All of JamesSnowden's Comments + Replies

Implicitly, yes. Though don’t use that exact formulation. money vs daly comparison is based on reported preference not swb. Daly vs swb comparison implicitly writes off time spent asleep where I assumed 1 daly = difference between 40->100 on swb scale.

If didn’t exclude sleep in botec, would make alcohol look worse as happiness bump from alcohol would be for lower % of time. (Set row 21 to 24)

2[anonymous]5mo
Yeah I'm not making the 'you've underestimated net benefits of alcohol' point, just trying to think through your assumptions

>Another thought - you measure the effects of alcohol on subjective wellbeing as a fraction of someone's waking hours. This seems right from a subjective wellbeing perspective. But is that also the way you think about the value lost by a death? By consistency, you would also need to implicitly downweight the disvalue a death by a third for the time people spend asleep. Or do you already do that in your moral weights?

Oh that's interesting. It's been a while now since I did this, but I think I was implicitly doing that with this calc

2[anonymous]5mo
Yeah wrt to your botec, I wasn't sure whether you were implicitly writing off time spent asleep.  I suppose you would also have to do the same for measuring the effects of money on wellbeing. Do you do that?

>I'm not sure I follow the claim that if you assume that alcohol taxation merely shifts the tax burden, there aren't strong reasons to think the deadweight loss will be greater from alcohol taxation vs other forms of taxation. The subjective wellbeing study found that drinking increases people's wellbeing by almost as much as spending time with friends. It seems unlikely to me that if the tax were instead eg on income that the benefits of the income would be as large as this. Intuitively, this seems off.

 

Interesting. That doesn't seem off to me. If... (read more)

4[anonymous]5mo
Hangovers are a myth

Hi Nick, thanks for your thoughts.

I agree air quality is meaningfully different from the other areas we highlight in terms of domestic salience (at least in India). But it’s not clear to me whether the existence of nascent government funding (and the consequent opportunity to improve the allocation of that funding) make philanthropic opportunities better or worse.

Efforts like the NCAP framework and 15th Finance Commission budget allocations in India are fairly new, and there aren’t well-developed playbooks for prioritizing and addressing sources of air pol... (read more)

8
NickLaing
5mo
Thanks so much for your great explanation James and the other ones on the post. Great to see direct engagement from the people running the program. the theory of change of trying to change the government's current allocation of makes some sense (I didn't pick it up in the podcast, but reading back it is there to some degree), but its very difficult.  Its always a difficult task influence governments to spend their money in more impactful directions - especially just with science and logic. Advocacy skills might be at least as important to your cause as the data the projects you fund produce. I would be interested to see if you have examples of philanthropies with small amounts of money and no real carrot or stick, influencing governments with larger amounts of money on the issue. Here in Uganda philanthropies can definitely influence the direction of healthcare for example (HIV, Malaria national programs. etc.), but its largely through pouring significant resources into that area, often more than the government can even which gives them hard power and carrots and sticks to wield. I'm also interested if Indian governments have shown in any practical way that they might be genuinely interested in cost-effectiveness analysis driving fund allocation? As far as I know in East Africa here cost-effectiveness analysis is almost completely unutilised by governments, I've certainly never heard it referred to from any level of government in any intervention here, health or otherwise. I hope India is more switched on than that and might pay more attention. I know nothing about the region really so maybe they do already use it. Anyway we will see what happens! Obvious clean air is wildly important and causes ludicrous amnounts of suffering and death. It may well be  a hard thing to judge the impact on - a rough one for the grantmaker and those doing the interventions. If the quality doesn't improve obviously that will be a fail, but if it does (as is likely) its going to be

Thanks Barry, 

At GiveWell (where I was working when we started the suicide prevention work), we discounted the impact to account for people who would otherwise die by suicide potentially living somewhat worse lives than a typical person in their context. Given the empirical and moral uncertainty, that estimate was based on a deliberative process and preference aggregation of different staff views rather than a single bottom-up model. Open Phil hasn't yet decided whether to incorporate a similar discount.

An overview of how GiveWell thought about it is ... (read more)

2
Barry Grimes
5mo
Thanks for providing such a thoughtful response. These value judgments are extremely difficult and it looks like you did the best you could with the evidence available. I haven't looked into the subjective wellbeing of suicide survivors but, if there's enough data, this could provide a helpful sense-check to your original discount rate. Although means restriction is very successful at reducing suicide rates, I'm curious how it compares to social determinants (or psychotherapy) if the goal is DALYs/QALYs/WELLBYs. It seems plausible that public health interventions that focus on improving quality of life could lead to a larger overall benefit (for a larger population) than ones that focus solely on reducing suicides (depending on philosophical views of course!)

Thanks for the thoughts Kartik!

(Speaking for myself; the 10% estimate comes from work I did at GiveWell but others at Open Phil and GiveWell may disagree with me)

I agree we shouldn’t dismiss consumer surplus entirely, and in retrospect would soften some of the wording in that doc – I think the irrationality point is important but not totalizing. The Nielsen idea is interesting and I’d like to think about it more. I think internalities are less bimodally distributed between people than your model, which muddies the waters, but I wonder if an analysis like t... (read more)

2
Karthik Tadepalli
5mo
Fair points, I agree that taxation has a lower bar. The bimodal point was illustrative, you could take some other individual characteristics as proxies for the extent of internalities (e.g. education) and weight people by that when estimating.

Thanks for pulling this together! It's great to see more funders in the space

Thanks for editing Michael. Fwiw I am broadly on board with swb being a useful framework to answer some questions. But I don’t think I’ve shifted my opinion on that much so “coming round to it” didn’t resonate

>Since then, all the major actors in effective altruism’s global health and wellbeing space seem to have come around to it (e.g., see these comments by GiveWell, Founders Pledge, Charity Entrepreneurship, GWWC, James Snowden).

I don't think this is an accurate representation of the post linked to under my name, which was largely critical.

Hello James. Apologies, I've removed your name from the list. 

To explain why we included it, although the thrust of your post was to critically engage with our research, the paragraph was about the use of the SWB approach for evaluating impact, which I believed you were on board with. In this sense, I put you in the same category as GiveWell: not disagreeing about the general approach, but disagreeing about the numbers you get when you use it. 

[Speaking for myself here]

I also thought this claim by HLI was misleading. I clicked several of the links and don't think James is the only person being misrepresented. I also don't think this is all the "major actors in EA's GHW space" - TLYCS, for example, meet reasonable definitions of "major" but their methodology makes no mention of wellbys

Thanks Jason, mostly agree with paras 4-5, and think para 2 is a good point as well. 

Do you think the neutral point and basic philosophical perspective (e.g., deprivationism vs. epicureanism) are empirical questions, or are they matters on which the donor has to exercise their own moral and philosophical judgment (after considering what the somewhat limited survey data have to say on the topic)? 

I think the basic philosophical perspective is a moral/philosophical judgement. But the neutral point combines that moral judgement with empirical models... (read more)

From HLI's perspective, it makes sense to describe how the moral/philosophical views one assumes affect the relative effectiveness of charities. They are, after all, a charity recommender, and donors are their "clients" in a sense. GiveWell doesn't really do this, which makes sense -- GiveWell's moral weights are so weighted toward saving lives that it doesn't really make sense for them to investigate charities with other modes of action. I think it's fine to provide a bottom-line recommendation on whatever moral/philosophical view a recommender feels is b... (read more)

Sure, happy to elaborate.

Here's figure 4 for reference:

I think each part of this chart has some assumptions I don't think are defensible.

1. I don't think a neutral point higher than 2 is defensible. 

You cite three studies in this report.[1] My read on what to conclude about the neutral point from those is:

i) IDinsight 2019 (n=70; representative of GW recipients): you highlight the average answer of 0.56, but this is excluding the 1/3 of people who say it's not possible to have a life worse than death.[2] I think including those as 0 mor... (read more)

On 3. Epicureanism being a defensible position

Epicureanism is discussed in almost every philosophy course on the badness of death. It’s taken seriously, rather than treated as an absurd position, a non-starter, and whilst not that many philosophers end up as Epicureans, I’ve met some that are very sympathetic. I find critics dismiss the view too quickly and I’ve not seen anything that’s convinced me the view has no merit. I don’t think we should have zero credence in it, and it seems reasonable to point out that it is one of the options. Again, I’m incline... (read more)

8
JoelMcGuire
1y
I could have been clearer, the 38% is a placeholder while I do the Barker et al. 2022 analysis. You did update me about the previous studies' relevance. My arguments are less supporting the 38% figure - which I expect to update with more data and more about explaining why I think that I have a higher prior for household spillovers from psychotherapy than you and Alex seem to. But really, the hope is that we can soon be discussing more and better evidence.  

Hi James, thanks for elaborating, that’s really useful! We'll reply to your points in separate comments.

Your statement, 1. I don't think a neutral point higher than 2 is defensible

Reply: I don’t think we have enough evidence or theory to be confident about where to put the neutral point. 

Your response about where to put the neutral point involves taking answers to survey questions where people are asked something like “where on a 0-10 scale would you choose not to keep living?” and assuming we should take those answers at face value for where to ... (read more)

Do you think the neutral point and basic philosophical perspective (e.g., deprivationism vs. epicureanism) are empirical questions, or are they matters on which the donor has to exercise their own moral and philosophical judgment (after considering what the somewhat limited survey data have to say on the topic)? 

I would graph the neutral point from 0 to 3. I think very few donors would set the neutral point above 3, and I'd start with the presumption that the most balanced way to present the chart is probably to center it fairly near the best guess fr... (read more)

Thanks Jason, makes sense.

I think I’m more skeptical than you that reasonable alternative assumptions make StrongMinds look more cost effective than AMF. But I agree that StrongMinds seems like it could be a good fit for some donors.

I think I’m more skeptical than you that reasonable alternative assumptions make StrongMinds look more cost effective than AMF. But I agree that StrongMinds seems like it could be a good fit for some donors.

Interested if you could elaborate here. I'm not sure which intuitions you consider 'reasonable' and why.  As Joel's figure 4 above indicates, for either HLI's or GiveWell's estimates of StrongMinds, talk therapy can be more cost-effective than bednets, and vice versa, but which is more effective depends on the philosophical assumptions - so that ou... (read more)

FWIW I don't think GiveDirectly should be "the bar" for being considered one of the most effective organizations in the global health and development space.

I think both 5x and 10x differences are big and meaningful in this domain, and I think there are likely billions of dollars in funding gaps between GiveWell's bar (~10x) and GiveDirectly. I think donors motivated by EA principles would be making a mistake, and leaving a lot of value on the table by donating to GiveDirectly or StrongMinds over GiveWell's recommendations (I say this as someone who's donat... (read more)

3
Guy Raveh
1y
Not going into the wider discussion, I specifically disagree with this idea: there's a trade-off here between estimated impact and things like risk, paternalism, scalability. If I'm risk-averse enough, or give some partial weight to bring less paternalistic, I might prefer donating to GiveDirectly - which I indeed am, despite choosing to donate to AMF in the past. (In practice, I expect I'll try to do a sort of Softmax based on my subjective estimates of a few different charities and give different amounts to all of them.)
Jason
1y35
10
0

Fair points. I'm not planning to move my giving to GiveWell All Grants to either SM or GD, and don't mean to suggest anyone else does so either. Nor do I want to suggest we should promote all organizations over an arbitrary bar without giving potential donors any idea about how we would rank within the class of organizations that clear that bar despite meaningful differences.

I mainly wrote the comment because I think the temperature in other threads about SM has occasionally gotten a few degrees warmer than I think optimally conducive to what we're trying ... (read more)

I felt happy reading the nice things your colleagues are saying about you Max, all of which ring true to me. I admire your humility, thoughtfulness and level-headedness, and I'm looking forward to seeing what you get up to next!

Thanks, this looks like a helpful report!

It looks like this estimate comes from the proportion of countries the Bloomberg consortium and World Bank worked in that passed various policies over a decade without adjusting for the counterfactual chance of policy changes without their work.

I’m curious if CE had any luck trying to estimate the counterfactual (Eg by looking at other countries, trends before BB, or diving deep on individual case studies)?

Fwiw when I looked at this a few years ago (at GiveWell, not OP) I couldn’t find any evidence of a difference i... (read more)

Interesting thoughts Joel. Is the analysis in (9) public / could you point me towards it?

(I work at open phil but only made a tiny contribution to this report; I’m just curious)

4
MvK
1y
You can find CE's Research Report here: https://3394c0c6-1f1a-4f86-a2db-df07ca1e24b2.filesusr.com/ugd/26c75f_2081c09f8f20405e89105ac88c01ec6d.pdf

(I work at Open Phil on Effective Altruism Community Building: Global Health and Wellbeing)

Our understanding is that only a small proportion of FTXFF’s grantees would be properly classified as global health or animal welfare. Among that subset, there are some grantees who we think might be a good fit for our current focus areas and strategies. We’ve reached out individually to grantees we know of who fit that description

That being said, it’s possible we’ve missed potential grantees, or work that might contribute across multiple cause areas. If you think that might apply to your project, you can apply through the same form.

On (1)

>people inflate their self-reports scores generally when they are being given treatment?

Yup, that's what I meant.

>Is there one or more studies you can point me to so I can read up on this, or is this a hypothetical concern?

I'm afraid I don't know this literature on blinding very well but a couple of pointers:

(i) StrongMinds notes "social desirability bias" as a major limitation of their Phase Two impact evaluation, and suggest collecting objective measures to supplement their analysis:

"Develop the means to negate ... (read more)

Excited to see your work progressing Michael!

I thought it might be useful to highlight a couple of questions I personally find interesting and didn't see on your research agenda. I don't think these are the most important questions, but I haven't seen them discussed before and they seem relevant to your work.

Writing this quickly so sorry if any of it's unclear. Not necessarily expecting an answer in the short term; just wanted to flag the questions.

(1) How should self-reporting bias affect our best guess of the effect size of therapy-ba... (read more)

3
MichaelPlant
5y
Hello James, Thanks for these. I remember we discussed (1) a while back but I'm afraid I don't really remember the details anymore. To check, what exactly is the bias you have in mind - that people inflate their self-reports scores generally when they are being given treatment? Is there one or more studies you can point me to so I can read up on this, or is this a hypothetical concern? I don't think I understand what you're getting at with (2): are you asking what we infer if some intervention increases consumption but doesn't increase self-reported life satisfaction in a scenario S but does in other scenarios? That sounds like a normal case where we get contradictory evidence. Let me know if I've missed something here. I'm not sure what you mean by this. Are you asking what the evidence is on what the causes and correlated of life satisfaction is? Dolan et al 2008 have a much cited paper on this.

I would deprioritise looking at BasicNeeds (in favour of StrongMinds). They use a franchised model and aren't able to provide financials for all their franchisees. This makes it very difficult to estimate cost-effectiveness for the organisation as a whole.

The GWWC research page is out of date (it was written before StrongMinds' internal RCT was released) and I would now recommend StrongMinds above BasicNeeds on the basis of greater levels of transparency, and focus on cost-effectiveness.

0
MichaelPlant
7y
Very interesting you say this. I recently suggested to Basic Needs' CEO that he get in contact with GW and hopefully this will lead to BN focusing more on cost-effectiveness and transparency. Did you and I not discuss the Strong Mind's RCT ages ago? I thought we agreed it was too good to be true and we really wanted to see something independent, but maybe I misremember/was talking to someone else. If it's the case the best evidence for mental health in the developing world is an internal RCT that shows 1. how far behind mental health is and 2. the urgent need for a better evidence base.

Thanks Holden. This seems reasonable.

A high impact foundation recently (and helpfully) sent me their grant writeups, which are a treasure trove of useful information. I asked them if I could post them here and was (perhaps naively) surprised that they declined.

They made many of the same points as you re: the limited usefulness of broad feedback, potential reputation damage, and (given their small staff size) cost of responding. Instead, they share their writeups with a select group of likeminded foundations.

I still think it would be much better if they mad... (read more)

I agree this seems relevant.

One slight complication is that donors to GWWC might expect a small proportion of people to renege on the pledge.

It seems like you're assuming that the GiveDirectly money would have gone only to the M-Pesa-access side of the (natural) experiment, but they categorized areas based on whether they had M-Pesa access in 2008-2010, not 2012-2014 when access was much higher.

Ah yes - that kind of invalidates what I was trying to do here.

I didn't notice that GiveWell had an estimate for this, and checking now I still don't see it. Where's this estimate from?

It came from the old GiveWell cost-effectiveness analysis excel sheet (2015). "Medians - cell V14". Act... (read more)

Thanks for this Jeff - a very informative post.

The study doesn't appear to control for cash transfers received through access to M-Pesa. I was thinking about how much of the 0.012 increase in ln(consumption) was due to GiveDirectly cash transfers.

Back of the envelope:

  • M-Pesa access raises ln(consumption) by 0.012 for 45% of population (c.20m people).
  • 0.012 * 20m = 234,000 unit increases in ln(consumption)

  • GiveDirectly gave c.$9.5m in cash transfers between 2012-14 to people with access to M-Pesa. [1]

  • GiveWell estimate each $ to GiveDirectly raises ln(c
... (read more)
0
Jeff Kaufman
7y
Good point! I hadn't thought about this at all. GiveDirectly's cash transfers were very large, enough that $9.5m would go to 33k people ($288/person). The population was 43M, so 1 in 1300 people received money from GiveDirectly. Their sample size is just 1593, so you expect 0-2 GiveDirectly recipients. I think they should be pretty visible in the data? Might be worth writing to the authors. It seems like you're assuming that the GiveDirectly money would have gone only to the M-Pesa-access side of the (natural) experiment, but they categorized areas based on whether they had M-Pesa access in 2008-2010, not 2012-2014 when access was much higher. I didn't notice that GiveWell had an estimate for this, and checking now I still don't see it. Where's this estimate from? (In my post I just took their average amount transferred, figured out what effect that had on the average recipient's income, and then discounted by .8 for GiveDirectly's overhead.)

I agree. Although some forms of personal insurance are also rational. Eg health insurance in the US because the downside of not having it is so bad. But don't insure your toaster.

I agree that dmu over crop yields is perfectly rational. I mean a slightly different thing. Risk aversion over utilities. Which is why people fail the Allais pradadox. Rational choice theory is dominated by expected utility theory (exceptions Buchak, McClennen) which suggests risk aversion over utilities is irrational. Risk aversion over utilities seems pertinent here because most moral views don't have dmu of people's lives.

0
Rick
8y
I think that this discussion really comes from the larger discussion about the degree to which we should consider rational choice theory (RCT) to be a normative, as opposed to a positive, theory (for a good overview of the history of this debate, I would highly suggest this article by Wade Hands, especially the example on page 9). As someone with an economics background, I very heavily skew toward seeing it as a positive theory (which is why I pushed back against your statement about economists' view of risk aversion). In my original reply I wasn't very specific about what I was saying, so hopefully this will help clarify where I'm coming from! I just want to say that I agree that rational choice theory (RCT) is dominated by expected utility (EU) theory. However, I disagree with your portrayal of risk aversion. In particular, I agree that risk aversion over expected utility is irrational - but my reasoning for saying this is very different. From an economic standpoint, risk aversion over utils is, by its very definition, irrational. When you define 'rational' to mean 'that which maximizes expected utility' (as it is defined in EU and RCT models), then of course being risk averse over utils is irrational - under this framework, risk neutrality over utils is a necessary pre-requisite for the model to work at all. This is why, in cases where risk aversion is important (such as the yield example), expected utility calculations take risk aversion into account when calculating the utils associated with each situation - thus making risk aversion over the utils themselves redundant. Put in a slightly different way, we need to remember that utils do not exist - they are an artifact of our modeling efforts. Risk neutrality over utils is a necessary assumption of RCT in order to develop models that accurately describe decision-making (since RCT was developed as a positive theory). Because of this, the phrase 'risk aversion over utility' has not real-world interpretation. Wi

In normative decision theory, risk aversion means a very specific thing. It means using a different aggregating function from expected utility maximisation to combine the value of disjunctive states.

Rather than multiplying the realised utility in each state by the probability of that state occurring, these models apply a non-linear weighting to each of the states which depends on the global properties of the lottery, not just what happens in that state.

Most philosophers and economists agree risk aversion over utilities is irrational because it violates the... (read more)

1
Rick
8y
I just want to push back against your statement that "economists believe that risk aversion is irrational". In development economics in particular, risk aversion is often seen as a perfectly rational approach to life, especially in cases where the risk is irreversible. To explain this, I just want to quickly point out that, from an economic standpoint, there's no correct formal way of measuring risk aversion among utils. Utility is an ordinal, not cardinal, measure. Risk aversion is something that is applied to real measures, like crop yields, in order to better estimate people's revealed preferences - in essence, risk aversion is a way of taking utility into account when measuring non-utility values. So, to put this in context, let's say you are a subsistence farmer, and have an expected yield of X from growing Sorghum or a tuber, and you know that you'll always roughly get a yield X (since Sorghum and many tubers are crazily resilient), but now someone offers you an 'improved Maize' growth package that will get you an expected yield of 2X, but there's a 10% chance that you're crops will fail completely. A rational person at the poverty line should always choose the Sorghum/tuber. This is because that 10% chance of a failed crop is much, much worse than could be revealed by expected yield - you could starve, have to sell productive assets, etc. Risk aversion is a way of formalizing the thought process behind this perfectly rational decision. If we could measure expected utility in a cardinal way, we would just do that, and get the correct answer without using risk aversion - but because we can't measure it cardinally, we have to use risk aversion to account for things like this. As a last fun point, risk aversion can also be used to formalize the idea of diminishing marginal utility without using cardinal utility functions, which is one of the many ways that we're able to 'prove' that diminishing marginal utility exists, even if we can't measure it directly.

We wanted to differentiate the website slightly from the eaglobal site while maintaining brand coherency so went for a slightly different shade of blue which feels a bit 'calmer'.

Not wedded to it though and may change back. Which do you prefer?

Thanks Ian - agreed it doesn't look fantastic at the moment. We embedded it on the website at the last moment and it screwed with the formatting. We'll be working to improve how it looks over the next couple of weeks.

Thanks Austen. This is really helpful feedback.

  1. Yes I agree. This is important but very hard to quantify. Of course the causal relationship goes both ways (poor physical health poor mental health) but it's probable that mental health disorders have worse downstream effects than most physical health problems (economic productivity, stigma, impact on carers, physical health). We tried to capture these qualitatively at the beginning of the report but could have been clearer that they weren't included in the cost-effectiveness calculations.

  2. Thanks - this is

... (read more)

Eric - this is so great! Coincidentally, CEA has also been working on a very similar report which was completed last week. It's here: https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B551Ijx9v_RoZWlUUFVTYWZ6aTVCUDRDLTViVHVyQVpPWVNn

I've shot you an email. We should definitely discuss our conclusions.

2
Austen_Forrester
8y
Very good report, James. I have a few comments: 1. The DALYs calculated for mental health don't factor in the huge effect that mental health has on physical health. This may be laboursome to estimate, but should at least be considered. And you mentioned that people with MNS issues are often treated horrendously by their family/society, but that also hasn't been factored into the DALY cost estimate. An MNS disorder with a 0.4 DALY could really have a 0.9 DALY when you factor in mistreatment. I realize this is probably impossible to do, but it important to recognize that socialization side effects have huge impacts on DALYS. 2. Sri Lanka pesticide ban cost per DALY: $1000 is pretty high. Eddleston estimated it at $2 per YLL using the actual costs of running Sri Lanka's pesticide regulation department. That figure doesn't even factor in savings in health care costs. Also, Sri Lanka and other countries have only banned a few HHPs. A total ban of HHPs could yield drastically different cost estimates. I should note that only a fraction of pesticides are classified as highly hazardous. A total HHP ban still leaves farmers with lots of choices to buy pesticides, in addition to non-chemical forms of pest control. 3. No choice for donating to advocate for pesticide bans: Later this year, I expect that the Global Initiative for Pesticide Poisoning Prevention will begin our anti-HHP campaign. It takes a long time to do the initial steps of receiving charity status and input from all the experts in the field. 4. Room for more funding for a program like StrongMinds doesn't make sense because it can be scaled up to LMIC around the world. 5. I don't understand what the mental health charities have to do with children. Do StrongMinds and BasicNeeds treat children?

1) Ah yes - thanks for pointing out. Probably has limited external validity for the strongminds model though (which is psychosocial treatment alone for most patients delivered by community health workers, with only the most serious cases referred to clinics for medication). The numbers come from the Chisholm (2015) WHO-CHOICE model. http://www.bmj.com/content/344/bmj.e609

2) Analysis is here https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1-lCC1zQHVZlJS8f9OfqhzcZTetHMxuMkW7nT75QDGhk/edit#gid=960072536

[This is quick and dirty but gives a rough indication of cost-effe... (read more)

0
LTengberg
7y
Hi James! Your comments to this blog post are very much appreciated - thank you for contributing. We are a group of students at Oxford University doing a research project where we are trying to find the most effective charity to donate to (see https://oxpr.io/). We are currently looking into StrongMinds, and found your helpful cost-effectiveness model. If we may ask, we were wondering if possibly you have a more up-to-date / complete version of the same? And possibly also ask which inputs you received from StrongMinds vs. inputs estimated (and if so, how those estimates were made)? Completely understandable if you don't have time to answer all questions, but truly any feedback from you at all would be greatly appreciated. Please do let us know. Many many thanks!
0
MichaelPlant
8y
1) Yeah, I never thought the numbers were that robust. More good measurement needed! 2) Thanks for this, will check this out soon. 3) Thanks 4). By being 10-18 times worse than we think, I mean anxiety/depression may cause about 10-18 more suffering than people expect them compared to other health conditions. This is from the the Dolan and Metcalfe paper: they show people are prepared to trade off 15% of life to remove 'some difficulty walking' and 'moderate anxiety or depression', but that people with 'moderate anxiety or depression' report 10x the reduction in life satisfaction that those with 'some difficulty walking' do, and 18x reduction in terms of daily effect (their measure for what we might call 'happiness'). In other words, the average person imagines walking with a limp would be bad as moderate depression (as inferred from trade offs), but actually the depression would be much worse for their happiness than the limp. This is explained by the focusing illusion and the non-adaptation stuff. If you look at the other numbers in the Dolan and Metcalfe paper, they show 'self care' and 'usual activities' are equally over-rated when people the trade-offs compared to how much they effect happiness. In terms of weighting, my thought is that if we constructed well-being adjusted life years (WELBYs) depression would be 10-ish times worse than walking with a limb, but this would be rescaled. So if depression has a WELBY weight of 0.8 (e.g. 1 year with depression is worth 0.2 years of happy life), then minor mobility issues have a WELBY weight of 0.08 or something. I would not suggest all cases of mental health should be understood as being many times worse than death! I don't think I implied that anyway, but I would clarify that in future. The overall thought is more like: daily life with depression is quite bad in terms of happiness, health conditions which don't cause depression (or pain) at all (or for very long) are probably not nearly as bad as we imagine

Just to add to this. Acute schizophrenia is one of the worst health conditions on GBD13 DALY weightings (c.0.8). Severe depression is also one of the worst (c.0.65).

See http://www.thelancet.com/action/showFullTableImage?tableId=tbl2&pii=S2214109X15000698

So Michael - I agree it's very possible that mental health disorders are underweighted by DALY weightings because of the focusing illusion. But they are actually weighted quite highly at the moment. 10 years with severe depression is worth approximately 3.5 years of healthy life.

0
MichaelPlant
8y
yes, it's interesting that schizophrenia tops the list anyway, although this could be the case in virtue of the face it stops you from leading a normal life part of the disability (this being based on the EQ-5D), rather than because severe schiozophrenics are less happy than severely depressed people. although they are weighted highly, that doesn't stop them from being underweighted. Given the way DALYs are constructed - measuring health, not happiness; using preferences, not adaptation - it's conceptually very hard to see how mental health conditions can't be underweighted in terms of happiness. Unless and until we measure people's experiences of various diseases we really won't know. My guess is that depression could be the most comparatively underweighted health state: if you can function normally, but you're just really sad, you might do pretty well on an EQ-5D metric because you're only doing badly in 1 of 5 criteria, and that's the criteria most linked to happiness. As an aside, do you know how the GBD project takes episode duration into account? Or is it just a measure of intensity?

Hi Michael! As I said before, congrats on an interesting paper.

A few points on this comment:

1) DCP3 didn't have any cost-effectiveness figures for the StrongMinds intervention (interpersonal group therapy). Is the $1,000/DALY figure you mention related to primary care advice on alcohol use?

2) I'm currently writing a piece on mental health for a HNW donor and tried to model c-e of StrongMinds. I got c.$650/DALY reducing to $400/DALY as intervention scales. The biggest uncertainty in this estimate is the long term effects of psychosocial treatment as hardly ... (read more)

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MichaelPlant
8y
Hello James. in reply: 1) check figure 3 on p1681 of DCP3. The box says "Depression: episodic treatment in primary care with (generic) antidepressant medication and psychosocial treatment" at the box implies it's between $1000/DALY and $10,000/DALY. I'm not sure exactly where those numbers came from. Have I misread that? 2) I'd be really keen to see your calculations and how you're putting it all together! 3) Can you point out where in their spreadsheet they specify that? I've just spent 20 minutes looking through it and am a bit lost. My estimate is then likely a miscalculation - thanks for pointing that out! What I should have done is use YLD figures for malaria and depression, and then transformed the disability rating using subjective well-being numbers. Then I'd need to say something about the badness of losing a life. I think this indicates the perils of using DALY numbers...

Thank you all for some great responses and apologies for my VERY late reply. This post was intended to 'test an idea/provoke a response' and there's some really good discussion here.

Bernadette,

Thank you for your very informative response. I must admit that my knowledge of EBM is much more limited than yours and is primarily Wikipedia-based.

The lines which particularly led me to believe that EBM favoured formal approaches rather than doctors' intuitions were:

"Although all medicine based on science has some degree of empirical support, EBM goes further, classifying evidence by its epistemologic strength and requiring that only the strongest types (coming from meta-analyses, systematic reviews, and randomized controlled trials) can ... (read more)

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Bernadette_Young
9y
Sorry for being slow to reply James. The methods of EBM do absolutely favour formal approaches and concrete results. However - and partly because of some of the pitfalls you describe - it's relatively common to find you have no high quality evidence that specifically applies to inform your decision. It is also relatively common to find poor quality evidence (such as a badly constructed trial, or very confounded cohort studies). If those constitute the best-available evidence, a strict reading of the phrase 'to greatest extent possible, decisions and policies should be based on evidence' would imply that decisions should be founded on that dubious evidence. However in practice I think most doctors who are committed to EBM would not change their practice on the basis of a bad trial. Regarding tradeoffs between maximising expected good and certainty of results (which I guess is maximising the minimum you achieve), I agree that's a point where people come down on different sides. I don't think it strictly divides causes (because as you say, one can lean to maximising expected utility within the global poverty), though the overlap between those who favour maximising expectation and those think existential risk is the best cause to focus on is probably high. I think this is actually going to be a topic of panel discussion at EA Global Oxford if you're going?

Thanks both for thoughtful replies and links.

I agree that it may be counterproductive to divide people who are answering the same questions into different camps and, on re-reading, that is how my post may come across. My more limited intention was to provide a (crude) framework through which we might be able to understand the disagreement.

I guess I had always interpreted (perhaps falsely) EA as making a stronger claim than 'we should be more reasonable when deciding how to do good'. In particular I feel that there used to be more of a focus on 'hard' rathe... (read more)