All of Max_Carpendale's Comments + Replies

I'm not sure that really responds to my point.

You seem to think that we should only posit qualia if it's strictly necessary to observe a behaviour. I was pushing back by saying that, given evolutionary relatedness and observed similarities, I don't believe that should be the criteria. 

For example, you could try to explain a baby's pain behaviour without reference to qualia as not being strictly necessary, but given that we know that they are just developing versions of us, that's not the most likely explanation. With other animals obviously the infere... (read more)

I wasn't talking about the specific emotional state either. I think this example here casts some doubt on the idea that verbal report is the principal or only way that we come to believe that other humans have qualia.

The question is not whether these behaviours could strictly be explainable without qualia. The question as what's the most likely explanation given that these animals are related to us and we solve a lot of these problems through qualia (while showing similar external signs).

For example, yeah, a dog could just look like she is in pain. But then we have to invent this new concept of ersatz pain that looks and functions a lot like our pain, but is actually unconscious, in order to describe the dogs mental state in this case. To the extent it looks similar to our pain in a given animal, this looks like a ad hoc move.

-10
MikhailSamin
5mo

Seems to me like the case for the importance of verbal report as evidence may be overstated. If my friend looks and behaves like they are suffering (cringing, recoiling away, etc.), but says they are not, I would assume that they actually are suffering. I assume you would agree? That suggests that other forms of evidence are actually more important than talking about qualia. 

-2
MikhailSamin
5mo
The existence of a verbal report of qualia is strong evidence that the reporter has subjective experience (or someone they've learned to report this way from having subjective experience). I'm not talking about specific emotional states being reported

I don't think the scale or expected value affects this strategy question directly. You still just use a strategy that is going to be most likely to achieve the goal.

If the goal is something you have really widespread agreement on, that probably leans you towards an uncompromising, radical ask approach. Seems like things might be going pretty well for AI safety in that respect, though I don't know if it's been established that people are buying into the high probability of doom arguments that much. I suspect that we are much less far along than the climate ... (read more)

I think this is tantamount to saying that we shouldn't engage within the political system, compromise, or meet people where they are coming from in our advocacy. I don't think other social movements would have got anywhere with this kind of attitude, and this seems especially tricky with something very detail orientated like a AI safety.

Inside game approaches (versus outside game approaches like this is describing) are going to require engaging in things this post says that no one should do. Boldly stating exactly the ideal situation you are after could ha... (read more)

2
Greg_Colbourn
6mo
This is fundamentally different imo, because we aren't asking for people to right injustices, stick up for marginalised groups, care about future generations, or do good of any kind; we're asking people not to kill literally everyone, including ourselves, and for those who would do (however unintentionally) to be stopped by governments. It's a matter of survival above all else.
2
Greg_Colbourn
6mo
I think there is something to be said for the radical flank effect, and Connor and Gabe are providing a somewhat radical flank (even though I actually think the "fucking stop!" position is the most reasonable, moderate one, given the urgency and the stakes!).

What incredible altruism, despite the very difficult circumstances. They are truly a hero.

I teared up when I read this initially, and when I reread it.  Thank you so much for sharing.

Thanks for your engagement with the report!

One way to go is for animal protection to start advocating for a right bans at some point, yes. Another possibility is that the industry is simply run into the ground through costly welfare reforms and competition through alternatives. Maybe this wouldn't remove all animal exploitation, and some animal products would still be demanded as a luxury good, but it would seem pretty significant if the reform path way could bring us that far, would you agree? A agree there is more of a natural flow towards ending all ani... (read more)

2
jasonk
2y
> Another possibility is that the industry is simply run into the ground through costly welfare reforms and competition through alternatives. Maybe this wouldn't remove all animal exploitation, and some animal products would still be demanded as a luxury good, but it would seem pretty significant if the reform path way could bring us that far, would you agree? I agree that would be significant. I suppose I remain skeptical that costly welfare reforms are realistic and will go very far.   Thanks for explaining your points further. I appreciate the exchange!

Thanks for your thoughts on this!

I think there's a pretty good argument that animal protectionism demands the nonuse of animals in all cases when that use necessarily involves a significant amount of suffering, which represent almost all cases, and makes the remaining cases prohibitively expensive. I describe his pathway in the piece.

You could argue that this stronger animal protection view is not implied by current rhetoric,  but the idea is that you build momentum and work up to stronger asks.

2
jasonk
2y
Thank you for encouraging me to go back and re-read. I had missed several of your points when skimming yesterday. I recall Erik Marcus making the case for what I believe he called "dismantlement theory" in his book "Meat Market" (2005). He essentially says that animal protectionists should engage in welfare campaigns that incrementally make animal use more expensive until it's discontinued. To restate your description of the reform pathway, I believe you're saying that welfare campaigning could continue up to a point and then transition to asking for outright bans or rights recognition. The abolitionist will argue that that the transition is not morally implied by animal protectionism. But I think you'd say that it is, provided that the continued animal use still involves a "significant amount of suffering"? I guess the thought is that there's a point where further welfare improvement (via cage size, enrichment, etc.) is no longer possible and that at this point animal protectionism will advocate for non-use, rather than continuing to advocate for further welfare improvements? I'm curious if there's any precedent for this. Assuming not, I'm curious what a concrete example of a transition would look like - what do we imagine the pathway actually looking like for egg laying hens for example. Further the abolitionist will argue that animal protectionism is not practically conducive to the transition. So long as animal protectionism has reinforced the practice of animal use (morally, legally, institutionally), the paradigm of sufficiently humane animal use will persist. Animal protectionism will have to become something entirely other than the animal protectionism as it exists today to make the transition. In terms of precedent for this, I'm thinking of anti-abortionists who had advocated for incremental changes to abortion practices (waiting periods, different practices, clinic requirements) switching to advocacy for bans. While in such a case, at least some activi

Hi Enginar,

 

This is a very interesting post, thank you for writing it! It fits very well into the idea of megaprojects for animals, or ways of using additional funding, which may become increasingly relevant as more funding comes into EA.

I've been working on a report on improving wild caught fish welfare at Animal Ask and the report should be relatively soon. I certainly share your thoughts that smaller fish should be the priority.

I have some (not necessarily decisive) worries about how this fits into the long-term strategy of animal advocacy. As you ... (read more)

2
Enginar
2y
Hi there! Thank you for the comment and your work on fish welfare. I agree, moral advocacy is also important and may have long term impacts. My point is that "not all" moral advocacy interventions or funding opportunities may be as cost-effective as directly purchasing a wild fish stunner. The main question is: does every animal advocacy group create as much (long term) impact as relieving the suffering of 30.000 fish per 1$?  Also, given that effective animal advocacy groups are limited in number and their ability to use funds to create impact are also limited due to their capacity and social conditions, this intervention may also be a very reasonable addition to the avenues of helping animals. I think same logic applies (even strongly) to other cause areas. One can say that advocacy for effective international aid and  effective development reforms might have even more impact in the short and long term. But given that the possibilities are limited and tractability is low, Give Well's funding opportunities are very impressive even if they do not have as much long term impact as a broad political or social change.   

Thanks so much for writing this! It's really good to hear from other members of the community who have struggled with this. It sounds like there are a lot of shared elements, and I think talking about it openly makes it easier for other people to do so. It's certainly been easier for me to bring up my imposter syndrome now that it's widely understood to be a problem in the community and bringing it up helps with recovering from it. 

 

Some things I find are helping in my case:

- Getting a lot of feedback. I find that my doubts flourish and grow in "... (read more)

Hi James,

Thanks for your deep engagement with the report and thoughtful comment! No, it didn't come across as blunt or rude or anything! :)

I was thinking of something closer to a vegan outreach campaign that was optimized for delegitimizing the industry when I wrote that. We did write that we think that its an institutional focus is more effective, and perhaps its abolitionist focus too, though veganism can also be framed in that way. Perhaps the report should have talked more about how other types of animal  campaigns can (and should) leverage the st... (read more)

5
James Özden
2y
Sorry I never replied but here's a very quick thing on what I thought our main disagreement was but maybe we're closer than I initially thought! I interpreted your conclusion to be something along the lines of "We shouldn't do any divestment as other approaches are less risky and more effective" but your final paragraph above is basically the view I hold too: Basically I totally agree, in that we should a couple campaigns/organisations trying divestment in a somewhat rigorous way to get some good learnings out of it, before deciding whether to stop it completely or  scale up. I just think when I read your sentence: I interpreted this as we shouldn't do it or invest in it at all! Not sure if it's just me but I think adding what you said above "some people should try it with some limited resources to test it properly"  to the conclusion would really help with understanding your final recommendation. Thanks for all your work on this again - super interesting!  

It's great to see the subject getting attention!

Getting plenty of honest – but understanding and contextualized – feedback has been particularly useful for me in dealing with imposter syndrome. It lets me worry less that I'm actually making tons of errors but they aren't being caught or that my managers are just being nice about it. It's a counterintuitive thing, so it was great to see it covered in this article.

This is a topical discussion topic in the movement. See this discussion for example: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/djQSjAQwXAcxMbFqQ/what-s-the-theory-of-change-theory-of-victory-for-farmed

Really looking forward to your articles!

It seems like you have a good strategy for producing high-quality articles (and particularly happy you'll be ordering by effect size).

1
Ben Williamson
2y
Thanks!

It must be gorgeous, and definitely appealing, but isn't it in the top ten for murder rate per captita?

3
jwpieters
2y
Unfortunately that is true. I would say that statistic might be misleading though as it largely depends on the area you're living in. Lower income areas account for most of the total murder in Cape Town the metropolitan area. Higher income areas (in which any expat would inevitably be living) are relatively safe. Overall though, you'd be correct in assuming that safety is more of a concern than in many European or US cities. But as far as anecdotal evidence goes, I have't been murdered yet.

Really unfortunate development. Compassion In World Farming recently released a report on the subject and why it's a terrible idea.

I want to make a couple of points here:

1) Since octopuses are carnivorous, a much larger number of fishes will be used to feed them

2) Since this is such a new development, it's an important time to oppose this and try to nip it in the bud

I get quite bad imposter syndrome, and I can take a stab at this.

Here are some general points I'd make here.

1) My imposter syndrome seems to come from a quite separate psychological process. So I could have my rational assessment of the situation (including some beliefs that work against imposter syndrome) but still feel the imposter syndrome quite strongly. Obviously they aren't completely unrelated, but they often do seem quite separate.

2) Imposter syndrome for me isn't just the belief that I am the least competent person in the room/org, it is the belie... (read more)

I had a similar journey. I still think that utilitarian is a good description for me, since it seems basically right to me in all non-sci-fi scenarios, but I don't have any confidence in the extreme edge cases.  

Adam Shriver has a few papers on breeding animals with the pain genes knocked out. See this paper for example.

This Awesome! I'm a big fan of your work. There really aren't any other organizations like Sentience Institute, so it's a pity you're not getting more funding .

I'm curious about your reasoning for the greater focus specifically on artificial sentience? Does it seem like the right time now?

Ali
2y13
0
0

Thanks Max! We get a good amount of funding, but each hiring round we receive multiple very strong applicants (e.g., recently graduated PhDs in a very challenging academic job market who are vegetarian or care about MCE-ish issues and would love to unite their passion and their day job) that we would love to hire. We believe we can absorb additional funding to do so, but it can be challenging to fundraise since our work lies at the intersection of animal advocacy and longtermism, and there is also uncertainty with our increased focus on artificial sentienc... (read more)

Congrats on being the new fund chair, Kieran!

I notice you've made a huge grant to Wild Animal Initiative. That's great! 

With work on this subject, I'm curious how you would prioritize between research to inform future interventions, advocacy to raise concern about the subject, and current interventions to improve wild animal welfare? 

1
Cameron_Meyer_Shorb
3y
Hi Max! I may not have much to add, because I know you've thought a ton about this and I'm obviously not on the AWF panel. But for what it's worth, here's how I would rate those categories, in descending order of expected impact: 1. Research to inform future interventions 2. Advocacy to raise concern about the subject 3. Current interventions to improve wild animal welfare Most of all, I think we should be measuring projects by how they contribute to the formation of a movement around wild animal welfare. That points in a slightly different direction than if we just think about the direct impact of a particular project. For example: 1. Research: Developing methods or concepts might catalyze further research better than simply developing technologies or species-specific knowledge. 2. Advocacy: Appealing to conservation organizations ("grasstops") might build coalitions quicker than appealing to the general public ("grassroots"). 3. Current interventions: Conceptually simple interventions on somewhat likable species (e.g., rat contraception) might attract more resources to the cause than counterintuitive interventions on alien species (e.g., humane insecticides), even if the latter would have more impact in the short term. Feel free to reach out if you want to bounce around ideas! cameronms@wildanimalinitiative.org
6
kierangreig
3y
Thanks, Max! :)  There certainly are. Here’s what we listed in our RFP:  We’d be interested in hearing from you if: * You want to tackle some “big-picture” question regarding wild animal welfare * You would like to launch a new non-profit venture, or you would like to trial something new, in the wild animal welfare space * You’re a scientist and want to pursue field-building activities, such as organizing conferences, trainings, courses, or events * You’re a scientist that could add welfare metrics to your current or planned research * You’d like to do some research regarding wild animal welfare field-building opportunities * You’d like to scope some opportunities for initial policy work on wild animal welfare * You’d like to explore the potential of non-controversial means to improve the lives of any relatively large-scale population of wild animals * You’re interested in exploring what for-profit business ideas might exist in the wild animal welfare space We would love to hear from you regarding any of the above! If in doubt, please err on the side of reaching out.

Thanks for writing this. While doing research on invertebrate sentience I've wondered about this kind of thing. I don't deliberately harm arthropods, but I haven't stopped hiking (where I'll probably step on many arthropods), and I definitely haven't stopped washing. It's true that you could give a means ends justification that help more animals by continuing to work I'm doing without disrupting my lifestyle by worrying about these things, but I'd be horrified if my normal life involved harming even a fraction as many large animals - I just don't feel the ... (read more)

Yeah, even the information for total number of neurons is absent for many invertebrates. More specific information like that would rarely be available.

1
Barry Grimes
4y
Thanks Max! I've added it to my reading list.

In my case at least, I can say that both the money and the reputation for winning was extremely valuable. Thanks for that!

I'm a hedonistic utilitarian, and I think that even voluntary suffering is be intrinsically bad, as long as it's still suffering at that point. Here the reasons I explain the phenomena that you note in your question. My answers are partially overlapping but some of the solutions you suggest.


- I personally mostly listen/watch/read media that deals with negative emotions. When I do this I sometimes have a twinge of the negative emotion, but I don't think I would really describe it is negatively valenced. Sometimes it may involve a bit of negat... (read more)

I get frequent muscle pain in my head and face and I normally believe that by massaging them. I've started to use use a part of my shirt or maybe another object as a barrier to let me do this without touching my hands to my face, but I guess my shirt could also pick up some of the virus, and I could be infected that way. Not sure what my other options are.

4
eca
4y
Carry hand sanitizer and do a quick hand sanitization before you touch your face? Clothes can pick up virus but are much less likely to come into contact with surfaces then your fingers. You could also keep a pocket full of latex gloves and either wear all the time then remove (carefully without contaminating your hand) before touching your face, or carefully putting on before touching your face.

I think you can travel to another country to donate eggs there. I think in general you get paid more in other countries if you are of certain demographics.

There's is a trap that consequentialists can easily fall into that the author describes beautifully in this post. I think the solution solution within consequentialism is to see that consequentialism doesn't recommend that we we only praise the highest achievers. Praise and blame are only justified within consequentialism when they produce good consequences, and it's beneficial to praise a wide variety of people, most especially people who are trying their hardest to improve the world.

For a fuller spectrum account of what it is to live a mor... (read more)

I've been in the community since about 2011, and I've also noticed this happening in myself and quite a few others who have been in the community for a long time. I'm not aware of any data on the subject. Denise's explanation of this and this post sounds right to me.

I came to the hotel as I was finishing a contract for Rethink Prioritites, worked for them there for one month, then did indepenent research. Now I am employed at an EA org again, and I am paying cost price.

8
Kirsten
4y
Thanks Max for being willing to talk about your finances online. I know that's a sensitive topic.
I agree that sentience, at least as we've defined it, is an all-or-nothing phenomenon (which is a common view in philosophy but not as common in neuroscience).

What do you think of the argument that there may be cases where it's unclear if the term is appropriate or not. So there would be a grey area where there is a "sort of" sentience. I've talked to some people who think that this grey area might be taxonomically large, including most invertebrates.


6
Jason Schukraft
4y
Hey Max, good question. I think we need to clearly separate our metaphysics from our epistemology in this area. If an entity is sentient if and only if there is something it is like to be that entity, then it's hard to see how sentience could come in degrees. (There are closely related phenomena that might come in degrees--like the intensity of experience or the grain of sensory input--but those phenomena are distinct from sentience.) There are certainly going to be cases where it's difficult to know if an entity is sentient, but our uncertainty doesn't imply that the entity is only partially sentient. I think it's plausible that this area of epistemic indeterminacy could remain quite large even with all the empirical facts in hand. However, there are some theories of mind on which it looks like there could be cases of metaphysical indeterminacy. If a certain type of reductive physicalism is true, and sentience doesn't reduce to any one feature of the brain but is instead a cluster concept, and the features that constitute the concept aren't coextensive, then there could be cases in which we don't know if an entity is sentient even with all the empirical and the philosophical facts in hand. (Technically, the fact that it can be metaphysically indeterminate that an entity possesses a property doesn't entail that the property comes in degrees, but it's a natural extension.)

Do you mainly see these scenarios as likely because you don't think there is likely to be many beings in future worlds or because you think that the beings that exist in those future worlds are unlikely to be conscious?

I had some thoughts about the second case. I've done some research on consciousness, but I still feel quite lost when it comes to this type of question.

It definitely seems like some machine minds could be conscious (we are basically in existence proof of that), but I don't know how to think about if a specific architecture wou... (read more)

1
Will Bradshaw
4y
I'm not sure I understand the first question. I don't really know what a "non-conscious being" would be. Is it synonymous with an agent? My impression is that feeling lost is a very common response to consciousness issues, which is why it seems to me like it's not that unlikely we get it wrong and either (a) fill the universe with complex but non-conscious matter, or (b) fill it with complex conscious matter that is profoundly unlike us, in such a way that high levels of positive utility are not achieved. The main response I can imagine for this at this time is something like "don't worry, if we solve AI alignment our AIs will solve this question for us, and if we don't things are likely to go much more obviously wrong". But this seems unsatisfactory here for some reason, and I'd like to see the argument sketched out more fully.

Thanks!

I personally would disagree that variety of experience is morally relevant. Obviously, most people enjoy variety of their own experiences, but that's already waded into the total hedonistic utilitarian equation because it makes us happier. So I don't think that we need to add it as a separate thing that has intrinsic moral value. Looking at diversity can also be aesthetically pleasing for us, but that gets waited in to the equation because it makes us happy, and so, again, I don't think we need to say it has intrinsic moral value. I d... (read more)

1
gavintaylor
4y
Good links Max. I've often felt there is a conflict between ecosystems/species preservation and animal welfare and these are really useful for exploring that idea more. However, I one point that I still get some cognitive dissonance from is the low-importance ascribed to (species) diversity. It seems like if resources are to be used to make more happy individuals (so using resources to improve the lives of unhappy individuals is not an option, maybe we're in a utopia where the lives of all sentient individuals are already net-positive and we value totalist population ethics), then it could, for instance, be better to produce more happy rhinos than happy humans, as there are far fewer rhinos than humans (if our utopia has the same current species numbers as the world today), so we will get more increase in the diversity of happy experiences. A moral weighting should also be applied between humans and rhinos, but if there is a huge difference in relative population numbers then it would probably be the dominating factor. How do others value a world with 7,700,000,000 people and 40,000 rhinos vs. a world with 7,700,010,000 people and 30,000 rhinos (using rough current species numbers and assuming all were fairly happy)? I think my intuition is to incorporate diminishing returns (for a given species) into multi-species population ethics, given that the experiences (phenomenology) of species differs, so they experience happiness in different ways. Does this make any sense, and is there a name for such ethical views? It works best for me from the totalist population ethics standpoint, and I probably wouldn't extend this to saying we should help unhappy rhinos over unhappy humans, even given the current populations of both species.

Imagine you heard about alien civilization that was pivoted towards colonizing the stars. But most of these aliens had almost no moral recognition and some of them were raised in inhumane conditions to be killed for trivial reasons for the other aliens. If I heard about this situation, I would be pretty concerned about what the aliens would do when they started colonizing the stars. I wouldn't be rooting for them by trying to prevent existential risk instead of trying to improve their values.


But of course, that's a description of our society. Th... (read more)

Thanks for your comment! I read your article and left a comment on it here. I'll try to think more about psychosomatics and add a section on it when I have time.

1
Richard Möhn
5y
Thanks for your comment on my article! I appreciate your thoughts and have left a lengthy answer.

It seems to me like when most EA's are talking about an expanding circle what we are talking about is either an expanding circle of moral concern towards 1) all sentient beings or 2) equal consideration of interests for all entities (with the background understanding that only sentient beings have interests).

Given this definition of what it means to expand the moral circle, I don't think Gwern's talk of a narrowing moral circle is relevant. For the list of entities that Gwern has described us as having lost moral concern for, we did not lose... (read more)

Thank you! :)

Thanks for mentioning C. elegans behavioural flexibility. I had meant to comment about that, but forgot to. That's a great paper on the subject.

I think people sometimes unfairly minimize the cognitive abilities of some invertebrates because it gives them cleaner and more straightforward answers about which organisms are conscious, according to their preferred theory.

8
Peter Wildeford
5y
However, there do appear to be very clear behavioral capabilities differences between C. elegans and other invertebrates (e.g., honeybees) as can be seen in our invertebrate sentience table.

You are very welcome! :)

That passage is also one of my favourite parts of his answers, thanks for highlighting it.

I'll take a look at that David Pearce post, thanks for the link.

Thanks for pointing at the typo, fixed it now.

Another way that frugality can improve productivity is that it can reduce the amount of time you spend buying, looking after, organizing, tidying, and thinking about physical possessions (because you probably have fewer of them). Of course, people who aren't frugal don't necessarily have more things, but they tend to have more of them.

Bravo!

I'm particularly excited about the paper submissions and the increased academic expertise of your staff. That seems very important in getting this work taken more seriously.

Excellent post!

Staying within the phylum, snails are consumed by humans in many cultures[53] and have attracted some attention as an edge case of consciousness in philosophical circles. A representative from class Gastropoda would therefore be useful.

It looks like there is a small error here. Aplysia was included on the table and is from class Gastropoda.

3
Jason Schukraft
5y
Good catch! I had terrestrial gastropods in mind, so I've changed the original post from "class Gastropoda" to "order Stylommatophora" (which includes Helix pomatia, the most commonly consumed snail) to reflect this focus.

Great article! I like the conceptual clarification that you do about what it means to say that a process is unconscious and how people use this term inconsistently in the literature. I've never seen that put so well and it's important.

I was wondering what you think of cases where a good idea 'spontaneously' occurs to someone while there thinking about something unrelated or while their mind is wandering. I only know anecdotes about this phenomenon, but I think it's a widespread phenomenon that most people would experience something... (read more)

8
Daniela R. Waldhorn
5y
Hey Max! Thanks for your feedback and for your vital contribution to this project. Sorry I couldn't get back to you before –I had taken a few days off. The example you provide fits well in what I classified as "sophisticated information processing functions that can be performed unconsciously". Of course we can come up with creative ideas after a period of conscious thought, but it doesn't necessarily happen that way. As you describe, unconscious processes play an important role in achieving creative insights, during what is called "the incubation period". Neuroimaging studies suggest that the association cortices are the primary areas that are active during this state and that the brain is spontaneously reorganizing itself. Recent research also supports the idea that it is not merely the absence of conscious thought that drives creativity incubation effects, but that during an incubation period unconscious processes contribute to creative thinking. It's still not clear which are the functional advantages of conscious over non-conscious thinking. In general, which kind of stimuli or tasks are more efficiently processed using unconscious mechanisms is an issue that remains to be elucidated. We also need a more refined distinction between neural correlates of unconsciousness (the absence of any conscious contents) vs. neural correlates of disconnectedness (the absence of perception of the environment) in different altered levels of consciousness. How these findings can be applied to research on consciousness in invertebrates? I'm unsure. Perhaps we can assess if equivalent structures of their CNS are activated when performing tasks that challenge them to "make associations" –and this may shed some light on how likely they are to show flexible ("creative") responses. Currently, in my opinion, it is clearer how these findings can contribute to improving our thinking: for instance, we are likely to benefit more from an incubation period when we get stuck, or when we a

Thanks! Good thoughts!

I'm also not sure if we know how expensive emotions are. In particular, even if some emotions are complicated, I'm not sure if the basic conscious experience of pain is complicated (at least the affective part of the experience, maybe not the sensory part). It subjectively seems like quite a simple feeling, but I don't know much about this, and I'd like to learn more.

Shelley Adamo misunderstands first question in part c) of her answer. I didn't mean to suggest that biology was required for consciousness, just that biological organisms might be more likely to have underlying homology with humans, which could mean that they might be conscious while similarly complex AI would not be.I think that our best theories of consciousness suggest that at some point AI will be conscious.

An issue with a written interview like this is that you can't make clarifications on the fly to head off misunderstandings. I hope to improve on conducting these interviews in the future.

Thanks for the recommendations! I'll try to take a look at the evidence for eccentric training, I wasn't aware of that. I didn't go into any specific recommendations about strength training, because I expect that because I wanted to keep the post fairly short and because I expect my recommendations would depend a lot on specific case, and so couldn't be communicated well in a general post. But if it's as effective as you say, I definitely should have mentioned it.

I'm planning on updating this post at some point and I'll mention eccentric training and mention you in the acknowledgements if the evidence find it does look good.

3
FJehn
3y
Did you have time to look at the evidence? If so, what is your impression? 
1[anonymous]5y
PMed you the paywalled review. There seems to be some agreement that evidence transfers between different tendons FYI, e. g. some studies are about Achilles tendons. The specific review on golfer arm (seen by my doc as nearly equivalent to RSI on the hand-facing tendons) is also in my message. If you want to talk to an expert about the evidence you can probably ask to skype him for a fee.
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