Sure, cultured meat is for most intents and purposes not yet available. If you think most of the badness of meat eating is in the killing itself, the exact conditions under which the animal lived probably don't matter much to your decision making. But it is possible with current technology to eat an animal that has not been tortured, had a rich and pleasant life, etc.  If you favor a [certain flavor of] utilitarian perspective, it's possible to eat meat such that the animal being eaten had a net very good life.

So, suppose I'm vaguely utilitarian but not a super strict consequentialist. How do I think about meat eating given that the marginal consumption causes lots of expected suffering, but the suffering is not a first order or desired consequence of my actions?

Thanks for writing this up - it's very comprehensive! (Also, broadly similar to my current thoughts.) There's one argument meat eating might be okay (not an argument for "good") that I rarely see discussed explicitly, and I'm wondering if you have thoughts on:

What's the nature of moral responsibility vis a vis indirect consequences of your actions? You have the quote about being to blame for murder even if you hired an assassin rather than pulling the trigger yourself -- and this seems reasonable to me. But how about this intuition pump: it just so happens that, whenever my mailman comes by to deliver mail, he kicks the neighbors dog a few times. I am aware of this. I now order something delivered by mail. Am I responsible for the dog getting kicked?

Intuitively (not a moral philosopher, disclaimers apply, etc.), I want to say that I'm not responsible. Even though the dog-kicking is a known consequence of my mail-getting,

• I didn't kick the dog
• I didn't want the dog to be kicked
• The dog doesn't have to get kicked as a core part of getting mail delivered
• I would be willing to pay more for my mail delivery if the dog were not kicked (to really torture the hypothetical, e.g. if the marginal non-sadistic mail carrier demanded slightly higher wages)

The correct "moral fix" isn't "don't get mail," it's "don't kick dogs." Do you share this intuition of non-responsibility? Is meat eating somewhere between hiring an assassin (bad consequences are inherent in the act; actor to blame) and getting mail in this hypothetical (bad consequences not inherent in the act of getting mail; actor not to blame)? How do you think about "blame" differently from "consequentialist obligation"?