Combining consequentialism with welfarism—the view that well-being is the only source of value—yields utilitarianism, the theory that thean act is morally right act is the one thatif and only if it maximizes well-being. When utilitarianism is further combined with hedonism as an account of well-being, the result is hedonistic, or classical,hedonistic utilitarianism—an influential theory held by Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick, according to which theSidgwick. On this theory, an act is morally right act is that whichif and only if it maximizes the surplus of happiness over suffering. If insteadIf, instead, utilitarianism is combined with a desire-fulfilmentfulfillment account of well-being, the result is preference utilitarianism, which holds that thean act is morally right act is that whichif and only if it maximizes preference satisfaction.

Consequentialism may instead be combined with a non-welfarist axiology. One such theory is pluralistic consequentialism, on which the rightholds that an act is that whichmorally right if and only if it maximizes the overall degree to which various different values—including both well-being and non well-being sources of value—are realized.

Another important difference between consequentialist views is whether the nature of the beneficiary influences how we weightweigh the good. Classical utilitarians,utilitarians, for example, would argue that one unit of pleasure is equally good no matter who experiences it, while prioritarians argue that it would be better if that unit of pleasure was experienced by someone who is relatively worse off.

MacAskill, William & Darius Meissner (2020) 'Consequentialism', in Elements and types of utilitarianism, Utilitarianismutilitarianism.

Applied to Deontic Fictionalism 7mo ago
Applied to MORE Effective Altruism 9mo ago
Applied to Deontology is not the solution 10mo ago

Sebo, Jeff & Tyler John (2020) Consequentialism and nonhuman animals, in Douglas W. Portmore (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 563–591.