All of dominicroser's Comments + Replies

My personal take is that Musk is fairly mysterious. Hence, I don't think there is sufficient evidence that he just says these things for personal gain? 
I don't mean this to defend him, to the contrary. It makes the world more uncertain that one the most powerful persons has such an insrutable personality. I think it would be worth foregoing Musk's upside potential for this world, if he were just more boring and predictable. 

3
Arepo
3mo
He doesn't seem super mysterious to me - I think he's motivated by a combination of genuine intent to make the world do better and ego, with a fair bit of room for arguing over which you think is the greater factor (I actually think the former).

How open are you to people with one leg in traditional academia and one leg in Seeds of Science?

PS: and just a general remark: this seems like such a valuable experiment. Big thanks for your courage! At the moment, it seems bewilderingly open-ended but I, as far as I can judge, it seems absolutely worth seeing what comes out of it.

1
rogersbacon1
3mo
Very open to it - dual appointments (or whatever) are no problem. If you are doing some kind of work that falls outside the purview of traditional academia/journals and think you would benefit from being a SoS Research Fellow then we are happy to have you.  re: PS - thanks! This is how we look at it - certainly could fail but worth a shot, let's see how it evolves

Thanks for writing this up so nicely. The framing in terms of EA relevance is perfect.

Here's another question I have that would be relevant to EA. Do you think that currently the risks from Back Contamination and Forward Contamination receive too much attention (relative to other risks)? In other words: is there some inertia in the sense that once a novel catastrophic risk does get recognized as a serious issue, it then doesn't easily get out of people's minds & institutional processes again?

(The background for my question is this: I read quite a bit a... (read more)

Economics professor Reiner Eichenberger has looked into this: https://road.cc/content/news/cycling-live-blog-15-november-2022-297375#live-blog-item-39683

However, I would not recommend to trust his views. While he is insightful and interesting, he is also one of the most contrarian, provocation-loving people I know. Plus, these thoughts are published in a column for a small newspaper rather than an academic journal.  

If you ever find someone who has seriously looked into that question, I'd be interested to know.

The basic question makes sense, though: w... (read more)

2
wes R
4mo
Thanks! I got the Idea from the question after vaguely hearing Adam Conover say something about it at the end of a snippet of one of the "Adam ruins everything" episodes, saying something along the lines of: "Actually, walking can be EVEN WORSE than driving". I'll try to find the exact episode and link it.

Thanks, that is a word of wisdom. I'll have to practice this!

Here's one challenge to your (convincing!) post: One of the only ways I get anything done in life is by promising it to someone and then being held accountable. What I achieve depends on what I promise -- there are no independently "realistic deadlines" for me. However, I usually don't achieve it by the date I promise. If I promise it by February, I get it done by March. But it wouldn't help if I promised it by March. In that case, I would just achieve it by April. 

While I'm exaggerating a bit to make my point clear, the upshot is that even though I a... (read more)

6
eirine
4mo
I'm similar in some aspects: There are some things I find so boring or difficult to do that I need external accountability to do them. In these cases, however, I wouldn't use the stakeholder to hold me accountable, but rather a colleague, friend, or other mechanism.  In fact, there are some instances where you want to be ambitious and say you'll do more than you think you do, e.g. when setting goals for yourself. However, I think that can backfire if you do it with a stakeholder. Does that make sense?

Thanks very much!

Two questions: 

(1) I have had to introduce cognitive biases to people myself and was wondering what reasons to give for the the precise selection of biases I present. As far as these 10 biases are concerned: Is it just a judgement call to choose this specific list of biases --- as they kind of seem practically relevant and much discussed? Or is there a more systematic reason for choosing these 10 or any other list?

(2) Yudkowsky's list is from 2008. Much has happened since. It would be nice if there were kind of a running update on which cognitive biases have moved up / down over time in terms of being supported by the evidence.

Focusmate.com 

Among the many things I've tried, this has been one of the most useful.

PS: Among the other many things I've tried, one I would not give up is "Sabbath rest" (and I don't move it to some other day of the week depending on circumstances -- it's just a strict rule of no work from dawn-to-dawn or midnight-to-midnight on Sunday). One side effect of this is that it 'gives me permission' to occasionally 'overdo' work during the week since a minimal and basic amount of rest is guaranteed, come what may.

oh dear. Thanks for spotting this - really appreciated. We'll add the correction.

Hm, hard question.

Personally, I would think:

-- If we don't radically expand our concern and love relative to the status quo, we are not following the teachings of Christ

-- It's hard to see the specific kind and strength of impartiality that utilitarianism recommends in the Bible (but this doesn't mean, as I said in the first point, that the status quo is OK)

The post is really nicely structured and written. 

However, to me the key debate is not whether it's possible to have growth while (1) protecting the planet  and (2) eradicating poverty. The question is how probable it is. I have generally found the arguments by the degrowth people quite convincing that it is in many ways improbable. 

However, strictly speaking, the question is not even how improbable it is but the comparative question whether it is more improbable than having degrowth while (1) protecting the planet and (2) eradicating povert... (read more)

I have been looking for a while now for good literature that provides arguments or evidence how reducing growth in rich countries would hurt/benefit the poor.

I agree that Hickel doesn't seem very trustworthy on this. I have looked a bit at the degrowth/post-growth literature and haven't found detailed, convincing engagement on this question. 

I've also looked elsewhere but I still don't know what literature to rely on -- despite its being such a core and straightforward question. Any advice on what to read on this would be appreciated.

I quite agree with this, particularly since there is a straightforward explanation why Christian scripture would not have focused on people far away in time and space: there were fewer technological possibilities for affecting people far away than there are today. [Edit: I now realize this point appears in footnote 2]

I do find it noteworthy that on the one occasion where Jesus was asked whom to count as a neighbour, he deliberately expands the circle and asks listeners to think about whom they can be a neighbour to.

1
Luke Eure
1y
It's a good point about the moral circle expansion. Maybe I can flip it and ask you: To the extent that Christians do not behave impartially towards people in other countries or people who won't be born for hundreds of years, do you think they are failing to follow the teachings of Christ?

Is there a typo in the first sentence - should it say impartiality rather than partiality?

2
Grayden
1y
Yes! A rather important typo! I’ve now fixed

I love this post. 

BTW, note that there have been two entries on closely related themes for the Cause Exploration Prize: here and here.

I think it is curious that effective altruism doesn't talk more about friendships or, more broadly, relationships. As far as I understand, relationships are a key determinant of happiness. Also, relationships are one of the first things that come to mind when objective list theorists try to explain to hedonists what might matter in addition to happiness. Relationships thus seem important.  

They also seems neglected... (read more)

One obvious tangible solution: legalizing dense housing.

On top of all the ecological, economic, and health reasons why we already need to do that, low-density suburbia puts physical distance between everyone, preventing us from forming relationships. We could place special emphasis on housing projects that include communal hangout areas/recreation facilities, as well as old-fashioned community centers.

1
rogersbacon1
1y
Thanks!  "It's a bit harder to see how it's tractable. " Yeah that's the hard one, did the best I could here but obviously most of my suggestions are not super practical/realistic.

There was something interesting I observed about myself: I have tried replacing reading the news by reading more relevant articles a number of times -- and I have failed just as many times. This made me realize that reading the news fulfils a certain purpose in my daily life and it is not information consumption. Rather it is: winding down, entertainment, etc. I usually read the news when having lunch. And when I tried intentionally reading something valuable (yes, I am thoroughly convinced that reading the news is hardly valuable) didn't deliver the same kind of reprieve.

I sincerely hope this cause will be taken as seriously as possible and thoroughly examined. 

On an anecdotal basis, I have been repeatedly surprised just how many people around me have had significant experiences along these lines. I would never have guessed this before my friends all were in child-bearing age.

I also think the relevance of this cause area might typically remain hidden from public sight because:

  1. less than half the population ever gives birth
  2. most people who do give birth, do so only once or very few times during their life
  3. if something goe
... (read more)

It is so helpful to have this  overview assesment in concentrated form. 

In public debates about the pros & cons of economic growth in rich countries there is often the idea "Growth in rich countries is unimportant/bad -- but, yes,  for poor countries it is important to still grow". 

The kind of work you portray about spillovers puts the viability of the idea "growth in poor countries without growth in rich countries" into question and helpfully puts numbers on how strongly growth in rich countries is linked to growth in poor countries.  

A paper that Kian Mintz-Woo is working on is relevant: "Incentives for the Long-Term(ist)"

From the abstract: "To address long-term externalities, I propose internalizing long-term externalized costs: according to our best estimates of the long-term costs of an activity or product, this cost should be added."

You would have to ask him directly where he's currently at with his draft.

9
Ramiro
2y
I'll do this. I think this discussion is getting a lot of track when it comes to climate change. Precisely because low-prob catastrophic scenarios are neglected by climate change IAMs - because they lead to a collapse of the cost-benefit analysis, according to Weitzman (2009) -  Stiglitz, Taylor & Stern have been advocating for target-consistent pricing. I wonder if something analogous would be feasible for x-risks. For instance, there have been many advocates for a robot tax on automation to internalize possible damages to job markets; I never quite bought this idea (I'm not sure we should distinguish types of unemployment when it comes to social insurance), but I find it more attractive if it could be used to fund differential progress.

Many people - both in academia and policymaking - consider the concept of 'Knightian Uncertainty' (roughly, the absence of probabilities for decision-making) to be highly relevant (eg for the purpose of spelling out precautionary principles). Does the concept make sense? If not, is it a problem that many people find it practically relevant?

Looking for help: what's the opposite of counterfactual reasoning -- in other words: when EAs encourage counterfactual reasoning, what do they discourage?

I ask because I'm writing about good epistemic practices and mindsets. I am trying to structure my writing as a list of opposites (scout mindset vs soldier mindset, numerical vs verbal reasoning, etc). 

Would it be correct to say that in the case of counterfactual reasoning there is no real opposite? Rather, the appropriate contrast is: "counterfactual reasoning done well vs. counterfactual reasoning done badly"?

Thank you so much - this is the most helpful text I've read about this question!

I'd love it if someone were to write 

-- an equally detailed post about developing countries (rather than just something the length of section 4.4)

-- summarized how well it's possible to boost growth in developing countries without doing so in developed countries.

The thought is that the best case for economic growth leading to happiness would be along the following lines (excluding the link between growth and catastrophic/existential risk):
- growth doesn't hurt happiness in... (read more)

Brian Green, the author of the epilogue, has contributed to EA for Christians in a number of helpful ways in the past (eg https://youtu.be/L3q6C-JzIyA)

Etwas mit "Ganzzeitdenken", "Gesamtzukunftsdenken", "Vollfristdenken"?

Das sind keine konkreten Vorschläge, sondern mehr Brainstorming. Etwas was ja Longtermism von Mainstream-Aufrufen zu mehr langfristigem Denken unterscheidet ist der Fokus auf der gesamten Zukunft (statt "nur" auf den nächsten 100 Jahren).

 

There are chapters here on Buddhism, Orthodox Judaism and Christianity in this book on religion and EA. 

I think there is a simple reason why EA is compatible with many moral views: increasing welfare is an important element of any sensible moral view. Utilitarianism is just the view that this is the only element that matters. But any other sensible moral view will acknowledge that increasing welfare matters at least alongside other considerations. 
Plus: the element of increasing welfare has become more important in the past 3-4 decades since... (read more)

One thing to keep in mind: for most people the point of a gift is not to transfer an economic resource to you but to express something about the relationship they have with you (and they're willing for this expression to cost something; and, generally, we're willing as a society for this expression to come with economic inefficiencies: often, the giver chooses a gift (though less so at weddings) and the giver has much less information about the preferences of the receiver than the receiver). 

I think gift-giving is a psychologically tricky issue. I als... (read more)

[Pre-remark: I have only lightly skimmed the post]

Just wanted to add a pointer to Tim Mulgan's book Ethics for a Broken World  -- given the similarity in framing: "Imagine living in the future in a world already damaged by humankind...Then imagine looking back into the past, back to our own time and assessing the ethics of the early twenty-first century. ....This book is presented as a series of history of philosophy lectures given in the future, studying the classic texts from a past age of affluence, our own time. "

I've given a number of small talks about effective donations to various non-EA audiences. In the end -- after having made my case for focusing on effectiveness in giving -- I encouraged them and said: "If my argument convinced you, how about making a start and using half of your next batch of donations for the most effective charities."

Do you see any problem in taking your research as evidence that this might be sensible advice? I know Giving Multiplier does something different. However, I wonder whether it's similar enough to be transferable?

There was a somewhat unusual short philosophical paper this year signed by lots of philosophers which claimed that avoidance of the repugnant conclusion should not be seen as a necessary condition for an adequate population ethics. I guess it's driven by a similar concern you have here: the repugnant conclusion is much less obviously repugnant than its name makes it seem.     

I love this post. It singles out a very specific problem and tackles it very thoughtfully.

On website blockers: I have also quitted them regularly but since I have started using ColdTurkey I have quitted much less. I think it's better than other blockers. 

For myself, family life has done the trick of making me go to bed at a reasonable hour. But as soon as my wife and kids are gone for a day or two, I (regrettably!) just stay up forever. One of the reasons why I do so (and which doesn't come up on your list) is that my mood often happens to be very good when I stay up late and I also enter flow states more easily when working late at night.

Great!
And just to add a small comment: The country of origin does not only affect transport distance but also the legal standards for animal welfare (and to a lesser extent how much GHGs are involved in production). My impression is that many people overrate this. They think "Oh yes, there is horrible animal farming elsewhere  - but I only eat meat from my own country and surely everything is much better here." It would be nice to have something to counter this objection.

This is really nicely done and it is exactly what many are looking for. Thank you so much! 

If it is to be shared more widely it might help to add a remark about how sensitive the results are to which country the animal products are from and whether they're organic or not. The reason for this being that many in the public sphere (and not infrequently wrongly) assume that this makes a crucial difference.

1
VilleSokk
3y
Thank you Dominic! There is already a paragraph about transportation on the methods page of the website. I will add a paragraph about organic food as well.

This is tangential but I wonder whether there are side-benefits for unrelated areas if humanity collectively engages in thinking about how it would design a space governance framework. Some past thinkers used the literary device of utopias in order to think about real-world problems. In the same way, putting us in the mindset of creating rules for space governance from scratch could be a helpful exercise and helpful priming in order to solve other (short-term, earth-bound) problems. 

Nice and helpful -- thanks!

I've always been fascinated by the biblical vision of a perfect world which features the lion and the lamb (etc) living together peacefully: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_lamb_and_lion

It might be interesting to sift through the history of humanity in order to collect further pre-1970 visions which lament WAS or which feature a utopia without WAS. I know extremely little about Buddhism, Hinduism, etc but given the links between humans and animals via rebirths: isn't the Nirvana as a state without suffering also the... (read more)

WHAT: A book like "Strangers Drowning", but focused on the "E" of EA rather than the "A" of EA.

WHY: narrative can be such a tremendous force in changing people's lives. It's often more powerful than argument (even for brainy people).

There's already a lot of world literature and newspaper stories on people who have been tremendously altruistic. There is much less literature about people who have been tremendously altruistic and -- this is key -- have been motivated by their altruism to care about effectiveness a... (read more)

Thanks for this! Very interesting.

And really sorry for replying only now -- I somehow missed this and only saw it now.

--- On population increase: yes, many Christians work towards population increase but it's equally true that many Christians don't. An interesting side remark is that the influential passage Genesis 1,28 on which pro-natalism is often based calls for *filling* the earth. Arguably, humanity can claim to have unlocked this achievement. We can tick it off our To-Do-List. (Also, in terms of background information, my view that determi... (read more)

Great to put the climate externality of a child explicitly in relation to other positive and negative values that come with having a child. Thanks for doing this and doing it so well.

A question: where else in the population ethics debate can I find the kind of reasoning that you employ? More specifically, where else can I find (1) lists of the bazillion positive and negative externalities of an additional child and (2) some argument -- however weak -- that takes us beyond agnosticism on the question whether an additional child is overall a *net* positive o... (read more)

3
MichaelPlant
4y
Hello Dominic, I do something of this in my DPhil thesis in chapter 2. I'm pretty uncertain whether the Earth is under- or overpopulated whatever one's views on population ethics.

Thanks a lot for this pointer!

An odd observation: He cites someone who's done such stuff before -- John Nolt, a philosopher. He himself is professor of the psychology of music. I think the calculations of both of them are extremely useful (even if extremely speculative). But there's a big question here: what prevented *scientists* from offering such numbers? Are they too afraid of publishing guesstimates? Does it not occur to them that these numbers are utterly relevant for the debate?

3
Kirsten
4y
That's a really good question! Maybe there just genuinely is too much uncertainty for any estimates, in their views. I'd honestly even be interested in deaths currently attributable to climate change, but I'm sure even that is a hard problem.

If the case for growth in rich and poor is very different (possibly negative in the one but not the other case), then it starts to matter a lot whether we can promote growth in poor countries without promoting growth in rich countries as a side-effect. I don't know how the proposed interventions fare in this respect?

You asked for other examples. The following two examples are certainly not the most relevant but they are interesting:

-- Benjamin Franklin, in his will, left £1,000 pounds each to the cities of Boston and Philadelphia, with the proviso that the money should be invested for 100 years, with 25 percent of the principal to be invested for a further 100 years. As a result, Boston wound up in 1990 with a fund of over $5 million, Philadelphia with $2.3 million.) [copy-pasted from a book review by Joseph Heathe in Ethics]

-- From Cliff Landesman's 1995... (read more)

6
vaniver
4y
Also of note is that he gave conditions on the investments; the money was to be lent to married men under 25 who had finished an apprenticeship, with two people willing to co-sign the loan for them. So in that regard it was something like a modern microlending program, instead of just trying to maximize returns for benefits in the future.
1
Sjir Hoeijmakers
4y
Thanks! These are useful examples.

Also, some ways of mitigating climate change have (positive or negative) side benefits* for humanity's ability to solve other upcoming challenges, such as AI safety or pandemics. And from an EA perspective, these latter challenges might possibly be higher priority than climate change. Thus, there's a further avenue for EAs who do not care much about climate change to "harness" the current societal focus on climate change for EA-aligned goals.


*For example, I'm thinking of side benefits of strategies such as:

-- strengthening global cooperation

-- spreading a radically technology-friendly mindset among greens

-- fighting anti-science trends in society

-- etc

A very general remark on this: "There are plenty of potential weaknesses to advocacy-based interventions compared to more direct interventions. One large concern we have is understanding the impact of organisations in this space."

Federally organized constituencies (Switzerland, US, etc) are a great thing for political scientists: you can compare the effect of policies or advocacy campaigns in different sub-national jurisdictions which are very similar. (Not sure whether this is of any help in your case, though).

PS: Just to add: fantastic initiative. Curious to hear how it's developing!

I've written a blogpost on whether Christians should share the emphasis that many EAs put on the long term, including extinction risks. Since this fits nicely with your aim in this blogpost -- i.e. whether *many* worldviews should prioritise existential risks -- I thought I'd mention it here: https://eachdiscussion.wordpress.com/2019/04/06/how-much-should-christian-eas-care-about-the-far-future-part-i/

8
Gavin
5y
Thanks for this. I'm not very familiar with the context, but let me see if I understand. (In a first for me, I'm not sure whether to ask you to cite more scripture or add more formal argument.) Let's assume a Christian god, and call a rational consequence-counting believer an Optimising Christian. Your overall point is that there are (or might be) two disjoint ethics, one for us and one for God, and that ours has a smaller scope, falling short of long-termism, for obvious reasons. Is this an orthodox view? 1. "The Bible says not to worry, since you can trust God to make things right. Planning is not worrying though. This puts a cap on the intensity of our longterm concern." 2. "Humans are obviously not as good at longtermism as God, so we can leave it to Him." 3. "Classical theism: at least parts of the future are fixed, and God promised us no (more) existential catastrophes. (Via flooding.)" 4. "Optimising Christians don't need to bring (maximally many) people into existence: it's supererogatory." But large parts of Christianity take population increase very seriously as an obligation (based on e.g. Genesis 1:28 or Psalm 127). Do you know of doctrine that Christian universalism stops at present people? 5. "Optimising Christians only need to 'satisfice' their fellows, raising them out of subsistence. Positive consequentialism is for God." This idea has a similar structure to negative utilitarianism, a moral system with an unusual number of philosophical difficulties. Why do bliss or happiness have no / insufficient moral weight? And, theologically: does orthodoxy say we don't need to make others (very) happy? If I understand you, in your points (1) through (4) you appeal to a notion of God's agency outside of human action or natural laws. (So miracles only?) But a better theology of causation wouldn't rely on miracles, instead viewing the whole causal history of the universe as constituting God's agency. That interpretation, which at least doesn't contradict
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