All of Devin Kalish's Comments + Replies

Thank you so much for writing this! I hope this isn't considered too off topic, but I run the Effective Altruism Addiction Recovery Group which I am maintaining but is still fairly slow at the moment. If you are reading this and are worried about your own addictive behaviors, feel free to join the server, or if you would rather not, feel free to reach out to me directly, and I would be happy to meet/help any way you think will be most useful. You should be able to join through this link:

https://discord.gg/W8sFnNEbdT

Pinea did complain about how many dimensions I wanted in my ethics...

Thanks, I see what you’re saying now. I can see value in positive reinforcement at least, but I guess I have a few reactions to some of the more specific points here:

  1. Insofar as people can find reference classes they don’t fit that predict alcoholism, they can do the same for not drinking. Muslims, some other conservative theists, people with physical health conditions, people who are recovering alcoholics, people who rarely hang out with friends. I think you are at high risk if you are say a young atheist socialite in somewhere like NYC, and you can als

... (read more)

Sorry, I'm not sure I understand what you mean here:

"I meant for the stat of non-drinkers to be a positive signal for the general population to choose not to drink and still feel normie."

Could you rephrase? As for my stats, this is an example that's been helpful. I definitely agree that most people can eventually recover and stop drinking pretty much for good (or less reliably, in moderation). I'm currently sober for about two months, and hope to fully recover myself. What I meant is that even if you do eventually recover, there are huge costs that are... (read more)

1
Patrick Liu
23d
Yes, let me try this rephrase.  The average American who currently drinks casually in social settings may be behaving so because they think everyone else is drinking and this would be considered normal behavior.  Sharing a statistic that nearly half of American do not drink regularly (as defined by the CDC) shows that it is also normal behavior to go out and not drink. I think this is a positive reinforcement for not drinking.  On the other hand, I would say warning people they should not drink because there is a 14% chance they may become an alcoholic is negative reinforcement, which could lead to backlash or otherwise be questioned.  It could be questioned if occasional drinking is the sole and direct cause for alcoholism.  Rather, most cases probably arise from a combination of drinking and genetic prevalence, family influence, social norms, body type, stress triggers, and other factors.  This could open the door to people deciding such scenarios don't apply to them.

Yeah, I’m getting the impression that one of the big things I ought to do with a final draft is expand my discussion of this change in my position, and possibly spin it off into its own appendix. For what it’s worth if this is true it means the risk from drinking is even higher than apparent, as even when you control for the portion of non-drinkers who are alcoholics or former alcoholics (depending on your preferred nomenclature), a quite significant portion of the people who don’t become alcoholics just don’t drink anyway (how much depends in large part on how many of these people used to drink a good deal and stopped, but never became alcoholics).

1
Patrick Liu
1mo
What stat are you working off of for people who become alcoholics?   I meant for the stat of non-drinkers to be a positive signal for the general population to choose not to drink and still feel normie.  I believe there are hopeful stories of people beating alcoholism through behavior change such as moving to a new place where their identity is not tied to drinking.  So I feel like stats don't tell us everything.

Thanks, this a decent gloss and I hope it will be helpful (I apologize again for the difficulty of the outline as currently written)

Worth adding though that alcoholism can get gradually worse over long periods, and many alcoholics spend decades in denial, so if you are trying to rule yourself into this class, you really should look at this much more objective criteria rather than sorta vibing "I've done this forever and I'm not an alcoholic".

I mean, people aren’t given “future alcoholic” cards. I think there are circumstances under which you can be sure drinking is especially risky, such as being a recovering alcoholic or having history with a different addiction or having a decent amount of recent family history with addiction, but I’m not aware of a ton of factors you can reference to be confident you won’t be one.

I don’t think your odds are more than half, but I do think they’re around one in ten if you’re an average American (if you’re drinking enough that cutting alcohol is a significant ... (read more)

3
Jason
1mo
I wonder if the target audience for the advice could be a crux here. From the perspective of a teenager who is deciding whether to start drinking, I am skeptical that doing so would be a net positive. Their odds of developing  alcohol use disorder (AUD), experiencing significant problems due to problem drinking, alcohol-related disability or early death, etc. are ~average -- and those risks are considerable as Devin points out. On the other hand, suppose you're a 40-year old who has consumed alcohol for the last 20-25 years, but has never experienced significant problems due to their drinking. For the past decade, your drinking has (with rare exceptions) been consistent with the guidance for low-risk drinking.[1] Significant reliance on base rates in the general population wouldn't be appropriate in this hypothetical; the question is how often people with a similar history end up developing problematic drinking habits. Of course, there are many points of gradation between these two hypotheticals. My hot take is that choosing or continuing to drink is generally going to be net negative in expectation for anyone in a community/subculture/friend group that pressures its members -- even indirectly -- to drink immoderately. Social conformity is a powerful drug, and people routinely overestimate their resistance to that drug. 1. ^ UK guidelines here, but note that the UK "unit" is smaller than the US "standard drink." I'm skeptical of the degree of difference for women & men in the US guidance, but in light of UK guidance that may be because the US guidance for men is too permissive.

If anyone knows how to insert this table in my post, I would be very appreciative. I don't know if it's obvious or something, but I haven't seen any instructions for it and I am not technically skilled.

2
tobytrem
1mo
Can be a bit finicky, but I think I've figured out the easiest way.  1. Select the text of the table and copy.  2. Paste into your draft, making sure to paste into a paragraph/ normal text section, and not into the heading. If you paste into the title, it'll be reformatted as a title rather than a table.  LMK if this works!

-Response to "Welfare and Felt-Duration"

I seriously doubt I'll have anything ready for this by draft amnesty week (maaaaybe a rough outline if I can post that), but it could be one of the most useful things for me to get feedback on, as it is what I'm planning to write for my thesis (not with that title, though if I adapt and shorten it into a blog post after writing it, it might have a title like that in the way this earlier post does):

https://www.thinkingmuchbetter.com/main/meat-veggies-response/

Essentially, it's on the topic of the issues subjective exp... (read more)

-Existentialist Currents in Pawn Hearts

Unlike the others here, I probably won't post this one, either for draft amnesty, or on the forum, at all, as it isn't sufficiently relevant (though I did make a related post on the forum which uh, remains my lowest karma post):

https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/fvqRCuLm4GkdwDgFd/art-recommendation-childlike-faith-in-childhood-s-end

But it's a post I am strongly thinking of putting on my own blog. Like my most recent blog post:

https://www.thinkingmuchbetter.com/main/fun-home/

This is one that I would be adapting ... (read more)

-The Case for Pluralist Evaluation

This is another one I started and never finished. I actually specifically started it as an intended draft amnesty entrant last year, but I think it is in even rougher shape, and I also haven't looked at it in a long time. Basically this was inspired by the controversy a little while ago over ACE evaluating their movement grants on criteria other than impact on animal welfare. I don't defend this specific case but rather make a general argument against this type of argument. Basically the idea is that most EA donors (especi... (read more)

-Against National Special Obligation

I started a draft on this one a while ago, but haven't looked at it again for a while, and probably won't post it. The idea is pretty simple and I think relatively uncontroversial amongst EAs: we do not have special obligations to help people in the same country as us. This is not just also true, but especially true in political contexts. I see the contrary opinion voiced by even quite decent people, but I think it is an extremely awful position when you investigate it in a more thorough and on-the-ground way rather than noticing where it matches common sense.

(Sorry I don't know how to do formatting very well, so I can't make one of those great big titles others are using here):

-Appendices to: Some Observations on Alcoholism:

Appendix posts are post I write on my blog sometimes like these:

https://www.thinkingmuchbetter.com/tags/appendices/

which essentially respond to things I now disagree with in the original post, or expand on ideas I didn't get to cover very thoroughly, or just add on relevant ideas that I feel don't deserve their own separate article. This one would be to my recentish article on my struggles ... (read more)

6
Devin Kalish
1mo
-Response to "Welfare and Felt-Duration" I seriously doubt I'll have anything ready for this by draft amnesty week (maaaaybe a rough outline if I can post that), but it could be one of the most useful things for me to get feedback on, as it is what I'm planning to write for my thesis (not with that title, though if I adapt and shorten it into a blog post after writing it, it might have a title like that in the way this earlier post does): https://www.thinkingmuchbetter.com/main/meat-veggies-response/ Essentially, it's on the topic of the issues subjective experience of time give to aggregative theories of well-being, and will especially use this preprint: https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/welfare-and-felt-duration-andreas-mogensen/ As a jumping off point. The basic idea will be to argue that theories of wellbeing that view individuals as the fundamental subject of morality, and moral value just being about doing what is good for these subjects, have a viable route to accommodate subjective time as opposed theories which view individuals more like containers which are filled with a certain amount of universal value, and views this value as the basic subject of morality. Essentially this will take on the "speed of thought" view Mogenson discusses, and views the wellbeing contribution of a given stimulus as relating to the "amount of subject" it impacts, and not just the raw amount of good or bad feeling the time period contains. I will also spend a good deal of time on objections to this suggestion, such as skepticism of the idea of personal identity, theories of consciousness that make feeling and thought relatively inseparable even in principle such as illusionism and phenomenal intentionality theory, and the objection that we have as much (or more) reason to identify with our feelings than our thoughts.
2
Devin Kalish
1mo
-Existentialist Currents in Pawn Hearts Unlike the others here, I probably won't post this one, either for draft amnesty, or on the forum, at all, as it isn't sufficiently relevant (though I did make a related post on the forum which uh, remains my lowest karma post): https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/fvqRCuLm4GkdwDgFd/art-recommendation-childlike-faith-in-childhood-s-end But it's a post I am strongly thinking of putting on my own blog. Like my most recent blog post: https://www.thinkingmuchbetter.com/main/fun-home/ This is one that I would be adapting from an undergrad essay, this one on the connections between existentialist thought and the Van Der Graaf Generator album "Pawn Hearts". There are ways I like this essay even more than my last one, but I think it in even rougher shape.
5
Devin Kalish
1mo
-The Case for Pluralist Evaluation This is another one I started and never finished. I actually specifically started it as an intended draft amnesty entrant last year, but I think it is in even rougher shape, and I also haven't looked at it in a long time. Basically this was inspired by the controversy a little while ago over ACE evaluating their movement grants on criteria other than impact on animal welfare. I don't defend this specific case but rather make a general argument against this type of argument. Basically the idea is that most EA donors (especially the great majority who claim to be somewhat "cause neutral") care about things other than the impact of charities within their intended causes. Insofar as a charity evaluator is looking at charities that could have impacts in other cause areas, evaluators have a reason to take this into account if they can. Global Health and Longtermist charity evaluators probably aren't ranking the charities ACE is at all, so it's up to ACE to incorporate their impacts in other areas into their ranking (and then be clear about the priorities/decisions that went into this).
2
Devin Kalish
1mo
-Against National Special Obligation I started a draft on this one a while ago, but haven't looked at it again for a while, and probably won't post it. The idea is pretty simple and I think relatively uncontroversial amongst EAs: we do not have special obligations to help people in the same country as us. This is not just also true, but especially true in political contexts. I see the contrary opinion voiced by even quite decent people, but I think it is an extremely awful position when you investigate it in a more thorough and on-the-ground way rather than noticing where it matches common sense.

On the topic of hopepunk (and to an extent Secular Solstice since that came up in another comment), I want to mention the Mary Ellen Carter by Stan Rogers, which is quite important to me for similar reasons.

Oh my god I am so excited for this, I've been trying to put together a thesis paper on this exact subject! I have had such a hard time finding prior relevant work.

Fair, fair, and fair. I do think there are mitigating responses to all of these points as well, but I’ll concede the point that these are cases on the fringes of convenience for him. I was personally more thinking about IQ if I had to think of an example - he seems to place more importance on it than most people, but as I think he pointed out in a blog post I can’t find now, this leads just an awful lot of people to really statist and quasi or outright fascist views, so even if it doesn’t actually imply fascism, it’s an area where adopting a view closer to the average would be more convenient, provide an additional reason he could give against such people.

Thanks, these are interesting examples (and if I’m commenting too much someone please tell me, I can do that sometimes I think), but I range from somewhat to very skeptical on them as counterexamples:

  1. This is the most plausible one I think, it really does seem like it lends support for greater intervention on certain views. However, it’s hard to find a view of population ethics/population sciences that does not have some population it prefers, or that gives a good account of why incentives will produce it naturally. My impression is that most people eith

... (read more)
2
Larks
6mo
1. I think the counterfactual, convenient view for him to hold on natalism would be to just not talk about it, which is the strategy most people adopt with inconvenient facts and allows them to simply ignore them when doing policy analysis. 2. Higher education is currently very subsidized, and I agree that he thinks removing these subsidies would be a big improvement. But his views imply that even with no subsidy it would still be over-consumed, because each credential imposes negative externalities on everyone else's credential. 3. I don't have much of a direct response to you, except that many left wing people seem to think "but humans aren't perfectly rational" is a compelling objection to free market policies, and I think he should be given some credit here.

I think any question that attempts to get at the heart of the strongest objection to a public figure's worldview is going to sound like an accusation, because in a way it is, mostly I hope it's taken as an ultimately good natured, curious, and productive accusation. On the point of libertarianism being a "good lens", I mean libertarianism as a policy suggestion. I am voicing suspicion that there isn't a plausible lens behind this policy view that generalizes so well in both philosophy and the real world that it doesn't leave Caplan's slate of opinions looking suspicious, but for what it's worth my second question was basically asking him to propose one.

Part of my second question is that I think in order to beat these two challenges, the best he can do is say that there is one fairly simple principle that is behind anarcho-capitalism, and that it generalizes so robustly, both when thrown into the real world, and when thrown into philosophical controversies, that it causes all of them to conveniently point in a similar direction. It would have to be one he believed in from a young age and saw vindicated more and more over time in practice, and it needs to be remarkably unpopular to, despite having unusuall... (read more)

Two reasons I disagree:

  1. It is suspicious to just happen to have a whole bunch of views that support one's pre-existing politics, but it is only a little less suspicious to have a whole bunch of not that related views that all conveniently support one coherent political view
  2. I'm taken to understand that Caplan has been a libertarian since he was a kid, and an ancap almost as long. Insofar as he considers most of or many of the listed positions to come from careful academic reflection, most of the arguments he makes about them are probably ones he didn't have when he first became sympathetic to his current politics
2
Devin Kalish
6mo
Part of my second question is that I think in order to beat these two challenges, the best he can do is say that there is one fairly simple principle that is behind anarcho-capitalism, and that it generalizes so robustly, both when thrown into the real world, and when thrown into philosophical controversies, that it causes all of them to conveniently point in a similar direction. It would have to be one he believed in from a young age and saw vindicated more and more over time in practice, and it needs to be remarkably unpopular to, despite having unusually powerful application in so many controversies, escape the sympathies of so many other experts. I suspect he will suggest something like this, but I am suspicious a principle that actually meets these criteria doesn't exist, and that much of his worldview is best explained by bias. This is why I think a question on this level is one of the best challenges to pose him.

Forgot mental illness, which again is suspiciously convenient, and maybe on the lower end of the plausibility spectrum among his views.

This is going to sound like an accusation, but that's because it's part of my biggest broad source of skepticism of him as a public intellectual. It seems like on a huge range of issues, from human nature, to free will, to X-risks, to animal rights, to land use, to immigration, to civil rights, Caplan holds the view most convenient to anarcho-capitalism that he can plausibly defend (and occasionally view I think are quite hard to plausibly defend). This doesn't indicate any specific view, again most of his views are at least plausible and I agree with many... (read more)

I'm not sure this is true. 

  • He is very pro-natal, which you might think is inconvenient for anarcho-capitalism because it implies that children have large positive externalities and hence maybe should be subsidized (as Robin thinks). 
  • He thinks most university degrees have significant negative externalities because of the signalling model, which would lend support to the idea that university education should be taxed. 
  • He believes that humans are often irrational, which undercuts some perfect-competition style arguments for anarcho-capitalism. 
4
Jackson Wagner
6mo
The framing of this does indeed sound like an accusation, and I kind of agree with Matthew Barnett that if you actually asked for "comment on the general trend", Caplan would just respond that he thinks he's right on all those things and that libertarianism is simply a good ideological lens. But I totally agree that it would be great to ask for "examples of views he holds that are most inconvenient for his politics" -- this seems like a generally interesting/underrated interview question!
7
Matthew_Barnett
6mo
Even though I disagree with Caplan on x-risks, animal rights, mental illness, free will, and a few other things, I ultimately don't think it's necessarily suspicious for him to hold the most convenient view on a broad range of topics. One can imagine two different ways of forming an ideology: * The first way is to come up with an ideology a priori, and then interpret facts about the world in light of the ideology you've chosen. People who do this are prone to ideological biases since they're evaluating facts based partly on whether they're consistent with the ideology they've chosen, rather than purely based on whether the facts are true. * The second way is to interpret various facts about the world, and after some time, notice that there's a general theory that explains a bunch of independent facts. For example, you might notice that, in various domains, most people are biased towards voting for things that appear superficially socially desirable rather than what they know is actually good for people. Then, based on this general theory, an ideology falls right out. I predict that, regardless of his own personal history, Bryan Caplan will probably appeal to the second type of reasoning in explaining why his views all seem "convenient". He might say: it's not that the facts are ideologically convenient, but that the ideology is convenient since it fits all the facts. (Although I also expect him to be a bit modest and admit that he might be wrong about the facts.)
2
Devin Kalish
6mo
Forgot mental illness, which again is suspiciously convenient, and maybe on the lower end of the plausibility spectrum among his views.

Because my draft response was getting too long, I’m going to put it as a list of relevant arguments/points, rather than the conventional format, hopefully not much is lost in the process:

-Ethics does take things out there in the world as its subjects, but I don’t take the comparison to empirical science in this case to work, because the methods of inquiry are more about discourse than empirical study. Empirical study comes at the point of implementation, not philosophy. The strong version of this point is rather controversial but I do endorse it, I will re... (read more)

1
alexherwix
7mo
Hey Devin,  first of all, thanks for engaging and the offer in the end. If you want to continue the discussion feel free to reach out via PM.  I think there is some confusion about my and also Spencer Greenberg's position. Afaik, we are both moral anti-realists and not suggesting that moral realism is a tenable position. Without presuming to know much about Spencer, I have taken his stance in the post to be that he did not want to "argue" with realists in that post because even though he rejects their position, it requires a different type of argument than what he was after for that post. He wanted to draw attention to the fact that moral anti-realism and utilitarian value monism doesn't necessarily and "naturally" go well together. Many of the statements he heard from people in the EA community were confusing to him not because anti-realism is confusing but being anti-realist and steadfastly holding on to value monism was, given that we empirically seem to value many more things than just one "super value" such as "welfare" and that there is no inherent obligation that we "should" only value one "super value". He elaborates that also in another post. My point was also mainly to point out that we should see moral theories as instruments that can help us get us more of what we value. They can help us reach some end-in-view and be evaluated in this regard, anything else is specious.  From my perspective, adopting classic utilitarianism can be very limiting because it can oversimplify and obscure what we actually care about in a given situation. It's maybe useful as a helpful guide for considering what should be important but I am trying to not delude myself that "welfare" must be the only thing I should care about. This would be akin to a premature closure of inquiry into the specific situation at hand. I cannot and will never be able to fully anticipate all relevant details and aspects of a real world situation, so how can I be a priori certain that there is only

I endorse moral uncertainty, but I think one should be careful in treating moral theories like vague, useful models of some feature of the world. I am not a utilitarian because I think there is some "ethics" out there in the world, and being utilitarian approximates it in many situations, I think the theory is the ethics, and if it isn't, the theory is wrong. What I take myself to be debating when I debate ethics isn't which model "works" the best, but rather which one is actually what I mean by "ethics".

1
alexherwix
7mo
This position seems confusing to me. So, either (1) ethics is something "out there", which we can try to learn about and uncover. Then, we would tend to treat all our theories and models as approximations to some degree because similar issues as in science apply. Or (2) we take ethics as something which we define in some way to suit some of our own goals. Then, it's pretty arbitrary what models we come up with, whether they make sense depends mainly on the goals we have in mind.  This kind of mirrors the question whether a moral theory is to be taken as a  standard for judging ethics (1) or a definition of ethics (2). Even if you opt for (2) the moral theory is still an instrument that should be treated as useful means to an end-in-view. You want the definition to be convincing by demonstrating that it can actually get you somewhere that is desirable. Thus, it would be appropriate to acknowledge what this definition can and cannot do so that people can make appropriate use of it. Whatever road you chose you still come to the point where you need to debate which model "works" best. That's the beauty of philosophical and ethical discourse.   And turning back to the question of value monism, I think Spencer Greenberg has some interesting discussion for people who are moral anti-realists (people who fall in camp 2 above) and utilitarians. Maybe that's worth checking out.  

The scenario given doesn’t seem to pump the intuition for value pluralism so much as prioritarianism. I suppose you could conceptualize prioritarianism as a sort of value pluralism, I.e. the value of helping those worse off and the value of happiness, but you can also create a single scale on which all that matters is happiness but the amount that it matters doesn’t exactly correspond to the amount of the happiness. I at least usually think of it as importantly distinct from most plural value theories. I’m open to the possibility that this is just semantic... (read more)

1
alexherwix
7mo
Yeah, I think the intuitions it pumps really depends on the perspective and mindset of the reader. For me, it was triggering my desire to exhibit comradery and friendship in the last moments of life. I could also adjust the thought experiment so that nobody is hurt and simply ask whether one of them should take the morphine or whether they should die "being there for each other". I really do believe that we are kidding ourselves when we say that we only value "welfare" narrowly construed. But I get that some people may just look at such situations with a different mindset and, thus, different intuitions are triggered.  Regarding your approach, I think the important thing to keep in mind is that "the map is not the territory." "Theories are not truth." "Every model is wrong but some are useful, some of the time." Thus, there is not necessarily a need to "update" theories with every challenge one encounters but it is still important to stay mindful of the limitations a given theory has and consider alternative viewpoints to ensure that one doesn't run around with huge blind spots. Moral uncertainty can help here to some degree but acknowledging that we simply value more things than welfare maximization seems also an important step to guard against oversimplification. Interestingly, Spencer Greenberg made a related (much more eloquent) post today.

I take the strongest argument for value monism to be something like this: if you have more than one value, you need to trade them off at some point. Given this, how do you decide the exchange rate? Either there is no principled exchange rate, in which case you can’t decide any principled way to trade them off and there is no principled reason to invoke any more than one value when making a decision anyway, which defeats the original intuition for why one would want to recognize more values, or there is some commonality between these values that can determi... (read more)

1
alexherwix
7mo
I mean, I do get the appeal. But as you say it also has pretty huge drawbacks. I am curious how far people are willing to tie themselves to the mast and argue that value monism is actually a tenable position to take as a "life philosophy" despite it's drawbacks. How far are you willing to defend your "principles" even if the situation really calls them into question? What would your reply to the thought experiment be?

Re Chalmers agreeing with you, he would, he said as much in the LessWrong comments and I recently asked him in person and he confirmed it. In Yudkowsky’s defense it is a very typical move among illusionists to argue that Zombiests can’t really escape epiphenomenalism, not just some ignorant outsider’s move (I think I recall Keith Frankish and Francois Kammerer both making arguments like this). That said I remain frustrated that the post hasn’t been updated to clarify that Chalmers disagrees with this characterization of his position.

4
Omnizoid
8mo
Yes, there are some arguments of questionable efficacy for the conclusion that zombieism entails epiphenomenalism.  But notably: 1. Eliezer hasn't given any such argument.  2. Eliezer said that deniers of zombieism are by definition zombieists.  That's just flatly false. 

I don’t have a link because Twitter is very difficult to search now if you don’t have an account (if someone wants to provide one be my guest, there’s one discussion thread involving Zach Weinersmith that says so for instance), but Yudkowsky currently uses and seems to like the nickname at this point.

5
Pablo
8mo
Thanks for the update: I have retracted the relevant part of my previous comment.

Got it, it still doesn’t seem like that will be much of a problem on a dedicated Discord server like this, I don’t think a critical mass of founders will just randomly wander onto an addiction specific Discord server, but I can pass along the advice to be safe.

Hm, good to know, do you think this will even be a problem on a Discord server though? Unless employers specifically join the server in order to rule candidates out the information won’t be super accessible - certainly not from just performing a search on the candidate’s name. I also think we should have rules, including Jason’s suggestion, that officially ban this behavior.

My experience in EA is that people who eventually become your funder or your boss were your peers / people you saw around the community a few years before.

Interesting, thanks for the information! My own experience with someone very close to me with an eating disorder has looked very familiar to me since becoming an addict myself, so it always seemed like it made sense to categorize them together. I guess my final and most important reason for wanting to include it though is just that we have someone who joined the server with an eating disorder, and wanting to know if they could count. Given this I plan to stick by my judgement, even if it means that technically the group is more “addiction and some related mental health disorders” rather than just “addiction”.

Thanks, I'll have to think over these. I just set up a chat to get things started, but truthfully I am very nervous about running/moderating a group chat like this. I'm not very tech savvy and don't even have social media. I've run a club and a fellowship before, but this was all in-person and I think involves very different skills. I'm kind of hoping the current set up will prove temporary and someone with more experience eventually gets involved if this project grows into something substantial. I'll try to take cues from this document as things develop in the meantime.

Now that a few people have expressed interest, I have decided to create a chat so that we can coordinate a bit and work out possible details. For now it's just a discord server here: https://discord.gg/DwMw9C6p If Discord doesn't work well for anyone and they have a better idea I would welcome it, I also have little experience with moderating or running a server, so if anyone else wants to takeover please let me know. I've just set this up as something to get started with for now. Thanks for your interest!

There was also a commenter on my first, anonymous post who expressed interest in something like this I could try reaching out to.

That would be great! What sort of backup would you need?

I agree, I think there's some holdover influence from psychoanalysis where the basic intuition seems to be that there's always some deeper explanation for mental illnesses relating to underlying complexes or misdevelopment or something, and that therapy is finding and fixing those, but I don't think this was ever a sensible idea to default to. Sometimes the reason someone is an alcoholic is as dumb as "I was a little bored at the wrong time to be a little bored, and alcohol is a socially normalized way to address this".

Thanks, I really appreciate it

This is a quick PSA, Emile Torres does think “Preventing AI from killing everyone is a real and important issue”. The last time this was pointed out to you (that I’m aware of) you clarified that Torres’ disagreement was basically with longtermism. Please, pleeease clarify this in the post, it isn’t remotely how this challenge comes off and is borderline spreading misinformation, which is especially bad for important coalition building.

3
Peter Berggren
9mo
I didn't mean to imply that Emile Torres didn't think that this was an extinction risk. I'm sorry that I misspoke on that part.

I was interested in most of the relevant cause areas in some form from childhood (the global poor, animal welfare, extinction risks), and independently formulated utilitarianism (not uncommon I’m told, both Bertrand Russell and Brian Tomasik apparently did the same), so I was a pretty easy sell.

I was assigned “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” and “All Animals are Equal” for a freshman philosophy course, and decided Peter Singer really got it and did philosophy in the way that seemed most important to me. Later I revisited Singer when working on a long fina... (read more)

I'm really heartened by this, especially some of the names on here I independently admired who haven't been super vocal about the issue yet, like David Chalmers, Bill McKibben, and Audrey Tang. I also like certain aspects of this letter better than the FLI one. Since it focuses specifically on relevant public figures, rapid verification is easier and people are less overwhelmed by sheer numbers. Since it focuses on an extremely simple but extremely important statement it's easier to get a broad coalition on board and for discourse about it to stay on topic. I liked the FLI one overall as well, I signed it myself and think it genuinely helped the discourse, but if nothing else this seems like a valuable supplement.

For what it’s worth I haven’t gotten around to reading a ton of your posts yet, but me and pretty much everyone I showed your blog to could tell pretty quickly that it was a cut above whatever I might picture just from the title. That said, I think all the changes are good ideas on the whole. Keep up the good work!

1
David Thorstad
1y
Thanks Devin! Let me know what you think

Fully endorsed. And I would add that if you don’t mind more speculative, harder to evaluate interventions there are organizations working on risks of future astronomical suffering like the Center for Long-Term Risk, and organizations working on wild animal suffering like Wild Animal Initiative. For more measurable impacts I don’t have much to add to weeatquince’s excellent suggestions.

So this depends if you take EA to be more fundamentally interested in theories of beneficence (roughly what ought you do to positively help others) or in theories of axiology (roughly what makes a world better or worse). I’m suspicious of most theories that pull these apart, but importantly Scanlon’s work is really interested in trying to separate the two, and basically ditch the direct relevance of axiology altogether. Certainly he goes beyond telling people what they ought not to do. If EA is fundamentally about beneficence, Scanlon is very relevant, if it’s more about axiology, he’s more or less silent.

So long as we’re sharing recommendations, Parfit also has a good paper that’s relevant to this, which a good deal of the more recent partial aggregation debate is leap-frogging off of.

The most obvious reason is probably aggregation. Scanlonians are among the philosophers most interested in developing non-aggregative theories of beneficence, and EA analyses tend to assume purely aggregative theories of beneficence as a starting point. More simply it could just be that Scanlon is still relatively obscure despite his moment in the sun on the Good Place.

3
William McAuliffe
1y
Strongly agreed. For those who want exposition on this point, see Ashford's article on demandingness in contractualism vs. utilitarianism https://doi.org/10.1086/342853
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