Naively, to someone with a negative utilitarian perspective, saving lives is a net harm, because those individuals will have some suffering in the remainder of their lives. However, the death of children might cause more psychological pain for others than if they survived to old age. Has anyone looked into how such a "grief differential" compares to the typical amount of suffering in a human life?
I ask as an increasingly committed negative utilitarian starting to take seriously the idea that maybe I should stop doing things that save kids' lives.
Thanks, Sanjay! David Roodman's findings had trickled through to me with a distortion, and it's very good to have that corrected. Saving lives somewhere like Chad or Niger (where apparently the offset is significantly less than 1:1) doesn't come into the career decision I'm making right now, so it looks like I'm safe.
Though I think I'll want to make sure to do more reading on this before I donate to the GiveWell Maximum Impact Fund again. Unless they've made it a policy not to support life-saving work in places where the fertility-mortality offset is weaker?