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Answer by Pawntoe4May 10, 20231

The paper makes the general statements quoted but in the text body clarifies that the evaluation has limitations in scope, omitting:

a) Tipping element cascades

So far, research on cascading behavior has primarily leveraged conceptual modeling rather than process and scenario-based approaches, limiting the applicability of these results for investigating the third question of what the cumulative impacts of transitions by multiple tipping elements might be.

b) Several tipping elements that are warming-dependent

We omit potential carbon fluxes or radiat

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jackva

Technical q: Is the Armstrong picture not showing?

New 80,000 Hours Podcast on high-impact climate philanthropy

Pawntoe41y7

Verbalising the distinctions between 1 - 5 was something I was struggling with, so thanks for putting it so concisely and comprehensively. I agree with all the points you have made and the clarification at the end, which is what I was trying to say in a jumbled up way.

My impression on tipping point sensitivity was based on specific events happening significantly ahead of projections from modelling. I will have a read through the linked paper suggesting tipping points aren't as bad as thought and comment on your linked post from March if necessary, but othe... (read more)

jackva

Thank you! I agree with you that the biggest uncertainty right now is on "how does warming and its impact translate into societal consequences?" and I would be keen for anyone reducing the uncertainty there. As I also discussed in the podcast, I think the biggest indirect longtermist risk from climate likely stems from a situation where non-great-power conflicts made more likely through climate become more catastrophic (e.g. through more distributed bio WMDs).

New 80,000 Hours Podcast on high-impact climate philanthropy

Pawntoe41y7

I found myself strongly aligned with the opinions expressed in this podcast. I strongly agree with Johannes’ opinion on personal emissions reduction, pro-nuclear, funding in high growth, large population countries, governmental advocacy and almost everything else said. So the following isn’t meant to be a broad critique.

I was confused about a small section that had several layered points that I didn’t really agree with after a whole podcast of opinions that aligned with mine. The comments around the idea that indirect effects of climate change leading to h... (read more)

jackva

Thanks for the thoughtful comment! I've actually recently become worried about similar issues and am planning a post on the question whether climate risk is decreasing. There's a lot in here so let me decompose. Overall climate risk looks something like (1) Emissions > (2) Warming as a function of climate sensitivity and tipping points > (3) Climate impacts at the level of warming > (4) Vulnerability to direct climate impacts > (5) Vulnerability to indirect climate impacts (e.g. dealing with climate-induced migration) Going through the chain: Expected warming has gone down a lot Expectations of (1) have strongly moved down. Climate sensitivity has remained roughly stable, narrowing somewhat (for this and (1) see here), I think recent work on tipping points suggests that they are less severe than previously thought (see here, and discussion of this and a paper from last year here), overall this does not suggest a stronger climate response than previously assumed (2), if one had to make a directional update it would probably be a downward one. So overall we should expect less warming and, crucially, we should expect a disproportionate probability decrease in tail warming scenarios (because emissions observed essentially rule out RCP 8.5). Insofar as mechanisms 3-5 are independent of our knowledge of them, I think it is safe to say “it looks like climate risk has significantly decreased”. Of course, we could be badly surprised. How expected climate risk might not have decreased What got me worried was Figure 4 from the SMP of the recent IPCC Synthesis Report suggesting higher risks at lower levels of warming (for all observed reasons for concern, the likely occurrence has moved downward between AR5 and A56 (2014 to 2022)): I haven’t yet had time to do the math on this, but it could be that, as you suggest, expected climate risk is not decreasing (or even increasing) because, at the same time as we observe much lower expected warming we discover that imp

The case for delaying solar geoengineering research

Pawntoe44y1

Hi John, thanks for the reply, I wasn't expecting one after this long but I am pleased about the thoroughness and thought you put into it.

Yes, I think it's likely to be catastrophic (not extinction risk). If your assertion that it is only likely to be used when warming is 4C+, your whole argument is moot because that is already past the point of no return. From the base that 4C+ is an unacceptable situation, you would immediately be making the case that SG should be funded and accelerated by your own following argument - that currently policy and resear

... (read more)

7[anonymous]4y

Thanks for this - have some quick replies below 1. If solar geoengineering is not going to be used until we get to 4 degrees, then there is no point in researching it even if 4 degrees is catastrophic. 2. I agree that the constraints on state action are not perfect. As you say, the saudis fund terrorism and major powers flex their muscles at each other in more or less overt ways. The deployment of solar geoengineering would be on a different order - a huge and bold move. Do I think India would deploy solar geoengineering without the consent of China, risking the almost guaranteed ire of China? No. The bet offer was not rhetorical and still stands if you would like it. We can pick an arbiter to make sure it happens. If you are worried about decaying attention, we could have a shorter timeframe? What do you think is the chance in the next 10 years that someone deploys it? 3. The debate about AI safety seems like a distraction to me - if you showed me that the case was analogous to solar geoengineering research, then I would argue that we should also delay AGI safety research for the same reasons. But it is disanalogous in numerous ways, so I don't see the point in exploring the analogy. Nevertheless... one rationale for AGI safety research is that some people think there is a non-negligible chance of AI in the next 20 years. Indeed, Toby Ord's median estimate is that we will get it in the next 20 years. If you believe that, then the case for AI safety research now is very clear. That is one disanalogy. Secondly, the downsides of AGI research seem minimal. There is some dim possibility that AGI research could lead us to irrationally downplay the risks of AGI, but I have literally never seen this concern brought up before as a reason not to do AGI safety research. As far as I am aware, no-one is not doing AGI safety research because of that consideration. In contrast, in climate there is a pretty much cross-field taboo against against talking about solar geoenginee

How hot will it get?

Pawntoe44y3

Cloud formation was the biggest unknown feedback loop and efforts to model them more accurately has led to the increase in range. The effects only start at unprecedented levels of warming which is why observational data may not fit.

https://e360.yale.edu/features/why-clouds-are-the-key-to-new-troubling-projections-on-warming

2[anonymous]4y

right, that's bad news.

On Collapse Risk (C-Risk)

Pawntoe44y2

I have tried to lay out in the section on probability, above, that most X-risks are a subset of C-risks as they collapse usually has to happen before an existential event. Most X-risks in their moderate form, such as a nuclear winter lasting a few years, moderate climate change, or a global pandemic seem much more likely to pose a C-risk than an X-risk.

On Collapse Risk (C-Risk)

Pawntoe44y2

Thanks for the comment! I am aware about the GCRI and GCRs but I don't see the term getting used much and (in both cases) seem to get conflated with X-risks, but I haven't addressed this at all in the piece so I will add an edit.

Thanks for catching the typo. I've been trying to embed the images but it hasn't been working, so I'm contacting support for help.

The analogy I was making was that socially held values are liable to change and (usually) improve over time, and any specific value might not disqualify a future civilisation from being counted as valuab

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8 things I believe about climate change

Pawntoe44y5

This doesn't seem to be the context in which you were dropping the link, seeing as they all have top-level summary numbers that feed into your boundaries and point 1 doesn't say anything about 2m/year being a lower bound, seeing as you are using it as the upper bound. I would like to see these other estimates of climate mortality as they aren't referenced or seem to feed into point 1.

On a meta-level I think disconnecting sources with the context with which you are referencing them is very unfriendly to the reader as they have to wade through... (read more)

8 things I believe about climate change

Pawntoe44y9

I think when considering your estimates for 1. it is important to consider the boundaries given by those sources and to contextualise them.

The WHO is only looking at disease burden but even there they are expecting 250k to 2050 (not even looking to 2100) and they estimate that CC will exacerbate malnutrition by 3% of current values - this seems extremely conservative. They don't seem to include the range increases for most other insect-transmitted diseases, just malaria, even within the extremely limited subset of causes they consider.

Impactlab'... (read more)

Linch

I think while it's some evidence that he considers his analysis still quite conservative, the most important contextualization of Danny Bresler's analysis, for our very high-level purposes of understanding expert opinion as laymen, is that (iirc) he perceives it to be a new/contrarian position, where most estimates of climate change mortality burden is too low (from his perspective). I also prefer the framing of things I hyperlink as "links I added that I thought might be helpful for helping to understanding the question further," rather than "sources," but I think that was my own fault for trying to write a short post at the possible expense of accuracy.

The case for delaying solar geoengineering research

Pawntoe44y6

Hi John, thank you for this piece. I know it's been a long time since you posted this but I wanted to respond to some of your thoughts.

"In my view, solar geoengineering is only likely to be used once warming is quite extreme, roughly exceeding around 4 degrees" - +4C is already endgame and catastrophic in my opinion. Considering that most of the heat is being absorbed by oceans leading to acidification, we'll already be seeing significant sequestration losses as marine animals are unable to build calcium carbonate shells.

"This sug... (read more)

2[anonymous]4y

Hello thanks for these interesting comments 1. Do you think that 4 degrees is "endgame and catastrophic" in the sense of being a threat to the long-term flourishing of humanity, or something else? I agree 4 degrees would be bad, but I don't see how that is relevant to my argument. 2. "individual actors may resort to solar geoengineering without worldwide consensus" I argue against it in my piece. If brazil starts doing stratospheric aerosol injection, this would affect weather in the US and other allies - it's not a plausible piece of statecraft in my opinion. You mention the risk of 'rogue actors' deploying it - I don't see an argument against what I said in my piece on this. You are stating one common view in the literature that is especially worried about unilateralism, but I find the other multilateralism take more persuasive. I am happy to offer a bet on this - what do you think the odds are of a single state unilaterally deploying stratospheric aerosol injection for more than 6 months over the next 30 years? I'll offer £500 I win/ £500 you win. Other things equal, understanding the ramifications of SG would be good, but there are costs to doing so, namely mitigation obstruction risk. 3. I agree it would've been better to look more in detail at the effects on Russia and that does update me towards it being bad for them. 4. Not sure I see why the connection to AGI research is relevant here. We should worry about neglect of a solution when that neglect is irrational. I think SG research is neglected for a reason - scientists and funders don't want to do it because they are worried about the moral hazard. 5. "A lot of the warming is already locked into the ocean. Giving another 30 years before starting to research will likely be too late." What do you mean by "a lot"? Emissions until 2080 will have a large effect on what level of warming there will be - it is still technically within our power to follow RCP2.6 or RCP8.5, which would have hugely different i

How urgent are extreme climate change risks?

Pawntoe45y9

I do not disagree that the Vice piece and the think tank research are likely alarmist and unrepresentative, but unfortunately in my opinion John Halstead's analysis and the underlying IPCC reports are entirely too optimistic on the flipside. I think this leaves a lot of room for further serious evaluation of the potential existential risks on climate change.

Firstly, John Halstead's review of existing literature. I was privileged enough to go to his talk EA Global London 2018 which was a summary of this work. It is a very large and understudied fi... (read more)

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