Thanks for the reply, Bob - it's great to learn more about this. It seems that so much just comes down to the available options. If freezing bugs feels like the only available option, it's totally understandable that people would do that. Without a clear consensus on what the best course of action is, people would probably rather do something than nothing. As for the live dissection thing, I suppose it highlights the complexity of making procedural changes in a scientific field. 

Great post - I'm on board with what you're saying. 

You mention that entomologists would, if given the choice between "an aversive and a non-aversive way of euthanizing insects," prefer the latter. I feel like this is what we would expect, but I just wonder how far that goes. How much would the average entomologist be willing to inconvenience themselves to choose the non-aversive way? If both options required equal resources, effort, time etc, we should expect people to choose to minimise (questionable) suffering, but minimising suffering may not always require equal resources; it may require more. This is the case in plenty of situations of course, not just those involving bugs. Your post just made me wonder how committed the entomologists you've spoken to would be to choosing the non-aversive way.

Perhaps, but I suspect they care a lot more about building empathy and compassion in children than they do about the actual well-being of bugs - I'd imagine that avoiding stepping on them is more of a means to an (anthropocentric) end.

Thanks for this. I agree with you - I find the argument that Williams makes compelling. When we look at our own actions, it seems that we could consider two questions: 1) What is the evidence that is influencing our actions? 2) How are we justifying our actions, in light of the available evidence?

In the past, slave owners and Vikings (or similar) might have had the wrong information (e.g. our victims do not have the capacity for suffering) or the wrong justification (e.g. our victims can and will suffer, but their suffering is justifiable because x, y, and z). Since we have access to more information than ever before, perhaps we are less likely to be misinformed. In that case, we need to be especially critical about how we justify our actions when we know they cause suffering. For example, we might kill deer in an area where there is overpopulation because we want to protect the ecosystem. Or we might allow for late-term abortions in cases where a baby would not survive more than a day or two. In these cases, suffering is possible but we justify it. 

It seems to me that cases of this kind are the ones in which we need to be especially vigilant about our reasoning. When it comes to something like "secularism leading to many people going to hell," it seems that we are on somewhat safer ground as we have no evidence for this - the problem is with the evidence, not the reasoning. Perhaps I'm wrong, but that's my instinct.

That seems to be true, you're right. In that case, maybe the difference is that a vegan is defined by their refusal to consume animal products. If a vegan does consume animal products, they are no longer vegan, as they no longer fit the definition. A Muslim, a Christian, or a Jew is not defined by their refusal to harm others (based on what you have said). Someone can be a murderer and a Christian; they might be a bad Christian, but still a Christian. You can't really be a bad vegan by eating animals - you just wouldn't be a vegan anymore. I'm thinking out loud so I don't know if my point is clear, but it feels like vegans are necessarily defined by refusing to consume animal products.

Thank you for writing this. I've been thinking a lot lately about short-term wins vs ultimate goal in the animal movement (I might actually write a short post about this later). I think you've touched on something really important. I will certainly reread later when I have more time.

My initial thought is in response to things like this: "If you and another advocate are actually aiming towards different things — for example, maybe you want to end all animal farming, and your conversation partner actually only cares about abolishing the worst practices in chicken farming — then you can still build understanding, share knowledge and identify ways to work together. " To me, this comes back to abolitionism vs welfarism and I'm not sure how they can work together. If one individual wants to end all animal exploitation, then improving conditions for chickens may actually be counter-productive. It seems likely that better welfare conditions for animals are, for an abolitionist at least, a short-term win that threatens a bigger, long-term goal (by easing consumer guilt or concern). I'd love to hear your thoughts on that. I wish that welfare wins were moving us towards the end of abolishing animal exploitation, but I am not convinced that that's the case.

In response to your "no space for sinners" argument, I would say that the prohibition of alcohol in Islam is quite different to the prohibition (if we want to call it that) of animal product consumption in veganism. It is my understanding that alcohol is banned to protect human interests - it is a sin, but based on the idea that it harms the individual, is bad for society, can lead to addiction etc. To commit a harm against oneself is different than to commit a harm against another. If we conclude that animals are worthy of moral consideration, then to consume animal products is a harm against another. Someone may want to take a health risk and consume drugs, but that doesn't mean they could morally justify, to themselves, giving dangerous drugs to someone else.

I believe that it is "practicable" rather than "practical". Veganism asks that we avoid harm to animals as much as is reasonably possible, not reasonably sensible. Buying a vegan burger than is much more expensive than a meat burger may not be practical but, provided one has enough money, it is practicable.