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Example syllabus "Existential Risks"

Great that you like this testing idea, Siebe!

I just tried out the judgment calibration test  with my Munich students, with 25 relatively difficult-to-assess statements.

Main finding: Roughly half score better and half score worse than they would have done if they had just uniformly answered "50%". I guess that this indicates that the test was slightly too difficult. Notably, I had included many statements about orders of magnitude (e.g. energy released by the sun in a year, or time scales), and those seem challenging.

But the best students had a mean square deviation of the estimate from the truth value of about 16%, which I guess is quite good.

The NPT: Learning from a Longtermist Success [Links!]

Great post -- and I fully agree that understanding the success of the NPT is hugley interesting and promising, and I also agree with this comment on the importance of this question regarding nuclear energy deployment!

There seems to be one line of thinking according to which almost any facilitating  of a country's starting a civilian nuclear energy programme increases proliferation risk and another line of thinking according to getting ahead of the curve in exporting comparatively  proliferation-resistant technology might actually reduce proliferation risks in the longer term. The idea behind the second view is nicely expressed by Rebecca David Gibbons in this passage:

"The positive effects of nuclear assistance on nonproliferation suggest a second important policy lesson for the United States and its allies: attempt to regain and maintain a competitive nuclear industry. When US and allied technology is desirable, the nonproliferation regime benefits. Indonesia, Japan, Egypt, and several other states joined the NPT in part to receive nuclear technology from Western suppliers. Today, Egypt is purchasing its nuclear technology from Russia and China and has not agreed to the most stringent IAEA safeguards agreement, the Additional Protocol. If suppliers less concerned with nonproliferation have better technology or offer more favorable agreements than the United States and its allies, the nuclear nonproliferation regime could be weakened." (Gibbons 2020, p. 294)

From: Gibbons, R. D. (2020), Supply to deny: The benefits of nuclear assistance for nuclear nonproliferation, Journal of Global Security Studies, 5:282-298.

Could you outline whether you think this reasoning is compelling, Danny?