All of DannyBressler's Comments + Replies

Hi Rhys, thanks for the question! Currently, this is just a proposal, and there is no one that I know of who is working on implementing it. But I hope that sharing the idea is useful to folks who may be interested in pursuing the idea or related ideas! Folks should reach out to me if they are interested in pursuing this idea (or taking some nugget of it to inform other ideas)! 

In similarly structured organizations, e.g., the IPCC, there are PhD researchers who are involved as chapter authors (I have a few friends from my PhD program who are IPCC authors). However, the more senior positions (e.g., chapter lead authors) tend to be more senior folks. 

I agree that what you’re saying could in principal be a problem, but I don’t think that’s how its actually played out in the case of the IPCC. I think there are many reasons why climate change is a politically polarized issue, and I personally don’t think that the IPCC played a material role in increasing polarization directly or indirectly (and IMO their impact went in the other direction for the reasons I outlined above).

2
jackva
3mo
I agree on that. My point is more forward-looking and in terms of counterfactuals: when there is an opportunity to shape an issue now making it institutionally look more like climate with an IPCC-equivalent is risky given the political environment now.

Thanks for this comment! I am definitely in favor of country-level efforts to address GCRs and to produce reports like this one. The same way that the U.S. produces the National Climate Assessment despite there also being IPCC reports. In this case, I think those two efforts are more complimentary than cannibalistic. E.g., folks that work on the National Climate Assessment in the US often also work on the IPCC and doing the work of organizing/prepping for one helps with organizing/prepping for another. And having an international IPGCR effort may also enco... (read more)

2
jackva
3mo
Thanks, Danny! I think this is a misunderstanding. I am not saying the IPCC caused polarization by something they did but rather by what they represent: 1. The IPCC and similar-style organizations can be used by rising populist anti-globalist, referring to an international scientific body as a reason to do something seems politically very risky when the reputation of science and of international institutions is lower than it used to be and a significant part of the electorate actively resents those authorities. 2. Insofar as the constraint on GCR risk-reduction is broad political support for difficult actions (like, say, constraining AI progress), anchoring / framing demands via something like an IPCGR might be harmful.

FYI - OMB has extended the comment period deadline for Circular A-4 to June 20th https://twitter.com/jacklienke/status/1665818966818799617?s=20

However, the Circular A-94 comment deadline is still today.

A-4 comment submission link: https://www.regulations.gov/document/OMB-2022-0014-0001 

A-94 comment submission link: https://www.regulations.gov/document/OMB-2023-0011-0001 

I'm pretty late to the party here, but I want to say I really enjoyed the piece! Your piece came out only three weeks before the big draft overhaul to the way that the U.S. does benefit-cost analysis came out, which is in a document called Circular A-4. I think there is a lot I'd change around the choices in the analysis, particularly in light of the new draft A-4 Guidance (most of which goes in favor of putting more weight on catastrophes):

  • The old A-4's use of a 7% discount rate on capital didn't make sense because the 7% includes other factors outside of
... (read more)
3
EJT
1y
Thanks, Danny! This is all super helpful. I'm planning to work through this comment and your BCA update post next week.

I think you're referring to the difference between Executive Order 12866 (from the Clinton Administration in 1993) and Executive Order 12291 (From the Reagan Administration in 1981). 

The Office of Management and Budget is only asking for comment on Circular A-4 and Circular A-94, not on Executive Order 12866, so I would not suggest making comments on that. 

Also, the administration released a new Executive Order 14094 on the same day that the A-4 and A-94 updates were released, which reaffirmed executive order 12866 but made some important changes... (read more)

2
Larks
1y
Thanks for explaining!

I think marginal climate interventions are in the conversation for being competitive on a global health and wellbeing basis. By that I mean ignoring the chance of existential risk from climate change, marginal climate interventions are in the conversation for being competitive just based on the expected impacts of climate change, which will be concentrated on the world's poorest people. This is provided that you can reduce marginal emissions on the order of  ~$1 per ton (which I know some folks have said is a reasonable estimate for targeted marginal ... (read more)

Thank you for sharing! For those interested in this topic, I'd highly suggest making a public comment on the new drafts of Circular A-4 and Circular A-94. 

I think the public commenting instructions should be up on OMB's Federal Register page soon (it looks like tomorrow and the commenting period typically lasts 45-60 days): Federal Register :: Agencies - Management and Budget Office

Public comment is an important part of the regulatory process, and agencies actually do pay attention to what people say. In addition, comments that are supportive of the approach taken are equally as valuable as critical comments. 

MHR
1y14
4
0

Comments can now be submitted!

Circular A-4: Link

Circular A-94: Link

No worries! I'm glad you found the paper useful and interesting!

The mortality cost of carbon is just the number of excess deaths from temperature-related mortality in units of excess deaths from emitting one metric ton of CO_2. So it's just excess deaths and nothing else. The social cost of carbon is the full monetized value of all climate impacts from emitting one ton of CO_2, which includes the monetized value of those excess deaths in addition to other sources of climate damages. You can see that before the model accounted for temperature-related mortal... (read more)

1
andrew_richardson
2y
Thank you for your responses! I added edits to the essay to reflect this.  Overall, as I noted in the edits, this exercise has made me shift from being skeptical about all climate change interventions to considering shifting some donations from global poverty to climate change interventions. Not entirely convinced, but it seems a lot more plausibly effective than I first suspected.  Some things I don't understand though: It makes sense that with a convex harms curve, marginal harms will be worse than this back of the envelope linear calculation suggests. But it's surprising that they're 10 times higher. I guess it's just very nonlinear, as you say, but that's surprising to me.  The $1/ton estimate comes from CATF, which is a lobbying organization. Their cost effectiveness calculations account for money they spend lobbying, but not deadweight loss caused by taxes and regulations. How reasonable is it accept that sort of accounting? 

Thank you for this post on a very important topic! And thank you for the kind words on my Mortality Cost of Carbon paper. 

I think that, at least from the perspective of using my paper, the analysis is actually much simpler than what you do above.  Instead of using the 83 million cumulative 2020-2100 excess deaths, use the mortality cost of carbon itself: i.e. the number of lives saved per ton of carbon dioxide reduced, which is provided by the paper. So instead of the equation you show above, the equation now becomes:

Marginal Cost Per Life Saved ... (read more)

1
andrew_richardson
2y
Thank you for commenting! I felt like I was relying on your paper without fully understanding it. I'm afraid that much of my post is just an attempt to reinterpret your work.  It's encouraging that Founder's Pledge thinks they can get such a low price on carbon! Interventions at that price really might be effective.  One major question I had about your paper is; what's the breakdown of harms between direct deaths, economic harms, and other losses (like non-fatal hunger)? When the WHO estimates 250,000 deaths each year from 2030-2050, should I interpret a multiplier on that to account for other harms like productivity lost from sickness?  I knew I was making a bad linearity assumption, but I think I might have underestimated how much error it was introducing. If I use my naive model to match your work, I get 50,000 tons/death, which is an order of magnitude off from your estimate. Is that because of an improper linearity assumption?  (50,000 tons/life) = (2 Tt/°C) * (2.5°C/AGW) / (100 million lives / AGW) When I have time later, I'll edit the post to include some of your feedback. 

Yes, I think it is. There is a literature on whether nuclear assistance  and technology sharing for peaceful uses tends to promote or hinder nuclear proliferation, that I mention and cite a bit in my second CSIS piece.

  1.  One piece of info related to the NPT that might be helpful: The NPT does contain an article (article VI) in which the the P5  (the 5 current permanent members of the UN Security Council, who at the time the NPT was made were the only countries who had successfully tested nuclear weapons) as well as all of the parties agree to participate in good-faith negotiations to pursue nuclear disarmament, but it does not specify a time-table and the language is deliberately vague. I think the NPT has done a good job of doing what its main goal is and what
... (read more)
5
MichaelA
3y
Thanks for this response! I'll be quite interested to learn more about Jeffrey's project once it's further along. I might reach out to you or Jeffrey in a few weeks about that.  Regarding the forecasts, we can have any time range and any topic. I already have a bunch of ideas, but just wanted to see if anything bubbled to mind for you independently which I could add to my list. (It's ok if not!)  I guess this might depend what you mean by "particularly reliable".  My understanding is that there's basically just no good evidence either way regarding how accurate and calibrated forecasts are over long time-scales (at least if we restrict ourselves to relevant kinds of forecasts, e.g. ones made by people who seem to have been genuinely trying rather than just making claims for rhetorical/political effect). But there's a little evidence (from Tetlock) to suggest that accuracy may decline relatively slowly after the first year or so. See in particular the great post How Feasible Is Long-range Forecasting?, footnote 17 there, and posts tagged long-range forecasting. Here's the summary of that post:

One other reason why I think that understanding the NPT is important for longtermists: As the world decarbonizes to address climate change (my other big area of research), nuclear electricity generation may increase substantially into more countries, and in particular to countries with lower levels of development/technology. It's crucial to know if the existing nonproliferation regime can ensure that this doesn't cause proliferation, and what sorts of investments must be made to ensure that nonproliferation regime continues to work.

8
simonfriederich
3y
Great post -- and I fully agree that understanding the success of the NPT is hugley interesting and promising, and I also agree with this comment on the importance of this question regarding nuclear energy deployment! There seems to be one line of thinking according to which almost any facilitating  of a country's starting a civilian nuclear energy programme increases proliferation risk and another line of thinking according to getting ahead of the curve in exporting comparatively  proliferation-resistant technology might actually reduce proliferation risks in the longer term. The idea behind the second view is nicely expressed by Rebecca David Gibbons in this passage: "The positive effects of nuclear assistance on nonproliferation suggest a second important policy lesson for the United States and its allies: attempt to regain and maintain a competitive nuclear industry. When US and allied technology is desirable, the nonproliferation regime benefits. Indonesia, Japan, Egypt, and several other states joined the NPT in part to receive nuclear technology from Western suppliers. Today, Egypt is purchasing its nuclear technology from Russia and China and has not agreed to the most stringent IAEA safeguards agreement, the Additional Protocol. If suppliers less concerned with nonproliferation have better technology or offer more favorable agreements than the United States and its allies, the nuclear nonproliferation regime could be weakened." (Gibbons 2020, p. 294) From: Gibbons, R. D. (2020), Supply to deny: The benefits of nuclear assistance for nuclear nonproliferation, Journal of Global Security Studies, 5:282-298. Could you outline whether you think this reasoning is compelling, Danny?

This is a really good point!

I think you're right that the magnitude of the benefit from the program depends heavily on how many people end up choosing to use the mask, especially in situations where they are more likely to contract the disease. Individuals will ultimately make a personal decision based on trade-offs between the probability of contracting the virus, comfort, convenience, and even fashion.

I also think there is significant heterogeneity in terms of how people weigh these factors. I do think that there are a significant number of people who, n... (read more)

3
Denkenberger
3y
Note that the shield claims to block droplets, but not aerosols. Aerosols will go around any shield. Even this shield with some loosefitting fabric only blocked ~10% of aerosols. Making it tight fitting with an elastic band improves it. But really what would be much safer is surgical mask material or N-95 material that is tightfitting. I do think that appearance is critical, at least in developed countries. In my experience, most people use only cloth masks, which block about 1/4 of aerosols. Moving to a surgical mask blocks about three quarters, which is an enormous improvement. There are concerns about long reuse of mass that are designed to be disposable, but they are doing UV treatment, and an easy thing is just putting it in an oven at about 80C for 45 minutes. A compromise could be a surgical mask underneath an attractive cloth mask, which is still easier to breath than N-95. Surgical masks seem to be easily available, and some are even attractive.

What I had in mind with this policy was that the government would contract directly with producers (using the defense production act where necessary) to procure enough N-95 respirators for everyone in the country, and the government would then distribute them to everyone. There would be some agreed upon price of procurement between the government and manufacturers that would be negotiated at the start of the process. If manufacturers want to produce more respirators than what they contracted for, they are welcome to do that and to sell it at a price they c... (read more)

2
Ofer
3y
I agree that the issue I raised does not interfere with this proposed intervention (sorry for not making this clear). Re availability, googling for the term [buy n95 masks] gives some relevant pointers within the first 2 result pages. There are probably many counterfeit respirators out there and these sellers don't seem well-known, but one may still want to bet on them if the manufacturer's website offers a way to authenticate the validity of some unique ids on the respirators etc. (3M has something like this). Note: I'm not recommending the above google search as a way to buy respirators; people may have better alternatives depending on where they live (e.g. in Israel one can buy n95 respirators from a well-known retailer).

Thanks, John! I really like your distinction between the type (1) and type (2) "pernicious moral hazard."

Yes I agree that the moral hazard I mention here would not be large enough to outweigh the benefits of the policy, putting it in the category of (1). My goal in that "potential issues" section was to think about the universe of potential issues that people could raise about the policy and address them. As you can tell, I don't currently think any of the issues are significant enough to make the policy not worth it. 

By the title, I thought this was going to be a discussion of the dangers of appeasing genocidal dictators (e.g. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3476200,00.html) ... clearly I was wrong!

(FWIW, I had a similar reaction. Like, it was quite clear to me what the actual topic of the post was going to be, but I was wondering whether the author was making a deliberate reference to highlight how bad they think the issue is. I was also wondering if the author was trying to sort of lead by example since comparisons to Nazi-related issues are very taboo in mainstream German discourse. Overall I figured that it's probably unintentional.)

FYI, I gave a presentation on my Mortality Cost of Carbon paper at the UCLA Climate Adaptation conference two days ago, available here: https://event.on24.com/wcc/r/2688287/118B1E2E57B33A902FDE6CE95202DB34 This is a brief (~20 minutes) less technical overview of the paper. My presentation starts at 53:20.

Also, the other two speakers on the panel (Tamma Carleton and Ishan Nath) were both authors on the Climate Impact Lab paper that Louis had posted about earlier: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/PATHShQoxQLHoZ7rE/linkpost-global-death-rate-from-ri... (read more)

FYI, Michael Greenstone (one of the authors of this study, the co-director of the Climate Impact Lab, and the Milton Friedman Distinguished Service Professor in Economics at University of Chicago) testified at a hearing in Congress on the health impacts of climate change a few weeks ago: https://youtu.be/N8nCZC0_yxU His opening statement is available in written form here: http://www.impactlab.org/news-insights/michael-greenstone-testifies-on-the-health-impacts-of-climate-change/

The copy you have is their 2019 version of the paper. The figure 9 I am referring to is their most recent 2020 NBER Working Paper version of the paper linked in the original post.

I agree that the RCPs, which were made in 2011, are outdated at this point. This is in large part because of the strong performance of renewable energy over the last decade. The RCPs at this point are still the standard emissions scenarios that are used in scientific papers, although I expect them to be updated in the near future when the next IPCC report comes out. Somewhere betw... (read more)

1) This hasn't been through peer review yet, but it's a project they've been working on for years, and this is at least the third iteration (first two iterations: https://epic.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Working-Paper-2.pdf https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/BFI_WP_201851.pdf). They've presented this paper at many academic conferences where they get criticism and feedback from other experts (including one I've been to). Unfortunately, publication timelines are very long in economics, so NBER working papers a... (read more)

6[anonymous]4y
2) I don't think this refutes Johannes point, which is that the headline figures claimed in the write-up on impact lab seem selected to get eye-catching figures. Although they run RCP4.5, they report the effects of RCP8.5 on the website and in the abstract. The mean effect is about a sixth smaller on RCP 4.5. To put RCP8.5 in context, energy demand nearly quadruples, driven mainly by coal. I do worry that this sort of work underestimates our ability to adapt. If energy demand does quadruple, there would be a lot more air conditioning to go round, and burning of coal would have driven a lot of income growth 3) From the copy I see, I think you are reporting Figure 7a, not 9a?

Below is one important point that I think is extremely difficult to know without being an active researcher in the field. Hauke hints at it in his footnote 6, but I want to expand on it since I think it is important to understand where the social cost of carbon estimates are coming from:

Ricke et al. 2018 (https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-018-0282-y) are using a climate damage function that predicts much higher damages than the damage function that is used in the main integrated assessment models (IAMs) that predict the social cost of carbon (DICE, F... (read more)

3
Hauke Hillebrandt
5y
Thank you for this comment. Relevant quote from my updated analysis above: "The new paper’s social cost of carbon figure is controversial and has been criticized for being too high for various methodological reasons.[6] For instance, one very critical new paper also now estimates the social cost of carbon on a country-level, suggesting that the global social cost of carbon is only $24 (and, using various sensitivity analyses, values ranging from $3.38/tCO2e to $21,889/tCO2e).[7] To account for the new paper overestimating or underestimating the social cost of carbon, below, we use sensitivity analysis to show how our model responds to over- or underestimating the true social cost of carbon by 10x."

I answer these questions and go over the methodology in detail in the video. A working paper will be coming soon, but for now all of the details are in the video.

I don't think there is much publicly available on this topic besides Koblentz's work (also check out his 2003 article in International Security). The "strategy of conflict" as it pertains to bioweapons is something we thought about, but we don't discuss it much in our paper. Some thoughts:

Historically bioweapons research has focused on diseases that are not transmissible person to person like Tularemia, Anthrax, Q Fever, and Botulism. If you dump a bunch of anthrax spores from an airplane over a city, you would kill a lot of people... (read more)