People would not distinguish between 53 ºC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5), and 53 ºC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4).

I should have been clearer. I meant "people would barely distinguish". In any case, my point is that you seem to believe pain of level 5 is infinitely worse than pain of level 4 despite people barely or not distinguishing between experiences with pain of level 4 and 5 if they are sufficiently close to the temperature-duration curve separating a highest level of pain of 4 and 5.

Would you prever averting i) 53 ºC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5) for 1 person with probability 10^-100 over ii) 53 ºC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4) for the 8 billion people on Earth with certainty?

You did not answer this? If it helps, you could imagine that it was a real situation, and that by default ii) all people on Earth would have one hand under water at 53 ºC with certainty for 59.9 s, but that you could prevent this, and instead have i) just one person have their hand under water at 53 ºC with probablity 10^-100 for 60.1 s. It seems obvious to me i) is way better. However, if you think level 5 pain is infinitely worse than level 4 pain, you would pick ii).

Actually, in my model, level 5 is unnecessary as it is evolutionarily the same response as level 4, so I’ll probably remove it from my updated model.

The number of levels of pain, and temperture is not important to the situation I described above. As long as you believe some pains are infinitely worse than others, it is possible to come up with a situation like the above where you would pick ii) all people on Earth having one hand under water at temperature T with certainty for 59.9 s (maximum level of pain of k) over i) just one person having their hand under water at temperature T with probablity 10^-100 for 60.1 s (maximum level of pain of k + 1).

I am only discussing temperature and duration, but my argument generalises to any number of dimensions affecting the maximum level of pain. If this depends on N variables, there will be a N-dimensional space with boundaries separating experiences with maximum level of pain k and k + 1. So, for a boundary which contains experiences with duration 60 s, people prioritising pains of level k + 1 infinitely more than pains of level k would pick ii) all people on Earth being subject to a painful stimulus with certainty for 59.9 s (maximum level of pain of k) over i) just one person being subject to the same painful stimulus with probablity 10^-100 for 60.1 s (maximum level of pain of k + 1).

If reincarnation were real, would you prefer infinite lifetimes with dust specks irritating you for 10 minutes, or just one lifetime of 10 min extreme unbearable hell? The former is infinity times larger than the second.

I do not know whether literal dust specks would be sufficiently bad to make my welfare negative. However, I would prefer 10 min of extreme unbearable hell over an infinite time with slighly negative welfare.

Thanks for the very interesting post, Andrés.

I liked the article The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness by Alexander Lerchner

I just linkposted this to the EA Forum.

Hi Andrés. How would you quantitatively compare the intensity of subjetive experiences across species? What would be a good proxy for the (expected) welfare range under electromagnetic (EM) field theories of consciousness?

Thanks for the very insightful post, Alfredo.

That makes sense. I was imagining inputs which are broader than car pieces, but narrower than just people (labour) and money (capita), like people in specific roles, or certain production equipment.

Hi David. Are you implying this post is neglecting non-empirical evidence? If so, which type of evidence do you have in mind?

Actually, this comes down to how we define the boundaries. If the difference is truly imperceptible, it remains within the same region where numerical comparisons are perfectly valid.

Do you think there is a temperature T, and duration t for which the pain of T for t + 0.1 s is infinitely (lexically) worse than pain of T for t - 0.1 s?

However, my claim is based on a discontinuous graph. Just as water undergoes a qualitative jump at 100 °C and turns into steam, I believe consciousness undergoes a phase transition at specific thresholds which creates a qualitative leap in the nature of pain.

What do you mean by "qualitative leap"? A large, but finite increase in pain intensity for a small increase in temperature or duration? If so, it would still be the case that a sufficiently long time in pain of level i would be worse than any given time in pain of level i + 1, as argued in Bentham's Bulldog's post.

I am not entirely certain, but maybe we might also consider the following hypothesis: This qualitative shift in experience morally corresponds to the tradability status of the experience itself.

This is how I would think about it. I do not know if there are large increases in pain intensity for small increases in temperature or duration. However, I agree pain intensity increases superlinearly with temperature for some ranges of temperature. Note the above goes very much against prioritising higher levels of pain infinitely (lexically) more.

But at a certain critical threshold (the point of systemic collapse where the subject entirely loses its rationality) this tradability factor effectively hits zero. In such a model, while Level 3 and Level 4 pain might possess vastly different coefficients due to the hidden tradability factor, they remain theoretically comparable. However, once we reach Level 5, we encounter a state of incomparability.

Imagine 53 ºC for 1 min separates the levels of pain 4 and 5, as it is roughly the case in the graph above (which assumes the temperature ranges you mentioned apply to a duration of 1 min). Would you prever averting i) 53 ºC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5) for 1 person with probability 10^-100 over ii) 53 ºC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4) for the 8 billion people on Earth with certainty? i) corresponds to 6.01*10^-99 s (= 60.1*1*10^-100) of level 4 pain in expectation, and ii) to 4.79*10^11 s (= 59.9*8*10^9*1) of level 5 pain in expectation. I understand you would prefer averting i) because you prioritise averting level 5 pain infinitely (lexically) more than averting level 4 pain. I do not understand this. People would not distinguish between 53 ºC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5), and 53 ºC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4).

Thanks for the great post, Rory. In reality, I think the intended output often increases as any of the input factors increases. However, your point remains that increasing the most limiting input factor may increase the output much more than increasing other input factors.

Level 1: Ignorable (40°C – 43°C)

I think you meant 44 ºC instead of 43 ºC. Level 2 starts at 44 ºC.

1-) As I stated earlier, duration is not just a multiplier; it is a catalyst for a qualitative shift. ( In the context of my Five-Phase Model, after a certain threshold, a prolonged Level 3 experience does not simply "add up" to a large Level 3 sum, it undergoes a functional priority shift, effectively transforming into a Level 4 state for example.)

It makes sense the maximum level of pain increases with duration, but I do not think this solves the core issue. There will still be very small changes in temperature or duration leading to a change in the level of pain. Consider the function f(T = "temperature of the water", t = "time with a hand under water") which outputs the highest level of pain (1 to 5). Below is an illustration from Gemini. It assumes the temperature ranges you provided apply to a duration of 1 min, and the level of pain increases with duration as you mentioned. The specific shape of the boundaries between pain level is not important. What matters is that boundaries exist. Imagine 45 ºC for 3 min separates the levels of pain 2 and 3, as it is roughly the case below. Would you prever averting i) 45 ºC for 3 min 0.1 s (maximum pain level of 3) for 1 person with probability 10^-100 over ii) 45 ºC for 2 min 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 2) for the 8 billion people on Earth with certainty? i) corresponds to 1.80*10^-98 s (= (3*60 + 0.1)*1*10^-100) of level 3 pain in expectation, and ii) to 1.44*10^12 s (= (2*60 + 59.9)*8*10^9*1) of level 2 pain in expectation. I understand you would prefer averting i) because you prioritise averting level 3 pain infinitely (lexically) more than averting level 2 pain. I do not understand this. People would not distinguish between 45 ºC for 3 min 0.1 s (maximum pain level of 3), and 45 ºC for 2 min 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 2).