As Holden Karnofsky uses the term toterm, "digital person" may refer to human whole brain emulations as well as digital "descendants" of humans:humans.[1]
The central case I'll focus on is that of digital people just like us, perhaps created via mind uploading (simulating human brains). However, one could also imagine entities unlike us in many ways, but still properly thought of as "descendants" of humanity; those would be digital people as well.
Karnofsky writes that "the transformative potential of something like digital people, combined with how quickly AI could lead According to it, form the case that we could be in the most important century".[2]
In particular, Karnofsky argues thatKarnofsky, digital people would have the same moral standing as humans (cf. moral patient), would accelerate economic growth and scientific progress,progress, and could cause a "lock-"lock-in" of values.values. For this reason, Karnofsky writes:
Mostconsiders the emergence of digital people a transformative development, as well as one that, because of advances in artificial intelligence, could occur thispiececentury—making it potentially the most important one in human history.[2]would apply to roughly any digital entities that (a) had moral value and human rights, like non-digital people; (b) could interact with their environments with equal (or greater) skill and ingenuity to today's people. With enough understanding of how (a) and (b) work, it could be possible to design digital people without imitating human brains.
"The central case I'll focus on is that of digital people just like us, perhaps created via mind uploading (simulating human brains). However, one could also imagine entities unlike us in many ways, but still properly thought of as "descendants" of humanity; those would be digital people as well." Karnofsky, Holden (2021) Digital people would be an even bigger deal, Cold Takes, July 27.
Karnofsky, Holden (2021) Digital people FAQ, Cold Takes, July 27.
Karnofsky, Holden (2021) Digital people FAQ, Cold Takes, July 27.
A digital person is a person running on digital computing hardware. Karnofsky (2021a) uses the term to refer to human whole brain emulations as well as digital "descendants" of humans:[1]
Karnofsky (2021b) writes that "the transformative potential of something like digital people, combined with how quickly AI [artificial intelligence] could lead to it, form the case that we could be in the most important century".[2]
Most of this piece
[theDigital People FAQ[2]]would apply to roughly any digital entities that (a) had moral value and human rights, like non-digital people; (b) could interact with their environments with equal (or greater) skill and ingenuity to today's people. With enough understanding of how (a) and (b) work, it could be possible to design digital people without imitating human brains.
Karnofsky, Holden (2021a) Digital People Would Be An Even Bigger Deal, Cold Takes, July 27.
Karnofsky, Holden (2021b) Digital people FAQ, Cold Takes, July 27.
Karnofsky, Holden (2021) Digital people would be an even bigger deal, Cold Takes, July 27.
Karnofsky, Holden (2021) Digital people FAQ, Cold Takes, July 27.
A digital person is an a person running on digital computing hardware. Karnofsky (2021a) uses the term to refer to human whole brain emulations as well as digital "descendants" of humans:
The central case I'll focus on is that of digital people just like us, perhaps created via mind uploading (simulating human brains). However, one could also imagine entities unlike us in many ways, but still properly thought of as "descendants" of humanity; those would be digital people as well.
Karnofsky (2021b) writes that "the transformative potential of something like digital people, combined with how quickly AI [artificial intelligence] could lead to it, form the case that is a moral patient and has at least human-level intelligence (Karnofsky 2021).
Beings created via whole brain emulation from typical humans constitute a paradigmatic example of digital people, at least on the plausible assumption that such beings would be phenomenally conscious or would at least inherit those properties by virtue of which human beings are generally regarded as possessing moral status. However, digital peoplewe could be created in ways other than by emulating human brains. Holdenthe most important century".
In particular, Karnofsky speculates argues that digital people very different fromwould have the same moral standing as humans might exist even soon after whole brain emulation becomes(cf. moral patient), would accelerate economic growth and scientific progress, and could cause a "lock-in" of values. Karnofsky writes:
Most of this piece [the Digital People FAQ] would apply to roughly any digital entities that (a) had moral value and human rights, like non-digital people; (b) could interact with their environments with equal (or greater) skill and ingenuity to today's people. With enough understanding of how (a) and (b) work, it could be possible
(Karnofsky 2021).to design digital people without imitating human brains.
Karnofsky, Holden (2021)(2021a) Digital People Would Be An Even Bigger Deal, Cold Takes, July 27.
Karnofsky, Holden (2021b) Digital people FAQ, Cold Takes, July 27.
Beings created via whole brain emulation from typical humans constitute a paradigmatic example of digital people, at least on the plausible assumption that such beings would be phenomenally conscious or would at least inherit those properties by virtue of which human beings are generally regarded as possessing moral patients.status. However, digital people could be created in ways other than by emulating human brains. Holden Karnofsky speculates that digital people very different from humans might exist even soon after whole brain emulation becomes possible (Karnofsky 2021).
A digital person is an artificial intelligence that is a moral patient and has at least human-level intelligence (Karnofsky 2021).
Beings created via whole brain emulation from typical humans constitute a paradigmatic example of digital people, at least on the plausible assumption that such beings would be phenomenally conscious or would at least inherit those properties by virtue of which human beings are generally regarded as moral patients. However, digital people could be created in ways other than by emulating human brains. Holden Karnofsky speculates that digital people very different from humans might exist even soon after whole brain emulation becomes possible (Karnofsky 2021).
Hanson, Robin (2016) The Age of Em: Work, Love, and Life When Robots Rule the Earth, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Karnofsky, Holden (2021) Digital people FAQ, Cold Takes, July 27.
artificial intelligence | artificial sentience | human-level artificial intelligence | moral patienthood | transformative development | whole brain emulation
I think "artificial" and "machine" are both sort of ambiguous -- ems are products of artifice/engineering/design in some respects but not in others. I think I've seen some people use "AI" to subsume ems, but I think this is less common, especially in EA-ish circles.
Also, I think the strategic significance of AI systems is wildly different from that of ems, so I think if we had one term "X" referring to AI, another "Y" referring to ems, and another "Z" referring to both, then we'd end up using the words X and Y a lot and the term Z rarely. I also don't know... (read more)
I also want to make a general complaint about how bad normal impersonal citation style is for clarity / epistemics / understanding.
If I cite a source in normal conversation, it's usually very clear why I'm citing it and what role the citation plays in my argument. In contrast, sticking a '(Smith 2007)' parenthetical at the end of a paragraph often leaves it unclear what role the citation is playing. E.g. (picking an example at random, not trying to find an especially bad one or anything like that):
... (read more)