All of basil.halperin's Comments + Replies

Raimondo and the Department of Commerce seem to have been remarkably effective on AI/China issues during the Biden administration. Is there any detailed reporting on how governance became (seemingly) so good there?

What are some of your favorite examples of their effectiveness?

(Nothing useful to contribute but wanted to say this seems very nice!)

1
Lukas Freund
5mo
Agreed, this looks fantastic, @zdgroff!
1
zdgroff
6mo
Thanks a lot! And good luck on the job market to you—let's connect when we're through with this (or if we have time before then).

The fact that Alameda could and did “borrow” (much) more than any other account on FTX due to the allow_negative flag is consistent with Levine’s description, but I agree a fuller accounting of events would include this piece of information and the accusations you cite.

7
Fermi–Dirac Distribution
6mo
Levine claimed that the fraud was not in how the money ended up at Alameda, but in how FTX claimed to be safe. I think that's wrong since the "allow_negative" flag looks fraudulent in itself. It just looks like something you'd use to implement embezzlement in computer code. For what it’s worth, Levine’s account of what the prosecution is trying to claim in the trial also seems wrong. He claims that the prosecution agrees with him, but their opening statement in the trial sounds much more like the version of the story he claims is wrong than the version he claims is correct. See, for example, the prosecution’s opening statements (summarized by @innercitypress): The fact that Levine is wrong is made even clearer in Ellison’s testimony. Again from @innercitypress: Note that she said “Alameda took several billions of dollars from FTX customers” is what makes her guilty, not “FTX lied to customers about how good their risk engine was.”

Could you say a bit more about why the allow_negative flag, which was unique to Alameda accounts, is consistent with Levine's references to borrowing "in the ordinary course of business . . . based on their crypto positions"? A special exception for a customer owned by FTX's CEO, which allowed said customer to go over $10B in the red when no other customer was allowed a similar privilege, does not sound "in the ordinary course of business" to me. That doesn't sound "based on their crypto positions" either.

Source for over $10B: this summary of recent testim... (read more)

Matt Levine had an especially clear exposition recently I thought:

A simple version of the charges against Sam Bankman-Fried would be something like “people deposited money at his crypto exchange, FTX, and he stole it and gave it to his crypto trading firm, Alameda Research, which squandered it on dumb crypto trades and endorsement deals.”

But this story is not exactly right. There was not money sitting in customer accounts that was then transferred to Alameda accounts and squandered. FTX was a futures exchange; it did not keep money in a box for customers.

... (read more)

As others have commented, this strikes me as a misleading summary.

But this story is not exactly right. There was not money sitting in customer accounts that was then transferred to Alameda accounts and squandered. FTX was a futures exchange; it did not keep money in a box for customers. The money in your FTX account was just money that FTX owed you. Nor did Alameda need to steal the money; FTX was a leveraged futures exchange, and traders like Alameda could, in the ordinary course of business, borrow money from FTX based on their crypto positions. The prob

... (read more)

This is not at all what happened. Alameda's "borrows" were not made via the normal margin lending program. You can see Caroline Ellison admitting so in a contemporaneous meeting that was recorded and played in court. Nishad Singh and Gary Wang explicitly wrote code to allow Alameda specifically to take customer funds from FTX via the "allow_negative" flag, according to their own sworn testimonies. It seems like Matt Levine is confusing this collapse with the Mango Markets collapse that happened around the same time, his description fits Mango much better t... (read more)

-2
bern
6mo
This is extremely good thank you.

Thanks for this, this is a topic I am very interested in -- to the the killer feature missing in Speechify is the ability to highlight and sync those highlights. Or more broadly, annotating in a multimodal way is difficult.

I instead use Goodreader, where you can have e.g. a Dropbox folder of all your PDFs synced across desktop and mobile; and you can annotate those PDFs while listening, then sync to Dropbox.

The downside of Goodreader is that the voice is pretty bad, and also that you can't reflow the text to make it easier to read on mobile while in audio ... (read more)

Any links on the referenced strategic review? Thanks!

-2
LukeDing
10mo
I am not sure if anything was published officially but I remember being ‘interviewed’ at the time and views were sought from a number of EAs and there were dedicated resources from CEA, a bit like the governance review being conducted at the moment but on strategic focus. The review’s remit was perhaps more on the future strategy of CEA but given the role played by CEA at the time which included 80,000 hours and GWWC, and other meta organisations were still quite young, quite significant. It led to the reorganisation of CEA and the rephrasing of GWWC pledge from health and poverty to more cause neutral as we have today. Others involved at the time will have more information.

Forgive me if I'm just being dumb, but -- does anyone know if there is a way in settings to revert to the old font/CSS? I'm seeing a change that (for me) makes things harder to read/navigate.

2
trammell
1y
Thanks for adding comments to it!

Levered ETFs exhibit path dependency, or "volatility drag", because they reset their leverage daily, which means you can't calculate the return without knowing what the interest rate does in between the 3% rise

The entire section is based on a first-order approximation, as explicitly noted in the post (which is also why we set aside e.g. the important issue of convexity). This point is of course correct!

A related point: The US stock market has averaged 10% annual returns over a century. If your style of reasoning worked, we should instead buy a 3x levered S

... (read more)
3
Wei Dai
1y
The point of my comment was that even if you're 100% sure about the eventual interest rate move (which of course nobody can be), you still have major risk from path dependency (as shown by the concrete example). You haven't even given a back-of-the-envelope calculation for the risk-adjusted return, and the "first-order approximation" you did give (which both uses leverage and ignores all risk) may be arbitrarily misleading, even for the purpose of "gives an idea of how large the possibilities are". (Because if you apply enough leverage and ignore risk, there's no limit to how large the possibilities are of any given trade.) I thought about not writing that sentence, but figured that other readers can benefit from knowing my overall evaluation of the post (especially given that many others have upvoted it and/or written comments indicating overall approval). Would be interested to know if you still think I should not have said it, or should have said it in a different way.

Thanks for these comments!

  • The short answer here is: yes agreed, the level of real interest rates certainly seems consistent with "market has some probability on TAI and some [possibly smaller] probability on a second dark age".
  • Whether that's a possibility worth putting weight on -- speaking for myself, I'm happy to leave that up to readers. 
    • (ie: seems unlikely to me! What would the story there be? Extremely rapid diminishing returns to innovation from the current margin, or faster-than-expected fertility declines?)
  • As you say, perhaps the possibility o
... (read more)

For what it's worth, I suspect many readers do think there's some chance of stagnation (i.e. put 5% credence or more). Will MacAskill devotes an entire chapter to growth stagnation in What We Owe the Future. In fact he thinks it's the most likely of the four future trajectories discussed in the book, giving it 35% credence (see note 22 to chapter 2, p. 273-4).

The Samotsvety forecasters think this is too high, but each still puts at least 1% credence on the scenario and their aggregated forecast is 5%. Low, but suggesting it's worth considering.

Yes, to emphasize, the post is meant to define the situation under consideration as: "something close to a 10x increase in growth; or death". We're interested in this scenario only because it's the modal scenario in the particular world of LW/EA/AI safety.

The logic of the argument does not apply as forcefully to "smaller" changes (which could potentially still be quite large), and would not apply at all if AI did not increase growth (ie did not decrease marginal utility of consumption)!

To summarise, the effect on equities seems ambiguous to you, but it's clearly negative on bonds, so investors would likely tilt towards equities.

"Negative for bonds" does not imply "shift investment from bonds to stocks", though. It could mean "shift toward short bonds" or  "shift investment from bonds, to just invest less overall".

In addition, the sharpe ratio of the optimal portfolio is decreased (since one of the main asset classes is worse)

I would push back on this too, for a related reason -- the optimal portfolio can include "go short bonds", wh... (read more)

2
Benjamin_Todd
1y
That makes sense. It just means you should decrease your exposure to bonds, and not necc buy more equities. I'm skeptical you'd end up with a big bond short though - due to my other comment. (Unless you think timelines are significantly shorter or the market will re-rate very soon.) In the merton's share, your exposure depends on (i) expected returns of the optimal portfolio (ii) volatility / risk (iii) the risk free rate over your investment horizon and (iv) your risk aversion. You're arguing the risk free rate will be higher, which reduces exposure. It seems like the possibility of an AI boom will also increase future volatility, also reducing exposure. Then finally there's the question of expected returns of the optimal portfolio, which you seem to think is ambiguous. So it seems like the expected effect would be to reduce exposure. 

Here's another way of putting things, that I'll post here for reference:

 

 

Suppose I think Google is undervalued, because it is going to have a $1T dividend in 2030, and the market doesn't realize this.

1. I buy Google today at some cheap price.

2. Possibility 1: before 2030, the market "corrects" and realizes that it was undervaluing Google. The stock price rises, and I receive capital gains.

3. Possibility 2: the market does not "correct" before 2030. I still get the big dividend in 2030, and was able to get it for a cheap price in 2023.

---

The abov... (read more)

1. Very interesting, thanks, I think this is the first or second most interesting comment we've gotten.

2. I see that you are suggesting this as a possibility, rather than a likelihood, but I'll note at least for other readers that -- I would bet against this occurring, given central banks' somewhat successful record at maintaining stable inflation and desire to avoid deflation. But it's possible!

3. Also, I don't know if inflation-linked bonds in the other countries we sample -- UK/Canada/Australia -- have the deflation floor. Maybe they avoid this issue.

4.... (read more)

2
dsj
1y
It appears the UK's index-linked gilts, at least, don't have this structural issue. See "redemption payments" on page 6 of this document, or put in a sufficiently large negative inflation assumption here.

Thanks for these comments. In short, to all of your questions, the answer is "yes". Some specific comments:

1. This is perhaps already clear, but it might be worth emphasizing that the economic logic is: real rates are particularly use for forecasting, since the sign of the effect is rather unambiguous for the TAI scenario; but it's possible the expected returns could be higher for trading on other bets, if you're willing to make stronger assumptions (e.g. "compute will be important").

2. Re: equities, the appendix post (especially #4 there) summarizes how w... (read more)

3
Benjamin_Todd
1y
Sorry for making you repeat yourself, I'd read the appendix and the Cochrane post :) To summarise, the effect on equities seems ambiguous to you, but it's clearly negative on bonds, so investors would likely tilt towards equities. In addition, the sharpe ratio of the optimal portfolio is decreased (since one of the main asset classes is worse), while the expected risk-free rate over your horizon is increased, so that would also imply taking less total exposure to risk assets. What do you think of that implication? One additional piece of caution is that within investing, I'm pretty sure the normal assumption is that growth shocks are good for equities e.g. you can see the Chapter in Expected Returns by Anti Ilmanen on the growth factor, or read about risk parity. There have been attempts to correlate the returns of different assets to changes in growth expectations. On the other hand, I would guess theta is above one for the average investor.

I'll just pop back in here briefly to say that (1) I have learned a lot from your writing over the years, (2) I have to say I still cannot see how I misinterpreted your comment, and (3) I genuinely appreciate your engagement with the post, even if I think your summary misses the contribution in a fundamentally important way (as I tried to elaborate elsewhere in the thread).

Thanks for this interesting exercise. The one caveat I'd note is that the multiplier you use is based on annual  revenue -- if the remittances from OpenAI to MSFT occur over a number of years, we would need to divide the $1T number that you calculate by that number of years.

(PS: amazing tiktoks)

3
Ben_West
1y
Microsoft has now officially announced their investment and their stock is up ~1% but that's within normal daily variance. Probably the deal was considered likely enough to go through that a lot of the assumed benefit from this deal was already priced in before the official announcement, but I think it's pretty hard to look at a graph of Microsoft stock price and claim that the market is pricing in substantial benefits in the next year.[1] PS: thanks :) 1. ^ fwiw, I'm considering this a market inefficiency and purchasing Microsoft stock as my only non-index fund holding. Feel free to check in with me next year and see how much I regret this.

Thanks Seth, we'll read your paper carefully. I'll just highlight that really the purpose of the analysis above is to engage specifically  with the extreme scenario you mention at the end

what the effect would be today of a giant anticipated increase in automation in 30 years, or of everyone dying with certainty in 30 years [...] we could try if anyone thinks it would be interesting

Also note we briefly allude to demographic trends, but in the (blog post!) analysis here, we want to ignore them because they seem plausibly swamped by the huge growth/morta... (read more)

4
Seth Benzell
1y
Hi Basil,  thanks so much for this gracious response. I don't quite buy this BOTEC though -- I don't see any theoretical reason the abstract representative agent couldn't have a negative time preference rate. Certainly, at the individual level, people might prefer to consume during their retirement or to build up savings for high anticipated taxes/costs when they're old.  There is no mathematical problem with an individual having a negative time preference rate (e.g. Utility = log(C_young) + 2*log(C_old)). So I don't see why rho = 0 needs to be a lower bound.  Thanks for your gracious words about my other work, and looking forward to your thoughts on the paper. 

1. We would welcome engagement from you regarding our argument that stock prices are not useful for forecasting timelines (the sign is ambiguous and effect noisy).

2. You offer what is effectively a full general argument against market prices ever being swayed by anything -- a bit more on this point here. Price changes do not need to be driven by volume! (cf the no-trade theorem, for the conceptual idea)

3. I'm not sure if this is exactly your point about prediction markets (or if you really want to talk about total capital, on which see again #2), but: ... (read more)

  1. But the stocks are the more profitable and capital-efficient investment, so that's  where you see effects first on market prices (if much at all) for a given number of traders buying the investment thesis. That's the main investment on this basis I see short timelines believers making (including me), and has in fact yielded a lot of excess returns since EAs started to identify it in the 2010s.
  2. I don't think anyone here is arguing against the no-trade theorem, and that's not an argument that prices will never be swayed  by anything, but that you ca
... (read more)

Sorry, I stand by my comment 110%.

If you already knew that belief in AGI soon was a very contrarian position (including amongst the most wealthy, smart, and influential people), I don't think you should update at all on the fact that the market doesn't expect AGI.

I want to maximally push back on views like this. The economic logic for the informational efficiency of markets has nothing  to do with consensus or 'non-contrarianness'. Markets are informationally efficient because of the incentive for those who are most informed to trade.

The argument here... (read more)

3
MichaelA
1y
Minor (yet longwinded!) comment: FWIW, I think that: * Rohin's comment seems useful * Stephen's and your rebuttal also seem useful * Stephen's and your rebuttal does seem relevant to what Rohin said even with his caveat included, rather than replying to a strawman * But the phrasing of your latest comment[1] feels to me overconfident, or somewhat like it's aiming at rhetorical effect rather than just sharing data and inferences, or somewhat soldier-mindset-y *  In particular, personally I dislike the use of "110%", "maximally", and maybe "emphatically". * My intended vibe here isn't "how dare you" or "this is a huge deal".  * I'm not at all annoyed at you for writing that way, I (think I) can understand why you did (I think you're genuinely confident in your view and feel you already explained it, and want to indicate that?), and I think your tone in this comment is significant less important than your post itself.  * But I do want to convey that  I think debates and epistemics on the Forum will typically be better if people avoid adding such flourishes/absolutes/emphatic-ness in situations like this (e.g., where the writing shouldn't be optimized for engagingness or persuasion but rather collaborative truth-seeking, and where the disagreed-with position isn't just totally crazy/irrelevant). And I guess what I’d prefer pushing toward is a mindset of curiosity about what’s causing the disagreement and openness to one’s own view also shifting. (I should flag that I didn't read the post very carefully, haven't read all the comments, and haven't formed a stable/confident view on this topic. Also I'm currently sleep-deprived and expect my reasoning isn't super clear unfortunately.) 1. ^ I also think the comment is overconfident in substance, but that's something that happens often in productive debates, and I think that cost is worth paying and hard to totally avoid if we want productive debates to happen.)  
9
Rohin Shah
1y
Can you describe in concrete detail a possible world in which: 1. "AGI in 30 years" is a very contrarian position, including amongst hedge fund managers, bankers, billionaires, etc 2. Market prices indicate that we'll get AGI in 30 years It seems to me that if you were in such a situation, all of the non-contrarian hedge fund managers, bankers, billionaires would do the opposite of all of the trades that you've listed in this post, which would then push market prices back to rejecting "AGI in 30 years"; they have more money so their views dominate. What, concretely, prevents that from happening?

If investors with $1T thought AGI soon, and therefore tried to buy up a portfolio of semiconductor, cloud, and AI companies (a much more profitable and capital-efficient strategy than betting on real interest rates) they could only a buy a small fraction of those industries at current prices. There is a larger pool of investors who would sell at much higher than current prices, balancing that minority.

Yes, it's weighted by capital and views on asset prices, but still a small portion of the relevant capital trying to trade (with risk and years in advance) o... (read more)

^This is an extremely, extremely important point!

Market prices are not a democracy. The logic for the efficiency of markets is emphatically NOT 'wisdom of the crowds'. It's that the most knowledgeable traders have the most to gain from trading, and so do so, and determine the price. (I have a riff on this here)

5
Stefan_Schubert
1y
Hm, Rohin has some caveats elaborating on his claim.  Unless they were edited in after these comments were written (which doesn't seem to be the case afaict) it seems you should have taken those caveats into account instead of just critiquing the uncaveated claim.

Thanks for this -- I think you put really nicely the interpretation that we also are pushing for.

If you don't like the OpenAI example, consider the possibility that other non-public companies could develop AGI...!

6
sapphire
1y
I did say some of the best investments are private. But there are good public investments (MSFT, TSM, SMSN, ASML). Nothing in investing is guaranteed but trying to invest in AI companies seems like a much better bet than shorting interest rates. Also many rationalists are rich enough they can try to invest in various private companies.

Pasting some of my replies to this from twitter FWIW:

  • That's just not correct, unless I'm misunderstanding -- 
    if you short rates, and next day the market decides you are right, then real rates spike and you make money. Simple as that 
    So I don't follow your claim ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
  • Sovereign debt markets are the some of the most well-functioning financial markets ever created by man -- this is literal orders of magnitude off. This is just not tether
  • also

I think the claim is that with fast takeoff, the market will either never decide that you are right (we die before the market realizes), or will decide you are right and you get rich but have only a short time to live, so there's no value to being rich.

FWIW -- eventually wrote up some more thoughts on this here.

Will subforum posts feature on the main RSS feed? Thanks!

2
Sharang Phadke
1y
Subforums will allow two types of posts: 1. "discussions", which are more casual and will only appear on the subforum 2. "posts", which are simply regular posts with the tag that the subforum uses - these can appear on the Frontpage as well as the subofurm if the user selects this option (it is selected by default)

One crude metric: the number of forecasters has gone up 25% in the last month, from n=284 to n=354

It would be interesting if it were possible to disambiguate:

1. Previous forecasters moved up their forecasts to shorter timelines

vs.

2. New forecasters, who have shorter timelines, offered forecasts for the question when they hadn't forecasted previously

Both are informative, and in a real-money prediction market both are equally informative. But with a forecasting platform, this could "just" be a composition bias?

2
basil.halperin
2y
One crude metric: the number of forecasters has gone up 25% in the last month, from n=284 to n=354

Cascading, systemic and GCRs typically aren’t priced into asset prices

I'm not sure that this is important to your arguments, but -- do you have any evidence that this is actually the case?

1
PhilC
2y
Good question. It is likely fairer to say that risks are sometimes accounted for by increasing the discount rate, but how they come up with the discount rate is fairly qualitative.

For diaphragmatic breathing, where are you getting the 27.05% number from? I didn't see it in the Hamasaki (2020) lit review you linked to.

Also, looking at that paper:

  • It seems like most of the RCTs are run on people with underlying conditions: asthma, cancer, etc. Of course this is of interest, but is not of general interest to generally healthy populations
  • In section 3.2.4 on RCTs involving healthy subjects, I only see studies on
    • The effect on motion sickness
    • Smokers
    • The effect on "forced vital capacity" when done in conjunction with upper body work
    • The effect
... (read more)
2
Ben Williamson
2y
The studies used for all our figures can be found in the evidence table. These are average effect sizes across the studies found that were relevant. In the case of diaphragmatic breathing, this is an average in effect size vs. control between the results of Ma et al. (2017) and Perciavalle et al. (2016). I hope that clarifies it a bit!

I like this writeup a lot, but I would say to anyone who's actually reading this should ignore the advice to not go into academia.

If you're reading this, you're probably selected  (!) to be someone who is atypical and has a decent shot at succeeding in academia. (See also: SSC on 'reversing all advice you hear'.) i.e.: if you're someone who's taking the time out of your day to read this, you're probably (probably!) similar to "Anita" here.

eca
3y24
0
0

Ugh. Shrug. That isn't supposed to be the point of this post. All my comments on this are to alert the reader that I happen to believe this and haven't tried to stop it from seeping into my writing. It felt disingenuous not to.

But since you raised, I feel like making it clear, if it isn't already, that I do not recommend reversing this advice. At least if you are considering cause areas/ academic domains that I might know about (see my preamble). I have no idea how applicable this is outside of longtermist technical-leaning work.

If you think you might be a... (read more)

4
Adrià Garriga Alonso
3y
I think even among such selected  crowd, Anita would stand out like a bright star. The average top-university PhD student doesn't end up holding a top faculty job. (This may seem elitist, but it is important: becoming a trainer of mediocre PhD students is likely not more effective than non-profit work).  A first-author Nature paper in undergrad (!) is quite rare too.

Agreed re: "mispricing = restatement that this is a contrarian position" -- but to push back on your "lack of feedback" point:

If the market can't price 30-year cashflows, it can't price anything, since for any infinitely-lived asset (eg stocks!), most of the present-discounted value of future cash flows is far in the future. 

See eg this Ralph Koijen thread and linked paper, "the first 10 years of dividends only make up ~20% of the value of the stock market. 80% is due to value of cash flows beyond 10 years"

(I wonder how big EMH proponents like Hanson and Yudkowsky explain the dissonance.)

6
Paul_Christiano
3y
If an asset pays me far in the future,  then long-term interest rates are one factor affecting its price. But it seems to me that in most cases that factor still explains a minority of variation in prices (and because it's a slowly-varying factor it's quite hard to make money by predicting it). For example, there is a ton of uncertainty about how much money any given company is going to make next year. We get frequent feedback signals about those predictions, and people who win bets on them immediately get returns that let them show how good they are and invest more, and so that's the kind of case where I'd be more scared of outpredicting the market. So I guess that's saying that I expect the relative prices of stocks to be much more efficient than the absolute level. Haven't looked at the claim but it looks kind of misleading. Dividend yield for SPY is <2% which I guess is what they are talking about? But buyback yield is a further 3%, and with a 5% yield you're getting 40% of the value in the first 10 years, which sounds more like it. So that would mean that you've gotten half of the value within 13.5 years instead of 31 years. Technically the stock is still valued based on the future dividends, and a buyback is just decreasing outstanding shares and so increasing earnings per share. But for the purpose of pricing the stock it should make no difference whether earnings are distributed as dividends or buybacks, so the fact that buybacks push cashflows to the future can't possibly affect the difficulty of pricing stocks. Put a different way, the value of a buyback to investors doesn't depend on the actual size of future cashflows, nor on the discount rate. Those are both cancelled out because they are factored into the price at which the company is able to buy back its shares. (E.g. if PepsiCo was making all of its earnings in the next 5 years, and ploughing them into buybacks, after which they made a steady stream of not-much-money, then PepsiCo prices would s

Personally I agree with the economic forecasts and approximate timelines here, but I haven’t seen a way of reconciling the “accelerating growth” prediction with the efficient market hypothesis.

Low 30-year government bond rates in the US (and 50- or 100-year rates in some other countries!) imply the market expects low growth over this time horizon, not ever-accelerating economic growth rates.

If growth goes up and interest rates rise, these are massively overvalued. It’s possible, but, we’d have to tell some some more elaborate stories (AI-led growth is not broad-based? It’s all captured by one firm...? It FOOMs?) if we want to be consistent with EMH.

I I think the market just doesn't put much probability on a crazy AI boom anytime soon. If you expect such a boom then there are plenty of bets you probably want to make. (I am personally short US 30-year debt, though it's a very small part of my AI-boom portfolio.)

I think it's very hard for the market to get 30-year debt prices right because the time horizons are so long and they depend on super hard empirical questions with ~0 feedback. Prices are also determined by supply and demand across a truly huge number of traders, and making this trade locks up y... (read more)

This smells like a composition effect. Have you checked that this is not just due to e.g. aging of the population; or driven by the rise in immigration?

3
bfinn
5y
On the aging thing I've just done a rough estimate. The median age increased about 3 years between 1999 and 2019, and as it's around 40 which is before the mid-life crisis (life satisfaction being U-shaped as you age, the lowpoint around 50), an age increase of 3 years would if anything lower happiness. (Of course it would be a mix of some going down and others up depending on their ages, but the overall effect would presumably be down. Incidentally the bottom of the U-shape hasn't noticeably got older as the population aged over this period.) But the effect is small anyway - the median, getting 3 years older, would lose about 0.07/10 points life satisfaction (when expressed as a score out of 10), which is only about 10% of the 1999-2019 change, as well as in the wrong direction.
1
bfinn
5y
The aging did occur to me, but without doing the numbers I doubt it would have an effect that fast on happiness, and certainly not that fast on misery. Re immigration, research shows immigrants mostly take on the happiness of the country they move to, partly retaining their previous happiness. And as most recent immigration has been from less happy countries (eg Eastern Europe), I’d expect the effect to be a small fall in happiness not a rise. Though again without doing the figures I doubt it would be big enough to affect the general shape of the graphs.

When you write it like that, it seems obvious :)

Thanks.