So it could make a lot of sense to update your actions towards that funder, more than would be the case if you had all the power.

That makes a lot of sense. However, updating actions toward a funder because of their power is one thing; updating beliefs is another. 

So there are several questions lurking for me here -- you mentioned one, whether deference to OP is "explained more by the fact that OP is powerful than that it is respected" (the true cause of deference). But the other question is what people tell themselves (and others) about why they defer to OP's views, and that could even be the more important question from an epistemic standpoint.

If Org A chooses to do X, Y, and Z in significant part because OP is powerful (and it would not have done so otherwise), it's important for Org A to be eagle-eyed about its reasoning (at least internally). Cognitive dissonance reduction is a fairly powerful force, and it's tempting to come out about to the view that X, Y, and Z are really important when you're doing them for reasons other than an unbiased evaluation of their merits.

One could argue that we should give ~0 deference to OP's opinions when updating our viewpoints, even if we alter our actions. These opinions already get great weight in terms of what gets done for obvious practical reasons, so updating our own opinions in that direction may (over?)weight them even more. 

Moreover, non-OP views probably influence other people's views even if they are not consciously given any weight. As noted above, there's the cognitive dissonance reduction effect. There's also the likelihood that X, Y, and Z are getting extra buzz due to OP's support of those ideas (e.g., they are discussed more, people are influenced by seeing organizations that follow X, Y, and Z achieve results due to their favorable funding posture, etc.). Filtering out these kinds of effects on one's nominally independent thinking is difficult. If people defer to what OP thinks on top of experiencing these indirect effects, then it's reasonable to think they are functionally double-counting OP's opinion.

Thanks for sharing. The estimated benefits seem plausible for the average attendee to me. On the one hand, I suspect most people are at significantly lower risk of significant illness transmission than you believe yourself to be. On the other hand, the value of eliminating one week of an average EAG participant's work-preclusive illness is probably more than $1000. (A conservative estimate of that value would consider the total cost of employing the individual, not just their direct salary -- and that is often at least 2x the employee's salary.) Although the median infection will cause less than a week's incapacitation, productivity-reducing symptoms can last for a while even if the risk of long COVID is estimated as low. You could also count added value from reducing the risk of getting other people sick, not just the reduction in risk to the mask-wearer.

As Larks mentioned, there are some meaningful non-economic costs to consider. There's always the option of selective usage (e.g., yes during a presentation at which you aren't speaking, no during a 1:1) to mitigate some of the non-economic costs. You may have accounted for at least some degree of non-usage when you specified that mask usage "reduces my chances of getting sick even by 50%," though. Your analysis might be more robust at a ~30% reduction to accommodate more periods of non-use. 

I suspect the harder questions on a cost-benefit assessment would be between various flavors of "sometimes mask" rather than just no mask or all mask. It would also involve considering alternative mitigation measures such as testing. It sounds like you're more susceptible than most and have a favorable cost/benefit profile; people who have new onset coughing or sneezing are likely to have one as well. 

I think nasal sprays are a more cost-effective solution.

Last I checked, the evidence for efficacy of nasal sprays was iffy (in part due to a paucity of unbiased studies and some questionable methodologies). I'm not opposed to the idea of using selected sprays on a very low risk of harm / uncertain benefit calculus, but -- unless the evidence base is significantly better than I recall -- then I think we should be careful to clarify that this intervention isn't in the same evidentiary ballpark as the one OP recommends.

Certainly plausible, but I'd note that the left percentage in 2022 was elevated from the trend line established by the three prior results. So the 2022 result could be largely noise. That still does leave a perceptible drop from the trendline vs. 2024, just not as pronounced.

And possibly the proposed cuts to the US defense budget, which I mention because those proposed cuts may be more likely to outlive Trump than the NATO stuff. (Maybe I am projecting because, as a US taxpayer, I have long felt that the US spends too much on defense.)

Most of this seems unrelated to my observation that evidence of weariness toward harshly criticizing people merely for their political beliefs does not provide much evidence of weariness for criticizing extremely powerful political people for their actions.

Yes, I know what due process is. In a strict sense, it applies only to governmental actions. In a looser sense, it applies to actions by private organizations that are considering taking adverse action against people associated with it -- e.g., a private university which is considering disciplining a student, a homeowner's association which is considering fining a unitowner. I am not aware of its extension to citizens (or groups of citizens) who wish to criticize a senior government official, or to a social movement that wishes to express its disapproval of a prominent person and distance themselves from said person. There would be far less speech if the so-called "court of public opinion" acted with the constraints of government action.

Even if due process did somehow apply, the classic case on the subject explains that "identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. " Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 

The private interest of Elon Musk in not being criticized by EAs is exceedingly modest. I think the expected value of additional safeguards is low -- he has made numerous troubling, divorced-from-reality, or erratic public statements and I am unaware of any dispute about whether the statements are his. Finally, with the volume of problematic statements, and new ones coming out on a near-daily basis, the burden of adjudicating them all would be considerable for a relatively small social movement. 

Relatedly, one of the reasons we can hold the government to the dictates of due process is that we concurrently give it the powers needed to carry out its functions while providing more protections. EA cannot subpoena Musk to judge him, or force him to sit for depositions on pain of imprisonment. Nor can it seek funds from the public fisc for investigations. 

Indeed, the American constitutional tradition gives people like Musk less protection than you or I: he is a quintessential public figure for defamation purposes. Owing to his control of X, he has an ability to respond to criticism that is exceptional even in comparison to most public figures. 

The isolated demand for "due process" rigor here is somewhat ironic given Musk's habit of shooting from the hip with criticisms about others, including federal employees when he is a public official, employment reform is within the scope of his apparent job functions, and people are suffering concrete harm (loss of jobs and contracts) as a result of his official conduct on the topic. Further irony comes from the fact that he owns a major social media platform that is infamous for people offering uninformed hot takes. These factors do not affect how we should treat him, but the irony is palpable.

There may be prudential reasons for treating Musk with kid gloves, or for not talking about him. "Due process" ain't it.

Assuming there's effective political stuff to be done with respect to the USAID situation (which is uncertain to me), it's plausible that any hint of EA involvement would be affirmatively counterproductive. Better to have more politically popular entities -- and entities not predominately funded by a guy who gave megabucks to the current officeholder's rivals -- in the lead for this one. If, for instance, EAs wanted to funnel money to any such entities, I suspect it would be savvy to do so quietly rather than talking about it on-Forum. It's possible that is playing a role in the lack of discussion here, although I too suspect this would have gotten more attention ~18 months ago.

<<very fed up with the practice of denouncing people for their political beliefs.>>

Among other things, there's a major difference between merely holding political beliefs and one's actions as apparently one of the most currently influential people in the most powerful organization that has ever existed in history (i.e., the US government).

We actually did not include most of our analysis or evidence in the review we published, since brevity is a top priority for us when we write reviews. The published review is only a small fraction of the problems we found. 

I'd suggest publishing an appendix listing more problems you believe you identified, as well as more evidence. Brevity is a virtue, but I suspect much of your potential impact lies with moving grantmaker money (and money that flows through charity recommenders) from charities that allegedly inflate their outcomes to those that don't. Looking at Sinergia's 2023 financials, over half came from Open Phil, and significant chunks came from other foundations. Less than 1% was from direct individual donations, although there were likely some passthrough-like donations recommended by individuals but attributed to organizations. 

Your review of Sinergia is ~1000 words and takes about four minutes to read. That may be an ideal tradeoff between brevity and thoroughness for a potential three-to-four figure donor, but I think the balance is significantly different for a professional grantmaker considering a six-to-seven figure investment. 

It's a hypothetical about feeding homeless people, so it doesn't track any of your prior decisions not to give advance notice to the target organization.

In the hypothetical, you could assert that advance notice wasn't warranted because your external evidence was overwhelming enough that providing advance notice and opportunity for comment would have been a waste of time. This would be consistent with my interpretation of the community norm, which is that critics should provide advance notice unless they can (and do) articulate a good cause on a situation-specific basis to dispense with doing so. But if you did provide this justification, and the organization was later able to provide a response that materially changed the conclusions to be drawn, then your organization would suffer a loss in credibility as a result.