All of Parker_Whitfill's Comments + Replies

We are still working on getting a more official version of this on Arvix, possibly with estimates for  and 

When we do that, we'll also upload full replication files. But I don't want to keep anyone waiting for the data in case they have some uses for it, so see here for the main CSV we used: https://github.com/parkerwhitfill/EOS_AI

1
Parker_Whitfill
Arxiv link here https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.23181

On 2), the condition you find makes sense, but aren't you implicitly assuming an elasticity of substitution of 1 with Cobb-Douglas?

Yes, definitely. In general, I don't have a great idea about what  looks like. The Cobb-Douglas case is just an example. 

Yep. We are treating  as homogenous (no differentiation in skill, speed, etc.) I'm interested in thinking about quality differentiation a bit more. 

In complete generality, you could write effective labor as 

.

That is, effective labor is some function of the number of human researchers we have, the effective inference compute we have (quantity of AIs we can run) and the effective training compute (quality of AIs we trained). 

The perfect substitution claim is that once training compute is sufficiently high, then eventually we can spend the inference compute on running some AI that substitutes for human researchers. Mathematically, for some 

w... (read more)

3
Charlie Harrison
Thanks for this Parker. I continue to think this research is insanely cool. I agree with 1) On 2), the condition you find makes sense, but aren't you implicitly assuming an elasticity of substitution of 1 with Cobb-Douglas? Could be interesting to compare with Aghion et al. 2017. They look at a CES case with imperfect substitution (i.e., humans needed for some tasks). https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w23928/w23928.pdf

Here is a fleshed out version of Cheryl's response. Lets suppose actual research capital is  but we just used  in our estimation equation. 

Then the true estimation equation is 

re-arranging we get 

So if we regress  on a constant and  then the coefficient on  is still  as long as q is  independent of 

Nevertheless, I think this should increase your uncertainty in our estimates because there is clearly a lot go... (read more)

Note that if you accept this, our estimation of  in the raw compute specification is wrong. 

The cost-minimization problem becomes 

.

Taking FOCs and re-arranging, 

So our previous estimation equation was missing an A on the relative prices. Intuitively, we understated the degree to which compute was getting cheaper. Now A is hard to observe, but let's just assume its growing exponentially with an 8 month doubling time per this Epoch paper. 

Imputing this guess of A, and estimating via OLS w... (read more)

I spent a bit of time thinking about this today.

Lets adopt the notation in your comment and suppose that  is the same across research sectors, with common . Let's also suppose common 

Then we get blow up in  iff 

The intution for this result is that when , you are bottlenecked b... (read more)

5
Tom_Davidson
Nice! I think that condition is equivalent to saying that A_cog explodes iff either * phi_cog + lambda > 1 and phi_exp + lambda > 1, or * phi_cog > 1 Where the second possibility is the unrealistic one where it could explode with just human input

Also, updating this would change all the intelligence explosion conditions, not just when 

Yep, I think this gets the high-level dynamics driving the results right. 

This is a good point, we agree, thanks! Note that you need to assume that the algorithmic progress that gives you more effective inference compute is the same that gives you more effective research compute. This seems pretty reasonable but worth a discussion. 

Although note that this argument works only with the CES in compute formulation. For the CES in frontier experiments, you would have the  so the A cancels out.[1]

  1. ^

    You might be able to avoid this by adding the A's in a less naive fashion. You don't have to train larger models

... (read more)
2
Tom_Davidson
Yep, as you say in your footnote, you can choose to freeze the frontier, so you train models of a fixed capability using less and less compute (at least for a while). 
1
Parker_Whitfill
Also, updating this would change all the intelligence explosion conditions, not just when σ<1. 

Thanks for the insightful comment. 

I take your overall point as the static optimization problem may not be properly specified. For example, costs may not be linear in labor size because of adjustment costs to growing very quickly or costs may not be linear in compute because of bulk discounting. Moreover, these non-linear costs may be changing over time (e.g., adjustment costs might only matter in 2021-2024 as OpenAI, Anthropic have been scaling labor aggressively). I agree that this would bias the estimate of . Given the data we have, there sho... (read more)

Great paper, as always Phil. 

I'm curious to hear your thoughts a bit more about if we can salvage SWE by introducing non-standard preferences. 

Minor quibble: "There is then no straightforward sense in which economic growth has historically been exponential, the central stylized fact which SWE and semi-endogenous models both seek to explain" 

I agree that there is no consumption aggregate under non-homothetic preferences, but we can still say economic growth has been exponential in the sense that GDP growth is exponential. Perhaps it is not a ... (read more)

6
trammell
Thanks! And yeah, that's fair. One possible SWE-style story I sort of hint at there is that we have preferences like the ones I use in the horses paper; process efficiency for any given product grows exponentially with a fixed population; and there are fixed labor costs to producing any given product. In this case, it's clear that measured GDP/capita growth will be exponential (but all "vertical") with a fixed population. But if you set things up in just the right way, so that measured GDP always increases by the same proportion when the range of products increases by some marginal proportion, it will also be exponential with a growing population ("vertical"+"horizontal"). But I think it's hard to not have this all be a bit ad-hoc / knife-edge. E.g. you'll typically have to start out ever less productive at making the new products, or else the contribution to real GDP of successive % increases in the product range will blow up: as you satiate in existing products, you're willing to trade ever more of them for a proportional increase in variety. Alternatively, you can say that the range of products grows subexponentially when the population grows exponentially, because the fixed costs of the later products are higher.

People often appeal to Intelligence Explosion/Recursive Self-Improvement as some win-condition for current model developers e.g. Dario argues Recursive Self-Improvement could enshrine the US's lead over China. 

This seems non-obvious to me. For example, suppose OpenAI trains GPT 6 which trains GPT 7 which trains GPT 8. Then a fast follower could take GPT 8 and then use it to train GPT 9. In this case, the fast follower has a lead and has spent far less on R&D (since they didn't have to develop GPT 7 or 8 themselves).  

I guess people are thinking that OpenAI will be able to ban GPT 8 from helping competitors? But has anyone argued for why they would be able to do that (either legally or technically)?

2
JoshYou
They could exclusively deploy their best models internally, or limit the volume of inference that external users can do, if running AI researchers to do R&D is compute-intensive.  There are already present-day versions of this dilemma. OpenAI claims that DeepSeek used OpenAI model outputs to train its own models, and OpenAI doesn't reveal their reasoning models' full chains of thought to prevent competitors from using it as training data. 
5
calebp
I think the mainline plan looks more like use the best agents/model internally and release significantly less capable general agents/models, very capable but narrow agents/models, or AI generated products.
5
MichaelDickens
The lead could also break down if someone steals the model weights, which seems likely.

Is the alignment motivation distinct from just using AI to solve general bargaining problems? 

1
tylermjohn
I don't know! It's possible that you can just solve a bargain and then align AI to that, like you can align AI to citizens assemblies. I want to be pitched.

Here is a counterargument: focusing on the places where there is altruistic alpha is 'defecting' against other value systems. See discussion here

Parker_Whitfill
2
1
0
29% ➔ 7% disagree

Roughly buy that there is more "alpha" in making the future better because most people are not longtermist but most people do want to avoid extinction. 

1
Parker_Whitfill
Here is a counterargument: focusing on the places where there is altruistic alpha is 'defecting' against other value systems. See discussion here

Good point, but can't this trade occur just through financial markets without involving 1 on 1 trades among EAs? For example, if you have short timelines, you could take out a loan, donate it all to AI Safety. 

1
Spiarrow
I haven't thought about this a lot, but my impression is this doesn't work for smeared probability distributions and a medium level of risk aversion? Let's say Alice thinks there is still a 20% chance AGI doesn't happen super fast / doesn't have transformative impact and she needs to pay back a loan in 10 years. Then if she doesn't want to take the risk of not being able to pay in these timelines, she cannot really donate all of the loan now. On the other hand, a 20% chance that Alice has to donate a lot of money to global health doesn't look like such a big risk, at least if she doesn't have to donate everything right away.  But maybe the difference here is my implicit assumption that owing donations to Bob isn't a big of a risk as owing money to a bank, because the former might cut Alice more slack and give her more time to pay.

Agreed with this. I'm very optimistic about AI solving a lot of incentive problems in science. I don't know if the end case (full audits) as you mention will happen, but I am very confident we will move in a better direction than where we are now. 

 

I'm working on some software now that will help a bit in this direction! 

Since it seems like a major goal is of the Future Fund is to experiment and gain information on types of philanthropy —how much data collection and causal inference are you doing/plan to do on the grant evaluations? 

Here are some ideas I quickly came up with that might be interesting. 

  1. If you decided whether to fund marginal projects by votes or some scoring system—you could later assess what you think is the impact of funding projects by using a regression-discontinuity-design. 
  2. You mentioned that there is some randomness in who you used as r
... (read more)

I'd say it's close and depends on the courses you are missing from an econ minor instead of a major. If those classes are 'economics of x' classes (such as media or public finance), then your time is better spent on research. If those classes are still in the core (intermediate micro, macro, econometrics, maybe game theory) I'd probably take those before research. 

Of course, you are right that admissions care a lot about research experience - but it seems the very best candidates have all those classes AND a lot of research experience. 

I would say an ideal candidate is a math-econ double major, also taking a few classes in stats and computer science. All put together, that's quite a few classes, but not an unmanageable amount. 

Mau
10
0
0

Is your sense that that's better than math major + econ minor + a few classes in stats and computer science + econ research (doing econ research with the time that would have otherwise gone to extra econ classes)? I'd guess this makes sense since I've heard econ grad schools aren't too impressed by econ majors and care a lot about research experience.

One case where this doesn't seem to apply is an economics Ph.D. For that, it seems taking very difficult classes and doing very well in them is largely a prerequisite for admissions. I am very grateful I took the most difficult classes and spent a large fraction of my time on schoolwork. 

The caveat here is that research experience is very helpful too (working as an RA). 

1
Mau
Good point, thanks! Definitely seems like a case where taking hard classes is useful--do you think this is also a case where taking many classes is useful?

Is there a strong reason to close applications in January? 

I'm only familiar with the deadlines for economics graduate school, but for that you get decisions back from graduate school in February-March along with the funding package. Therefore, it would be useful to be able to apply for this depending on the funding package you receive (e.g. if you are fully funded you don't need to apply, but if you are given little or no funding, it would be important to apply) . 

3
Bastian_Stern
The main reason has to do with capacity/turnaround times. Our experience is that a lot of candidates apply very close to the deadline, and prospective grad students typically have to accept their offers in mid-April, so if we had set our deadline in, say, mid-March instead, this would have given us only c.4 weeks to process these applications (which as it happens is already going to be a busy period for the relevant team members for other reasons). The earlier deadline gives us more wiggle room, although it does come at the cost you highlight. Candidates who don’t apply in time for our deadline and find out in February/March that they’ll require funding may want to consider applying to the Long-Term Future Fund.

I highly recommend cold turkey blocker, link here. It offers many of the features you listed above,  including scheduled blocking, blocking the whole internet, blocking specific URL or search phrases (Moreover, this can be done with regex, so you can make the search terms very general),  password-protected blocks, no current loopholes (if there are ones please don't post them, I don't want to know!) and the loopholes that used to exist (proxies) got fixed. 

Pricing seems better than freedom as it's $40 for lifetime usage. My only complaint is that there is no phone version. 

I'd still agree that we should factor in cooperation, but my intuition is then that it's going to be a smaller consideration than neglect of future generations, so more about tilting things around the edges, and not being a jerk, rather than significantly changing the allocation. I'd be up for being convinced otherwise – and maybe the model with log returns you mention later could do that. If you think otherwise, could you explain the intuition behind it?

I think one point worth emphasizing is that if the cooperative portfolio is a p... (read more)

What piece of advice would you give to you 20 year old self?

Because my life has been a string of lucky breaks, ex post I wouldn’t change anything. (If I’d gotten good advice age 20, my life would have gone worse than it in fact has gone.) But assuming I don’t know how my life would turn out: 

  • Actually think about stuff and look stuff up, including on big-picture questions, like 'what is the most important problem in the world?'
  • Take your career decision really seriously. Think of it as a research project, dedicate serious time to it. Have a timeline for your life-plans that’s much longer than your degree. R
... (read more)

Strong upvote as a find EA book recommendations very useful, and I'd like to encourage more people to post recommendations.

As an aside, it could be worth noting which books are available as audiobooks.

My vague impression is that this is referred to as pluralism in the philosophy literature, and there are a few philosophers at GPI who subscribe to this view.

4
richard_ngo
From skimming the SEP article on pluralism, it doesn't quite seem like what I'm talking about. Pluralism + incomparability comes closer, but still seems like a subset of my position, since there are other ways that indefinability could be true (e.g. there's only one type of value, but it's intrinsically vague)

Thanks for the summary and the entire sequence of posts. I thoroughly enjoyed them. In my survey of the broader literature c) is mostly true and I'd certainly like to see more philosophical engagement on those issues.

"A pretty standard view of justice is that you don't harm others, and if you are harming them then you should stop and compensate for the harm done. That seems to describe what happens to farmed animals."

I think this only applies to people who are contributing to the harm. But for a vegan for is staunchly opposed to factory farming, they aren't harming the animals, so factory farming is not an issue of justice for them.

"Whether we seek to alleviate poverty directly or indirectly, we might suppose that such efforts will get a privileged status over very different cause areas if we endorse the justice view. But our other cause priorities deal with injustices too; factory farming is an unjust emergency, and an existential catastrophe would clearly be a massive injustice that might only be prevented if we act now. And just like poverty, both of these problems have been furthered by selfish and corrupt international institutions which have also contributed to our wealth

... (read more)
2
bwildi
Isn't factory farming a clear-cut case of injustice? A pretty standard view of justice is that you don't harm others, and if you are harming them then you should stop and compensate for the harm done. That seems to describe what happens to farmed animals. In fact, as someone who finds justice plausible, I think it creates a decent non-utilitarian argument to care about domestic animal suffering more than wild animal suffering. As my last sentence suggests, I do think that justice views are likely to affect cause prioritisation. I think you're right that justice may lead you to different conclusions about inter-generational issues, and is worth a deeper look.