I think there could be ways of doing both. But yeah, I think the core idea of "it's good to actively help people, and helping more is better than helping less" should be a core component of civic virtue that's taught as plain commonsense wisdom alongside "racism is bad", etc.

Definitional clarity can be helpful if you think that people might otherwise be talking past each other (using the same word to mean something importantly different without realizing it). But otherwise, I generally agree with your take. (It's a classic failure-mode of analytic philosophers that some pretend not to know what a word means until it has been precisely defined. It's quite silly.)

Eh, I'm with Aristotle on this one: it's better to start early with moral education. If anything, I think EA leaves it too late. We should be thinking about how to encourage the virtues of scope-sensitive beneficentrism (obviously not using those terms!) starting in early childhood.

(Or, rather, since most actual EAs aren't qualified to do this, we should hope to win over some early childhood educators who would be competent to do this!)

I mean, it's undeniable that the best thing is best. It's not like there's some (coherent) alternative view that denies this. So I take it the real question is how much pressure one should feel towards doing the impartial best (at cost of significant self-sacrifice); whether the maximum should be viewed as the baseline for minimal acceptability, and anything short of it constitutes failure, or whether we rather aim to normalize something more modest and simply celebrate further good beyond that point as an extra bonus.

I can see pathologies in both directions here. I don't think it makes sense to treat perfection as the baseline, such that any realistic outcome automatically qualifies as failure. For anyone to think that way would seem quite confused. (Which is not to deny that it can happen.) But also, it would seem a bit pathological to refuse to celebrate moral saints? Like, obviously there is something very impressive about moral heroism and extreme altruism that goes beyond what I personally would be willing to sacrifice for others?  I think the crucial thing is just to frame it positively rather than negatively, and don't get confused about where the baseline or zero-point properly lies.

What do you mean by "maximization"? I think it's important to distinguish between:

(1) Hegemonic maximization: the (humanly infeasible) idea that every decision in your life should aim to do the most impartial good possible.

(2) Maximizing within specific decision contexts: insofar as you're trying to allocate your charity budget (or altruistic efforts more generally), you should try to get the most bang for your buck.

As I understand it, EA aims to be maximizing in the second sense only. (Hence the norm around donating 10%, not some incredibly demanding standard.)

On the broader themes, a lot of what you're pointing to is potential conflicts between ethics and self-interest, and I think it's pretty messed up to use the language of psychological "health" to justify a wanton disregard for ethics. Maybe it's partly a cultural clash, and when you say things like "All perspectives are valid," you really mean them in a non-literal sense?

Sounds like a good move! In my experience (both as an author and a reader), Substack is very simple and convenient, and the network effects (e.g. obtaining new readers via substack's "recommendations" feature) are much larger than I would have predicted in advance.

My claim is not "too strongly stated": it accurately states my view, which you haven't even shown to be incorrect (let alone "unfair" or not "defensible" -- both significantly higher bars to establish than merely being incorrect!)

It's always easier to make weaker claims, but that raises the risk of failing to make an important true claim that was worth making. Cf. epistemic cheems mindset.

I'm happy for people to argue that there are even better options than GW out there. (I'd agree!) But that's very emphatically not what Wenar was doing in that article.

Maybe I spoke too soon: it "seems unfair" to characterize Wenar's WIRED article as "discouraging life-saving aid"? (A comment that is immediately met with two agree votes!) The pathology lives on.