Dual-use research is particularly relevant in the field of biosecurity. A salient example is so-called "gain-of-function" research, which "might help identify the most dangerous strains of flu in nature, create targets for vaccine development, and alert the world to the possibility that H5N1 could become airborne" but also cause the accidental deployment of a biological agent and provide malicious actors with information that enables them to create particularly dangerous pathogens.
See e.g. Jürgen Altmann (2010) Dual use, in David Guston (ed.) Encyclopedia of Nanoscience and Society, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, pp. 171–173. See also p. 402, footnote † in Sebastian Farquhar, Owen Cotton-Barratt & Andrew Snyder-Beattie (2017) Pricing externalities to balance public risks and benefits of research, Health Security, vol. 15, pp. 401–408.