It’s always possible for a decent moral view to be self-effacing, because having true beliefs isn’t the most important thing in the world. If an evil demon said “Agree to moral brainwashing or I’ll torture everyone for eternity,” then you’d obviously better agree to the brainwashing.

What about the deontologist who says "I can't agree to moral brainwashing because that would involve being complicit in an objective wrong"? I don't see how this position reduces to or implies the belief that "having true beliefs [is] the most important thing in the world".

Or by "decent moral view" did you mean "decent consequentialist moral view"?

A failure mode I see here is where philosophy education comes to be regarded as something like math education is now: something that everyone believes has no practical application, but we are forced to learn it anyway. Why does a farmer or engineer need to know the difference "between consequentialism and deontology"? If philosophy comes to be seen as rigor for the sake of pointless rigor, it will be trusted less.

-"In each case, I think EA emphasizes estimating the impact in terms of human outcomes like lives saved. Successful Supreme Court cases could be a useful intermediate outcome, but ultimately I'd want to know something like the impact of the average case on well-being, as well as the likelihood of cases going the other way in the absence of funding the Institute for Justice."

But a Supreme Court case could have potentially infinite effects in the future, since it will be used as precedent for further cases etc. Is it really possible to model this? If it is not possible, then is it possible that IJ is the most effective charity, even though it cannot be analyzed under an EA framework?