Global catastrophic biological risk

Leo (+27)
Pablo (+1210)
Pablo (+12/-14)
Pablo (+626/-856)
Pablo (+18/-18)
JasperGo (+18)
Pablo (+320)
Pablo (+1844/-304)
Leo (+3/-2)
Pablo (+32/-6)

Recommendations

In The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity, Toby Ord offers several policy and research recommendations for handling risks from engineered pandemics:[6]

  • Bring the Biological Weapons Convention into line with the Chemical Weapons Convention: taking its budget from $1.4 million up to $80 million, increasing its staff commensurately, and granting the power to investigate suspected breaches.
  • Strengthen the WHO’s ability to respond to emerging pandemics through rapid disease surveillance, diagnosis and control. This involves increasing its funding and powers, as well as R&D on the requisite technologies.
  • Ensure that all DNA synthesis is screened for dangerous pathogens. If full coverage can’t be achieved through self-regulation by synthesis companies, then some form of international regulation will be needed.
  • Increase transparency around accidents in BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories.
  • Develop standards for dealing with information hazards, and incorporate these into existing review processes.
  • Run scenario-planning exercises for severe engineered pandemics.
  1. ^

    Lewis, Gregory (2020) Reducing global catastrophic biological risks, 80,000 Hours, March 9.

  2. ^

    Schoch-Spana, Monica et al. (2017) Global catastrophic biological risks: toward a working definition, Health Security, vol. 15, pp. 323–328.

  3. ^

    Duprex, W. Paul et al. (2015) Gain-of-function experiments: Time for a real debate, Nature Reviews Microbiology, vol. 13, pp. 58–64.

  4. ^

    Selgelid, Michael J. (2016) Gain-of-Function research: Ethical analysis, Science and Engineering Ethics, vol. 22, pp. 923–964.

  5. ^
  6. ^

    Ord, Toby (2020) The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity, London: Bloomsbury Publishing, p. 279–280.

A global catastrophic biological risk (GCBR) is a global catastrophic risk that is biological in nature (Lewis 2020; cf. Schoch-Spana et al. 2017).nature.[1][2]

A life-sciences area which currently receives attention from risk experts is gain-of-function (GOF) research, in which particularly concerning pathogens like H5N1 influenza are modified to increase their virulence or transmissibility. Researchers are divided as to whether the benefits of such experiments are worth the risks that come from either accidental release of pathogens or the misuse of discoveries by malicious actors (Duprex et al. 2015; Selgelid 2016).actors.[3][4] In the near term, such pathogens probably pose a non-existential global catastrophic risk, but there is some chance that related life-sciences work might one day pose an existential risk.

80,000 Hours rates reducing global catastrophic biological risks a "highest priority area": a problem at the top of their ranking of global issues assessed by importance, tractability and neglectedness (80,000 Hours 2021).[5]

BibliographyFurther reading

80,000 Hours (2021) Our current list of the most important world problems, 80,000 Hours.

Duprex, W. Paul et al. (2015) Gain-of-function experiments: Time for a real debate, Nature Reviews Microbiology, vol. 13, pp. 58–64.
An overview article featuring leading proponents and opponents of gain-of-function experiments discussing the benefits and risks associated with this research.

Schoch-Spana, Monica et al. (2017) Global catastrophic biological risks: toward a working definition, Health Security, vol. 15, pp. 323–328.

Selgelid, Michael J. (2016) Gain-of-Function research: Ethical analysis, Science and Engineering Ethics, vol. 22, pp. 923–964.
A paper outlining the main moral considerations surrounding gain-of-function research.

  1. ^

    Lewis, Gregory (2020) Reducing global catastrophic biological risks, 80,000 Hours, March 9.

  2. ^

    Schoch-Spana, Monica et al. (2017) Global catastrophic biological risks: toward a working definition, Health Security, vol. 15, pp. 323–328.

  3. ^

    Duprex, W. Paul et al. (2015) Gain-of-function experiments: Time for a real debate, Nature Reviews Microbiology, vol. 13, pp. 58–64.

  4. ^

    Selgelid, Michael J. (2016) Gain-of-Function research: Ethical analysis, Science and Engineering Ethics, vol. 22, pp. 923–964.

  5. ^

Evaluation

80,000 Hours rates reducing global catastrophic biological risks a "highest priority area": a problem at the top of their ranking of global issues assessed by importance, tractability and neglectedness (80,000 Hours 2021).

80,000 Hours (2021) Our current list of the most important world problems, 80,000 Hours.

A global catastrophic biological risk (GCBR) is a global catastrophic risk that is biological risk of unprecedented scale with the potential to cause major harm to human civilization.in nature (Lewis 2020; cf. Schoch-Spana et al. 2017).

Cotton-Barratt, Owen et al. (2016) Global catastrophic risks, Global Challenges Foundation/Global Priorities Project.
A report focusing on risks from biotechnology, as well as other types of global catastrophic risk.

Esvelt, Kevin (2020) Mitigating catastrophic biorisks, Effective Altruism Forum, September 3.

Inglesby, Thomas V. & Amesh A. Adalja (eds.) (2019) Global Catastrophic Biological Risks, Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Lempel, Howie & Keiran Harris (2020) Dr Greg Lewis on Covid-19 and reducing global catastrophic biological risks, 80,000 Hours, April 17.

Lewis, Gregory (2020) Reducing global catastrophic biological risks, 80,000 Hours, March 9.

Kilbourne, Edwin Dennis (2008) Plagues and pandemics: past, present, and future, in Nick Bostrom & Milan M. Ćirković (eds.) Global Catastrophic Risks, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 287–307.

Millett, Piers & Andrew Snyder-Beattie (2017) Existential risk and cost-effective biosecurity, Health Security, vol. 15, pp. 373–383.

Nouri, Ali & Christopher F. Chyba (2008) Biotechnology and biosecurity, in Nick Bostrom & Milan M. Ćirković (eds.) Global Catastrophic Risks, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 450–480.

Schoch-Spana, Monica et al. (2017) Global catastrophic biological risks: toward a working definition, Health Security, vol. 15, pp. 323–328.

Shulman, Carl (2020a) What do historical statistics teach us about the accidental release of pandemic bioweapons?, Reflective Disequilibrium, October 15.

Shulman, Carl (2020b) Envisioning a world immune to global catastrophic biological risks, Reflective Disequilibrium, October 15.

Wiblin, Robert & Keiran Harris (2018) The careers and policies that can prevent global catastrophic biological risks, according to world-leading health security expert Dr Inglesby, 80,000 Hours, April 18.

Yassif, Jaime (2017) Reducing global catastrophic biological risks, Health Security, vol. 15, pp. 329–330.

biosecurity | existential risk | global catastrophic risk | Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security | Nuclear Threat Initiative

Cotton-Barratt, Owen et alal. (2016) Global catastrophic risks, Global Challenges Foundation/Global Priorities Project.
A report focusing on risks from biotechnology, as well as other types of global catastrophic risk.

Duprex, W. Paul et al. (2015) Gain-of-function experiments: Time for a real debate, Nature Reviews Microbiology, vol. 13, pp. 58–64.
An overview article featuring leading proponents and opponents of GOFgain-of-function experiments discussing the benefits and risks associated with this research.

Selgelid, Michael J. (2016) Gain-of-Function research: Ethical analysis, Science and Engineering Ethics, vol. 22, pp. 923–964.
A paper outlining the main moral considerations surrounding GOFgain-of-function research.

Load more (10/15)