All of tomwein's Comments + Replies

Hi Tim. Thanks for your comment. I've tried to explain in a little more depth what I mean by dignity in a response above, and there's a deeper discussion in my WIP literature review. But I think your definition is a reasonable approximation - and your closing thought seems about the same level that I would estimate the possible scale of this. Cash transfers seem like a good example of an intervention that is pretty dignity-focused.

I like your point about how the individual might trade-off between respectful treatment and malarial drugs, because i... (read more)

Thanks Gordon - I think that's my intuitive sense as well. It also chimes with some of the work by IDinsight about how respondents differently value lives depending on age (putting a very strong emphasis on saving children's lives). I should plan to spend some good time talking with people who work on calculating QALYs to see if there are opportunities to integrate this.

Ishaan, thanks for sharing these thoughts. As you say, cash transfers feel like an opportune one here - I did some thinking to support Jeremy Shapiro's work on cash and recipient preferences right at the start of this project, published here. Extending that to give an overview of how different interventions compare and how their ranking might change sounds like a really productive possible project!

Thanks Sanjay for these responses.

I think your caution on how we could easily overestimate our impact is right. We have good evidence that disrespect is common. In a study with 239 participants from Kibera in Nairobi, a one-unit increase in disrespect score was associated with a reduction on the wellbeing scale of 0.2, and a reduction in the self-efficacy scale of 0.3 (both significant at p=>0.01) - that's suggestive, but not precise enough yet. Something for a wider study at some point!

On tractability, I think I see more promise. Charities are we... (read more)

Thanks for this very thoughtful response - I think it really clarifies some of the tensions I referred to in my response to DavidMoss above. I framed my original post as one about integration of different interests, but you are right that they proceed from different ethical commitments. As you conclude, many of us here have some personal commitment to both those ethics, but they aren't really integratable

I think some dignity-informed interventions *would* pass a cost-effectiveness test - but probably not at the very top of the effectiveness pyramid. D... (read more)

Thanks EdoArad and mwcvitkovic.

Drawing on work by Remy Debes and others, I define dignity as a quality possessed by each person. That quality is characteristic (it is at least part of what defines personhood), inalienable (it cannot be stripped away), and unquantifiable - no one has more or less dignity. This is called a moralized idea of dignity in the literature, and differs from the merit-based definition which says that some people have greater dignity than others.

In recognition of the fact that people have dignity, we have a duty to treat them with ... (read more)

Thanks Wolf. The reason I think to speak about dignity as a general phenomenon rather than a series of concrete indignities is that there are so many possible different indignities, which are very context dependent - but there is a sufficient similarity between how those different indignities are experienced to make them worthwhile capturing under one category. Therefore we can offer measures that are appropriate to many situations without having to come up with different specific survey questions for every different possible indignity.

To your second poin... (read more)

This is a fair point. I've treated dignity as equivalent to a cause area here, but that's not really what it is. I think in part I'm borrowing INT because I'm not sure how philosophers make arguments over fundamental values - the empiricist in me wants to root it in some sort of popularity/preferences survey. There's definitely an unresolved tension in my thinking between regarding dignity as an end, and regarding it as a promising strategy for promoting welfare.

It's something I'll do some reading on, but if anyone has recommendations for reading on how philosophers arrive at understandings of fundamental values, I'd love to read them.

I'm emerging from hibernation. Apologies for taking so long to reply.

A quick post to thank everyone for this thoughtful feedback. Personal life has kept me from responding as fully as I'd like so far, but I'll be back soon to do so properly.

Of course - this is the main RCT: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(15)00060-1/abstract

Multiyear commitments have a particularly high value to charities, especially when they can be used for operational support. They allow charities to take more risks, act more directly in line with their mission, and spend less time on report writing. They are much rarer in the sector.

Thanks for your work on this. One charity to consider is Raising Voices, which I think fits their mandate exceptionally well (and which I also think should be considered by the wider EA community).

Full disclosure: I'm a former employee of Raising Voices.

RV has a program to prevent violence against children in schools. It is well-evidenced - there are now more than 25 peer-reviewed papers, including RCTs and cost-effectiveness evaluations, available on their VAC prevention program. They are based in Uganda, and their theory of change explicitly focuses... (read more)