Negative utilitarianism

Magnus Vinding (+67)
Teo Ajantaival (+126) I added this back because a bit more diversity does not seem to me like a reason to omit a point-by-point critique of an influential yet misleading essay (though perhaps clear response chains, such as this and the Gustafsson pair, could be ordered into some kind of threads).
Pablo (+145/-60) I replaced Vinding's critique of Ord with his critique of Gustafsson, and added Gustafsson's essay, since there is already a detailed critique of Ord by Knutsson and it seems the section should be a bit more diversified; feel free to revert if you disagree though
Pablo (+24/-24)
Teo Ajantaival (+126) Added to Further reading: Vinding, Magnus (2022) Point-by-point critique of “Why I’m Not a Negative Utilitarian”, Center for Reducing Suffering, May 30.
Pablo (+183)
Leo (+594/-667)
Pablo (+9/-9)
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Ord, Toby (2013) Why I’m not a negative utilitarian, Toby Ord’s Blog, February 28.

Tomasik, Brian (2013) Three types of negative utilitarianism, Essays on Reducing Suffering, March 23.

The first and most commonly discussed dimension of variation concerns the relative moral weight accorded to suffering and happiness. Standard NU may be regarded as a "strong" form of NU, holding that no amount of happiness can ever count for more than any amount of suffering. By contrast, "weak" versions of NU hold instead that a given quantity of suffering counts for more than a corresponding quantity of happiness, but accept that large enough quantities of happiness can in principle outweigh any quantity of suffering (Griffin 1979; Arrhenius & Bykvist 1995; Ord 2013; Knutsson 2019).suffering.[1][2][3][4] Strong NU views may be further subdivided into lexical NU and absolute NU, which either affirm or deny, respectively, that happiness counts for something (Ord 2013).something.[3] On strong lexical NU, of two outcomes equally unpleasant, one counts for more than the other if it is the more pleasant of the two; whereas on absolute strong NU both outcomes count equally. Between strong lexical NU and weak NU, there is room for an intermediate or hybrid form of NU, sometimes called lexical threshold NU (Ord 2013; Tomasik 2013),[3][5] according to which there is some amount of suffering that no amount of happiness can outweigh, but otherwise suffering can be outweighed by a large enough amount of happiness.

BibliographyFurther reading

Arrhenius, Gustaf & Krister Bykvist (1995) Future Generations and Interpersonal Compensations: Moral Aspects of Energy Use, Uppsala: Uppsala University.

Griffin, James (1979) Is unhappiness morally more important than happiness?, The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 29, pp. 47–55.

Knutsson, Simon (2019) The world destruction argument, Inquiry, pp. 1–20.

Ord, Toby (2013) Why I’m not a negative utilitarian, Toby Ord’s Blog, February 28.

Tomasik, Brian (2013) Three types of negative utilitarianism, Essays on Reducing Suffering, March 23.

  1. ^

    Griffin, James (1979) Is unhappiness morally more important than happiness?, The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 29, pp. 47–55.

  2. ^

    Arrhenius, Gustaf & Krister Bykvist (1995) Future Generations and Interpersonal Compensations: Moral Aspects of Energy Use, Uppsala: Uppsala University.

  3. ^

    Ord, Toby (2013) Why I’m not a negative utilitarian, Toby Ord’s Blog, February 28.

  4. ^

    Knutsson, Simon (2019) The world destruction argument, Inquiry, pp. 1–20.

  5. ^

    Tomasik, Brian (2013) Three types of negative utilitarianism, Essays on Reducing Suffering, March 23.

Negative utilitarianism (NU) is a version of utilitarianism whose standard account holds that an act is morally right if and only if it leads to less suffering than any of its alternatives. NU was originally presenteddeveloped as an alternative to classical utilitarianism, which regards suffering and happiness as equally important, and is a leading example of a suffering-focused view, a broader family of ethical positions that assign primary—though not necessarily exclusive or overriding—moral importance to the alleviation of suffering.

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