All of Jason Schukraft's Comments + Replies

Hi Vaipan,

Thanks for your questions. I’ll address the last one, on behalf of the cause prio team.

One of the exciting things about this team is that, because it launched so recently, there’s a lot of room to try new things as we explore different ways to be useful. To name a few examples:

  • We’re working on a constellation of projects that will help us compare our grantmaking focused on risks from advanced AI systems to our grantmaking focused on improving biosecurity and pandemic preparedness.
  • We’re producing a slew of new BOTECs across different focus areas.
... (read more)

Hi Chris,

Thanks for your question. Two quick points:

(1) I wouldn't model Open Phil as having a single view on these sorts of questions. There's a healthy diversity of opinions, and as stated in the "caveats" section, I think different Open Phil employees might have chosen different winners.

(2) Even for the subset of Open Phil employees who served as judges, I wouldn't interpret these entries as collectively moving our views a ton. We were looking for the best challenges to our AI worldview in this contest, and as such I don't think it should be too surprising that the winning entries are more skeptical of AI risks than we are.

0
Greg_Colbourn
7mo
It would be great if you could put words to this effect -- or state your actual current views on AI x-risk -- right up front in your winners announcement, because to me (and no doubt many others) it basically looks like OpenPhil are updating away from the problem being urgent right at the point where we've hit crunch time and it couldn't be more urgent! I'm really quite upset about this.

Hi Jason, thank you for giving a quick response. Both points are very reasonable.

The contest announcement post outlined "several ways an essay could substantively inform the thinking of a panelist", namely, changing the central estimate or shape of the probability distribution of AGI / AGI catastrophe, or clarifying a concept or identifying a crux.

It would be very interesting to hear if any of the submissions did change any of the panelists' (or other Open Phil employees') mind in these ways, and how so. If not, whether because you learned an unantici... (read more)

Hi Paul, thanks for your question. I don't have an intrinsic preference. We encourage public posting of the entries because we believe that this type of investigation is potentially valuable beyond the narrow halls of Open Philanthropy. If your target audience (aside from the contest panelists) is primarily researchers, then it makes sense to format your entry according to the norms of the research community. If you are aiming for a broader target audience, then it may make sense to structure your entry more informally.

When we grade the entries, we will be focused on the content. The style and reference won't (I hope) make much of a difference.

1
paul_dfr
1y
That's very helpful, thank you!

Hi Nicholas,

The details and execution probably matter a lot, but in general I'm fine with bullet-point writing. I would, however, find it hard to engage with an essay that was mostly tables with little prose explaining the relevance of the tables.

1
NicholasKross
1y
OK, thanks! Also, after more consideration and object-level thinking about the questions, I will probably write a good bit of prose anyway.

Hi Nicholas,

Thanks for your question. It's a bit difficult to answer in the abstract. If your ideas hang together in a nice way, it makes sense to house them in a single entry. If the ideas are quite distinct and unrelated, it makes more sense to house them in separate entries. Another consideration is length. Per the contest guidelines, we're advising entrants to shoot for a submission length around 5000 words (though there are no formal word limits). All else equal, I'd prefer three 5000 word entries to one 15,000 word entry, and I'd prefer one 5000 word entry to ten 500 word entries.

Hope this helps.

Jason

1
NicholasKross
1y
These details help, thank you!

Thanks both - I just added the announcement link to the top of this page.

Hi David,

Thanks for your comment. I am also concerned about groupthink within homogenous communities. I hope this contest is one small push against groupthink at Open Phil. By default, I do, unfortunately, expect most of the submissions to come from people who share the same basic worldview as Open Phil staff. And for submissions that come from people with radically different worldviews, there is the danger that we fail to recognize an excellent point because we are less familiar with the stylistic and epistemic conventions within which it is embedded.

For ... (read more)

You could of course commit to acting on some kind of judgment of some diverse group you think worth differing too, rather than  acting on your own opinion.  One way to understand what David Thorstad is asking (which he might or might not endorse) is why you don't do that given it would (allegedly) mean acting on a more-like-to-be-correct opinion, rather than one that is less-likely to be correct. From that point of view, it's just missing the point to say 'we're trying to get our opinion updated', because you shouldn't be using your opinions, rather than some properly diverse groups opinions to be setting policy in general.

 

Hi Phil - just to clarify: the entries must entirely be the original work of the author(s). You can cite others and you can use AI-generated text as an example, but for everything that is not explicitly flagged as someone else's work, we will assume it is original to the author.

Hi David,

Thanks for your questions. We're interested in a wide range of considerations. It's debatable whether human-originating civilization failing to make good use of its "cosmic endowment" constitutes an existential catastrophe. If you want to focus on more recognizable catastrophes (such as extinction, unrecoverable civilizational collapse, or dystopia) that would be fine.

In a similar vein, if you think there is an important scenario in which humanity suffers an existential catastrophe by collectively losing control over an ecosystem of AGIs, that would also be an acceptable topic.

Let me know if you have any other questions!

We are just ironing out the final legal details. The official announcement will hopefully go live by the end of next week. Thanks for checking!

Thanks for your questions!

We plan to officially launch the contest sometime in Q1 2023, so end of March at the latest.

I asked our in-house counsel about the eligibility of essays submitted to other competitions/publications, and he said it depends on whether by submitting elsewhere you've forfeited your ability to grant Open Phil a license to use the essay. His full quote below:

Essays submitted to other competitions or for publication are eligible for submission, so long as the entrant is able to grant Open Phil a license to use the essay. Since we plan

... (read more)
1
paul_dfr
1y
Thanks for a great answer! That's very helpful.

Thanks Jason. I can now confirm that that is indeed the case!

Hi Zach, thanks for the question and apologies for the long delay in my response. I'm happy to confirm that work posted after September 23 2022 (and before whatever deadline we establish) will be eligible for the prize. No need to save your work until the formal announcement.

I think part of my confusion stems from the distinction between "X is a concern we're noting" and "X is a parameter in the cost-effectiveness model"

The distinction is largely pragmatic. Charter cities, like many complex interventions, are hard to model quantitatively. For the report, we replicated, adjusted, and extended a quantitative model that Charter Cities Institute originally proposed. If that's your primary theory of change for charter cities, it seems like the numbers don't quite work out. But there are many other possible theories of change, an... (read more)

One of the authors of the charter cities report here. I'll just add a few remarks to clarify how we intended the quoted passage. I'll highlight three disagreements with the interpretation offered in the original post.

We should care if neocolonialism is real, if it's bad, and if it's induced by Charter Cities. If so, that should impact the cost-effectiveness estimate, not just factor in as a side-comment about PR-risk.

(1) We absolutely care whether neocolonialism is bad (or, if neocolonialism is inherently bad, we care about whether charter cities would... (read more)

5
RobBensinger
2y
PR risk is a lot weirder and more complicated than a lot of people take it to be. Breaking it off into a separate discussion, or a separate bucket, seems wise to me in a lot of cases.
2
AppliedDivinityStudies
2y
Thanks! Really appreciate getting a reply for you, and thanks for clarifying how you meant this passage to be understood. I agree that you don't claim the PR risks should disqualify charter cities, but you do cite it as a concern right? I think part of my confusion stems from the distinction between "X is a concern we're noting" and "X is a parameter in the cost-effectiveness model", and from trying to understand the relative importance of the various qualitative and quantitative arguments made throughout. I.e., one way of interpreting your report would be: 1. There are various ways to think about the benefits of Charter Cities 2. Some of those ways are highly uncertain and/or difficulty to model, here are some briefly comments on why we think so 3. We're going to focus on quantitatively modeling this one path to impact 4. On the basis of that model, we can't recommend funding Charter Cities and don't believe that they're cost-effective for that particular path to impact In that case, it makes less sense for me to think of the neocolonialism critique as a argument against Charter Cities, and more sense to think of it as an explanation for why you didn't choose to prioritize analyzing a different path to impact. Is that about right? Or closer to right than my original interpretation?

The person who replaces me has all my same skills but in addition has many connections to policymakers, more management experience, and stronger quantitative abilities than I do.

Hi James, thanks for your question. The climate change work currently on our research calendar includes:

  1. A look at how climate damages are accounted for in various integrated assessment models
  2. A cost effectiveness analysis of anti-deforestation interventions
  3. A review of the landscape of climate change philanthropy
  4. An analysis of how scalable different carbon offsetting programs are

This is also motivated by having a (still very young) kid we're thinking about how to eventually engage with our giving.

I have a four-year-old and a six-year-old. We discuss our giving with them regularly. When my daughter turned five, we started giving her a weekly allowance with the strong expectation (though no outright requirement) that she would make her own charitable donation every December. During the giving process, we talk a lot about her values and offer guidance, but the ultimate amount and destination of the donation is up to her. Last year... (read more)

Hi tcelferact,

I have a PhD in philosophy, and I'm a senior research manager at Rethink Priorities. If you want to discuss PhD applications, shoot me a PM and we can set up a call. My main piece of advice is to optimize the writing sample for getting accepted to whatever programs you think are the best fit for you. Optimizing that metric might result in a much different writing sample than trying to find an actual good idea and writing about that.

1
tcelferact
3y
Thank you, PMed!
6
Linch
3y
Another question of course is why philosophy PhD programs are the best way to go if OP is more interested in researching robust decision making than other questions in philosophy. Not knowing too much about the field, David Manheim's dissertation for example seems pretty related. 

Despite the skepticism about charter cities that Dave and I express in the report, I would be comfortable recommending @effective_jobs retweet openings at Charter Cities Institute. There are plenty of folks in the EA community who would be a good fit for CCI, and it seems to me that an aggregator like @effective_jobs should lean toward casting a wider rather than narrower net.

Hi Alex,

Thanks for your comment. I've written a bit about the potential relevance of intelligence and emotional complexity to capacity for welfare here. But I share your skepticism about their relevance to moral status. I'm reminded of this comic:

Someone could say that they will torture animals unless vegans give them money, I guess. I think this doesn't happen for multiple reasons.

Interestingly, there is at least one instance where this apparently has happened. (It's possible it was just a joke, though.) There was even a law review article about the incident.

I do think we have been able to acquire talent that would not have been otherwise counterfactually acquired by other organizations.

As an additional data point, I can report that I think it's very unlikely that I would currently be employed by an EA organization if Rethink Priorities didn't exist. I applied to Rethink Priorities more or less on a whim, and the extent of my involvement with the EA community in 2018 (when I was hired) was that I was subscribed to the EA newsletter (where I heard about the job) and I donated to GiveWell top charities. At the time, I had completely different career plans.

A lot depends on what constitutes a cause area and what counts as analysis. My own rough and tentative view is that at some level of generality (which could plausibly be called "cause area"), we can use heuristics to compare broad categories of interventions. But in terms of actual rigorous analysis, cause area is certainly not the right unit, and, furthermore, as a matter of empirical fact, there aren't really any research organizations (including Rethink Priorities, where I work) that take cause area to be the appropriate unit of analysis.

Very curious to hear the thoughts of others, as I think this is a super important question!

I agree with your first two sentences. I feel unsure precisely what you mean by the sentence after that.

E.g., are you saying that no research organisations are spending resources trying to help people prioritise between different broad cause areas (e.g., longtermism vs animal welfare vs global health & development)? Or just that there's no research org solely/primarily focused on that?

My impression is that: 

  • There were multiple orgs that were primarily focused on between-cause prioritisation research in the past
  • But most/all have now decided on one
... (read more)

If you haven't seen it yet, you might find this report on the viability of cultured meat helpful. Open Philanthropy commissioned the report.

Hi David,

Thanks for the suggestions! Anyone who works on this topic in the future should probably investigate them further. My current rough impression is that, even if there were a market for the stubble, the process of baling the stubble for transport and sale would either be time-and-labor intensive or require equipment that the average farmer in the region can't afford. Because of the nature of the crop cycle, farmers are under intense pressure to clear the stubble quickly, hence the appeal of stubble burning.

Hey Harrison, I think the short answer is that it's just a really messy situation and any potential solution that has a shot at improving on the status quo has to take political reality into account.

Hey Harrison,

I'm also not knowledgeable about Indian politics, but it seems pretty clear that Indian farmers wield considerable political influence. (See the reaction to the introduction of three market-friendly farm laws for the most recent demonstration of this power.) I'd like to think political compromise is possible, but it's hard to know which compromises are feasible.

Fortunately, it appears that many of the potential solutions to stubble burning are essentially win-win. Although stubble burning is an effective way to deal with crop residue in the sh... (read more)

4
Denkenberger
3y
For one, you lose the nitrogen in the residue to the air through burning. With all the cattle in India, I would think you could just feed the residue to them, and this says it could make up about 50% of their diet. And you might be able to grab some human edible calories first through the leaf protein concentrate process. There is also cellulosic ethanol or cellulosic sugar, though those are likely not economical now.
1
Harrison Durland
3y
Again, I'm not super knowledgeable of the situation and/or the proposals, but to draw on a bit of economist/libertarian thought by cross-applying concepts from other, similar situations (e.g., pollution externalities): I would be hesitant to describe many of the (likely-impactful) solutions as truly "win-win." Proposals 1 and 2 clearly (and sort of/potentially proposals 3 and 5) are subsidies that help farmers at the expense of everyone else. Yes, it may be the case that the "city folk" would benefit from less pollution, but they would have to bear a (likely heavy) portion of the tax burden to fund that--all to stop pollution which is imposing non-consensual, uncompensated harms on them in the first place. So, it might be true if proposal 1 works at reducing pollution it's a "better-better" situation than doing nothing, but (to put it dramatically) that's vaguely akin to saying "paying off the mafia for protection is a win-win, since the mafia makes money and they don't smash stores."  Toning it down a bit: that's not to say they are necessarily bad proposals, or that such solutions (even when less than ideal) are not the best politically feasible options. But I am slightly curious to see more evidence about the market dynamics of the situation: if political feasibility were not a limitation, what would be the optimal response? Starting with the simple, econ 101/102 approach: If stubble burning is really so bad for the farmers, it begs the question why they don't just cease the practice on their own. It seems the obvious answer is "because those benefits are still less than the cost of not burning"; as a matter of 101/102-level (i.e., simplistic) economics, the response to that should be "raise prices and either compensate people for the damage you impose on them through pollution or stop doing the pollution." This I think is where market failures probably step onto the stage to wrinkle things... but I only have a narrow slice of experience with ag policy, and it i

Hi Dan,

Thanks for your questions. I'll let Marcus and Peter answer the first two, but I feel qualified to answer the third.

Certainly, the large number of invertebrate animals is an important factor in why we think invertebrate welfare is an area that deserves attention. But I would advise against relying too heavily on numbers alone when assessing the value of promoting invertebrate welfare. There are at least two important considerations worth bearing in mind:

(1) First, among sentient animals, there may be significant differences in capacity for welfare o... (read more)

Hi Denis,

Lots of really good questions here. I’ll do my best to answer.

  1. Thinking vs reading: I think it depends on the context. Sometimes it makes sense to lean toward thinking more and sometimes it makes sense to lean toward reading more. (I wouldn’t advise focusing exclusively on one or the other.) Unjustified anchoring is certainly a worry, but I think reinventing the wheel is also a worry. One could waste two weeks groping toward a solution to a problem that could have been solved in afternoon just by reading the right review article.

  2. Self-consciou

... (read more)
5
Dawn Drescher
3y
Your advice to talk to people is probably most important to me! I haven’t tried that a lot but when I did, it was very successful. One hurdle is not wanting to come off as too stupid to the other person (but there are also people who make me feel sufficiently at ease that I don’t mind coming off as stupid) and another is not wanting to waste people’s time. So I want to first be sure that I can’t just figure it out myself within ~ 10x the time. Maybe that a bad tradeoff. I also sometimes worry that people would actually like to chat more, but my reluctance to waste their time interferes with both our interest to chat. (Maybe they have the same reluctance, and both of us would be happier if he didn’t have it. Can we have a Reciprocity.io for talking about research, please? ^^) Typing speed: Haha! You can test it here for example: https://10fastfingers.com/typing-test/english. I’ve been stagnating at ~ 60 WPM now for years. Maybe there’s some sort of distinction that some brains are more optimized toward (e.g., worse memory) or incentivized to optimize toward (e.g., through positive feedback) fewer low-level concepts and other more toward more high-level concepts. So when it comes to measures of performance that have time in the denominator, the first group hits diminishing marginal returns early while the second keeps speeding up for a long time. Maybe the second group is, in turn, less interested in understanding from first-principles, which might make them less innovative. Just random speculation. Obvious questions: Yeah, I’ve been wondering how it can be that now a lot of people come up independently with cases for nonhuman rights and altruism regardless of distance, but a century ago seemingly almost no one did. Maybe it’s just that I don’t know because most of those are lost in history and those that are not, I just don’t know about (though I can think of some examples). Or maybe culture was so different that a lot of the frameworks weren’t there that these ide

Hi Roger,

There are different possible scenarios in which invertebrates turn out to be sentient. It might be the case, for instance, that panpsychism is true. So if one comes to believe that invertebrates are sentient because panpsychism is true, one should also come to believe that robots and plants are sentient. Or it could be that some form of information integration theory is true, and invertebrates instantiate enough integration for sentience. In that case, the probability that you assign to the sentience of plants and robots will depend on your assess... (read more)

1
RogerAckroyd
3y
Thank you. That is rather different from my view of sentience in some ways, I appreciate the clarification. 

Hey Edo,

I definitely receive valuable feedback on my work by posting it on the Forum, and the feedback is often most valuable when it comes from people outside my current network. For me, the best example of this dynamic was when Gavin Taylor left extensive comments on our series of posts about features relevant to invertebrate sentience (here, here, and here) back in June 2019. I had never interacted with Gavin before, but because of his comments, we set up a meeting, and he has become an invaluable collaborator across many different projects. My work is ... (read more)

Sometimes, they ask us to instead donate the money to a charity on their behalf, which we are also willing to do.

Oh, cool. I didn't realize this was a possibility. I've always claimed the money and then donated the same amount to Rethink Priorities (where I work). If I'm lucky enough to have the opportunity in the future, I'll do this instead.

(I basically get paid to write content for the Forum, so I'm not really comfortable accepting the prize money.)

Hey Michael,

Thanks for your comment! The point you raise is a good one. I’ve thought about related issues over the last few months, but my views still aren’t fully settled. And I’ll just reiterate for readers that my tentative conclusions are just that: tentative. More than anything, I want everyone to appreciate how much uncertainty we face here.

We can crudely ask whether motivation is tied to the relative intensity of valenced experience or the absolute intensity of valenced experience. (‘Crudely’ because the actual connection between motivation and vale... (read more)

Oh nice, that sounds really cool - definitely keep me updated!

Hey Peter,

Thanks for the kind words. There’s no current plan to pursue academic publication. This question comes up periodically at Rethink Priorities, and there’s a bit of disagreement about what the right strategy is here. Speaking personally, I would love to see more of my work published academically. However, thinking about strategic decisions like these is not my comparative advantage, so I’m happy to defer to others on this question, and leadership at Rethink Priorities generally isn’t keen on using researcher hours to pursue academic publication. Th... (read more)

7
PeterSlattery
3y
Thanks Jason, that's really useful context! I have some related interested in building better networks and processes for crafting mutually beneficial arrangements between people paid to publish (i.e., academics) and those who are paid only to do the research but will gain from getting it published (i.e., practice based researchers).  It is pretty much a scaled up version of what you did with Bob. I am exploring a few options now and I hope to have more to report in the future.

Great, this is fantastic, thanks! Clearly there is a lot more I need to think about! I just sent you a message to arrange a chat. For anyone following this exchange, I'll try to post some more thoughts on this topic after Adam and I have talked.

Hey Adam,

Thanks for your comment! I agree that the distinction between the sensory and affective components of pain experience is an important one that merits more discussion. I briefly considered including such a discussion, but the report was already long and I was hoping to avoid adding another layer of complexity. My assumption was that, while it’s possible for the two components to come apart, such dissociation is rare enough that we can safely ignore it at this level of abstraction. That could be a naïve assumption, though. Even if not, you’re right ... (read more)

Jason, thanks for the response! I'd definitely be interested in talking more some time...I'm a bit of a novice on this forum so let me know the best way to set something up.

As a first pass at your questions, my chapter The Unpleasantness of Pain for Humans and Other Animals gets at some of them. 

I think for (1), it depends on how strongly you mean "comes apart."  If we just mean varying one dimension while the other stays constant, or varying one dimension more than the other, there are a huge number of instances where this occurs.  If, howe... (read more)

Hey Michael,

I think this is an interesting idea. Unfortunately, I'm woefully ignorant about the relevant details, so it's unclear to me if the differences between artificial neural networks and actual brains makes the analogy basically useless. Still, I think it would probably be worthwhile for someone with more specialized knowledge than myself to think through the analogy roughly along the lines you've outlined and see what comes of it. I'd be happy to collaborate if anyone (including yourself) wants to take up the task.

There are lots of potential points of contact. The most obvious is that to determine an individual's possible intensity range of valenced experience, we have to think about the most intense (in the sense of most positive and most negative) experiences available to that individual. I don't have a view about how long-tailed the distribution of pleasures and pains is in humans, but I agree that it's a question worth investigating. And if there are differences in how long-tailed the distribution of valenced experiences is across species, that would entail diff... (read more)

It’s plausible to assign split-brain patients 2x moral weight because it’s plausible that split-brain patients contain two independent morally relevant seats of consciousness. (To be clear, I’m just claiming this is a plausible view; I’m not prepared to give an all-things-considered defense of the view.) I take it to be an empirical question how much of the corpus callosum needs to be severed to generate such a split. Exploring the answer to this empirical question might help us think about the phenomenal unity of creatures with less centralized brains than humans, such as cephalopods.

This seems like a pretty good reason to reject a simple proportion account

To be clear, I also reject the simple proportion account. For that matter, I reject any simple account. If there’s one thing I’ve learned from thinking about differences in the intensity of valenced experience, it’s that brains are really, really complicated and messy. Perhaps that’s the reason I’m less moved by the type of thought experiments you’ve been offering in this thread. Thought experiments, by their nature, abstract away a lot of detail. But because the neurological mech... (read more)

2
MichaelStJules
3y
Fair point. I agree. Still, I would conclude from my thought experiments that proportion can't matter at all in a simple way (i.e. all else equal, and controlling for number of firing neurons), even as a small part of the picture, while number still plausibly could in a simple way (all else equal, and controlling for proportion of firing neurons), at least as a small part of the picture. All else equal, it seems number matters, but proportion does not. But ya, this might be close to useless to know now, since all else is so far from equal in practice. Maybe evolution "renormalizes" intensity when more neurons are added. Or something else we haven't even imagined yet.

Hey Michael,

Thanks for engaging so deeply with the piece. This is a super complicated subject, and I really appreciate your perspective.

I agree that hidden qualia are possible, but I’m not sure there’s much of an argument on the table suggesting they exist. When possible, I think it’s important to try to ground these philosophical debates in empirical evidence. The split-brain case is interesting precisely because there is empirical evidence for dual seats of consciousness. From the SEP entry on the unity of consciousness:

In these operations, the corpus

... (read more)
5
Stijn
3y
About split brain; those studies are about cognition (having beliefs about what is being seen). Does anyone know if the same happens with affection (valenced experience)? For example: left brain sees a horrible picture, right brain sees picture of the most joyfull vacation memory. Now ask left and right brains how they feel. I imagine such experiments are already being done? My expectation is that asking the brain hemisphere who sees the picture of the vacation memory, that hemisphere will respond that the picture strangely enough gives the subject a weird, unexplainable, kind of horrible feeling instead of pure joy. As if feelings are still unified. Anyone knows about such studies?
9
MichaelStJules
3y
 One argument against proportion mattering (or at least in a straightforward way): 1. Suppose a brain responds to some stimuli and you record its pattern of neuron firings. 2. Then, suppose you could repeat exactly the same pattern of neuron firings, but before doing so, you remove all the neurons that wouldn't have fired anyway. By doing so, you have increased the proportion of neurons that fire compared to 1. I think 1 and 2 should result in the exact same experiences (and hence same intensity) since the difference is just some neurons that didn't do anything or interact with the rest of the brain, even though 2 has a greater proportion of neurons firing. The claim that their presence/absence makes a difference to me seems unphysical, because they didn't do anything in 1 where they were present. Or it's a claim that what's experienced in 1 depends on what could have happened instead, which also seems unphysical, since these counterfactuals shouldn't change what actually happened. Number of firing neurons, on the other hand, only tracks actual physical events/interactions. I had a similar discussion here, although there was pushback against my views. This seems like a pretty good reason to reject a simple proportion account, and so it does seem like it's really the number firing that matters in a given brain, or the same brain with neurons removed (or something like graph minors, more generally, so also allowing contractions of paths). This suggests that if one brain A can be embedded into another B, and so we can get A from B by removing neurons and/or connections from B, then B has more intense experiences than A, ignoring effects of extra neurons in B that may actually decrease intensity, like inhibition (and competition?).
8
MichaelStJules
3y
All fair points. What if we only destroyed 1%, 50% or 99% of their corpus callosum? Would that mean increasing degrees of moral weight from ~1x to ~2x? What is it about cutting these connections that increases moral weight? Is it the increased independence? Maybe this an inherently normative question, and there's no fact of the matter which has "more" experience? Or we can't answer this through empirical research? Or we're just nowhere near doing so?

Hi Michael,

Thanks for the comment and thanks for prompting me to write about these sorts of thought experiments. I confess I’ve never felt their bite, but perhaps that’s because I’ve never understood them. I’m not sure what the crux of our disagreement is, and I worry that we might talk past each other. So I’m just going to offer some reactions, and I’ll let you tell me what is and isn’t relevant to the sort of objection you’re pursuing.

  1. Big brains are not just collections of little brains. Large brains are incredibly specialized (though somewhat plastic

... (read more)

I agree with 1. I think it weakens the force of the argument, but I'm not sure it defeats it.

2 might be a crux. I might say that unity is largely illusory and integration comes in degrees (so it's misleading to count consciousnesses with integers) since we can imagine cutting connections between two regions of a brain one at a time (e.g. between our two hemispheres), and even if you took distinct conscious brains and integrated/unified them, we might think the unified brain would matter at least as much as the separate brains (this is Shulman's thought exp... (read more)

Cool, thanks Michael, I hadn't seen that. (And thanks to Antonia as well for writing the summary!)

Load more