Great post! As someone who previously worked for 4 years at a company who matched up to 30k per year, and now at one that matches 20k per year, this was and continue to be a major factor in consideration of my career options. An EA friend/colleague of mine initiated a project in 2020 called MatchForMore, attempting to bring awareness to this issue and form a community of employees who leverage their matching opportunities to maximize their good.

Unfortunate to say, but we have not been active on this project for quite some time, as our website matchformore.org would reveal. But happy to discuss with anyone more ways to incorporate such programs. Earn To Give+ I know was considering taking over this effort a couple years back, but I have not followed up on their status.

Okay, thanks for clarifying for me! I think I was  confused in that opening line when you clarified that your views do not say that only a relief of suffering improves a mental state, but in reality it's that you do think such is the case, just not in conjunction with the claim that happiness also intrinsically improves a mental state, correct?

>Analogously, you can increase the complexity and artistic sophistication of some painting, say, but if no one ever observes it (which I'm comparing to no one suffering from the lack of more intense happiness), there's no "improvement" to the painting.

With respect to this, I should have clarified that the state of contentment, that becomes a more intense positive state was one of an existing and experiencing being, not a content state of non-existence and then pleasure is brought into existence. Given the latter, would the painting analogy hold, since in this thought experiment there is an experiencer who has some sort of improvement in their mental state, albeit not a categorical sort of improvement that is on par with the sort the relives suffering? I.e. It wasn't a problem per se (no suffering) that they were being deprived of the more intense pleasure, but the move from lower pleasure to higher pleasure is still an improvement in some way (albeit perhaps a better word would be needed to distinguish the lexical importance between these sorts of *improvements*).


 

Right, though would it not be distinct for one to differ on whether they agree with the evaluation (I do) that one situation lacks a preexisting problem? If one takes the absence of pleasure as a preexisting problem, and perhaps even on the same moral plane as the preexisting problem of existing suffering, then the fundamental disagreement may not sufficiently be identified in this manner, right? 

Can you elaborate a bit on why the seemingly arbitrary view you quoted in your first paragraph wouldn't follow, from the view that you and Teo are defending?  Are you saying that from your and Teo's POVs, there's a way to 'improve a mental state' that doesn't amount to decreasing suffering (/preventing it)? The statement itself seems a bit odd, since 'improvements' seems to imply 'goodness', and the statement hypothetically considers situations where improvements may not be good..so thought  I would see if you could clarify.

In regards to the 'defensible alternative', it seems that one could  defend a plausible view that a state of contentment, moved to a state of increased bliss, is indeed an improvement, even though there wasn't a need for change. Such an understanding seems plausible in a self-intimating way when one valence state transitions to the next, insofar as we concede that there are states of more or less pleasure, outside an negatively valanced states. It seems that one could do this all the while maintaining that such improvements are never capable of outweighing the mitigation of problematic, suffering states. **Note, using the term improvement can easily lead to accidental equivocation between scenarios of mitigating suffering versus increasing pleasure, but the ethical discernment  between each seems manageable. 

Thanks so much for this great post! I've had Schwab Charitable for about a year now, and has been very smooth. Also potentially worth noting, one can transfer between DAFs across various providers, so if the size of a DAF were to change, I think it should be feasible to move to one with better options/fees as needed.

Quick comment. With respect to your first point, this has always struck me as one of the better points as to why non ethical arguments should primarily avoided when it comes to making the case for veganism. However, after reading Tobias Leenaert's 'How to Create a Vegan World: A Pragmatic Approach', I've become a bit more agnostic on this notion.  He notes a few studies from The Humane League that show that red-meat reducers/avoiders tend to eat less chicken than your standard omnivore. He also referenced a few studies from Nick Cooney's book, Veganomics, which covers some of this on p. 107-111. Combined with the overall impact non-ethical vegans could have on supply/demand for other vegan products (and their improvement in quality), I've been a bit less worried about this reason.

I think your other reasons are all extremely important and underrated, though, so still lean overall that the ethical argument should be relied on when possible :)  

Huge fan of the work your team has done, so thank you all for everything!  A couple questions :)

1. For potential donors who are particularly interested in wild animal welfare research, how would you describe any key differentiating factors between the approaches of Rethink Priorities and  Wild Animal Initiative? 

2. For donors who might want to earmark donations to go specifically towards wild animal welfare research within your organization, would this in turn affect the allocation of priority-agnostic donations otherwise made to Rethink? Or is there a way in which such earmarked donations indeed counterfactually support this specific area as opposed to the general areas you cover? (This question applies to most multi-focused orgs.)

3. With respect to invertebrate research, and specifically 'invertebrate sentience', it seems that the sheer number of invertebrates existing would be the driving factor in calculating any expected benefit of pursuing interventions. Are there 'sentience probabilities' low enough to put such an expected value of intervention in question? (I have not thoroughly looked through your publicly available work, so feel free to point to relevant resources if this question has been addressed!)

Thanks in advance for all your thoughts!

Donor Advised Funds with no minimum contribution requirements

Fidelity Charitable and Schwab Charitable recently eliminated the minimum initial contribution requirements for their donor-advised funds. 

Fidelity and Schwab are major financial services companies. Their nonprofit arms operate donor-advised funds (DAFs), which are tools to make donating more convenient and tax-efficient (see Aaron Hamlin’s succinct summary for more info). Like many financial services companies, Fidelity and Schwab previously required customers to contribute ~$5,000 in order to open a DAF. Now, they’ll let you open a DAF with any initial contribution.

This is particularly exciting for donors interested in patient philanthropy: the idea that we could maximize the impact of our donations by donating later. To learn more about patient philanthropy and see if this approach might be right for you, see:

• 80,000 Hours Podcast: Phil Trammell on patient philanthropy
• Phil Trammell’s paper on patient philanthropy
• Previous EA Forum posts: 
  • The case for investing to give later
  • Crucial questions about optimal timing of work and donations
  • Estimating the philanthropic discount rate
  • Are we living at the most influential time in history?

Now that it’s easy to open a DAF with a contribution of any size, it’s a great time to consider patient philanthropy.

Cheers to the Giving Season!!

 

*Special thanks to Cameron Meyer Shorb (Wild Animal Initiative) for the feedback!