No worries at all (and best wishes to you too!).

One last clarification I'd want to add is just the distinction between uncertainty and cluelessness. There's immense uncertainty about the future: many different possibilities, varying in valence from very good to very bad. But appreciating that uncertainty is compatible with having (very) confident views about whether the continuation of humanity is good or bad in expectation, and thus not being utterly "clueless" about how the various prospects balance out.

It depends what constraints you put on what can qualify as a "good reason". If you think that a good reason has to be "neutrally recognizable" as such, then there'll be no good reason to prefer any internally-coherent worldview over any other. That includes some really crazy (by our lights) worldviews. So we may instead allow that good reasons aren't always recognizable by others. Each person may then take themselves to have good reason to stick with their starting points, though perhaps only one is actually right about this -- and since it isn't independently verifiable which, there would seem an element of epistemic luck to it all. (A disheartening result, if you had hoped that rational argumentation could guarantee that we would all converge on the truth!)

I discuss this epistemic picture in a bit more detail in 'Knowing What Matters'.

Probably nothing left to discuss, period. (Which judgment calls we take to correlate with the truth will simply depend on what we take the truth to be, which is just what's in dispute. I don't think there's any neutral way to establish whose starting points are more intrinsically credible.)

A very important consequence of everyone simultaneously dying would be that there would not be any future people. (I didn't mean to imply that what makes it bad is just the harm of death to the individuals directly affected. Just that it would be bad for everyone to die so.)

Philosophical truths are causally inefficacious, so we already know that there is a causal explanation for any philosophical belief you have that (one could characterize as) having "nothing to do with" the reasons why it is true. So if you accept that causal condition as sufficient for debunking, you cannot have any philosophical beliefs whatsoever.

Put another way: we should already be "questioning our beliefs"; spinning out a causal debunking story offers nothing new. It's just an isolated demand for rigor, when you should already be questioning everything, and forming the overall most coherent belief-set you can in light of that questioning.

Compare my response to Parfit:

We do better, I argue, to regard the causal origins of a (normative) belief as lacking intrinsic epistemic significance.  The important question is instead just whether the proposition in question is itself either intrinsically credible or otherwise justified.  Parfit rejects this (p.287):

Suppose we discover that we have some belief because we were hypnotized to have this belief, by some hypnotist who chose at random what to cause us to believe. One example might be the belief that incest between siblings is morally wrong. If the hypnotist's flipped coin had landed the other way up, he would have caused us to believe that such incest is not wrong. If we discovered that this was how our belief was caused, we could not justifiably assume that this belief was true.

I agree that we cannot just assume that such a belief is true (but this was just as true before we learned of its causal origins -- the hypnotist makes no difference).  We need to expose it to critical reflection in light of all else that we believe.  Perhaps we will find that there is no basis for believing such incest to be wrong. Or perhaps we will find a basis after all (perhaps on indirect consequentialist grounds).  Either way, what matters is just whether there is a good justification to be found or not, which is a matter completely independent of us and how we originally came by the belief.  Parfit commits the genetic fallacy when he asserts that the causal origins "would cast grave doubt on the justifiability of these beliefs." (288)

Note that "philosophical reasoning" governs how we update our beliefs, iron out inconsistencies, etc. But the raw starting points are not reached by "reasoning" (what would you be reasoning from, if you don't already accept any premises?) So your assumed contrast between "good philosophical reasoning" and "suspicious causal forces that undermine belief" would actually undermine all beliefs, once you trace them back to foundational premises.

The only way to actually maintain coherent beliefs is to make your peace with having starting points that were not themselves determined via a rational process. Such causal "debunking" gives us a reason to take another look at our starting points, and consider whether (in light of everything we now believe) we want to revise them. But if the starting points still seem right to us, in light of everything, then it has to be reasonable to stick with them whatever their original causal basis may have been.

Overall, the solution is just to assess the first-order issues on their merits. "Debunking" arguments are a sideshow. They should never convince anyone who shouldn't already have been equally convinced on independent (first-order) grounds.

We disagree about "what we have reason to" think about the value of humanity's continued existence -- that's precisely the question in dispute. I might as well ask why you limit yourself to (widely) imprecise credences that don't narrow things down nearly enough (or as much as we have reason to).

The topics under dispute here (e.g. whether we should think that human extinction is worse in expectation than humanity's continued existence) involve ineradicable judgment calls. The OP wants to call pro-humanity judgment calls "suspicious". I've pointed out that I think their reasons for suspicion are insufficient to overturn such a datum of good judgment as "it would be bad if everyone died." (I'm not saying it's impossible to overturn this verdict, but it should take a lot more than mere debunking arguments.)

Incidentally, I think the tendency of some in the community to be swayed to "crazy town" conclusions on the basis of such flimsy arguments is a big part of why many outsiders think EAs are unhinged. It's a genuine failure mode that's worth being aware of; the only way to avoid it, I suspect, is to have robustly sensible priors that are not so easily swayed without a much stronger basis.

Anyway, that was my response to the OP. You then complained that my response to the OP didn't engage with your posts. But I don't see why it would need to. Your post treats broad imprecision as a privileged default; my previous reply explained why I disagree with that starting point. Your own post links to further explanations I've given, here, about how sufficiently imprecise credences lead to crazy verdicts. Your response (in your linked post) dismisses this as "motivated reasoning," which I don't find convincing.

To mandate broadly imprecise credences on the topic at hand would be to defer overly much to a formal apparatus which, in virtue of forcing (with insufficient reason) a kind of practical neutrality about whether it would be bad for everyone to die, is manifestly unfit to guide high-stakes decision-making. That's my view. You're free to disagree with it, of course.

I think it's conceptually confused to use the term "high epistemic standards" to favor imprecise credence or suspended judgment over using one's best judgment. I don't think the former two are automatically more epistemically responsible.

Suspended judgment may be better than forming a bad precise judgment, but worse than forming a good precise judgment. Nothing in the concept of "high standards" should necessarily lead us to prioritize avoiding the risk of bad judgment over the risk of failing to form a good judgment when we could and should have.

I've written about this more (with practical examples from pandemic policy disputes) in 'Agency and Epistemic Cheems Mindset'

I just posted the following reply to Jesse:

I don't think penalizing complexity is enough to escape radical skepticism in general. Consider the "universe popped into existence (fully-formed) 5 minutes ago" hypothesis. It's not obvious that this is more complex than the alternative hypothesis that includes the past five minutes PLUS billions of years before that. One could try to argue for this claim, but I don't think that our confidence in history should be *contingent* on that extremely contentious philosophical project working out successfully!

But to clarify: I don't think I say anything much in that post about "the reasons why we should start with" various anti-skeptical priors, and I'm certainly not committed to saying that there are "similar reasons" in every anti-skeptical case. The similarity I point to is simply that we clearly should have anti-skeptical priors. "Why" is a separate question (if it has an answer at all, the answer may vary from case to case).

On whether we agree: When I talk about exercising better rather than worse judgment, I take success here to be determined by the contents of our judgments. Some claims warrant higher credence than others, and we should try to have our credences match as close as possible to the objectively warranted level.

But that's quite different from focusing on whether our judgments stem from a "reliable source". I think there's very little chance that you could show that almost any of your philosophical beliefs (including this very epistemic demand) stem from a source that we can independently demonstrate to be reliable. I think the kind of higher-order inquiry you're proposing is a dead end: you can't really judge which philosophical dispositions are reliable until you've determined which philosophical beliefs are true.

To illustrate with a couple of concrete examples:

(1) You claim that "an evolutionary pressure toward pro-natalist beliefs" is an "unreliable" source. But that isn't unreliable if pro-natalism is (broadly) correct.

(2) Compare evolutionary pressures to judge that pain is bad. A skeptic might claim this source is "unreliable", but we needn't accept that claim. Since pain is bad, when evolution disposes us to believe this, it is disposing us towards a true belief. (To simply assert this obviously won't suffice to convince a skeptic, but the lesson of post-Cartesian epistemology is that trying to convince skeptics is a fool's game.)

To be clear: you're arguing that we should be agnostic (and, more strongly, take others to also be utterly clueless) about whether it would be good or bad for everyone to die?

I think this is a really good example of what I was talking about in my post, It's Not Wise to be Clueless.

If you think that, in general, justified belief is incompatible with "judgment calls", then radical skepticism immediately follows. You can't even establish, to this standard, that the external world exists. I take that to show that there's a problem with the epistemic standards you're assuming.

It's OK - indeed, essential - to make judgment calls, and we should simply try to exercise better rather than worse judgment. There are, of course, tricky questions about how best to do that. But if there's anything that we've learned from philosophy since Descartes, it's that skeptical calls to abjure from disputable judgments altogether are... not feasible.

Just sharing a quick link in case it's of interest: Many will recall Leif Wenar's WIRED article from last year, which attacked charitable giving from a philosophical perspective of valorizing status quo bias. There was plenty of discussion of his substantive arguments at the time. One thing that people mostly just politely overlooked was his very public attack on Will MacAskill as a philosopher. My latest post revisits the controversy to assess whether his charges against MacAskill were reasonable.

(The bulk of the post is paywalled, but you should be able to activate a 7-day free trial if you aren't otherwise interested in my work.)