Fanaticism

1. ^{^}

   Wilkinson, Hayden (2022) In defense of fanaticism, Ethics, vol. 132, pp. 445–477.

2. ^{^}

   Tarsney, Christian (2020) The epistemic challenge to longtermism, Global Priorities Institute, section.section 6.2.

1. ^{^}

   Wilkinson, Hayden (2022) In defense of fanaticism, Ethics, vol. 132, pp. 445–477.

2. ^{^}

   Tarsney, Christian (2020) The epistemic challenge to longtermism, Global Priorities Institute, sec.section. 6.2.

1. ^{^}

   Wilkinson, Hayden (2022) In defense of fanaticism, Ethics, vol. 132, pp. 445–477.

2. ^{^}

   Tarsney, Christian (2020) The epistemic challenge to longtermism, Global Priorities Institute.Institute, sec. 6.2.

Fanaticism is the apparent problem faced by moral theories that rank a minuscule probability of an arbitrarily large value above a guaranteed modest amount of value.^[1][2] Some have argued that fanaticismfanatical theories should be rejected and that this might undermine the case for certain philosophical positions, such as longtermism.

Fanaticism is the positionapparent problem faced by moral theories that it's morally better to reject "a certainty ofrank a moderately good outcome, such as one additional life saved" in favour of "a lottery which probably gives a worse outcome, but has a tinyminuscule probability of some vastly better outcome (perhaps trillionsan arbitrarily large value above a guaranteed modest amount of additional blissful lives created)."value.^[1][2] Some have argued that fanaticism should be rejected and that this might undermine the case for certain philosophical positions, such as longtermism.

Beckstead, Nick & Teruji Thomas (2021) A paradox for tiny probabilities and enormous values, Global Priorities Institute.

Wilkinson, Hayden (2022) In defense of fanaticism, Ethics, vol. 132, pp. 445–477.

Wilkinson, Hayden (2020) In defence of fanaticism, GPI Working Paper No. 4-2020 (updated January 2021).

1. ^{^}

   Wilkinson, Hayden (2020)(2022) In defencedefense of fanaticism, GPI Working Paper No. 4-2020 (updated January 2021).Ethics, vol. 132, pp. 445–477.

2. ^{^}

   Tarsney, Christian (2020) The epistemic challenge to longtermism, Global Priorities Institute.

Fanaticism can be described asis the position that it's morally better to reject "a certainty of a moderately good outcome, such as one additional life saved" in favour of "a lottery which probably gives a worse outcome, but has a tiny probability of some vastly better outcome (perhaps trillions of additional blissful lives created)." (Wilkinson 2020).^[1] Some have argued that fanaticism should be rejected and that this might undermine the case for certain philosophical positions, such as longtermism.

See also the concept of "Pascal's mugging" (LessWrong 2020).

Bibliography

LessWrong (2020) Pascal’Pascal's mugging, LessWrong Wiki, August 3 (updated 23 September 2020).

Further reading

1. ^{^}

   Wilkinson, Hayden (2020) In defence of fanaticism, GPI Working Paper No. 4-2020 (updated January 2021).

alternatives to expected value theory | altruistic wager | decision theory | decision-theoretic uncertainty | expected value | moral uncertainty | naive consequentialism vs. sophisticated consequentialism | risk aversion

Fanaticism can be described as the position that it's morally better to reject "a certainty of a moderately good outcome, such as one additional life saved" in favour of "a lottery which probably gives a worse outcome, but has a tiny probability of some vastly better outcome (perhaps trillions of additional blissful lives created)" (Wilkinson,(Wilkinson 2020). Some have argued that fanaticism should be rejected and that this might undermine the case for certain philosophical positions, such as longtermism.

Fanaticism can be described as the position that it's morally better to reject "a certainty of a moderately good outcome, such as one additional life saved" in favour of "a lottery which probably gives a worse outcome, but has a tiny probability of some vastly better outcome (perhaps trillions of additional blissful lives created)" (Wilkinson, 2021)(Wilkinson, 2020). Some have argued that fanaticism should be rejected and that this might undermine the case for certain philosophical positions, such as longtermism.

See also the concept of "Pascal'"Pascal's mugging" (LessWrong 2020).

LessWrong (2020) Pascal’s mugging, LessWrong Wiki, August 3 (updated 23 September 2020).

Wilkinson, Hayden (2020) In defence of fanaticism, GPI Working Paper No. 4-2020 (updated January 2021).

Fanaticism can be described as the position that it's morally better to reject "a certainty of a moderately good outcome, such as one additional life saved" in favour of "a lottery which probably gives a worse outcome, but has a tiny probability of some vastly better outcome (perhaps trillions of additional blissful lives created)" (Wilkinson, 2021). Some have argued that fanaticism should be rejected and that this might undermine the case for certain philosophical positions, such as longtermism. 

See also the concept of "Pascal's mugging". 

alternatives to expected value theory | altruistic wager | decision theory | decision-theoretic uncertainty| expected value | moral uncertainty | naive consequentialism vs. sophisticated consequentialism | risk aversion