I don't think all of the examples are reliable indicators, but I agree policy changes, declarations, and executive orders are clear demonstrations of intent. On specifics:
The "stigmatize opponents as Nazis" tactic wins short-term but undermines epistemics and amplifies long-term conflict by reducing info access and the viability of reasonable dissent.
People with stigmatized beliefs hide them to keep their friends, and others become more sensitive to detect them. False-positive and false-negative rates go up. False accusations polarize victims and mobs while true accusations lose credibility as people cry wolf. Some associate with stigmatized people when they don't intend to, others avoid associating with people that don't even hold stigmatized views for their correlated reasonable views.
As all want every vote they can get, each side competes to stigmatize the other, while dog whistling to extremists to gain support without spooking the center. It's a big defection trap we should step back from, and focusing directly on policy helps avoid distraction.
I think Trump would crack down on illegal immigration. I'd be unhappy if it goes beyond throwing out criminals with victims and illegal immigrants consuming more than they make. I doubt it will be as extreme as what he says, because few things ever are and it wasn't before, but I do worry about downside risk. As things are, I worry more about status quo and downside risks with Harris on immigration outcomes and policy.
I had thought I found a more credible source before and this is all I can find on search engines now. TL;DR: there isn't a public record of his opposition before the war started, and the person who claims he did oppose the war before it started primarily talks about right after it started and would have political incentives to lie or misremember. Will update the claim.
I share this concern. I find the Georgia case very sketchy. There are other claims I haven't dug into as much yet.
My main observation is that he and his people really do think the election was stolen from them. In their media bubble you'll see stuff like surveys of non-U.S. citizens where double digit percentage say they vote: enough to sway some states that Trump lost if you extrapolate (but maybe this is complete disinfo?). Because they believe (whether their beliefs are accurate or not) that the democratic rules are already being hacked/broken against them, they want to get as close to cheating as possible (and some probably do want to just break rules fully). It is true that census resident counts (independent from citizenship) shape the electoral college numbers, and thus manipulating illegal immigration does directly contribute votes to whoever wins states with disproportionate shares of illegal immigrants.
I think all these forms of defection are unacceptable. We can't have the Dems playing the Rajneeshi strategy and the Republicans playing voter suppression. Dems have been serious about election security in the past, but right now Republicans at least superficially seem more serious about fixing things, because concessions from the Dems would play into the Trump narrative. OTOH, it wouldn't surprise me if the reforms proposed by Republicans to make voting easier and more secure include poison pills?
But anyway the core point I am making here is that the most important thing to do for coup proofing/election hacking is to establish more broadly/justifiably credible election integrity. There is a path to do it that Republicans will agree to, but the Dems can't for narrative reasons + the view that stronger voter ID laws are voter suppression (which they could be if changed very close to an election).
Separate from narrative, many Dems dislike the electoral college in general because it does geographically bias against what they'd get with popular voting. This is a general problem for scaling democracy in a mutually beneficial manner: smaller states/coalitions need disproportionate power to have incentive to join, or they can expect their interests to be decisively vetoed all the time. It's why the UN and EU don't do anything by population popular vote either.
I agree with several things here, however I'm still net in favor of Trump (for now) in terms of making the future better. The following response is incredibly long and detailed and so there may be some confirmation bias. If it's not too costly, I'd like to know where and why I'm wrong on whatever you think my highest priority misconceptions are. Cheers!
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1. I agree PEPFAR was wonderful, though it doesn't seem that likely to do a ton long-term, whereas the Iraq war and the fear it has inspired in other countries about U.S. self control/risk of going to war on the basis of false info has put us on footing for war with Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, etc. which is a much greater risk. Trump did oppose the Iraq War before it started [edit: not in public/this is contested], (although there was a period before it started where he was briefly supportive in an uncertain manner). To me this reflects someone that was unusually thoughtful/changed their mind early relative to public convo (and their political party) at the time.
2. Agree Trump will likely not be great on factory farming. I do think this matters if morality gets "locked in" before too long in the future. At the same time, animals do not right now have the agency to chose to shape the future in the ways that humans do, it makes sense to focus on getting human affairs sorted first unfortunately in the same way it made sense for governments to spend money winning WW2 faster over doing famine relief for those in Axis occupied territory. The fundamental contests that must be won and made more win-win are human affairs: success here enables greater success on AI and animals. Right now, to the degree there are any health trade-offs, the veganism focus tends to make the EA coalition intellectually weaker and more politically polarized. My long-term ideal nevertheless is nutritionally complete veganism and cultivated meat, or eating animals with healthy happy lives and painless deaths.
3. Trump's rhetoric on strongmen gets blown out of proportion by media and is close to optimal for manipulating foreign dictators into accepting deals that are better for the world at large. I've seen academics that hate Trump for tribal reasons admit this. Likewise when he's not making the blunder of being belligerent without being strategic, his personality combo greatly reduces the prospect of war via mixing the right kinds of fear and assurance. Right away, the other side has greater uncertainty and fear about how Trump might respond to provocation which creates hesitancy to do anything that might start a war. On longer timelines, Trump's aim for deal making, opposition to regime change wars, and lower degree of ideological subversion provide greater assurance that a Trump status quo will be less personally existentially threatening to such leaders, their families, and their ruling coalitions... so long as they don't do really bad stuff. It is true that we didn't get new wars under Trump, I do think the strike on Qasem Soleimani was smart, and I do think his Afghanistan pull-out strategy of keeping an airbase was good in expectation, and something that the Biden admin squandered. (Though if what people say about his orders after losing the election are true, Trump may have tried to squander the pull-out on purpose for Biden, though I am not aware of irrecoverable mistakes/actual changes before Biden was in office?).
4. I agree on character mattering. I do not think Trump's character is great on some dimensions, however the dimensions that are most critical I am pretty sure are better with Trump than with Biden and Harris. There's a variety of comparisons you can make, but in general you can expect we know more of the negative info about Trump than about Biden and Harris given the media environment, so unless you have deep personal experience the default should be some degree of discounting on Trump's character flaws relative to Harris.
5. I am also worried about democratic concerns, especially in terms of freedom. That said:
On Sam's other arguments you responded to:
On a final, less related note: Trump is ironically more politically centrist than Harris. His rhetoric allows him to appease the Republicans without going as socially conservative or staffing the government with as many Republican appointees. Democratic admins are increasingly one party states with extreme groupthink, whereas a Trump admin in practice will likely be far more politically balanced even if he purges a ton of people and brings in a few nuts. You can look at party affiliations of appointees over time if you are skeptical of that claim.
I very much agree that a larger area burning all at once will loft soot higher on expectation than a thinner moving flame front, because the hot gasses at the center of the burning mass essentially have nowhere to diffuse but up. That specific argument isn't really a matter of crying wolf, it was just very silly for people to claim that oil well fires could have such big effects in the first place.
That said, this it doesn't really matter in terms of the estimates here because the soot loft estimate is based on the Los Alamos model, which is also where I'd place my bet for accuracy. Also, the initial Los Alamos model was based on Atlanta's suburbs which means their outputs are highly relevant for burning in U.S. cities, and cover some of Dave's objections as well.
I think it can be productive here to taboo the word "capitalism" and to just think about trade-offs between incentive alignment and skill.
A lot of regulations prevent governments from hiring in an efficient manner, and this results in a comparative lack of talent in many areas that consultancies excel... or seem to excel (e.g. short-term metric hacking). Many of these regulations make sense from the standpoint of reducing conflicts of interest *within* the government, however these conflicts of interest and vulnerabilities are sometimes immediately recreated when outsourcing. If the regulations posed less burden to efficient hiring and work within government, it would be easier to internally develop aligned talent. Regardless of if advice comes from inside or outside of government, you want there to be competitive pressure for the advice to be good (one of the reasons gov outsources) and long-term incentive alignment on good outcomes.
One should be concerned with extractive models generally, not just in the context of capitalism. People can form extractive coalitions in business and they can do the same within government agencies as well. Policies that require more transparency from consulting firms when it is critical to avoid conflict of interest may be helpful, but there really needs to be lower cost ways to enact and enforce such regulations to prevent more morally dubious workarounds.
Thanks Linch!
Re 1, I think we are on the same page now. I'll consider his Iraq war views as basically not strong evidence either way.
Re 2, I don't think the second part is confused, but agree it is not relevant to Trump, just strategy selection for EAs.
Re 3, this is something I'd put like ~80% credence in, and I think it is more important than most points. The 20% comes from increased volatility/unpredictability.
Re 4, I believe C, and put a very low probability on B. I think it was rational for Trump, given his info state, to believe that he lost at least one state due to illegal voting. I think the vast majority of spammy claims and cases Republicans pressed were not credible at all, and I don't know how to feel about these overall in terms of norm decay, vs. attempting to get the legal system to check a lot of potential claims quickly when you don't yet have good evidence (I oppose anyone that was knowingly making false claims/cases). I do think their worries about mail-in ballots and vulnerability to illegal voting are justified, and that there is a lot gov could do to increase justified confidence in the elections. The states close to or below 1% margins went D with mail-in votes: its not surprising mail-in votes were more D heavy, but it's easy to see why they thought they got cheated. I'm pretty sure things like the Electronic Registration Information Center don't work super well given that I received mail in ballots and political calls for places I deregistered and no longer lived.
On the part about firing, see this NBER paper. It is necessary to firing people for political reasons to increase competency, and the left purges the bureaucracy more thoroughly that the right historically, granting the left cost advantages for programs they want. The problem is choosing good programs to do.
Re: Resisting expert pressure areas I think Trump made good decisions despite expert pressure:
- High confidence: Energy policy (also in Europe) + strategy for getting allies and NATO to pay more, negotiating the Abraham accords.
- Medium confidence: his version of the Afghan pullout strategy (keeping Bagram), striking Soleimani, using tariffs to renegotiate trade deals (though bad execution in some areas)
- Mixed: COVID: bad cuts (justified citing CFHS on the U.S. being the most prepared), bad to initially downplay, good on travel relative to experts at the time, good to do Operation Warp Speed and push for earlier scaling, inconsistent on masks, good on re-opening earlier and schools.
On Harris' record: It's fair she didn't have much influence on CA policy and wasn't in a good position to influence much in Congress either. The bills she's proposed would have cost more than $20 trillion by now, but those didn't pass and may have just been to send signals.
I agree you have no reason to take anything I say on expert interviews at face value. I think your set of views is reasonable to have given your network.
Re 5: Due to greater economic policy rationality, explicit false beliefs on climate change that are typical of many Republicans are less costly in practice than Democrat implicit false beliefs on climate trade-offs. Texas is building more clean energy capacity than basically everywhere else in the U.S. combined. Environmental reviews, lawsuits, and over regulation of nuclear power are all issues that largely come from the left and make it hard to do any construction that would reduce emissions. Because climate is a virtue signaling topic for the left, typical proposals sacrifice more value than they could hope to save due to uneconomical spending proposals and bans (e.g. on pipelines with allies, fracking, etc.) To be fair, Harris has shifted to be pro-fracking now I think, but she did propose $10 Trillion in climate spending before. We could debate the merits of the Paris agreement pull out and I agree the U.S. should be more energy efficient per capita, but fundamentally it doesn't make sense to handicap the U.S. economy more than the Chinese economy and have allies free-ride on U.S. defense spending at the same time.
Agree that NIMBYism and car culture pose big problems and conservatives can be worse on both, though as Dems control the cities and the policies that drive cost growth in them, I think they are more to blame in the worst cases. As an example, the environmental review to even look at digging another metro tunnel under the bay was set to cost a billion dollars. In the bay most of the NIMBY arguments complain about gentrification, stopping greedy developers, and protecting the environment. For national policy, Trump's head of HUD claimed to be anti-NIMBY and aimed to condition HUD funding on local zoning reform. That said, Walz is YIMBY too, the Biden admin does seem to be trying harder to increase housing supply now, and some of the permitting form looks potentially promising provided lots of the things they add on don't become veto points. Overall, I do think conservatives will be more NIMBY in the suburbs, but will open more areas to development and lower crime in a manner that facilitates relatively more urban density.
In terms of reducing wokeness there's both policy and attitudes. A Trump admin can continue repealing policies that incentivize and force people and companies to be more woke if they want to succeed or to defend rights that have little to do with discrimination. At the same time, people being mad about Trump will increase woke reactions, so that's fair and I am not sure how things net out on polarization. Causing the far right to go nuts doesn't sound great either when they have all the guns, but either way I don't want to be held hostage by extremist reactions.
On the praise for dictators thing, I misinterpreted your comma. Disregard.
Re: JD's statements around the assassination: I directionally agree, though if we consistently apply the standard that people who publicly jumps to conclusions about responsibility in response to violent events shouldn't be in office, then I'm not sure that many presidents/VPs reach the bar.
On immigration: my understanding was that the border proposal was unacceptable because it explicitly tolerates allowing just under 5,000 people in per day via illegal border crossings rather than via border control points. If this specific claim is not true, that would substantially change my view of how bad his opposition to the border compromise is.
On AI I share the same hopes as you. I don't want ideological capture by e/accs or EAs though, because both are too myopic. I want them counter balancing each other, and I want tech acceleration mostly focused on things other than AI and narrow/harder to abuse applications of AI. I think we need substantial growth to deal with the debt burden, and generate enough value to have more positive-sum politics and foreign policy. At the same time, I think it is hard to directly attack most of the EO as stated. One issue is largely on how the involvement of the government to assure that AI increases equity will lead to a lot of negative-sum behavior and censorship that has nothing to do with safety. Thiel sometimes articulates the more extreme version of the longer-term concern in terms of authoritarianism, but that seems further off.
Overall, I agree the biggest threats and opportunities aren't necessarily right or left wing. I feel now like I have a few points on foreign policy and immigration policy that could cause me to make large updates if I find more decisive counter-evidence to my current position. I think it may take me longer to sort through cruxes/points of info that would make me decisively more fearful of dictatorship risk.