angles—by philosophers working in social epistemology and by economists working in game theory.
Huemer, Michael (2019) On challenging the experts, Fake Nous, July 6.
Learning that some person or group of people hold certain views may sometimes provide valid grounds for epistemic deference, that is, for updating our own beliefs in response to what others appear to believe, even if we ignore the reasons for those beliefs or do not find those reasons persuasive. The question of when, how, and to what extent a rational agent should defer to others has been the studied—from somewhat different angles—by philosophers working in social epistemology and by economists working in game theory.
Frances, Bryan & Jonathan Matheson (2018) Disagreement, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, February 23 (updated 13 November 2019).
Frances, Bryan (2018) Disagreement, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Epistemic deference is the process of updating one's beliefs in response to what others appear to believe, even if one ignores the reasons for those beliefs or
dodoes not find those reasons persuasive. The question of when, how, and to what extent a rational agent should defer to others has been studied—from somewhat different angles—by philosophers working in social epistemology and by economists working in game theory.