All of Robin's Comments + Replies

This article isn't an exclusive list of the countries that celebrate it, merely a list of how it's celebrated in 11 noteworthy nations. It's also celebrated in Iran, China, Germany...

Good analogy. Note that environmental statements made by oil companies cannot be trusted even for a few years when expected profits increase, even when costly actions and investment patterns appear to back them up temporarily. E.g.
https://www.ft.com/content/b5b21c66-92de-45c0-9621-152aa335d48c

'BPs chief executive Bernard Looney defended its latest reversal, stating that “The conversation three or four years ago was somewhat singular around cleaner energy, lower-carbon energy. Today, there is much more conversation about energy security, energy affordability.”'

Do current person-affecting ethicists become longtermist if we achieve negligible senescence? Will virtue-ethicists too if we can predict how their virtue will develop over time? Do development economists become longtermists if we develop Foundation-style Psychohistory? We don't have a singular term for "not a virtue ethicist" other than "non-virtue ethicist" and there's no commonality amongst nonlongtermists other than being the out-group to longtermists.

Neartermist = explicitly sets a high effective discount rate (either due to uncertainty or a pure rate of time preference) should not include non-consequentialists or people with types of person-affecting views resulting in a low concern for future generations.

On your new document: I think I generally nod along to the peak oil and efficiency stuff. The renewables section is unconvincing, as you might imagine from our discussion above. You are right that there are a bunch of problems with IAMs making simplifications, but you don't demonstrate that any of the factors they are missing would seriously change the results of them. It's good to see that some of your arguments have grown more nuanced, but it also makes reviewing it more complicated and I don't really have the time to debug the report in detail. I'm some... (read more)

5
Corentin Biteau
9mo
Hi !  Thanks for the answer, sorry I didn't reply earlier. I started working on another project for EA France, aiming to identify impactful charities working in France, so I had much less time to spend on the topic of energy depletion. I didn't want to do a rushed answer, but didn't find the time to dig into the topic once again... you know how it goes. So instead, I'll just publish an update on my thinking on the topic (while keeping in minf that I have found several important articles that I have to read).   So far, I've updated more positively on renewables - their improvement is indeed faster than just about anyone had anticipated (which makes papers obsolete as soon as they're a few years old, and therefore makes it very difficult to get properly informed on the subject). Several articles I've read have indeed made me update on them. There were several elements where I had underestimated adaptability. The EROI of renewables is indeed correct. I have a higher probability of an energy transition "from the top", where we maintain energy growth (which isn't necessarily good news, given that the more energy we have, the greater our capacity to destroy our environment and generate existential risks). Your link about the Twitter thread exposing the limits to the GTK report was indeed interesting. I also found an article here that showed several other limits.  I'm talking less and less about a 2050 timeframe (which is what most of the litterature talks about). However, I'm more worried about what short-term disruptions could imply. Indeed, my worries are more about the fact that limits on fossil fuels are probably short-term : and that time constraints could prove significant. Going from a system where almost all trucks, or cement making, or steel making, or fertilizers, or hydrogen, or plastics (etc.) are dependent on fossil fuels, to a system where >50% of these are not fossil... this is going to take time, and I'm worried about what would happen during this t

Yes, that is the "arguably": do you require agency in your definition of trade, and at what level. There is a mutualistic relationship with the honeybee hives  that produce honey and pollinate well, hence their levels are rising during generally declining  numbers of other bees. Similarly, we have traded with the genomes of domestic animals, increasing their number, even if the individuals that hold the genes have a worse life because of this trade. There are several stages and timescales to these interactions. The bees trade labor for nectar wit... (read more)

Agree. We don't trade with ants but we do trade with monkeys, both in experiments https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=675503 and when tourists have things stolen https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/monkeys-bali-swipe-tourists-belongings-and-barter-them-snacks-180963485/. It seems to me that communication is all that is really required. Arguably all domestication is a trade that's become established over evolutionary timeframes. (Domesticated) honey bees are therefore both trading with us and with flowers when they pollinate and produc... (read more)

5
Lorenzo Buonanno
1y
Cross-posting a similar thread from LessWrong

I'm sorry your situation has deteriorated from the FTX scandal, that must be very difficult. A lot of people have it much worse than me!

I don't see this as an argument between "everything will turn out fine" and "things will end badly", but "things will go badly for very specific reasons to do with materials accessibility" and "materials accessibility is not the limiting factor". I consider something a lack of imagination where every aspect of the solution exists, but for cost reasons we don't currently combine them in most supply chains. Entirely electrif... (read more)

8
Corentin Biteau
1y
Hi !  It's a period with a lot of uncertainties but don't worry, I can manage. Many people have it worse, indeed, and are more in need of help. I am working on a post (well, probably in several parts) that aims to address the usual counterpoints to the problem of energy depletion:  https://docs.google.com/document/d/1l-VI5gR-xGaUL95tvNgZ_BsXFB-aUQOtlug9zC-sn3M/edit# Since you are good at challenging my position, maybe you could find some mistakes that would help improve the post. I talk about substitution and coal and transition scenarios and and whether adaptation is possible.   For me, the core issue is scale. Every individual aspect of the solution might exist, and can work in a small system, but does that mean it can scale up to what our industrial society requires? Or worse, to the ever-increasing requirements of economic growth? There are other ways of manufacturing things, yes. But there are also constraints of time and investment: right now, for materials this is the main constraint, since a mine takes on average 16 years to go from exploration to production. Several organizations, like the World Bank, the IEA, the IMF, McKinsey and Company and Eurometaux have all issued reports warning of this growing problem.  Ah, I had not seen that, good point. Plus, they seemed to have done a lot of efficiency. Does the materials that are used in the factory (metals, plastics) have been produced with renewables as well ? I haven't seen that info in the article. It's hard to pinpoint for historical examples at the global level, since a feature of our current civilization is interconnectedness. Every time a material shortage arised somewhere, it was possible to compensate with the production somewhere else (especially for oil). This means that in the last 70 years we haven't really tested yet a situation where oil is lacking everywhere, over an extended period. Still, there are some analysts asserting that oil depletion in Syria and Venezuela were a serious fact

I've been quite stressed, for reasons other than lack of materials! How about you?

I'm not particularly impressed by the podcast. It seems to lack any imagination in working out how to decarbonise the construction of renewable energy itself, which is not generally regarded as a fundamental problem (as opposed to being slightly expensive to transition).

I encountered this twitter thread which I think explains better than I did why EROI isn't that useful: https://mobile.twitter.com/AukeHoekstra/status/1341730308060831744

Exponential energy consumption increase ... (read more)

3
Corentin Biteau
1y
Ah, sorry to hear you've been stressed. The FTX debacle doesn't arrange things (I myself have a 6-months in indefinite hold because of that). I'm kind of disappointed that you handwave all the information in this podcast with a "lack of imagination".   I feel a bit like if I'd been told "don't worry, everything will sort itself out". Well, what if it doesn't ? I'm not asking for a scenario in which everything turns to be fine because this or this technology exists. I know it's a possibility. I'm wondering if things will really turn out that way. I read the book Life after fossil fuels  and it felt to me that she really tried to take a look at the solutions proposed, in more depth than almost anyone I've seen. Anything you can think of is probably on her website Energy skeptic, but it's more of a mess (and of course, pessimistic, but that shouldn't come as a surprise).   But even if we somehow  find a solution to replace almost all our fossil-based industrial system by something powered by intermittent electricity (the biggest 'if' in any sentence), I am still worrying over several points : Time constraints * It would take time  to do research and put into place these solutions. Replacing all of our industrial system that took many decades to build would take loads of time. * Renewables, so far, can replace electricity production. But if needs more complex supply chains to go beyond that (batteries, which needs mines that take time to be opened). * Right now less than 1% of truck transportation, ship transportation, cement making, steel making, most metal smelting, fertilizer production, mineral extraction, is made using electricity (and I'm not even talking about renewable electricity) * This means that until, say, 70% of the infrastructure switches to being powered by renewables, increases in oil, gas and coal prices (or at least decreases in availability) will have a huge impact on the affordability on the tranport of almost all commodities (leading to

Yes, I've also been busy and I think the conversation is getting hard to follow and delivering diminishing returns. But to address a few points: 

I think we are mostly in agreement that these scenarios are both bad and plausible, but disagree about the badness and plausibility. However on the second point, the paper you quote is simply not providing enough evidence of its point. Potentially 40 or so years of constant consumption would pass this test, but you should not assume that consumption of energy or resources is constant per GDP, as it simply has... (read more)

4
Corentin Biteau
1y
Oh, great to hear from you ! How have you been doing ?   Here are my answers to these points. I must admit that yeah, we have a different view on things - which is good as I learn a lot of stuff -, but I feel like I could explain better the extent of our predicament. I have found this podcast episode which should explain why I am still worried about all of that, and deeply worried. Now, it has exagerations on a number of points, and some of the data isn't the most recent, I absolutely agree, but damn, overall I really have trouble seeing how to solve all the issues she points out.   Now for the individual points: Thanks for pointing out the limits in Cherp et al. It's useful to know that, energy production is still going up to some extent - not fast enough, but still up. Energy consumption going up. You are right that we probably  won't consume as much energy and materials in the next ∼30 years as we did in the past 10,000 - that was indeed an exageration, sorry. But the overall amount of energy consumed is still going up, which is a problem.  * Even by accepting the hypothesis that most of the world economies will be service-based in the future (which begs the question of where industry will be done), like rich countries, a recent report estimates that this scenario, in my eyes optimistic, would still lead to an energy demand around 780-950 EJ in 2080, so 35-65% higher than in 2019. * As for materials, there is a recoupling of materials and economic growth, meaning we use more and more materials per point of GDP, at the moment when the economy was supposed to be dematerialized with the advent of the Internet. This trend is expected to worsen with a metal-based energy transition. For me, the risk of supply chains breaking down isn't that it lasts for several years. It's that such a breakdown would itself have terrible consequences even for a short period - and transforming deeply society.  * The food autonomy of cities in France is of about 2%. Meaning

Three scenarios where we do not make a green transition: 
Firstly, we are structurally prevented by government forces, for instance, in many countries there is difficulty in obtaining planning permission to get renewables in place, or have perverse tax incentives (gas cheaper than electricity for instance) that make the transition difficult. Both of these are currently happening in the UK, but  not enough to resist the pull of renewables completely!
Secondly,  energy demand takes off so quickly (perhaps due to AI) that we expand green power wi... (read more)

4
Corentin Biteau
2y
Sorry for the long wait! I was on a vacation. The points you put forward are important, if think all three scenarios you point out could happen, especially combined. To rephrase what you said, there are: 1. Systemic lock-ins, where the dominant actors prevent the arising of other solutions. I think another factor is implicit, it's that we know how to use fossil fuels everywhere, so most of the time it's the safest bet in industry or transportation. Of course, it's not preventing a transition, but it's slowing it down seriously. More on that here (p. 75). For instance, the European Commission wants to allow the use of coal and gas for green hydrogen. 1. Public opposition, you're right. In say Poland or France there is quite some opposition to windmills (I've seen that a legal complaint was filed for 7 out of 10 windmills projects in France). 2. Energy consumption still going up, and fast. If the global economy continues to grow at about 3.0% per year (although it could be less), we will consume as much energy and materials in the next ∼30 years as we did cumulatively in the past 10,000. Also, I'd be more optimistic if renewables were actually reducing fossil fuel use, instead of just adding up to it.  3. Supply chains breaking down. Talking about these below. A long enough recession could trigger this, as said in post 2. I think this is where we have probably a different view on things. "Fixing the situation" requires several components, some of them being international cooperation for trade and goods, trust in the future (for investment) and a long-term vision (for making the right technological choices). These elements are in decline, at least in the US or Europe. Not for China though, as you said, but I'd argue it is an outlier. If, say, France had to transition in a hurry toward renewables within the next 10 years, it would be entirely dependent of China, on which >80% of the solar panels manufacturing depends. Or on Chile or Australia for copper or lit

Yes, I think our exchange has been fruitful and thought-provoking. 
Battery-wise: I think this is why I focus on energy cost variability rather than absolute energy cost, energy may well have a negative cost at some times but very large at others. The analyses of the effects of these are different. 
Civilisation requires a large energy surplus, but I don't see any reason to assume that the EROI specifically needs to be any value above 1. If I change the unit of the solar cell (let's say EROI 10) to a solar-powered solar cell factory (EROI = 100 bec... (read more)

4
Corentin Biteau
2y
I'm curious, what would make you consider an option "we do not manage to do an energy transition" as a possible scenario? 1. I agree that I don't worry that much about China for this reason. China is able to do this because it has a goal of becoming n°1 and surpassing the US within 30 years - but as soon as it is less dependent on money from rich western countries, well, I'm not sure it will continue to supply resources and metals (controls >60-70% of refining) and solar panels in the same terms. I fail to envision a scenario where every nation is in"war economy" state but international cooperation and trade go on as usual. 1. We are very dependent on oil to make a transition because almost all (>99%) mining trucks, ships, long-distance trucks depend on oil. Same goes for plastic production and making asphalt. This indidentally means that oil is currently necessary for the extraction and transport of almost of all the world’s primary energy (solar panels and windmills are transported by road, as is coal). We could switch to electric trucks or stuff like that (at what scale? with what materials?), but by the time >50% of global transport changes (when?), every price increase in oil will affect the availablility of the rest of energy sources. 2. I don't base myself on prices as a reference for scarcity because the relationship between oil prices and production looks like this:   1. (by the way, see here for only oil prices but inflation-adjusted) 2. Do you have sources for the betterment of the financial system? I know there are more regulations since 2008 and several patches have been applied, but from what I got it still seems that the root causes of the problem are still there (no separation between  commercial and investment banking, finance so complex pretty much nobody understands it completely, focus on short-term profit - at least that's what I got from summaries of this book). 3. Oh, yeah I quoted this study in post 1. But it assumes solar

Getting closer, anyway. Maybe we will have to

We already know how to solve the blackouts problem via dedicated generation (or storage) for high-impact sectors. In a renewable economy, very large amounts of energy are available very cheaply at certain times, so for instance a factory with a 1-day battery that can produce at night before sunny days is able to work nearly as efficiently as they do now. You aren't actually relocating very much of the economy (only very heavy industry) and this constantly relocates towards incidentally-sunnier countries anyway f... (read more)

4
Corentin Biteau
2y
Then again, thanks for these points, it's interesting to exchange with you.  For storage, I agree that what you describe could be an option if batteries continue to get much cheaper and better. However, getting 1 night of batteries for factories would still be more energy-costly compared to what we do today (because of 60%-80% round-trip efficiency, the need for building overcapacity, additional mineral extraction, and the energy cost making batteries). So we'd have to use more energy to do the same thing. I agree that the "net energy we get back" would still be net positive, but  the reason I mention the energy cost of green technology is because of the EROI (Energy Returned on Energy Invested), that has to be high (10-12) to sustain a complex civilization. 1. Governments can make wartime economies to handle energy differently, yes, and probably will. However, getting to that point would mean a very different world order. This would have probably been caused by a serious economic crisis. But we'd be in the realm of systemic risks described in post 2. What history taught us is that for a war economy to go on, you need an external enemy (and maybe an internal one too). This could have serious implications, like countries with resources (oil, gas, coal, metals, phosphorus) could decide to keep these resources for themselves. Of course, this would mean a serious energy descent for countries that are dependent on trade, and that don't have an army big enough to weigh in. 1. I didn't express myself clearly, sorry. What I say isn't that "with the current amount of investment in energy, we won't have enough for the transition, so we should need more for green energy". What I'm saying is "it's probably not possible to have a much bigger investment capacity than we have now". Oil prices are already in a spot where they oscillate between "too high for consumers" and "too low for energy companies", which is unsustainable - so green energy probably cannot afford to be mu

I think we're getting closer to an agreement. I would be more tempted if your thesis were "energy will become much more expensive at some times of day/year, as will certain minerals, and this will depress GDP compared to naive expectations." It's not obvious to me that low energy storage does more than require heavy industry to relocate to more consistent climes and/or stop for a few days each year, which would depress GDP but hardly to the level of existential threat. 

  1. I think most of these are economic points about how expensive it is to make the tra
... (read more)
1
Corentin Biteau
2y
Yes, we may get closer to an agreement on several points. My thesis is close to how you formulated it, although it's more of "I think energy will get more and more expensive overall [or at least less affordable], and it should reduce overall GDP for a long period".   The issue of storage is not just that energy will be less available at time of the year, it's that there is a serious risk of blackout and/or the grid straight up crashing down (but we'd go for blackouts first). Blackouts would impact many things that depend on electricity: communications, refrigeration, ATMs, hospitals, most factories and microchips production... Relocation is possible but 1/ Relocating entire industries takes time, and costs money and energy 2/ Living in remote sunny locations (where few people are) needs a good transport system (for food and water) - and these are areas most exposed to climate change. 1. Most of these are economic points, indeed. But this is because energy is an integral part of the economy - as I said, I think it's more useful of seeing money as a way of allocating goods and services that are produced with energy. This is a view usually held by heterodox economists, so most people have not heard of it - as mainstream economists don't include natural resources as an input of their models. But it fits rather well with data, so seeing the economy as a material phenomenon helps immensely. So when I say investment, it's not just a matter of printing more money, it's a matter of dedicating real materials and energy towards the transition (at the expense of other uses).  1. It's also worth remembering that investment in already falling short of what is needed in the energy sector, like for the US grid (see post 2). BloombergNEF puts the bill at $173 trillions - 2 times world GDP. Moreover, in the past, a recession occurred when energy prices reached 10% of GDP, so the transition cannot cost too much. This is why I don't think investment can get that high. 2. I'
  1. These are not new technologies - thin film and primarily-organic PV have been commercially available for decades. They don't out-compete silicon based on price point/efficiency, not unviability [1-2]. The organic films are again very thin, so very little land is required to grow the material to make them (the question would be how many times over a piece of land could produce the feedstock to cover itself in a year, I'm sure it would be tens of times). Similarly, the volume of copper and zinc mined in a year is enough to put a few nanometers around the wor
... (read more)
8
Corentin Biteau
2y
These are very good points you're making, thanks for the thoughtful answer. 1. For solar, when I spoke of new technologies, I spoke mainly about your 2020 link - but I agree that solar panels can be made without rare metals, this is true. It's probably possible to make version of them that do not rely on too complicated stuff. The limits on metals are rather about the quantities required for batteries: current energy transition plans focus mainly on lithium (which will mean shortages given the long downtimes). It's possible to switch to other metals to avoid stuff like cobalt (say we use Sodium Sulfur), , but by the time we decide that this would mean a serious delay. For copper and zinc, the issue is more that they're used about everywhere, so there's a lot of competition for their uses. 1. For planes, steel or trucks, my main point is not that it's impossible to replace them. My point is that alternatives are less energy-efficient, or have more constraints, or are more expensive (less affordable), or will a take a long time to deploy. "We can do that", yes, but at what scale? 1. Land constraints : How many biofuels would be required? Won't that compete with land and food? You can check the section on biofuels here. 2. Efficiency losses : For hydrogen, the problem is not about materials, indeed. It's rather a problem of lower efficiency, and high investment required. For storage, I think the highest issue for hydrogen is the low round-trip efficiency, only at about 30-40% from what I've seen, meaning we lose a lot of the energy invested. I'm sorry, I  mixed several different challenges in the storage and hydrogen parts, so the structure wasn't really clear.  3. Transition time: It's possible to make steel with hydrogen, you're right. There are pilot plants for that, as your link shows (although their estimates for commercialization are earlier than I though). But smelters take a huge amount of upfront investment and last 20 to 50 years, s

I think a deeper look at several of these points shows that it's not as bad as it seems. 

1) It is already quite possible to make solar cells  and batteries without any particularly rare metals [1], and some solar cells can be constructed either from films with active areas only nanometers thick (meaning only a few million tons are required to coat the world in them) or entirely out of organic components [2]. Similarly, while the most commercially viable batteries at present may involve somewhat scarce metals like lithium, it's possible to make th... (read more)

1
timunderwood
2y
"So let’s imagine an EROI [for solar panels] of 2:1. That would mean that, to simplify, half of our society's resources go toward producing energy. Let's say this means that, roughly, 50% of people are working in the energy sector (directly or indirectly), which is already huge." I'll probably finish reading/ skimming your longer document in a bit, but there is a clear mistake in this sentence, and I think if you consider it for long enough, you will realize it severely and perhaps fatally undercuts the entire argument you are making. If solar panels had an EROI of 2 to 1, and all our energy came from solar panels, you then need to make two solar panels for every single one that you are using for net energy generation. This doubles the cost of using solar panels from what it would be with an infinite EROI, which doubles the amount of resources (excluding returns and costs of scale effects) required to make enough solar panels to run our civilization on. So if with infinite EROI you needed to make say 1 quadrillion kilowatt hours worth of solar panels to run your civilization, now you need to make 2 quadrillion kilowatt hours worth, since half of them will be used up in the process of making the rest. The point is, this says nothing about whether 50 percent of society's resources are being used to make these solar panels, or 1 percent, because that depends on how hard it is to make solar panels. If it is very easy to make and deploy solar panels, any positive rate of return on EROI is fine, while of it is extremely expensive and hard to make them, we can't transition even of the EROI is infinite.
5
Corentin Biteau
2y
Hi! Thanks for taking the time to answer. Did you look at the full version? It should provide an answer to the points you are making (this here is just a summary without much data). I really tried to do a deeper dive there. 1. About solar and new technologies, I try to answer these points in post 1. I tend to be wary of ambitious announcements about new technologies - they take a lot of time to be deployed, and there is quite an history of very promising technologies that worked in the lab but end up not working at an industrial scale. Plus, zinc and copper are among the metals facing declining ore grades and that will eventually face a peak (earlier than rare earths, ironically). For the organic panels - how much land is needed to grow the biomass? 1. But even if it did work (which would be good news), then that shouldn't change the core issue of solar: it still produces only electricity, not what is required to move trucks and smelt cement or steel (plus it's intermittent). 2. For storing energy, there are batteries from other metals, like iron, as you said, but their properties are less good, from what I understand. For instance, what is the energy cost of making these batteries? From what I read, "The energy equivalent of 100 barrels of oil is used in the processes to fabricate a single battery that can store the equivalent of one barrel of oil". You can check the deeper dive about storage here , and for metals here. I also spend some time on Compressed air storage which is very limited by locations. 2. About GDP and energy, this adressed in post 2, but this is adressed at length in this section of the additional doc.  You're right that there has been some absolute decoupling in rich nations - however, this does not translate to the global level. There are several reasons for that: 1. Rich countries tend to do more stuff like services, indeed, but other countries cannot do that - they need energy to grow at earlier stages (for food, heating, housi

Strong agree, and part of this is just that EAs should be more modest about how much their assessments of sector impact out-perform other people's. In the long term, weird second-order social impacts of interventions matter a lot more than the direct impact. For example, the (disputed) effects of abortion on crime rates https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272721001043?via%3Dihub and female employment/social engagement https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12122-004-1028-3 may create social spirals that continue long after the medica... (read more)

1
Amber Dawn
2y
Thanks Robin! Very good points.

I respect you immensely for writing this, but some degree of altruism is required for being an effective altruist - not an infinite duty to self-sacrifice, but the understanding that you can be trusted to do so on big things, and costly signs you will do so are helpful. 10% giving is one such costly sign and it's not required that you do all of them (I also think you overestimate the fraction of EAs who are vegan). However I  think the disjunction between wanting the best for the world and wanting to have a high profile by improving the world occurs e... (read more)

For those abroad unfamiliar with quite how unpopular Dominic Cummings is, here's an article arguing he was the most unpopular man in the country at the time

https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/newsmaker-dominic-cummings--britains-most-hated-man-1.71730676

and here's a poll from May 2021 showing only 14% of people trusted him on government handling of COVID, by comparison with 34% for the prime minister. https://docs.cdn.yougov.com/iszcru07g6/TheTimes_Coronahandling_Cummings_Results_210520.pdf

This is an incredibly important question. It is also an incredibly dangerous one. There are many real EA whose views on this topic constitute either an X-risk or an S-risk to EAs with only subtly different assessments: people who, given a truly aligned omnipotent AGI would either wipe out the majority of humans or create many lives others view as unhappy. Historically, well-intentioned eugenicists have killed many people who self-identify as having worthwhile lives. 
I also think there is a miscalibration in the creation test; many humans instinctively... (read more)

I agree with the comments that you are massively overconfident in the applicability of your logic and your title, but raise a good point for a marginal-but-political voter. However in practice both USA parties are actively ridding themselves of moderates, so an important first step is to push for voting reforms that make it possible for young, sane people to get into positions of power in the Republican party without either actually or pretending to hold a swathe of clearly harmful views about e.g. climate change, abortion access and pandemic preparedness.... (read more)

I can't imagine much worse for the prospects of EA than to be associated with Dominic Cummings. He of course now claims to have had very little influence on COVID policy, since it was widely regarded as a shambles during his time. Whatever the truth of this, it's precisely through association with widely hated figures like this that EA risks evaporating as quickly as it has grown. This is also why we need to make a strong distinction between "the abstract idea of maximising positive impact," which would survive this, and "the social movement that this forum is part of",  a member of a rather short-lived reference class (albeit with some good signs at the moment, as you say). 

6
Robin
2y
For those abroad unfamiliar with quite how unpopular Dominic Cummings is, here's an article arguing he was the most unpopular man in the country at the time https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/newsmaker-dominic-cummings--britains-most-hated-man-1.71730676 and here's a poll from May 2021 showing only 14% of people trusted him on government handling of COVID, by comparison with 34% for the prime minister. https://docs.cdn.yougov.com/iszcru07g6/TheTimes_Coronahandling_Cummings_Results_210520.pdf

I feel like it defeats the whole point of April 1st if articles clearly declare themselves to be parodies  at the top of the page. Although it's still a fair bet that some people won't notice. 

3
Ivan Burduk
2y
FWIW I was linked here from a slack thread, and I didn't notice the tag.  Also, personally I don't find it takes away from the humor of it. Nice post, good laugh.

This info was not present at the time I wrote this reply. As you say, most of this doesn't apply in the case of Russians, but it seems unwise to even discuss the optimal actions for Russians in a non-anonymised public chat. 

I'm deeply skeptical that this is a good action for anyone who isn't personally tied to Ukraine.  Foreigners fighting is a substantial propaganda boost for Putin ("Look, Ukraine is a Western stooge after all") and risks muddying the water around whether or not the nation they are from is at war with Russia, potentially spiralling the conflict. NATO is holding off doing any act tantamount to declaring war for a reason. Ukrainians have the benefit of local geographic knowledge, being trusted by the community and speaking the co-ordinating languages; wha... (read more)

3
DPiepgrass
2y
Please note that if Putin wants to say "Ukraine is a Western stooge after all", he will say that whether there are 20 foreign fighters or 200,000.
1
david_reinstein
2y
But he did say his friends were Russian, which might negate this argument? (Not sure if they have other nationalities though)

Indeed, although CATF is still very North America-centric. I'd be more excited to learn about a similar charity acting in China (assuming it wanted Western money). 

7
jackva
3y
CATF operates in China, albeit with a small program (but one could fund that to grow!). They are also generally expanding and have recently been funded to set up a somewhat significant presence in the EU as well.   

This is a really great discussion piece and a very mature response from Giving Green (GG) to it. I would mostly second jackva’s comments, and will just raise a few additions points. 

There seems to be a misapprehension on the core criticism. The fundamental criticism of this article is not just that GG don’t do things quantitatively, but that they have completely neglected the “cost” side of cost-benefit analysis. The qualitative metrics don’t attempt to account for either the actual scale of money needed to do anything, nor the potential negatives of ... (read more)

7
jackva
3y
"Finally, I struggle with way this entire discussion revolves around US policy change. I suspect the amounts of money spent on lobbying in the USA is hugely more than in most countries, but I don't see any consideration of neglectedness at the country level." This is actually another important and independent reason why we should expect CATF > TSM, CATF can optimize marginal resources across different geographies whereas Sunrise is limited to the US environment.

TL;DR: Assuming everything can be fit with a linear trend completely overwhelms the importance of working out what that trend is in these extreme cases, so while instructive for median behaviour, I don’t believe this approach is sufficient to assert anything about tail probabilities.

It’s good to see so much work summarised in one page, but the cost of this is rigour. I agree with the problems with using ECS as mentioned above, and add that, since these trajectories do not result in net 0 CO$_2$ emissions at 2100, it’s not even a good ... (read more)

Answer by RobinApr 22, 20201
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I did a crude calculation in DICE2016R, which doesn't take into account a wide range of effects nor most of the points in my comment below about elasticity. In terms of damage to the economy, the social cost of carbon for 10 years, 20 years and 30 years is about $5, $10 and $14, verses a current total social cost of carbon of $37. This is just taking the social cost of carbon now minus the discounted social cost of carbon in the future for the optimised development pathway. It's about an order of magnitude lower in the non-optimised (baseline) pa... (read more)

Something that the authors of this book perhaps should have highlighted is that DICE's main virtue is its simplicity: it is far from being either the only or the best IAM for most analyses. However, to appreciate how badly calibrated the damage function is, here's a note from the documentation:

"However, current studies generally omit several important factors (the economic value of losses from biodiversity, ocean acidification, and political reactions), extreme events (sea-level rise, changes in ocean circulation, and accelerated climate ch... (read more)

For most reasonable emissions pathways, temperature and linked physical effects depend only on cumulative emissions*. Delaying a given emission by some time therefore does not impact the amount of climate change it causes, so from a climate-focused perspective we don’t see any change in the harm of emissions with time (this may not be true at very low net emissions rates but is at rates similar to present-day). This would mean that the only time delaying emissions would have any climatic benefit would be if they are delayed until a time when net emi... (read more)