All of Michael_S's Comments + Replies

"My view is that - for the most part - people who identify as EAs tend to have unusually high integrity. But my guess is that this is more despite utilitarianism than because of it."

This seems unlikely to me. I think utilitarianism broadly encourages pro-social/cooperative behaviors, especially because utilitarianism encourages caring about collective success rather than individual success. Having a positive community and trust helps achieve these outcomes. If you have universalist moralities, it's harder for defection to make sense.

Broadly, I think that w... (read more)

2
Tristan Williams
1y
Yeah, utilitarianism also isn't going to always (or even most of the time, depending on the flavor) be convergent on "pro-social/cooperative behaviors". I think this is because it's easy to forget that while utilitarianism does broadly work towards the good of the community, it does so in a way that aggregates individual utility and takes an individual's experience to be the key building block of morality (as opposed to something like Communitarianism, which centers the good of the community and the sort of behavior you mention as a more base tenet of its practice). How much it will be convergent with these behaviors is certainly up for debate, but so long as the behaviors mentioned above are only useful towards increasing aggregate individual utility, you will have many places where this will diverge. This is perhaps harder to see when you imagine a polar extreme as you mention "lying or being an asshole to people all the time" but I don't think anyone is worried about that for utilitarianism. More that they might follow down a successive path of deceit or overriding of other people's interest towards what they see to be the greater good (i.e. "knowing" a friend would be better off if they didn't have to bear the weight of some bad thing in the world that relates to them that they wouldn't find out about if you don't tell them--this seems like the sort of thing utilitarianism might justify but maybe shouldn't). 
9
kokotajlod
2y
In practice, many of the utilitarians/consequentialists don't see the negative outcomes themselves, or at least sufficiently many of them don't that things will go to shit pretty quickly. (Relatedly, see the Unilateralists' Curse, the Epistemic Prisoner's Dilemma, and pretty much the entire literature of game theory, all those collective action problems...).  

In general, I'm a big fan of approaches that are optimized around Value of Information. Given EA/longtermism's  rapidly growing resources (people and $), I expect that acquiring information to make use of resources in the future is a particularly high EV use of resources today.

Congrats!

I think part of this is about EAs recalibrating what is "crazy" within the community. In general, I think the right assumption is that if you want $ to do basically anything, there's a good chance (honestly >50%) you can get it.

If you don't want someone to do something,  makes sense not to offer a large amount of $. For the second case, I'm a bit confused by this statement:

"the uncertainty of what the people would do was the key cause in giving a relatively small amount of money"

What do you mean here? That you were uncertain in which path was best?
 

1
Rebecca Kagan
3y
"the uncertainty of what the people would do" --> Both groups were being funded for open-ended plans (in one case, a career transition, in the other "exploring EA field-building"), rather than a specific venture, hence the uncertainty. "If you don't want someone to do something" --> This isn't the case -- if the funders hadn't wanted the recipients to move forward, they wouldn't have given funding. In that case, the funder offered to support a different plan than the one that was originally pitched, namely instead of a venture, a career transition.

Very interesting, valuable, and  thorough overview!

I notice you mentioned providing grants of 30k and 16k that were or are likely to be turned down. Do you think this might have been due to the amounts of funding? Might levels of funding an order of magnitude higher have caused a change in preferences? 

Given the amount of funding in longtermist EA, if a project is valuable, I wonder if amounts closer to that level might be warranted. Obviously the project only had 300k in funding, so that level of funding might not have been practical here.  However, from the perspective of EA longtermist funding as a whole, routinely giving away this level of funding for projects would be practical.
 

3
Rebecca Kagan
3y
Hey Michael! I don’t know if more money would have changed their decisions, but I want to clarify that the funding panel wasn’t funding constrained (we actually had more than $300k set aside for this), and funders didn’t make the decision with that as a limitation. The cases aren’t actually that similar — in one, the funding panel gave a low amount to discourage the individual from pursuing the idea and support a career transition, in the other they gave the individuals more than requested — but in both cases the uncertainty of what the people would do was the key cause in giving a relatively small amount of money, not being funding constrained.

I work in Democratic data analytics in the US and I agree that there's potentially a lot of value to EAs getting involved in the partisan side rather than just the civil service side to advance EA causes. If anyone is interested in becoming more involved in US politics, I'd love to talk to them. You can shoot me a message.

Hey; I work in US politics (in Data Analytics for the Democratic Party). Would love to chat if you think it would be useful for you.

Yes. People aren't spending much money yet because people will mostly forget about it by the election.

Independent of the desirability of spending resources on Andrew Yang's campaign, it's worth mentioning that this overstates the gains to Steyer. Steyer is running ads with little competition (which makes ad effects stronger), but the reason there is little competition is because decay effects are large; voters will forget about the ads and see new messaging over time. Additionally, Morning Consult shows higher support than all other pollsters. The average for Steyer in early states is considerably less favorable.

1
Michael_Cohen
5y
Good to know. Really?

I'd be curious which initiatives CSER staff think would have the largest impact in expectation. The UNAIRO proposal in particular looks useful to me for making AI research less of an arms race and spreading values between countries, while being potentially tractable in the near term.

There's also other counterfactual matching opportunities that tend to arise around the same time though.

Yeah, I don't think filling the finite universe we know about is where the the highest expected value is. It's likely some form of possible infinite value, since it's not implausible that this could exist. But ultimately, I agree that the implications of this are minor and our response should basically be the same as if we lived in a finite universe (keep humanity alive, move values towards total hedonic utilitarianism, and build safe AI).

I'm not arguing for arguing for false arguments; I'm just saying that if you have a point you can make around racial bias, you should make that argument, even if it's not an important point for EAs, because it is an important one for the audience.

I think this is rather weak and mostly arguing against a straw-man. I don't see Effective Altruists arguing that you should refrain from investments in your human capital. It makes sense to cut down on consumption (eg. eat out less). But I don't know of any EAs arguing that you should refrain from say buying books.

In general, I'm glad that it was included because it ads legitimacy to the overall argument with Vox's center-left audience.

I strongly prefer building legitimacy with true arguments (I also expect trying to be rigorous and only saying true things will build better long-term legitimacy, though I think I would advocate for being truthful even without that)

I found this really helpful, and gave me what I expect to be actionable information I can use in my own work (I work in Democratic politics). Much appreciated!

2
Vilfredo's Ghost
5y
Maybe I should've asked you the question I just asked on another post instead: as someone interested in minimizing x-risk, who should I support for President? Or better yet, who has a good compilation of candidates' records on x-risk-related issues, so I can make my own decision?
1
DannyBressler
5y
Glad to hear!

I agree that limitations on RCTs are a reason to devalue them relative to other methodologies. They still add value over our priors, but I think the best use cases for RCTs are when they're cheap and can be done at scale (Eg. in the context of online surveys) or when you are randomizing an expensive intervention that would be provided anyway such that the relative cost of the RCT is cheap.

When costs of RCTs are large, I think there's reason to favor other methodologies, such as regression discontinuity designs, which have faired quite well compared to RCTs (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/pam.22051).

3
Eva
6y
I agree that it would be important to weigh the costs and benefits - I don't think it's exclusively an issue with RCTs, though. One thing that could help in doing this calculus is a better understanding of when our non-study-informed beliefs are likely to be accurate. I know at least some researchers are working in this area - Stefano DellaVigna and Devin Pope are looking to follow up their excellent papers on predictions with another one looking at how well people predict results based on differences in context, and Aidan Coville and I also have some work in this area using impact evaluations in development and predictions gathered from policymakers, practitioners, and researchers.
1
RomeoStevens
6y
Would the development of a VoI checklist be helpful here? Heuristics and decision criteria similar to the flowchart that the Campbell collab. has for experimental design heuristics.

FYI, I'm pretty busy over the next few days, but I'd like to get back to this conversation at one point. If I do, it may be a bit though.

0
Jeffhe
6y
No worries!

To your first comment, I disagree. I think it's the same thing. Experiences are the result of chemical reactions. Are you advocating a form of dualism where experience is separated from the physical reactions in the brain?

I think there is more total pain. I'm not counting the # of headaches. I'm talking about the total amount of pain.

Can you define S1?

We may not, as these discussions tend to go. I'm fine calling it.

I think we have to get closer to defining a subject of experience, (S1); I think I would need this to go forward. But here's my position on the... (read more)

0
Jeffhe
6y
Hi Michael, I removed the comment about worrying that we might not reach a consensus because I worried that it might send you the wrong idea (i.e. that I don't want to talk anymore). It's been tiring I have to admit, but also enjoyable and helpful. Anyways, you clearly saw my comment before I removed it. But yeah, I'm good with talking on. I agree that experiences are the result of chemical reactions, however the nature of the relations "X being experientially worse than Y" and "X being greater in number than Y" are relevantly different. Someone by the name of "kbog" recently read my very first reply to you (the updated edition) and raised basically the same concern as you have here, and I think I have responded to him pretty aptly. So if you don't mind, can you read my discussion with him: http://effective-altruism.com/ea/1lt/is_effective_altruism_fundamentally_flawed/dmu I would have answered you here, but I'm honestly pretty drained from replying to kbog, so I hope you can understand. Let me know what you think. Regarding defining S1, I don't think I can do better than to say that S1 is a thing that has, or is capable of having, experience(s). I add the phrase 'or is capable of having' this time because it has just occurred to me that when I am in dreamless sleep, I have no experiences whatsoever, yet I'd like to think that I am still around - i.e. that the particular subject-of-experience that I am is still around. However, it's also possible that a subject-of-experience exists only when it is experiencing something. If that is true, then the subject-of-experience that I am is going out of and coming into existence several times a night. That's spooky, but perhaps true. Anyways, I can't seem to figure out why you need any better of a definition of a subject-of-experience than that. I feel like my definition sufficiently distinguishes it from other kinds of things. Moreover, I have provided you with a criteria for identity over time. Shouldn't this be enoug

Of course, it is possible that within the cow's physical system's life span, multiple subjects-of-experience are realized. This would be the case if not all of the experiences realized by the cow's physical system are felt by a single subject.

That's what I'm interested in a definition of. What makes it a "single subject"? How is this a binary term?

I am making a greater than/less than comparison. That comparison is with pain which results from the neural chemical reactions. There is more pain (more of these chemical reactions based experiences)... (read more)

0
Jeffhe
6y
REVISED TO BE MORE CLEAR ON MAR 19: You also write, "There is more pain (more of these chemical reactions based experiences) in the 5 headaches than there is in the 1 whether or not they occur in a single subject. I don't see any reason to treat this differently then the underlying chemical reactions." Well, to me the reason is obvious: when we say that 5 minor pains in one person is greater than (i.e. worse than) a major pain in one person" we are using "greater than" in an EXPERIENTIAL sense. On the other hand, when we say that 10 neural impulses in one person is greater than 5 neural impulses in one person, we are using "greater than" in a QUANTITATIVE/NUMERICAL sense. These two comparisons are very different in their nature. The former is about the relative STRENGTH of the pains, the latter is about the relative QUANTITIES of neural impulses. So just because 10 neural impulses is greater than 5 neural impulses in the numerical sense, whether the 10 impulses take place in 1 brain or 5 brains, that does NOT mean that 5 minor pains is greater than 1 major headache in the experiential sense, whether the 5 minor pains are realized in 1 brain or 5 brains. This relates back to why I said it can be very misleading to represent pain comparisons in numerals like 5*2>5. Such representations do not distinguish between the two senses described above, and thus can easily lead one to conflate them.
0
Jeffhe
6y
Just to make sure we're on the same page here, let me summarize where we're at: In choice situation 2 of my paper, I said that supposing that any person would rather endure 5 minor headaches of a certain sort than 1 major headache of a certain sort when put to the choice, then a case in which Al suffers 5 such minor headaches is morally worse than a case in which Emma suffers 1 such major headache. And the reason I gave for this is that Al's 5 minor headaches is more painful (i.e. worse) than Emma's major headache. In choice situation 3, however, the 5 minor headaches are spread across 5 different people: Al and four others. Here I claim that the case in which Emma suffers a major headache is morally worse than a case in which the 5 people each suffer 1 minor headache. And the reason I gave for this is that Emma's major headache is more painful (i.e. worse) than each of the 5 people's minor headache. Against this, you claim that if the supposition from choice situation 2 carries over to choice situation 3 - the supposition that any person would rather endure 5 minor headaches than 1 major headache if put to the choice -, then the case in which the 5 people each suffer 1 minor headache is morally worse than Emma suffering a major headache. And your reason for saying this is that you think 5 minor headaches spread across the 5 people is more painful (i.e. worse) than Emma's major headache. THAT is what I took you to mean when you wrote: "Conditional on agreeing 5 minor headaches in one person is worse than 1 major headache in one person, I would feel exactly the same if it were spread out over 5 people." As a result, this whole time, I have been trying to explain why it is that 5 minor headaches spread across five people CANNOT be more painful (i.e. worse) than a major headache, even while the same minor 5 headaches all had by one person can (and would be, under the supposition). Importantly, I never took myself to be disagreeing with you on whether 5 instances

1) I'd like to know what your definition of "subject-of-experience" is.

2) For this to be true, I believe you would need to posit something about "conscious experience" that is entirely different than everything else in the universe. If say factory A produces 15 widgets, factory B produces 20 widgets, and Factory C produces 15 widgets, I believe we'd agree that the number of widgets in A+C is greater than the number of widgets produced by B, no matter how independent the factories are. Do you disagree with this?

Similarly, I'd say if 15 n... (read more)

0
Jeffhe
6y
1) A subject of experience is just something which "enjoys" or has experience(s), whether that be certain visual experiences, pain experiences, emotional experiences, etc... In other words, a subject of experience is just something for whom there is a "what-it's-like". A building, a rock or a plant is not a subject of experience because it has no experience(s). That is, for example, why we don't feel concerned when we step on grass: it doesn't feel pain or feel anything. On the other hand, a cow is a subject-of-experience - it presumably has visual experiences and pain experience and all sorts of other experiences. Or more technically, a subject-of-experience (or multiple) may be realized by a cow's physical system (i.e. brain). There would be a single subject-of-experience if all the experiences realized by the cow's physical system are felt by a single subject. Of course, it is possible that within the cow's physical system's life span, multiple subjects-of-experience are realized. This would be the case if not all of the experiences realized by the cow's physical system are felt by a single subject. 2) But when we say that 5 minor headaches is "worse" or "more painful" than a major pain, we are not simply making a "greater than, less than, or equal to" number comparison like 5 minor headaches is more headaches than 1 major headaches. Clearly 5 minor headaches, whether they are spread across 5 persons or not, is more headaches than 1 major headache. But that is irrelevant. Because the claim you're making is that 5 minor headaches, whether they are spread across 5 persons or not, is WORSE or MORE PAINFUL than 1 major headache. And this is where I disagree. I am saying that for 5 minor headaches to be plausibly worse than a major headache, it must be the case that there is a what-it's-like-of-going-through-5-minor-headaches, because only THAT KIND of experience can be plausibly worse or more painful than a major headache. But, for there to be THAT KIND of experie

I'd say I'm making two arguments:

1) There is no distinct personal identity; rather it's a continuum. The you today is different than the you yesterday. The you today is also different from the me today. These differences are matters of degree. I don't think there is clearly a "subject of experience" that exists across time. There are too many cases (eg. brain injuries that change personality) that the single consciousness theory can't account for.

2) Even if I agreed that there was a distinct difference in kind that represented a consistent person... (read more)

0
Jeffhe
6y
1) I agree that the me today is different from the me yesterday, but I would say this is a qualitative difference, not a numerical difference. I am still the numerically same subject-of-experience as yesterday's me, even though I may be qualitatively different in various physical and psychological ways from yesterday's me. I also agree that the me today is different from the you today, but here I would say that the difference is not merely qualitative, but numerical too. You and I are numerically different subjects-of-experience, not just qualitatively different. Moreover, I would agree that our qualitative differences are a matter of degrees and not of kind. I am not a chair and you a subject-of-experience. We are both embodied subjects-of-experience (i.e. of that kind), but we differ to various degrees: you might be taller or lighter-skinned, etc I thus agreed with all your premises and have shown that they can be compatible with the existence of a subject-of-experience that extends through time. So I don't quite see a convincing argument for the lack of the existence of a subject-of-experience that extends through time. 2) So here you're granting me the existence of a subject-of-experience that extends through time, but you're saying that it makes no moral difference whether one subject-of-experience suffers 5 minor headaches or 5 numerically different subjects-of-experience each experience 1 minor headache, and that therefore, we should just focus on the number of headaches. Well, as I tried to explain in previous replies, when there is one subject-of-experience who extends through time, it is possible for him to experience what it's like of going through 5 minor headaches, since after all, he experiences all 5 minor headaches (whether he remembers experiencing them or not). Moreover, it is ONLY the what-it's-like-of-going-through-5-minor-headaches that can plausibly be worse or more painful than the what-it's-like-of-going-through-a-major-headache. In cont

It's the same 5 headaches. It doesn't matter if you're imagining one person going through it on five days or imagine five different people going through it on one day. You can still imagine 5 headaches. You can imagine what it would be like to say live the lives of 5 different people for one day with and without a minor headache. Just as you can imagine living the life of one person for 5 days with and without a headache. The connection to an individual is arbitrary and unnecessary.

Now this goes into the meaningless of personhood as a concept, but what wou... (read more)

0
Jeffhe
6y
If I'm understanding you correctly, you essentially deny that there is a metaphysical difference (i.e. a REAL difference) between A. One subject-of-experience experiencing 5 headaches over 5 days (say, one headache per day), and B. Five independent subjects-of-experience each experiencing 1 headache over 5 days (say, each subject has their 1 headache on a different day, such that on any given day, only one of them has a headache). And you deny this BECAUSE you think that, in case A for example, there simply is no fact of the matter as to how many subjects-of-experience there were over those 5 days IN THE FIRST PLACE, and NOT because you think one subject-of-experience going through 5 headaches IS IDENTICAL to five independent subjects-of-experience each going through 1 headache. Also, you are not simply saying that we don't KNOW how many subjects of experience there were over those 5 days in case A, but that there actually isn't an answer to how many there were. The indeterminate-ness is "built into the world" so to speak, and not just existing in our state of mind. You therefore think it is arbitrary to say that one subject-of-experience experienced all 5 headaches over the 5 days or that 5 subjects-of-experience each experienced 1 headache over the 5 days. But importantly, IF there is a fact of the matter as to how many subjects-of-experience there is in any given time period, you would NOT continue to think that there is no metaphysical difference between case A and B. And this is because you agree that one subject-of-experience going through 5 headaches is not identical to five independent subjects-of-experience each going through 1 headache. You would say, "Obviously they are not identical. The problem, however, is that - in case A, for example - there simply is no fact of the matter as to how many subjects-of-experience there were over those 5 days IN THE FIRST PLACE so saying that one subject-of-experience experienced all 5 headaches is arbitrary." I h

I think this is confusing means of estimation with actual utils. You can estimate that 5 headaches are worse than one by asking someone to compare five headaches vs. one. You could also produce an estimate by just asking someone who has received one small headache and one large headache whether they would rather receive 5 more small headaches or one more large headache. But there's no reason you can't apply these estimates more broadly. There's real pain behind the estimates that can be added up.

0
Jeffhe
6y
I agree with the first half of what you said, but I don't agree that "there's no reason you can't apply these estimates more broadly (e.g. to a situation where 5 minor headaches are spread across 5 persons). Sure, a person who has felt only one minor headache and one major headache can say "If put to the choice, I think I'd rather receive another major headache than 5 more minor headaches", but he says this as a result of imagining roughly what it would be like for him to go through 5 of this sort of minor headache and comparing that to what it was like for him to go through the one major headache. Importantly, what is supporting the intelligibility of his statement is STILL the what-it's-like-of-going-through-5-minor-headaches, except that this time (unlike in my previous reply), the what-it's-like-of-going-through-5-minor-headaches is imagined rather than actual. But in the situation where the 5 minor headaches are spread across 5 people, there isn't a what-it's-like-of-going-through-5-minor-headaches, imagined or actual, to support the intelligibility of the claim that 5 minor headaches (spread across 5 people) are worse or more painful than a major headache. What there is are five independent what-it's-like-of-going-through-1-minor-headache, since 1) the 5 people are obviously experientially independent of each other (i.e. each of them can only experience their own pain and no one else's), and 2) each of the 5 people experience just one minor headache. But these five independent what-it's-likes can't support the intelligibility of the above claim. None of these what-it-likes are individually worse or more painful than the major headache. And they cannot collectively be worse or more painful than the major headache because they are experientially independent of each other. The what-it's-like-of-going-through-5-minor-headaches is importantly different from five independent what-it's-like-of-going-through-1-minor-headache, and only the former can support the

If a small headache is worth 2 points of disutility and a large headache is worth 5, the total amount of pain is worse because 2*5>5. It's a pretty straightforward total utilitarian interpretation.I find it irrelevant whether there's one person who's worse off; the total amount of pain is larger.

I'll also note that I find the concept of personhood to be incoherent in itself, so it really shouldn't matter at all whether it's the same "person". But while I think an incoherent personhood concept is sufficient for saying there's no difference if it's spread out over 5 people, I don't think it's necessary. Simple total utilitarianism gets you there.

0
Jeffhe
6y
I assume we agree that we determine the points of disutility of the minor and major headache by how they each feel to someone. Since the major headache hurts more, it's worth more points (5 in this case). But, were a single person to suffer all 5 minor headaches, he would end up having felt what it is like to go through 5 headaches - a feeling that would make him say things like "Going through those 5 minor headaches is worse/more painful than a major headache" or "There was more/greater/larger pain in going through those 5 minor headaches than a major headache". We find these statements intelligible. But that is because we're at a point in life where we too have felt what it is like to go through multiple minor pains, and we too can consider (i.e. hold before our mind) a major pain in isolation, and compare these feelings: the what-it's-like of going through multiple minor pains vs the what-it's-like of going through a major pain. But once the situation is that the 5 minor headache are spread across 5 people, there is no longer the what-it's-like-of-going-through-5-minor-headaches, just 5 independent what-it's-likes-of-going-through-1-minor-headache. As a result, in this situation, when you say "the total amount of pain [involved in 5 minor headaches] is worse [one major headache]", or that "the total amount of pain [involved in 5 minor headaches] is larger [than one major headache], there is nothing to support their intelligibility. So, I honestly don't understand these statements. Sure, you can use numbers to show that 10 > 5, but there is no reality that that maps on to (i.e. describes). I worry that representing pain in numbers is extremely misleading in this way. Regarding personhood, I think my position just requires me to be committed to there being a single subject-of-experience (is that what you meant by person?) who extends through time to the extent that it can be the subject of more than one pain episode. I must admit I know very little about the t

Choice situation 3: We can either save Al, and four others each from a minor headache or Emma from one major headache. Here, I assume you would say that we should save Emma from the major headache

I think you're making a mistaken assumption here about your readers. Conditional on agreeing 5 minor headaches in one person is worse than 1 major headache in one person, I would feel exactly the same if it were spread out over 5 people. I expect the majority of EAs would as well.

-1
Jeffhe
6y
Hi Michael, Thanks very much for your response. UPDATE (ADDED ON MAR 16): I have shortened the original reply as it was a bit repetitive and made improvements in its clarity. However, it is still not optimal. Thus I have written a new reply for first-time readers to better appreciate my position. You can find the somewhat improved original reply at the end of this new reply (if interested): To be honest, I just don't get why you would feel the same if the 5 minor headaches were spread across 5 people. Supposing that 5 minor headaches in one person is (experientially) worse than 1 major headache in one person (as you request), consider WHAT MAKES IT THE CASE that the single person who suffers 5 minor headaches is worse off than a person who suffers just 1 major headache, other things being equal. Well, imagine that we were this person who suffers 5 minor headaches. We suffer one minor headache one day, suffer another minor headache sometime after that, then another after that, etc. By the end of our 5th minor headache, we will have experienced what it’s like to go through 5 minor headaches. After all, we went through 5 minor headaches! Note that the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-5-headaches consists simply in the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-the-first-minor-headache then the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-the-second-minor-headache then the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-the-third-minor-headache, etc. Importantly, the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-5-headaches is NOT whatever we experience right after having our 5th headache (e.g. exhaustion that might set in after going through many headaches or some super painful headache that is the "synthesis" of the intensity of the past 5 minor headaches). It is NOT a singular/continuous feeling like the feeling we have when we're experiencing a normal pain episode. It is simply this: the what-it’s-like of going through one minor headache, then another (sometime later), then another, then another, then another. Noth

On this topic, I similarly do still believe there’s a higher likelihood of creating hedonium; I just have more skepticism about it than I think is often assumed by EAs.

This is the main reason I think the far future is high EV. I think we should be focusing on p(Hedonium) and p(Delorium) more than anything else. I'm skeptical that, from a hedonistic utilitarian perspective, byproducts of civilization could come close to matching the expected value from deliberately tiling the universe (potentially multiverse) with consciousness optimized for pleasure or pain. If p(H)>p(D), the future of humanity is very likely positive EV.

In most cases, I expect interventions to impact policy to also have diminishing marginal returns. Eg An experiment on legislative contacts found little increased effect with more calls (https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109-014-9277-1) .

(Global catastrophic risks: Fund CEPI, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations.) looks interesting. It looks like they have a goal of raising 1B dollars (http://www.sabin.org/updates/blog/cepi-new-approach-epidemic-preparedness). My impression is that they are likely to meet this, but I may be mistaken. Would additional funding to CEPI likely be counterfactual?

Sure, this material is most important for EAs. However, it could be used to raise funding from EAs that would then be used to secure even more funding from the public sector in a way that's more difficult for AI safety.

Really exciting work! This seems like an intervention that could potentially be funded with public resources more easily than AI safety research could, which opens up another avenue to funding.

I see how this could be very useful in the event of a nuclear war, but I do have some skepticism about how useful these alternative foods wold be for a less severe shortage. With a 10% reduction in agricultural productivity, why do you think alternative foods that don't need sunlight could be cheaper than simply expanding how much of useable land we devote to agriculture/using land to grow products that are cheaper per calorie?

3
Denkenberger
6y
As for the funding part of your comment, it is true that the agricultural risks are more mainstream than AI. We have been pursuing public resources (e.g. grants). However, I think EAs with their willingness to change their minds and openness to expected value calculations are ideal candidates to recognize the value of this early on and help get it off the ground.
4
Denkenberger
6y
Thanks! Good question - for a 10% shortfall, it is more about alternate feed than alternate food. The natural gas digesting bacteria is currently being used as fish feed. We could utilize agricultural residues much better, first extracting edible calories directly, which has been done at both small and large scale. Then we take the left over of that and put it into a cellulosic or second-generation biofuel process that breaks the cellulose into sugar that people could eat. Finally, the leftover from that could be fed to animals. In addition, we might be able to have municipal collection of food waste to feed pigs. Just with agricultural residues, we could save/produce more than 10% of our current food consumption. Another possibility is growing mushrooms on logging residues that normally just decompose and feeding the leftover from that to animals, which has already been done. And we might even want to do some of this now to reduce the environmental impact of animals.

As a quick update, I also tried something similar on the EA survey to see whether making certain EA considerations salient would impact people's donation plans. The end result was essentially no effect. Obligation, Opportunity, and emphasizing cost benefit studies on happiness all had slightly negative treatment effects compared to the control group. The dependent variable was how much EA survey takers reported planning to donate in the future.

It might make a lot of sense to test the risk vs. accidents framing on the next survey of AI researchers.

0
kbog
7y
You will have to be sure that the researchers actually know what you mean though. AI researchers are already concerned about accidents in the narrow sense, and they could respond positively to the idea of preventing AI accidents merely because they have something else in mind (like keeping self driving cars safe or something like that). If accept this switch to language that is appealing at the expense of precision then eventually you will reach a motte-and-bailey situation where the motte is the broad idea of 'preventing accidents' and the bailey is the specific long-term AGI scheme outlined by Bostrom and MIRI. You'll get fewer funny looks, but only by conflating and muddling the issues.

I disagree. I believe good ballot measure polling should more accurately reflect the actual language that would appear on the ballot. There's a known bias towards voters being more likely to support simpler language.

Unless this is an extremely expensive measure (which is probably won't be), I don't think that assumption is correct. Most voters will probably never hear about the initiative before they see it on the ballot/will have seen a cursory ad that they barely paid attention to.

Cool; had missed that row. Yeah, if it polls, 70% the chance of passage might be close to 80%. Conditional upon that level of support, your estimate seems reasonable to me (assuming the ballot summary language would not be far more complex than the polled language).

Yeah, I agree that it being an effective treatment is a necessary precursor to it being a good ballot law to pass by ballot initiative and part of the EV calculation for spending money on the ballot measure itself.

That seems similar to Milan_Griffes' approach. However, when we're comparing ballot measures to other opportunities, I think the relevant cost to EA would be the cost to launch the campaign. That's what EAs would actually be spending money on and what could be spent on other interventions.

We don't have to assume away the additional costs of getting the medicine, but that can be factored into the benefit (ie. the net benefit is the gains they would get from the medicine - the gains they lose from giving up the funds to purchase the drugs)

Hey; I made some comments on this on the doc, but I thought it was worth bringing them to the main thread and expanding.

First of all, I'm really happy to sea other EAs looking at ballot measures. They're a potentially very high EV method of passing policy/raising funding. They're particularly high value per dollar when spending on advertising is limited/nothing since the increased probability of passage from getting a relatively popular measure on the ballot is far more than the increased probability from spending the same amount advertising for it.

Also, a... (read more)

1
Milan_Griffes
7y
2
Peter Wildeford
7y
One potential way of thinking about this is that the ballot measure in itself does not accomplish much, it just "unlocks" the ability for people to more cheaply help themselves. This could be modeled as the costs of the ballot measure + the costs of people helping themselves over a stream of X years, put against the benefits of people helping themselves over X years. I would use 5 for X, assuming that a lot can change in 5 years and maybe drug legalization would happen anyway, but I think a higher value for X could also be justified. This kind of (costs of unlocking + costs of what is unlocked over time) vs. benefits of what is unlocked over time is also how I model the cost-benefit of developing a new medicine (like a vaccine), since the medicine is useless unless it is actually given to people, which costs additional money.

Thanks!

I adapted that framing from Will MacAskill (example of this starting 12:45 in the podcast with Sam Harris here: https://www.samharris.org/podcast/item/being-good-and-doing-good). MacAskill refers to the framing as "Excited Altruism" It might come across as better when he tells it than in a web survey. But I think it's pretty similar. I grouped this in with "opportunity", which I've also seen called "exciting opportunity" in the ea community (http://lukemuehlhauser.com/effective-altruism-as-opportunity-or-obligation/).

Bu... (read more)

Sounds interesting. Would love to take a look when you get a chance to provide the links.

Yeah, the survey was a lot longer. Typically general public surveys will cost over 10 dollars a complete, so getting 1200 cases for a survey like this can cost thousands of dollars.

I agree that model specification can be tricky, which is a reason I felt it well worth it to use the proprietary software I had access to that has been thoroughly vetted and code reviewed and is used frequently to run similar analyses rather than trying to construct my own.

I did not make sure people read the paragraph. I discussed the issue a bit in my discussion section, but on... (read more)

No; I did not fit multiple models. Lasso regression was used to fit a propensity model using the predictors.

Using bachelor's vs. non-bachelor's has advantages in interpretability, so I think this was the right move for my purposes.

I did not spend an exorbitant amount of time investigating diagnostics, for the same reason I used a proprietary package was has been built for running these tests at a production level and has been thoroughly code reviewed. I don't think it's worth the time to construct an overly customized analysis.

1
nikvetr
7y
Ah, gotcha. But re: code review, even the most beautifully constructed chains can fail, and how you specify your model can easily cause things to go kabloom even if the machine's doing everything exactly how it's supposed to. And it only takes a few minutes to drag your log files into something like Tracer and do some basic peace-of-mind checks (and others, e.g. examine bivariate posterior distributions to assess nonidentifiably wrt your demographic params). More sophisticated diagnostics are scattered across a few programs but don't take too long to run either (unless you have e.g. hundreds or thousands of chains, like in marginal likelihood estimation w/ stepping stones... a friend's actually coming out with a program soon -- BONSAI -- that automates a lot of that grunt work, which might be worth looking out for!). :] (on phone at gym with shit wifi so can't provide links/refs atm, sorry!)

Sure, in an ideal world, software would all be free for everyone; alas, we do not live in such a world :p. I used the proprietary package because it did exactly what I needed and doesn't require writing STAN code or anything myself. I'd rather not re-invent the wheel. I felt the tradeoff of transparency for efficiency and confidence in its accuracy was worth it, especially since I wouldn't be able to share the data either way (such are the costs of getting these questions on a 1200 person survey without paying a substantial amount).

But the basic model was just a multilevel binomial model predicting the dependent variable using the treatments and questions asked earlier in the survey as controls.

0
nikvetr
7y
Of course (though wheel reinvention can be super helpful educationally), but there are great free public R packages that interface to STAN (I use "rethinking" for my hierarchical Bayesian regression needs but I think Rstan would work, too), so going with someone's unnamed, private code isn't necessary imo. How much did the survey cost (was it a lot longer than the included google doc, then? e.g. Did you have screening questions to make sure people read the paragraph?). And model+mcmc specification can have lots of fiddly bits that can easily lead us astray, I'd say

Unfortunately, because I used proprietary survey data/a proprietary R package to run this analysis, I don't think I'll be able to share the data and code.

1
nikvetr
7y
Ah, interesting! What package? I've never heard of something like that before. Usually in the cold, mechanical heart of every R package is the deep desire to be used and shared as far as possible. If it's just someone's personal interface code, why not use something more publicly available? Can you write out your basic script in pseudocode (or just math/words?)? Especially the model and MCMC specification bits?

Yup, binomial.

The respondents in a treatment were each shown a message and asked how compelling they thought it was. The control was shown no message.

Yeah; the plots are the predicted values for those given a particular treatment. and Average Treatment Effect is the difference with the control.

I did not include every control used in the provided questionnaire. There were a mix of demographics/attitudinal/behavioral questions asked in the survey that I also used. These controls, particularly previous donations, were important for decreasing variance.

I use... (read more)

0
nikvetr
7y
Ah, I guess that's better than no control, and presumably paying attention to a paragraph of text doesn't make someone substantially more or less generous. Did you fit a bunch of models with different predictors and test for a sufficient improvement of fit with each? Might do to be wary of overfitting in those regards maybe... though since those aren't focal Bayes tends to be pretty robust there, imo, so long as you used sensible priors "I used a multilevel model to estimate the effects among those with and without a bachelor's degree. So, the bachelor's estimate borrow's power from those without a degree, reducing problems with over fitting." If I'm understanding correctly, you had a hyperprior on the effect of education level? With just two options? IDK that that would help you much (if you had more: e.g. HS, BA/S, MS, PhD, etc. it might, but I'd try to preserve ordering there, myself). "These models used STAN, which handles these multilevel models well. Convergence was assessed with gelman-rubin statistics." STAN's great, but certainly not magic or perfect, and though idk them personally I'm sure its authors would strongly advocate paranoia about its output. So you got convergence with multiple (2?) chains from a random (hopefully) starting value? R_hats were all 1? That's good! Did all the other cheap diagnostics turn up ok (e.g trace plots, autocorrelation times/ESS, marginal histograms, quick within-chain metrics, etc.)?

I agree that the modal outcome of a Trump presidency is that he changes little and the Democrats come out stronger at the end of his presidency than they entered. However, I still think it would have been better that Clinton had won (even if we assume the same congress).

The most important reason is tail risk. As others have commented, the risk of nuclear war may be greater under Trump than it would have been under Clinton. So far, he seems to be pursuing a more conventional foreign policy than I feared, but I still believe the risk is higher than with Clin... (read more)

Thanks for the write up. I think you make a compelling case that this is more effective than canvassing, which can be over 1000 dollars for votes at the margin in a competitive election like 2016. I do think there are a few ways your estimate may be an overestimate though.

Of those who claimed they would follow through with vote trading, some may not have. You mention that there wouldn't have been much value to defecting. However, much of the value of a vote for individual comes from tribal loyalties rather than affecting the outcome. That's why turnout is... (read more)

2
Ben_West
7y
Yeah, those are fair points. I would say that some EA's seem to over-estimate the amount of time people put into choosing a candidate. There are probably a few people who are calculating the Nash equilibrium and deciding to defect after agreeing to trade, but most people just do the honest thing because they are honest.

This sounds really great to me. I love the idea of having more RCTs in the EA sphere. I would definitely record how much they are giving 1 year later.

I also think it's worth having a hold out set. People can pre-register the list of friends, than a random number generator can be used to randomly selects some friends not to make an explicit GWWC pitch to. It's possible many of the friends/contacts who join GWWC and start donating are those who have already been exposed to EA ideas before over a long period of time, and the effect size of the direct GWWC pi... (read more)

1
Linch
7y
I don't think there will be enough datapoints to do this. But if there are enough people willing to be in this experiment and they think they have a lot of friends they'll be willing to contact, I will include a holdout set.

You can't look at aggregate turnout numbers being different and assume the composition of turnout was different. You're making the assumption that there was 0 movement from Obama to Trump or from Romney to Clinton; both of which are definitely incorrect as evidenced by polling.

Secondly, turnout is much higher than that appears; much more will come in from California, Washington, Oregon and Colorado. It always takes these states forever to report. So the turnout numbers now are misleading.

At most, campaign funds would have moved this a point or two. Campaign funding has little impact on presidential elections; Clinton far outspent Trump and Trump was far outspent in the primary election. If we assume an effective size of 5% for all of Trump's money and assume no diminishing marginal return (both very generous assumptions), that 0.15% is 0.0075 percentage points in movement. The outcome was decided by 1, so that's over two orders of magnitude lower than what was needed under generous assumptions. It was probably more orders of magnitude lowe... (read more)

1
kbog
7y
It is true. Romney got 61 million votes and McCain got 60 million. Obama got 69 million and 66 million in 2008 and 2012 respectively. This year, Trump got 60 million votes and Hillary got 61 million. Well, depending on how early before the election you want to consider. The debates for instance were all more than a week before the election. Again, it's basically impossible to put effort into making things like this happen, and the best way to do so might simply be conventional ways of building political clout and awareness.

Thiel had essentially nothing to do with the outcome of this election.

This was not primarily a turnout issue. Black turnout was down, but Hispanic turnout was up. White turnout appears relatively flat (both Democratic and Republican white turnout), but we'll know more when actual person level vote history is released. Regardless, EA messaging is not the right way to appeal to Berners.

The easiest way to shift the outcome of the election would have been to change public opinion by a point or two by shifting the narrative of the race in the final week. Comey was successful at doing this.

1
kbog
7y
Well he gave about 0.15% of their money, and campaign funding is fairly important. The important thing is that in future campaigns, funding may influence the outcome of elections. It was all about turnout, fewer people voted Democrat than in 2012 and 2008. Trump won just by holding onto similar GOP vote totals from previous elections while people dropped Clinton. I don't know what the right type of messaging is and I don't know who we will need to appeal to in 4 or 8 years. My point is that there are probably bigger things to be done besides phone banking. That's a good point but I think it was an exceptional case as the email story had been unfolding for many months and people were already primed to watch for news about it. It's also very hard to actually do it intentionally if you don't have some big news you can release.
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