Epistemic deference

Applied to Deference Culture in EA by Joey at 25d

Huemer, Michael (2019) On challenging the experts, Fake Nous, July 6.

Applied to Deferring by Pablo at 2mo

Learning that some person or group of people hold certain views may sometimes provide valid grounds for epistemic deference, that is, for updating our own beliefs in response to what others appear to believe, even if we ignore the reasons for those beliefs or do not find those reasons persuasive. The question of when, how, and to what extent a rational agent should defer to others has been the studied—from somewhat different angles—by philosophers working in social epistemology and by economists working in game theory.

BibliographyFurther reading

Frances, Bryan & Jonathan Matheson (2018) Disagreement, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, February 23 (updated 13 November 2019).

Applied to Minimal-trust investigations by Pablo at 7mo
Applied to Independent impressions by MichaelA at 9mo