Fanaticism

Applied to Moral dilemma by Tormented at 20d

Fanaticism can be described as the position that it's morally better to reject "a certainty of a moderately good outcome, such as one additional life saved" in favour of "a lottery which probably gives a worse outcome, but has a tiny probability of some vastly better outcome (perhaps trillions of additional blissful lives created)" (Wilkinson,(Wilkinson 2020). Some have argued that fanaticism should be rejected and that this might undermine the case for certain philosophical positions, such as longtermism.

Fanaticism can be described as the position that it's morally better to reject "a certainty of a moderately good outcome, such as one additional life saved" in favour of "a lottery which probably gives a worse outcome, but has a tiny probability of some vastly better outcome (perhaps trillions of additional blissful lives created)" (Wilkinson, 2021)(Wilkinson, 2020). Some have argued that fanaticism should be rejected and that this might undermine the case for certain philosophical positions, such as longtermism.

See also the concept of "Pascal'"Pascal's mugging" (LessWrong 2020).

LessWrong (2020) Pascal’s mugging, LessWrong Wiki, August 3 (updated 23 September 2020).

Wilkinson, Hayden (2020) In defence of fanaticism, GPI Working Paper No. 4-2020 (updated January 2021).

Fanaticism can be described as the position that it's morally better to reject "a certainty of a moderately good outcome, such as one additional life saved" in favour of "a lottery which probably gives a worse outcome, but has a tiny probability of some vastly better outcome (perhaps trillions of additional blissful lives created)" (Wilkinson, 2021). Some have argued that fanaticism should be rejected and that this might undermine the case for certain philosophical positions, such as longtermism. 

See also the concept of "Pascal's mugging". 

alternatives to expected value theory | altruistic wager | decision theory | decision-theoretic uncertainty| expected value | moral uncertainty | naive consequentialism vs. sophisticated consequentialism | risk aversion