All of ben.smith's Comments + Replies

Elliot has a phenomenally magnetic personality and is consistently positive and uplifting. He's generally a great person to be around. His emotional stamina gives him the ability to uplift the people around him and I think he is a big asset to this community.

1
Elliot Billingsley
2mo
awww shucks

TLDR: I'm looking for researcher roles in AI Alignment, ideally translating technical findings into actionable policy research


Skills & background: I have been an local EA community builder since 2019. I have a PhD in social psychology and wrote my dissertation on social/motivational neuroscience. I also have a BS in computer science and spent two years in industry as a data scientist building predictive models. I'm an experienced data scientist, social scientist, and human behavioral scientist.

Location/remote: Currently located on the West Coast of the... (read more)

1
Elliot Billingsley
2mo
I can attest that Ben is an awesome community builder and communicator about EA!

But I would guess that pleasure and unpleasantness isn't always because of the conscious sensations, but these can have the same unconscious perceptions as a common cause.

This sounds right. My claim is that there are all sorts of unconscious perceptions an valenced processing going on in the brain, but all of that is only experienced consciously once there's a certain kind of recurrent cortical processing of the signal which can loosely be described as "sensation". I mean that very loosely; it even can include memories of physical events or semantic though... (read more)

 

I would say thinking of something funny is often pleasurable. Similarly, thinking of something sad can be unpleasant. And this thinking can just be inner speech (rather than visual imagination)....Also, people can just be in good or bad moods, which could be pleasant and unpleasant, respectively, but not really consistently simultaneous with any particular sensations.

 

I think most of those things actually can be reduced to sensations; moods can't be, but then, are moods consciously experienced, or do they only predispose us to interpret consciou... (read more)

3
MichaelStJules
4mo
What do you mean by "reduced to"? It's tricky to avoid confounding here, because we're constantly aware of sensations and our experiences of pleasure and unpleasantness seem typically associated with sensations. But I would guess that pleasure and unpleasantness aren't always because of the conscious sensations, but these can have the same unconscious perceptions as a common cause. Apparently even conscious physical pain affect (unpleasantness) can occur without pain sensation, but this is not normal and recorded cases seem to be the result of brain damage (Ploner et al., 1999, Uhelski et al., 2012). I'm not sure, and that's a great question! Seems pretty likely these are just dispositions. I was also thinking of separation anxiety as an unpleasant experience with no specific sensations in other animals (assuming they can't imagine their parents, when they are away), but this could just be more like a mood that disposes them to interpret their perceptions or sensations more negatively/threatening.   Thanks for pushing on this. There are multiple standards at which I could answer this, and it would depend on what I (or we) want "conscious" to mean. With relatively high standards for consciousness like Humphrey seems to be using, or something else at least as strict as having a robust global workspace (with some standard executive functions, like working memory or voluntary attention control), I'd assign maybe 70%-95% probability to the in principle possibility based on introspection, studies of pain affect without pain sensation, and imagining direct stimulation of pleasure systems, or with drugs or meditation. However, I'd be very surprised (<15%) if there's any species with conscious pleasure or unpleasantness without the species generally also having conscious sensations. It doesn't seem useful for an animal to be conscious of pleasure or unpleasantness without also being conscious of their causes, which seems to require conscious sensation. Plus, whatever me

To give a concrete example, my infant daughter can spend hours bashing her toy keyboard with 5 keys. It makes a sound every time. She knows she isn't getting any food, sleep, or any other primary reinforcer to do this. But she gets the sensations of seeing the keys light up and a cheerful voice sounding from the keyboard's speaker each time she hits it. I suppose the primary reinforcer just is the cheery voice and the keys lighting up (she seems to be drawn to light--light bulbs, screens, etc). 

During this activity, she's playing, but also learning ab... (read more)

Yes I see that is a reasonable thing to not be convinced about and I am not sure I can do justice to the full argument here. I don't have the book with me, so anything else I tell you is pulling from memory and strongly prone to error. Elsewhere in this comments section I said

When you have sensations, play can teach you a lot about your own sensory processes and subsequently use what you've learned to leverage your visual sensations to accomplish objectives. It seems odd that an organism that can learn (as almost all can) would evolve visual sensations b

... (read more)

To me "conscious pleasure" without conscious sensation almost sounds like "the sound of one hand clapping". Can you have pure joy unconnected to a particular sensation? Maybe, but I'm sceptical. First, the closest I can imagine is calm joyful moments during meditation, or drug-induced euphoria, but in both cases I think it's at least plausible there are associated sensations. Second, to me, even the purest moments of simple joy seem to be sensations in themselves, and I don't know if there's any conscious experience without sensations.

Humphrey theorises th... (read more)

2
MichaelStJules
4mo
Thanks, this is helpful! I would say thinking of something funny is often pleasurable. Similarly, thinking of something sad can be unpleasant. And this thinking can just be inner speech (rather than visual imagination). Inner speech is of course sensory, but it's not the sensations of the inner speech, and instead your high-level interpretation of the meaning that causes the pleasure. (There might still be other subtle sensations associated with pleasure, e.g. from changes to your heart rate, body temperature, facial muscles, or even simulated smiling.) Also, people can just be in good or bad moods, which could be pleasant and unpleasant, respectively, but not really consistently simultaneous with any particular sensations.   Maybe some other potential capacities that seem widespread among mammals and birds (and not really investigated much in others?) that could make use of conscious sensation (and conscious pleasure and unpleasantness): 1. episodic(-like) memory (although it's not clear this is consciously experienced in other animals) 2. working memory 3. voluntary attention control 4. short-term planning (which benefits from the above) FWIW, mammals seem able to discriminate anxiety-like states from other states.[1] I don't think they are motivated to explore things they find unpleasant or aversive, or unpleasantness or aversion themselves. Rather, it just happens sometimes when they're engaging in the things they are motivated to do for other reasons. Ya, this seems plausible to me. But this also seems like the thing that's more morally important to look into directly. Maybe frogs' vision is blindsight, their touch and hearing are unconscious, etc., so they aren't motivated to engage in sensory play, but they might still benefit from conscious unpleasantness and aversion for more sophisticated strategies to avoid them. And they might still benefit from conscious pleasure for more sophisticated strategies to pursue pleasure. The conscious pleasure, u

Humphrey's argument fish aren't conscious doesn't only rest on their not having the requisite brain structures, because as you say, it is possible consciousness could have developed in their own structures in ways that are simply distinct from our own. But then, Humphrey would ask, if they have visual sensations, why are they uninterested in play? When you have sensations, play can teach you a lot about your own sensory processes and subsequently use what you've learned to leverage your visual sensations to accomplish objectives. It seems odd that an organ... (read more)

3
MichaelStJules
4mo
Does he spell out more why it's useful to learn more about your own sensations? Also, couldn't this apply to any perception that feeds into executive functions/cognitive control, conscious or not? What if sensory play is just very species-specific? Do the juveniles of every mammal and bird species play? Would he think the species without play aren't conscious, even if they have basically the same sensory neural structures? A motivation to engage in (sensory) play has resource costs. Playing uses energy and time, and it takes energy to build the structures responsible for the motivation to play. And the motivation could be risky without a safe environment, e.g. away from predators or protection by parents and with enough food. Fish larvae don't seem to get such safe environments. I guess a thesis he's stated elsewhere is that it's the function of consciousness to matter. This is the adaptive belief it causes. So, conscious sensations should just be interesting to animals with them, and maybe without that interest, there's no benefit to conscious sensation. This doesn’t seem crazy to me, and it seems pretty plausible with my sympathies to illusionism. Consciousness illusions should be adaptive in some way. But, this only tells me about conscious sensation. Animals without conscious sensation could still have conscious pleasure, unpleasantness and desires, which realize the mattering and interest. And animals don't engage in play to explore unpleasantness and aversive desire. So what are the benefits of unpleasantness and aversive desire being conscious as opposed to unconscious? And could there be similar benefits for conscious sensation? If there are, then sensory play may not be (evolutionarily) necessary for consciousness in general or conscious sensation in particular after all.

I tend to think that questions about which organisms or systems are conscious mostly depend on identifying the physical correlates of consciousness, and understanding how they work as a system, and that questions about panpsychism, illusionism, eliminativism, or even Calmer's Hard Problem don't bear on this question very much. I think there's probably still a place for that philosophical debate because (1) there might be implications about where to look for the physical systems and (2) as I said to Michael earlier, illusionism might change our perspective ... (read more)

say that pain is bad (even if it is not phenomenal) because it constitutively includes the frustration of a desire, or the having of a certain negative attitude of dislike

I'm curious how, excluding phenomenal definitions, you define he defines "frustration of a desire" or "negative attitude of a dislike", because I wonder whether these would include extremely simple frustrations, like preventing a computer generated character in a computer game from reaching its goal. We could program an algorithm to try to solve for a desire ("navigate through a maze t... (read more)

3
MichaelStJules
4mo
I think illusionists haven't worked out the precise details, and that's more the domain of cognitive neuroscience. I think most illusionists take a gradualist approach,[1] and would say it can be more or less the case that a system experiences states worth describing like "frustration of a desire" or "negative attitude of a dislike". And we can assign more moral weight the more true it seems.[2] We can ask about: 1. how the states affect them in lowish-order ways, e.g. negative valence changes our motivations (motivational anhedonia), biases our interpretations of stimuli and attention, has various physiological effects that we experience (or at least the specific negative emotional states do; they may differ by emotional state), 2. what kinds of beliefs they have about these states (or the objects of the states, e.g. the things they desire), to what extent they're worth describing as beliefs, and the effects of these beliefs, 3. how else they're aware of these states and in what relation to other concepts (e.g. a self-narrative), to what extent that's worth describing as (that type of) awareness, and the effects of this awareness. 1. ^ Tomasik (2014-2017, various other writings here), Muehlhauser, 2017 (sections 2.3.2 and 6.7), Frankish (2023, 51:00-1:02:25), Dennett (Rothman, 2017, 2018, p.168-169, 2019, 2021, 1:16:30-1:18:00), Dung (2022) and Wilterson and Graziano, 2021. 2. ^ This is separate from their intensity or strength.

Not absolutely sure I'm afraid. I lent my copy of the book out to a colleague so I can't check.

Humphrey mentioned illusionism (page 80 acc to Google books) but iirc he doesn't actually say his view is an illusionist one.

Personally I can't stand the label "illusionism" because to me the label suggests we falsely believe we have qualia, and actually have no such thing at all! But your definition is maybe much more mundane--there, the illusion is merely that consciousness is mysterious or important or matters. I wish the literature could use labels that are m... (read more)

2
MichaelStJules
4mo
I think this is technically accurate, but illusionists don't deny the existence of consciousness or claim that consciousness is an illusion; they deny the existence of phenomenal consciousness and qualia as typically characterized[1], and claim their appearances are illusions. Even Frankish, an illusionist, uses "what-it-is-likeness" in describing consciousness (e.g. "Why We Can Know What It’s Like To Be a Bat and Bats Can’t"), but thinks that should be formalized and understood in non-phenomenal (and instead physical-functional) terms, not as standard qualia. The problem is that (classic) qualia and phenomenality have become understood as synonymous with consciousness, so denying them sounds like denying consciousness, which seems crazy.   Kammerer, 2019 might be of interest. On accounting for the badness of pain, he writes: This approach is also roughly what I'd go with. That being said, I'm a moral antirealist, and I think you can't actually ground value stance-independently.   Makes sense. 1. ^ "Classic qualia: Introspectable qualitative properties of experience that are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective." (Frankish (video)) I think this is basically the standard definition of 'qualia', but Frankish adds 'classic' to distinguish it from Nagel's 'what-it-is-likeness'.

Thanks Michael. For readers who are confused by my post but still want to know more, consider just reading (2), which is a very good précis by Nick Humphrey of his book which I tried to summarize. It might be better for readers, rather than reading my essay, to just read that. 

Actually, I have to correct my earlier reply. Iirc the argument is that all conscious animals engage in physical play, not necessarily that all playful animals are conscious. On the other hand, Humphrey does say that all animals engaging in pure sensation-seeking type play are conscious, so that's probably the sort of play he'd need to bring him around on octopuses.

Humphrey spent a lot of time saying that authors like Peter Godfrey-Smith (whose book on octopus sociality and consciousness I have read, and also recommend) are wrong or not particularly serious when they argue that octopus behavior is play, because there are more mundane explanations for play-like behavior. I can't recall too much detail here because I no longer have Humphrey's book in my possession. In any case I think if you convinced him octopuses do play he would probably change his mind on octopuses without needing to modify any aspects of the overall theory. He'd just need to concede that the way consciousness developed in warm blooded creatures is not the only way it has developed in evolutionary history.

No, the author is ultimately unclear why qualia in itself is useful, but by reasoning about the case studies I listed, his argument that qualia is in fact related to recursive internal feedback loops is ultimately a bit stronger than just "these things all feel like the same things so they must be related".

Humphrey first argues through his case studies that activity in the neocortex seems to generate conscious experience, while activity in the midbrain does not. Further, midbrain activity is sophisticated and can do a lot of visual and other perceptual pro... (read more)

I've tried to condense a book-length presentation into a 10 minute read and I probably have made some bad choices about which parts to leave out.

Its not that sensory play is necessary for producing sentience. The claim is that any animal that is sentient would be motivated to play. There might be other motivations for play that are not sentience, but all sentient creatures (so the argument goes) would want to play in order to explore and learn about the properties of its own sensory world.

For the limbless species you mentioned, if we imagine a radical scen... (read more)

4
Bella
4mo
That makes sense — I appreciate you doing that work & making calls about what to include; I bet there's a lot I'm missing!! Ah, I wrote & meant 'a necessary condition for' — I hadn't misunderstood the argument in the way you're worried about in your second paragraph (but perhaps a useful clarification for anyone reading!) My problem is I don't buy that 'any animal that is sentient would be motivated to play' — and ultimately I think the additional explanation you've provided here, about shared ancestry and neurophysiology, is interesting & relevant to think about re: which if any animals are sentient, but I think it just boils down to: This argument, while IMO important/pretty compelling as a reason to start of with some moderate credence on animal sentience, doesn't do that much, and certainly couldn't, on its own, convince me of any necessary conditions for sentience — certainly not sensory play. It also doesn't do anything to convince me that non-bird non-mammals are sufficiently different (in terms of shared ancestry and neurophysiology) from humans, such that we should think they're not sentient. [fn] I'm unsure from your summary if Humphrey means to claim this or not, sorry!

Early (and peak) Quakers went down some weird ineffective paths. It's cool that they were into nonviolence and class equality, but they were also really into renaming the days of the week and months of the year to avoid pagan names.

This sounds like hits-based cause selection. The median early Quaker cause area wasn't particularly effective, but their best cause area was probably worth all of the wasted time in all of the others.

I am visiting a Quaker church for the first time ever tomorrow. I've been out of religious community for 15 years or so and I'd like to explore one that is compatible with my current views.

I'm trying to think about what "EA but more religious" might look like. Could you form a religious community holding weekly assemblies to celebrate our aspirations to fill the lightcone with happy person moments? I think that is a profoundly spiritual and emotional activity and I think we can do it.

I'll post a longer post to this effect soon.

Linkpost: Sheelah Kolhatkar at The New Yorker writes "Inside Sam Bankman-Fried’s Family Bubble" https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/10/02/inside-sam-bankman-frieds-family-bubble

I conditionally disagree with the "Work trials". I think EA companies doing work trials is a pretty positive innovation that EA in particular does that enables them to hire for a better fit than not doing work trials. This is good in the long run for potential employees and for the employer.

This is conditional on 

  • work trials being paid at a reasonable rate, where "reasonable" is probably within ~20% of the expected compensation paid out by the job, on a pro rata hourly rate.
  • Probably the trial being 40 hours or less

I can anticipate some reasonable disa... (read more)

4
keller_scholl
7mo
I think that distinguishing between 1-8 hours (preferably paid), up to 40 hours, and 1-6 months, is very important here. I am happiest about the shortest ones, particularly for people who have to leave a job (part of why I think that OP is talking about the latter sort).

JJ--thanks for all your words of support in the last few years. I appreciate your attitude, care, and your hard work. I'm sorry to hear about this. Hope you are well!

It seems like a safer bet that AI will have some kind of effect on lightening the labor load than it will solve either of those particular problems.

I've spent hours going over your arguments and this is a real crux for me. AI is likely to lessen the need for human workers, at least for maintaining our existing levels of wealth.

I've stumbled here after getting more interested in the object-level debate around pronatalism. I am glad you posted this because, in the abstract, I think it's worthwhile to point out where someone may not be engaging in good faith within our community.

Having said that, I wish you had framed the Collins' actions in a little more good faith yourself. I do not consider that one quoted tweet to be evidence that of an "opportunistic power grab". I think it's probably a bit unhealthy to see our movement in terms of competing factions, and to seek wins for one'... (read more)

Have you looked at the fertility rate underlying the UN projections? They're projecting fertility rates across China, Japan, Europe, and the United States to arrest their yearly decline and begin to slowly move up back to somewhere in the 1.5 to 1.6 range.
 

That seems way too high because it's assuming not just that current trends stop but that they reverse to the opposite direction of that observed. Even their "low" scenario has fertility rebounding from a low in ~2030.

This despite all those countries still have a way to go before they get to the low ... (read more)

I enjoyed this post. I think it is worth thinking about whether the problem is unsolveable! I think one takeaway I had from Tegmark's Life 3.0 was that we will almost certainly not get exactly what we want from AGI. It seems intuitively that any possible specification will have downsides, including the specification to not build AGI at all.

But asking for a perfect utopia seems a high bar for "Alignment"; on the other hand, "just avoid literal human extinction" would be far too low a bar and include the possibility for all sorts of dystopias.

So I think it's... (read more)

3
Remmelt
11mo
Glad to read your thoughts, Ben. You’re right about this: * Even if long-term AGI safety was possible, then you still have to deal with limits on modelling and consistently acting on preferences expressed by humans from their (perceived) context. https://twitter.com/RemmeltE/status/1620762170819764229 * And not consistently represent the preferences of malevolent, parasitic or short-term human actors who want to misuse/co-opt the system through any attack vectors they can find. * And deal with that the preferences of a lot of the possible future humans and of non-human living beings will not get automatically represented in a system that AI corporations by default have built to represent current living humans only (preferably, those who pay). A humble response to layers on layers of fundamental limits on the possibility of aligning AGI, even in principle, is to ask how we got so stuck on this project in the first place.

I have a very uninformed view on the relative Alignment and Capabilities contributions of things like RLHF. My intuition is that RLHF is positive for alignment I'm almost entirely uninformed on that. If anyone's written a summary on where they think these grey-area research areas lie I'd be interested to read it. Scott's recent post was not a bad entry into the genre but obviously just worked a a very high level.

Can you describe exactly how much you think the average person, or average AI researcher, is willing to sacrifice on a personal level for a small chance at saving humanity? Are they willing to halve their income for the next ten years? Reduce by 90%?

I think in a world where there was a top down societal effort to try to reduce alignment risk, you might see different behavior. In the current world, I think the "personal choice" framework really is how it works because (for better or worse) there is not (yet) strong moral or social values attached to capability vs safety work.

Here's something else I'd like to know on that survey:

  • what proportion of respondents wants to post on EAF or engage in other discussions they think are important for EA's goals, but don't, or will only do so anonymously because they are worried about the consequences?
  • how does that compare to the proportion who feel free to contribute without fear of retribution?
  • what proportion thinks they have been in fact passed over for an opportunity because they have criticized EA or said something else "politically incorrect" here?

Surveys of these types are often anonymous, because 

  • while it is possible for people to make false responses, that doesn't happen very much, because it is time consuming, and unethical, and there just aren't that many people out there who are all of unethical, have lots of time on their hands, and want to manipulate our survey. Manipulated responses are generally more of a danger for short polls (e.g., "which political party would you vote for"), but less of an issue for 10 minute + surveys.
  • there are means of probabilistically filtering false responses
... (read more)
8
Arturo Macias
1y
In my view you underestimate the degree of intentionality and coordination of the offensive against EA.

This is a great idea. EA already runs an annual community survey. So it wouldn't necessary to create a whole new survey to get this data --just add some questions to the existing community survey. If they aren't already on there it would be great to see them on the next survey.

I am now also very curious about what value the community gets from various kinds of experiences in EA spaces.

For example, I'm curious how most women would weigh being in a community that lets them access healthy professional networks free from the tensions of inappropriate* sexual/romantic advances against being in a community where they are able to find find EA partners. (I am implying that there is a tradeoff here.)

I am also curious if the men in the community have an opposing view - if so, it might be important to think about how  the existing sta... (read more)

Ben -- good idea. I think the crucial thing would be to phrase the questions about these issues as neutrally and factually as possible, to avoid responses biases in either direction. 

Ideally EA would ask just about actual first-hand experiences of the individual, rather than general perceptions, impressions based on rumors and media coverage, or second/third-hand reports.

1
Arturo Macias
1y
If you have not a Census of EA, you can not do this kind of survey. The EA Survey is donde on a voluntary basis on the Forum, and false identities can be used to manipulate results. Any EA survey shall be based on a anonymous answers but verified identity.

EA has copped a lot of media criticism lately. Some of it (especially the stuff more directly associated with FTX) is well-deserved. There are some other loud critics who seem to be motivated by personal vendettas and/or seem to fundamentally object with the movement's core aims and values, but rather than tackling those head-on, seem to be trying to simply through everything that'll stick, no matter how flimsy. 

None of that excuses dismissal of the concerning patterns of abuse you've raised, but I think it explains some of the defensiveness around here right now.

[comment deleted]1y31
8
0

It sounds like you want to engage constructively to reduce abuse in the community, and I appreciate that. The community will be stronger in the long run if it can be a safer and more welcoming space.

I know we're a bunch of weirdos with a very specific set of subcultural tics, but I hope everyone appreciates your efforts to help. I think people here really are unusually motivated to do good and there is a lot of goodwill as a result. On the other hand, I think a lot of that is ego driven. And it's a very nerdy culture, male-dominated and probably many peopl... (read more)

[comment deleted]1y13
5
5

Thank you for your explanation. I appreciate you taking the time to explain your reasoning on that point and find it useful for being confident in the rest of what you have to say here.

[comment deleted]1y12
5
0

I don't mean this as a comment on the particular case reported in the TIME article, though I'd reject using naive base rate calculations as a last word on someone's probabilistic guilt. but the "only 2-3% of allegations are false" stuck out to me because I read a better estimate is probably more like 2-10%. https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/02/17/lies-damned-lies-and-social-media-part-5-of-∞/ there's a lot of ambiguity here--issues like not every "report" is an "allegation" because sometimes reports don't name a perpetrator. I have no idea what the correct f... (read more)

[comment deleted]1y21
6
3

I agree with you that mixing romantic relationships with professional ones occurs among people who are monogamous or don't identify as polyamorous.

I personally wouldn't like to see EAs discouraged from being polyamorous. I'm not actively polyamorous myself, but I wouldn't want to see people restricted to more traditional romantic styles, like monogamous marriage, because I think many of those relationship styles developed in a very different social and technological context than the context we have now. Our culture at large probably benefits from people pi... (read more)

7[anonymous]1y
Okay, I think I misunderstood your previous comment to be relating more to conflicts of interest--I agree it's important to be mindful of overlap between romantic connections and professional life for these reasons, and that it is especially important for people with many partners in the same field to be mindful of this (whether they have many partners because they are a serial monogamist, have a lot of casual sex, or practice a particular style of polyamory)
7
Xavier_ORourke
1y
Another important difference with monogomy is that it's taboo to make a proposition to somebody who's already married or already in a serious relationship, so people don't make them as often.

I think polyamory as it is described in the articles mixes complex webs of personal relationships with professional ones. Romantic connections within polyamorous communities can be complicated even without entanglement with professional concerns. When you bring in layers of professional connections on top of that, I can see why there might be an extra dimension of vulnerability to coercion and exploitation.

[anonymous]1y26
12
8

Totally agree that mixing romantic relationships with professional ones can in certain contexts create conflicts of interest, but I really fail to see how this is unique to polyamory. Plenty of monogamous people develop romantic relationships with their supervisors, plenty of monogamous people unfairly favor their partners (or more often, their partner's sibling or other close connection), and plenty of monogamous people have wide webs of deep platonic friendships that introduce complications that are completely analogous to polyamorous relationships. This attitude seems a bit dismissive of the reality of deep platonic friendships, which for many people are more committed and loving than the average romantic relationship. 

A simple back-casting or systems-mapping exercise (foresight/systems-theoretical techniques) would easily have revealed EA’s significant exposure and vulnerability (disaster risk concepts) to a potential FTX crash. The overall level of x-risk is presumably tied to how much research it gets, and the FTX crash clearly reduced the amount of research that will get done on x-risk any time soon. 

This is not the first time I've heard this sentiment and I don't really understand it. If SBF had planned more carefully, if he'd been less risk-neutral, things cou... (read more)

I was inspired by your post, and I wrote a post about one way I think grant-making could be less centralized and draw more on expertise. One commenter told me grant-making already makes use of more expert peer reviewers than I thought, but it sounds like there is much more room to move in that direction if grant-makers decide it is helpful.

 

https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/fNuuzCLGr6BdiWH25/doing-ea-better-grant-makers-should-consider-grant-app-peer 

At a pinch, I would say review might be more worthwhile for topics where the work builds on a well-developed but pre-existing body of research. So, funding a graduate to take time to learn about AI Safety full-time as a bridge to developing a project probably wouldn't benefit from a review, but an application to develop a very specific project based on a specific idea probably would.

I don't have a sense on how often five-to-low-six-figure grants involve very specific ideas. If you told me they usually don't, I would definitely update against thinking a peer review would be useful in those circumstances.

3
Jason
1y
I have no idea, to be honest. My belief that smaller grants might not be the best trial run for cost-effectiveness is based more on assumptions that (1) highly qualified reviewers might not think reviewing grants in that range is an effective use of their time; and (2) very quick reviews are likely to identify only clearly erroneous exercises of grantmaking discretion. Either assumption could be wrong! But I think at that grant size, the cost-effectiveness profile might be more favorable for a system of peer review under specified circumstances rather than as a automatic practice. Knowing that they were only being asked when there was a greater chance their assistance might be outcome-determinative might help with attracting quality reviewers too.

Thank you, David! From what you've said here it seems clear my post was missing critical information.

I'm not sure this post literally could have been much better researched, conditional on me writing it. I don't feel entitled to contact funders to ask them about their process (perhaps I should feel free to? I'm not sure). EA Funds website mentions briefly they "engage expert-led teams of subject matter experts" in their decision-making, and that's something I should have researched first and mentioned, but also, I think that gives away so little informatio... (read more)

3
Davidmanheim
1y
I agree that this is tricky to do, because the processes aren't so well publicly documented. (Not that they should be - funders providing information about their processes make them more gameable, as most government funding is!)  I do think that you could have asked more people with knowledge of the process to review the post, and also think that the Survival and Flourishing Fund documents what they do pretty clearly, including both their writeup, and at least one forum post by a reviewer documenting it pretty extensively.

I don't feel entitled to contact funders to ask them about their process (perhaps I should feel free to? I'm not sure)

I do think you should feel free to do this! Open Phil, EA Funds, GiveWell, and ACE all have contact pages, and "I'm thinking about how EA funding could be better and I wanted to understand more how you work," followed by specific questions that aren't too much work to answer, is something I'd expect to be well received.

On the other hand, I don't think you have to do this. Your post, as is, still is helpful in describing how the NIH and... (read more)

Agreed, but 5% is much lower than "certain or close to certain", which is the starting point Nuno Sempere said he was sceptical of.

I don't know that anyone thinks doom is "certain or close to certain", though the April 1 post could be read that way. 5% is also much lower than, say, 50%, which seems to be a somewhat more common belief.

I'm chalking this one up in favor of playing the long game--as Holden Karnowsky likes to advise, prioritizing building career capital because it would create greater impact in the future. Clearly though, Prof. Karlan has been making a substantial impact in the area for a couple of decades at least.

I enjoyed this read, and agree with the vibes of it. I am not sure what specifically is being recommended. I do think it would be good if EA avoids alienating people unnecessarily. That has two implications:

(a) the movement avoid identifying with the political left any more than is strictly entailed by the goals of EA, because it will alienate people on the political right who could contribute;

(b) being more conservative, in the non-political sense of holding new ideas lightly  and giving a lot of weight to conventional ideas. This could be framed on ... (read more)

1
Further or Alternatively
1y
Thanks for your comments! What specifically is being recommended? Good question. I would say two things. (1) Think about issues of recruitment, leadership, public messaging, public association with an eye to virtues such as statesmanship & good judgment. There’s no shortage of prophets in EA; it’s time for some kings. But that’s really vague & unhelpful too! Ok, true. I’m no statesman but how about something like this: (2) Choose one disease and eliminate it entirely. People will say that eliminating disease X is doing less good than reducing disease Y by 40% (or something like that). Ignore them. Eliminating disease X shows the world that EA is a serious undertaking that achieves uncontroversially good things. Maybe disease X would have mutated and caused something worse; maybe not – who knows! We’re clueless! But it would show that EA is not just earnest young people following a fad but a real thing that really matters. That’s the kind of achievement that could take EA to the next level. (Obviously, don’t give up on the existential risks & low-chance/high-impact stuff. I just mean that concrete proof of effectiveness is a great recruiting & enthusing tool.)  On whether EA appeals enough to conservatives (1) It’s not bad, but could be a lot better. Frankly, EA is a good fit with major world religions that encourage alms-giving (Christianity & Islam spring to mind) and ought to be much bigger there than it is.  (2) This anecdote from Tyler Cowen’s talk: “And after my talk, a woman went up to me and she came over and she whispered in my ear and she said, you know, Tyler, I actually am a social conservative and an effective altruist, but please don't tell anyone.” Hmm.

My impression is that many people are subconsciously or implicitly aware of this dynamic, and that contributes to the high level of interest in topics or decisions that are likely to set the tone for the future. I think many people are acting in ways that they hope would set the standard precisely because they want the movement to be defined in the ways they act. I don't mean to single out any particular point of view as being motivated in this way, because in my experience most of the views being expressed here are sincerely held and principled.

Neverthele... (read more)

Awesome resource thanks 🙏!

I think everything after the words "Christian Blind Mission" was unnecessary and if he had ended the statement there, it would have been less provocative. I don't think that would have been the best possible choice but it would have been better than what we got.

That's something I couldn't have predicted before he posted the thing, but I'm sure a more skilled communicator could have.

The reason the words afterwards were harmful is because irrespective of their truth value, they raise an issue that is potentially harmful just to get into. By talking about it ... (read more)

4
DPiepgrass
1y
That's a fair point. But Rohit's complaint goes way beyond the statement being harmful or badly constructed. Ze is beating around the bush of a much stronger and unsubstantiated claim that is left unstated for some reason: "Bostrom was and is a racist who thinks that race directly affects intelligence level (and also, his epistemics are shit)". What ze does say: "his apology, was, to put it mildly, mealy mouthed and without much substance" "I'm not here to litigate race science.;" "someone who is so clearly in a position of authority...maintaining this kind of view."; "If you believe there are racial differences in intelligence"; "a third of the community seems to support him" [implied to be a bad thing]; "applauding someone for not lying is great but not if the belief they're holding is bad"; "Do not mistake 'sticking with your beliefs' to be an overriding good, above believing what's true"; "sticking with the theory that 'race X is inferior in Y'"; "leaders of your movement is saying these things that are just wrong".

I think starting the post with "Do Better" is a kind of rhetorical flush that probably erodes goodwill between you and the people you want to convince while giving no reasons for people to agree with what you are saying.

It's a common turn of phrase, and when I see it I often think it's an effort to sort of shame people into agreeing with what you are saying, to assert moral superiority without actually providing argument for it. In your post you do make a number of arguments which I think are pretty good. I don't think they need to be embellished with some... (read more)

Thank you! That's a reasonably significant update for me.

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