Hey there!

Thanks for responding, and for your honesty regarding time for engagement. If you end up writing out in greater length what you have to say, happy to see an extended version of your response. That said, it seems to me that what you did write already provides good grounds for me to engage, so here's a quick response from my side point-by-point:

1. The scenario is a story, and all narrative scenarios are. [...] The point is not to paint a full analytical picture; the point is to change minds and inspire action. So I don't think it's quite right to hold it to the standard of a rigorous analytical exercise: it's a different tool for a different job.

I think I largely agree to this, actually. That's why I tried to emphasise in my intro, and to a lesser extent throughout the post, that I see my response as complementary: narratives are a good tool to inspire action, but they require attendant analytical exercises to have positive value. Action in an ill-considered direction is worse, I would argue, than no action at all, and definitely worse than reflective action. 

The scenario Europe 2031 (in contrast to other narrative projects that make more of an effort to highlight uncertainties and multiple possible futures, see e.g. AI 2040) leaves its readers with a fairly strong conclusion in the Epilogue, one that very much sends the (emotionally charged) message "we know what we need to do, and we should do it even if it is politically painful". The authors offer a more analytical, and somewhat more nuanced / uncertainty-aware, outline of their argument in the Summary, the FAQs that you also (rightly in my mind) cite, and their Compute Forecasting section. But my sense is that many readers will mainly focus on the scenario itself, not the analytical bits on the side; this post here is one attempt to shift that a little bit further in the direction of using the scenario as an entry-point to the analytical discussion, rather than as a shortcut to a seemingly clear conclusion. 

You are right, I think, to ask about the actual empirical effects of Europe 2031's publication. The honest answer is (a) that I'm not in Brussels (or another EU hub), so I have a very poor sense of what is being discussed with how much of a truth-seeking intention to it; and (b) I think it's too early to tell. I do think, however, that other people have established quite well how narratives and stories can obfuscate public and policy debates^[1]; and that feels enough to at least be worried about Europe 2031 having a similar effect, if we don't try explicitly to counter that obfuscating effect.

2. The scenario clearly describes itself as having a narrow focus on purpose. The scenario is exclusively about maintaining European agency, and says nothing about how to use that agency once it has been achieved or strengthened.

That's largely true, but I also think it's a good example of means and ends being hard to separate in practice. "Maintaining European agency" is a means to an end which the authors barely discuss, and I think it's fair for them not to discuss it at length (for the reasons they themselves list in the FAQ, and which you cite above). However, to the extent that their proposal for "maintaining European agency" hinges on instrument that have implications for diverse AI governance aims, I do think they have a responsibility to discuss that; or, at least, I think we should use the scenario as a starting point for discussing these implications. If the scenario's proposal for "maintaining European agency" mainly consists in "massive compute build-outs on EU territory" (and I have confirmed with one of the authors that my reading of that is broadly in line with what they themselves take the main message of the scenario to be), then that is not neutral with respects to "other [deliberately ignored] aspects of the AI transition": such a build-out might accelerate frontier AI development; might further amass power with US frontier AI companies (if, as the scenario suggests, such a build-out would happen under the auspices of these capital-rich US frontier companies); and might undermine EU regulatory standards, which could otherwise be used as a tool in AI governance efforts. It also diverts capital and attention away from other potential European responses to rapid AI developments. 

I think my main sticking point here is: I agree that "maintaining European agency" is a worthwhile instrumental goal to strive for, because I too would like to the see the EU as a capable actor in future AI governance developments; but I think that we face many really difficult and politically/normatively meaningful questions when it comes to deciding which strategy to pursue in order to maintain European agency. I want our response to Europe 2031 to be that we discuss vigorously and honestly what different strategies might look like, and what their merits and costs are. I think the scenario itself may not spark these discussions (because neither the scenario nor the authors' supplementary commentary insinuate that there are open questions here at all). So I wrote this Forum post to start filling that gap.

3. On power concentration and international coordination: These are super important, but you can't do much about them without agency. Europe being "AI colonized" and losing its agency to a handful of foreign companies and states, is itself one of the forms of power concentration the scenario is trying to get Europe to defend against. Building European leverage is, in part, a hedge against exactly that concentration, as well as a way to gain the agency to combat other problems.

My response to this is largely the same as the one offered above: I think there should be controversy and open discussion around how we can prevent Europe from being "AI colonized", around what it means for Europe to build up effective leverage, and around what we are and are not willing to give up in our attempt to build up such (supposed/potential) leverage. My sense is that Europe 2031 "falls into the same trap"^[2] as Anthropic itself did: assuming that a race is inevitable and that the best option is to come out on top (or near the top, in Europe's case), even if that means accepting all of the costs the race brings in the first place. I want for that assumption to be vigorously debated, not taken for granted.

Lastly, thanks for linking the post on the (potential) effectiveness of fictional accounts. I haven't read it yet, but it definitely falls within what I'm interested in and I'm glad to have the link (and also for others visiting this post to have access to the link)!

1. ^{^}

   Here I would insert a reference from the study of propaganda, media studies, or a similar field if I had the time to look for it. I hope to come back to this later this week, but apologise in advance if I fail to. My only excuse is that those fields and their general takeaway - stories influence minds, and not always in an epistemically ideal way - is a sufficiently well-accepted piece of common knowledge that my claim survives without a specific reference (?). 

2. ^{^}

   In quotation marks, because it is only a trap given the specific worldview from which I am speaking; one that should, just like Europe 2031's worldview, be vigorously debated and contested!