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Mechanism design has been used to improve social outcomes in domains such as medical residency matching,[1] school choice,[2] organ donation,[3] and voting. Mechanisms have also been proposed to improve the provision of public goods.goods.[4]
Peters, Dominik (2019) Economic design for effective altruism, in Jean-François Laslier et al. (eds.) The Future of Economic Design, Cham: Springer, pp. 381–388.
Wiblin, Robert & Keiran Harris (2019) Radical institutional reforms that make capitalism & democracy work better, and how to get them, 80,000 Hours, February 8.
Mechanism Design for Social Good (MD4SG). An initiative using techniques from algorithms, optimization, and mechanism design to improve access for marginalized groups.
Mechanism design has been used to improve social outcomes in domains such as medical residency matching (Wikipedia 2009),matching,[1] school choice (Abdulkadiroğlu & Sönmez 2003),choice,[2] organ donation (Roth, Sonmez & Unver 2004),donation,[3] and voting. Mechanisms have also been proposed to improve the provision of public goods (MikkW 2020).goods.[4]
Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila & Tayfun Sönmez (2003) School choice: A mechanism design approach, American Economic Review, vol. 93, pp. 729–747.
MikkW (2020) The case for promoting/creating public goods markets as a cause area, Effective Altruism Forum, October 24.
Roth, A. E., T. Sonmez & M. U. Unver (2004) Kidney exchange, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 119, pp. 457–488.
Wikipedia (2009) National resident matching program, Wikipedia, April 6 (updated 9 May 2021).
Wikipedia (2009) National resident matching program, Wikipedia, April 6 (updated 9 May 2021).
Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila & Tayfun Sönmez (2003) School choice: A mechanism design approach, American Economic Review, vol. 93, pp. 729–747.
Roth, A. E., T. Sonmez & M. U. Unver (2004) Kidney exchange, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 119, pp. 457–488.
MikkW (2020) The case for promoting/creating public goods markets as a cause area, Effective Altruism Forum, October 24.
Mechanism design has been used to improve social outcomes in domains such as medical residency matching (Wikipedia 2009), school choice (Abdulkadiroğlu & Sönmez 2003), organ donation (Roth, Sonmez & Unver 2004), and voting. Mechanisms have also been proposed to improve the provision of public goods (MikkW 2020).
Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila & Tayfun Sönmez (2003) MechanismSchool choice: A mechanism design approach. , American Economic Review, vol. 93, pp. 729–747.
MikkW (2020) The case for promoting/creating public goods markets as a cause area, Effective Altruism Forum, October 24.
Roth, A. E., T. Sonmez & M. U. Unver (2004) Kidney exchange, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 119, pp. 457–488.
Wikipedia article.(2009) National resident matching program, Wikipedia, April 6 (updated 9 May 2021).
Mechanism design has been used to improve social outcomes in domains such as medical residency matching, school choice, organ donation, and voting. Mechanisms hashave also been proposed to improve the provision of public goods.
Mechanism design is a field that applies economics and game theory to the design of incentive structures, or mechanisms. Mechanisms are often designed to achieve specific social objectives. Conventionally, mechanism design assumes that players have private information about their preferences and act rationally so as to maximize those preferences.
There are several types of mechanisms:
Mechanisms can be evaluated based on the following criteria:
Mechanism design has been used to improve social outcomes in domains such as medical residency matching, school choice, organ donation, and voting. Mechanisms has also been proposed to improve the provision of public goods.
Mechanism design - Wikipedia
cooperation & coordination | economics | electoral reform | game theory | markets for altruism
Mechanism design is a field that applies economics and game theory to the design of incentive
structures,structures—ormechanisms. Mechanisms are often designedmechanisms—in order to achieve specific social objectives. Conventionally, mechanism design assumes that players have private information about their preferences and act rationally so as to maximize those preferences.