Longtermism

Both patient and urgent longtermism, and broad and targeted longtermism, are positions that exist on a continuum. The terms "urgent"/"patient" and "broad"/"targeted" divide these continua into two discrete regions, similarly to how the terms "tall" and "short" divide the height continuum. These distinctions may thus be seen as uncovering an underlying dimension along which longtermism can vary. Accordingly, the more relevant questions are "How patient/urgent should longtermism be?" or "How broad/targeted should longtermist interventions be?", rather than "Should longtermism be patient or urgent?" or "Should longtermism be targetedbroad or narrow?targeted?"

Longtermism may be seen as following from the conjunction of three core claims.claims:^[3] First, future

1. Future people matter morally. Second, if
2. If Earth-originating intelligence is not prematurely extinguished, the vast majority of people that will ever exist will exist in the future. Third, people
3. People alive today can predictably influence whether these people exist and how well their lives go.

Longtermism may be seen as following from the conjunction of three keycore claims.^[3] First, future people matter morally. Second, if Earth-originating intelligence is not prematurely extinguished, the vast majority of people that will ever exist, if Earth-originating intelligence is not prematurely extinguished,exist will exist in the future. Third, people alive today can predictably influence whether these people exist,exist and how well their lives go.

Strong longtermism holds that positively influencing the long-term future is the key moral priority of our time. This form of longtermism was introduced by Hilary Greaves and Will MacAskill,^[4] and has precedents in the work of Nick Bostrom,^[5][6] Nick Beckstead,^[7][8] and others. Note that theThe authors do not define or discuss "weak" longtermism; the contrast is rather with longtermism as such, which as noted above holds that positively influencing the long-term future is a key priority, but not necessarily the top priority. 

This distinction can be explained in reference to the hinge of history hypothesis, i.e., the hypothesis that we are currently living at a time wherewhen humanity has unusually high influence over the long-term future. Urgent longtermists find the hypothesis plausible and, accordingly, hold that it makes sense to spend our altruistic resources relatively quickly. (Altruistic resources include not just financial assets, but other resources that can accumulate and be spent deliberately in the pursuit of altruistic goals, such as credibility, career capital and coordination ability.ability.) By contrast, patient longtermists hold that the opportunities for influence are not concentrated in the near term and, in line with this, they favour investing these resources so that they can be deployed at some point in the future, when the moments of significant influence arrive.

This distinction between broad and targeted interventionswas originally introduced by Nick Beckstead in his doctoral dissertation, On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far Future.^[9] Targeted (or narrow) longtermism attempts to positively influence the long-term future by focusing on specific, identifiable scenarios, such as the risks of misaligned AI or an engineered pandemic. By contrast, broad longtermism tries to have a long-term influence by pursuing general approaches with the potential to be useful in a broader range of contexts, such as building effective altruism or promoting global cooperation.

One additional distinction sometimes made—which also originates in Greaves and MacAskill—is between axiological and deontic longtermism. ("Axiological" and "deontic" are technical terms borrowed from moral philosophy: "axiological" means "related to what is good or valuable", and "deontic" means "related to what we ought to do or have reason to do".) Axiological longtermism holds that positively influencing the long-term future is among the most valuable things we can do, whereasdo. In contrast, deontic longtermism holds that positively influencing the long-term future is among the things we have most reason to do. Sometimes these views are...

MacAskill, William (2022) What is longtermism and why does it matter?, BBC News, August 8.

MacAskill, William, Hilary Greaves & Elliott Thornley (2021) The moral case for long-term thinking, in Natalie Cargill & Tyler John (eds.) The Long View: Essays on Policy, Philanthropy, and the Long-Term Future, London: First, pp. 19–28.

1. ^{^}

   Ord, Toby (2020) The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity, London: Bloomsbury Publishing, p. 46.

2. ^{^}

   MacAskill, William (forthcoming) (2022) What We Owe the Future, New York: Basic Books.

3. ^{^}

   Moorhouse, Fin (2021) Introduction to longtermism, Effective Altruism, January 27. 

4. ^{^}

   Greaves, Hilary & William Macaskill (2021) The case for strong longtermism, Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford.

5. ^{^}

   Bostrom, Nick (2003) Astronomical waste: The opportunity cost of delayed technological development, Utilitas, vol. 15, pp. 308–314.

6. ^{^}

   Bostrom, Nick (2013) Existential risk prevention as global priority, Global Policy, vol. 4, pp. 15–31.

7. ^{^}

   Beckstead, Nick (2013) On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far Future, doctoral thesis, Rutgers University.

8. ^{^}

   Beckstead, Nick (2019) A brief argument for the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future, in Hilary Greaves & Theron Pummer (eds.) Effective Altruism: Philosophical Issues, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 80–98.

9. ^{^}

   Beckstead, Nick (2013) On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far Future, PhD thesis, Rutgers University.

10. ^{^}

    Gustafsson, Johan & Petra Kosonen (2022) 'Prudential longtermism', unpublished.

11. ^{^}

    MacAskill, William (2019) “Longtermism”, Effective Altruism Forum, July 25.

12. ^{^}

    Greaves, Hilary & William MacAskill (2021) The case for strong longtermism, working paper.

A distinction is sometimes drawn between longtermism simpliciter and strong versionsLongtermism may be seen as following from the conjunction of that view.three key claims.^[3] While allowingFirst, future people matter morally. Second, the vast majority of people that other formswill ever exist, if Earth-originating intelligence is not prematurely extinguished, exist in the future. Third, people alive today can predictably influence whether these people exist, and how well their lives go.

Types of influence may also be important, stronglongtermism

Strong vs. weak longtermism

Strong longtermism holds that positively influencing the long-term future has dominantis the key moral importance.priority of our time. This view has been defendedform of longtermism was introduced by Hilary Greaves and WilliamWill MacAskill,^[4] and has precedents in the work of Nick Bostrom,^[5][6] Nick Beckstead,Beckstead,^[7][8] and others. Note that the authors do not define or discuss "weak" longtermism; the contrast is rather with longtermism as such, which as noted above holds that positively influencing the long-term future is a key priority, but not necessarily the top priority. 

Patient vs. urgent longtermism

This distinction can be explained in reference to the hinge of history hypothesis, i.e. the hypothesis that we are currently living at a time where humanity has unusually high influence over the long-term future. Urgent longtermists find the hypothesis plausible and, accordingly, hold that it makes sense to spend our altruistic resources relatively quickly. (Altruistic resources include not just financial assets, but other resources that can accumulate and be spent deliberately in the pursuit of altruistic goals, such as credibility, career capital and coordination ability.) By contrast, patient longtermists hold that the opportunities for influence are not concentrated in the near term and, in line with this, they favour investing these resources so that they can be deployed at some point in the future, when the moments of significant influence arrive.

Broad vs. targeted longtermism

This distinction was originally introduced by Nick Beckstead in his doctoral dissertation, On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far Future.^[9] Targeted (or narrow) longtermism attempts to positively influence the long-term future by focusing on specific, identifiable scenarios, such as the risks of misaligned AI or an engineered pandemic. By contrast, broad longtermism tries to have a long-term influence by pursuing general approaches with the potential to be useful in a broader range of contexts, such as building effective altruism or promoting global cooperation.

Both patient and urgent longtermism, and broad and targeted longtermism, are positions that exist on a continuum. The terms "urgent"/"patient" and "broad"/"targeted" divide these continua into two discrete regions, similarly to how the terms "tall" and "short" divide the height continuum. These distinctions may thus be seen as uncovering an underlying dimension along which longtermism can vary. Accordingly, the more relevant questions are "How patient/urgent should longtermism be?" or "How broad/targeted should longtermist...

Longtermism may be seen as following from the conjunctionA distinction is sometimes drawn between longtermism simpliciter and strong versions of three key claims.that view.^[3] First, future people matter morally. Second, the vast majorityWhile allowing that other forms of people that will ever exist, if Earth-originating intelligence is not prematurely extinguished, exist in the future. Third, people alive today can predictably influence whether these people exist, and how well their lives go.

Types of longtermism

Strong vs. weak longtermism

Strongmay also be important, strong longtermism holds that positively influencing the long-term future is the keyhas dominant moral priority of our time.importance. This form of longtermism was introducedview has been defended by Hilary Greaves and WillWilliam MacAskill,^[4] and has precedents in the work of Nick Bostrom,^[5][6] Nick Beckstead,Beckstead,^[7][8] and others. Note that the authors do not define or discuss "weak" longtermism; the contrast is rather with longtermism as such, which as noted above holds that positively influencing the long-term future is a key priority, but not necessarily the top priority. 

Patient vs. urgent longtermism

This distinction can be explained in reference to the hinge of history hypothesis, i.e. the hypothesis that we are currently living at a time where humanity has unusually high influence over the long-term future. Urgent longtermists find the hypothesis plausible and, accordingly, hold that it makes sense to spend our altruistic resources relatively quickly. (Altruistic resources include not just financial assets, but other resources that can accumulate and be spent deliberately in the pursuit of altruistic goals, such as credibility, career capital and coordination ability.) By contrast, patient longtermists hold that the opportunities for influence are not concentrated in the near term and, in line with this, they favour investing these resources so that they can be deployed at some point in the future, when the moments of significant influence arrive.

Broad vs. targeted longtermism

This distinction was originally introduced by Nick Beckstead in his doctoral dissertation, On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far Future.^[9] Targeted (or narrow) longtermism attempts to positively influence the long-term future by focusing on specific, identifiable scenarios, such as the risks of misaligned AI or an engineered pandemic. By contrast, broad longtermism tries to have a long-term influence by pursuing general approaches with the potential to be useful in a broader range of contexts, such as building effective altruism or promoting global cooperation.

Both patient and urgent longtermism, and broad and targeted longtermism, are positions that exist on a continuum. The terms "urgent"/"patient" and "broad"/"targeted" divide these continua into two discrete regions, similarly to how the terms "tall" and "short" divide the height continuum. These distinctions may thus be seen as uncovering an underlying dimension along which longtermism can vary. Accordingly, the more relevant questions are "How patient/urgent should longtermism be?" or "How broad/targeted should...

1. ^{^}

   Ord, Toby (2020) The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity, London: Bloomsbury Publishing, p. 46.

2. ^{^}

   MacAskill, William (forthcoming) (2022) What We Owe the Future, New York: Basic Books.

3. ^{^}

   Moorhouse, Fin (2021) Introduction to longtermism, Effective Altruism, January 27. 

4. ^{^}

   Greaves, Hilary & William Macaskill (2021) The case for strong longtermism, Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford.

5. ^{^}

   Bostrom, Nick (2003) Astronomical waste: The opportunity cost of delayed technological development, Utilitas, vol. 15, pp. 308–314.

6. ^{^}

   Bostrom, Nick (2013) Existential risk prevention as global priority, Global Policy, vol. 4, pp. 15–31.

7. ^{^}

   Beckstead, Nick (2013) On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far Future, doctoral thesis, Rutgers University.

8. ^{^}

   Beckstead, Nick (2019) A brief argument for the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future, in Hilary Greaves & Theron Pummer (eds.) Effective Altruism: Philosophical Issues, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 80–98.

9. ^{^}

   Beckstead, Nick (2013) On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far Future, PhD thesis, Rutgers University.

10. ^{^}

    Gustafsson, Johan & Petra Kosonen (2022) 'Prudential longtermism', unpublished.

11. ^{^}

    MacAskill, William (2019) “Longtermism”, Effective Altruism Forum, July 25.

12. ^{^}

    Greaves, Hilary & William MacAskill (2021) The case for strong longtermism, working paper.

criticism of longtermism and existential risk studies | ethics of existential risk | existential risk | existential security | global health and wellbeing | institutions for future generationslong-range forecasting | long-range forecastinglongtermist institutional reform | macrostrategy | non-humans and the long-term future | patient altruism | trajectory change

One additional distinction sometimes made—which also originates in Greaves and MacAskill—is between axiological and deontic longtermism. ("Axiological" and "deontic" are technical terms borrowed from moral philosophy: "axiological" means "related to what is good or valuable" and "deontic" means "related to what we ought to do or have reason to do".) Axiological longtermism holds that positively influencing the long-term future is among the most valuable things we can do, whereas deontic longtermism holds that positively influencing the long-term future is among the things we have most reason to do. Sometimes these views are combined with strong longtermism, so axiological strong longtermism becomes the view that influencing the long-term future is the most valuable thing to do and deontic strong longtermism becomes the view that influencing the long-term future is the thing we have most reason to do.

One additional distinction sometimes made—which also originates in Greaves and MacAskill—is between axiological and deontic longtermism. ("Axiological" and "deontic" are technical terms borrowed from moral philosophy: "axiological" means "related to what is good or valuable" and "deontic" means "related to what we ought to do or have reason to do".) So axiologicalAxiological longtermism holds that positively influencing the long-term future is among the most valuable things we can do, whereas deontic longtermism holds that positively influencing the long-term future is among the things we most reason to do. Sometimes these views are combined with strong longtermism, so axiological strong longtermism becomes the view that influencing the long-term future is the most valuable thing to do and deontic strong longtermism becomes the view that influencing the long-term future is the thing we have most reason to do.