Aird, Michael (2020) Collection of discussions of epistemic modesty,
"rationalist/EA exceptionalism", and similar, LessWrong, March 30.
Many additional resources on this topic or related topics.
LessWrong (2021) Modest epistemology, LessWrong Wiki
Learning that some person or group of people hold certain views may sometimes provide valid grounds for epistemic deference, that is, for updating our own beliefs in response to what others appear to believe, even if we ignore the reasons for those beliefs or
don't find those reasons persuasive. The question of when, how, and to what extent a rational agent should defer to others has been the studied—from somewhat different angles—by philosophers working in social epistemology and by economists working in game theory.
deference and social epistemology tag is for posts relevant to when, how, and to what extent we should update our beliefs based on what others appear to believe - even if we don't know the reasons underlying those others' beliefs, or even if we don't find those reasons compelling. (The term "epistemic modesty" is often used in this context.) This tag can also be used for other broadly related topics, such as social epistemology , how to balance inside- and outside-views , or how to share information and conclusions efficiently without causing information cascades or anchoring people.