Yudkowsky's message is "If anyone builds superintelligence, everyone dies." Zvi's version is "If anyone builds superintelligence under anything like current conditions, everyone probably dies." Yudkowsky contrasts those framings with common "EA framings" like "It seems hard to predict whether superintelligence will kill everyone or not, but there's a worryingly high chance it will, and Earth isn't prepared," and seems to think the latter framing is substantially driven by concerns about what can be said "in polite company." Obviously I can't speak for all of EA, or all of Open Phil, and this post is my personal view rather than an institutional one since no single institutional view exists, but for the record, my inside view since 2010 has been "If anyone builds superintelligence under anything close to current conditions, probably everyone dies (or is severely disempowered)," and I think the difference between me and Yudkowsky has less to do with social effects on our speech and more to do with differing epistemic practices, i.e. about how confident one can reasonably be about the effects of poorly understood future technologies emerging in future, poorly understood circumstances. (My all-things-considered view, which includes various reference classes and partial deference to many others who think about the topic, is more agnostic and hasn't consistently been above the "probably" line.) Moreover, I think those who believe some version of "If anyone builds superintelligence, everyone dies" should be encouraged to make their arguments loudly and repeatedly; the greatest barrier to actually-risk-mitigating action right now is the lack of political will. That said, I think people should keep in mind that: * Public argumentation can only get us so far when the evidence for the risks and their mitigations is this unclear, when AI has automated so little of the economy, when AI failures have led to so few deaths, etc. * Most concrete progress on worst-case AI risk

I'm currently facing a career choice between a role working on AI safety directly and a role at 80,000 Hours. I don't want to go into the details too much publicly, but one really key component is how to think about the basic leverage argument in favour of 80k. This is the claim that's like: well, in fact I heard about the AIS job from 80k. If I ensure even two (additional) people hear about AIS jobs by working at 80k, isn't it possible going to 80k could be even better for AIS than doing the job could be? In that form, the argument is naive and implausible. But I don't think I know what the "sophisticated" argument that replaces it is. Here are some thoughts: * Working in AIS also promotes growth of AIS. It would be a mistake to only consider the second-order effects of a job when you're forced to by the lack of first-order effects. * OK, but focusing on org growth fulltime seems surely better for org growth than having it be a side effect of the main thing you're doing. * One way to think about this is to compare two strategies of improving talent at a target org, between "try to find people to move them into roles in the org, as part of cultivating a whole overall talent pipeline into the org and related orgs", and "put all of your fulltime effort into having a single person, i.e. you, do a job at the org". It seems pretty easy to imagine that the former would be a better strategy? * I think this is the same intuition that makes pyramid schemes seem appealing (something like: surely I can recruit at least 2 people into the scheme, and surely they can recruit more people, and surely the norm is actually that you recruit a tonne of people" and it's really only by looking at the mathematics of the population as a whole you can see that it can't possibly work, and that actually it's necessarily the case that most people in the scheme will recruit exactly zero people ever. * Maybe a pyramid scheme is the extreme of "what if literally everyone in EA work

For fun I mapped different clusters of people's overall AI x-risk probabilities by ~2100 to other rates of dying in my lifetime, which is a probability that I and other quantitative people might have a better intuitive grasp of. It might not be helpful or actively anti-helpful to other people, but whatever. x-risk "doomer": >90% probability of dying. Analogy: naive risk of death for an average human. (around 93% of homo sapiens have died so far). Some doomers have far higher probabilities in log-space. You can map that to your realistic all-things-considered risk of death[1] or something. (This analogy might be the least useful).  median x-risk concerned EA: 15-35% risk of dying. I can't find a good answer for median but I think this is where I'm at so it's a good baseline[2], many people I talk to give similar numbers, and also where Michael Dickens put his numbers in a recent post. Analogy: lifelong risk of death from heart disease. Roughly 20% is the number people give for risk of lifelong dying from heart disease, for Americans. This is not accounting for technological changes from improvements in GLP-1 agonists, statins, etc. My actual all-things considered view for my own lifetime risk of dying from heart disease (even ignoring AI) is considerably lower than 20% but it's probably not worth going into detail here[3].  median ML researcher in surveys: 5-10%. See here for what I think is the most recent survey; I think these numbers are relatively stable across surveyed years, though trending slightly upwards. Analogy: lifelong risk of dying from 3-5 most common cancers. I couldn't easily find a source that just lists most to least likely cancer to kill you quickly online, but I think 3-5 sounds right after a few calculations; you can do the math yourself here. As others have noted, if true, this will put AI x-risk as among your most likely causes of death.  AI "optimist": ~1% risk of doom. See eg here. "a tail risk2 worth considering, but not the dominant so

I think that the phrase ["unaligned" AI] is too vague for a lot of safety research work. I prefer keywords like: - scheming  - naive - deceptive - overconfident - uncooperative I'm happy that the phrase "scheming" seems to have become popular recently, that's an issue that seems fairly specific to me. I have a much easier time imagining preventing an AI from successfully (intentionally) scheming than I do preventing it from being "unaligned."

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