It only relates to it insofar as someone could view your post (just looking at the title) as implying socialism and EA (at the broadest level, trying to do the most good we can with resources) are at odds. In reality, a lot of critics of EA are addressing the community's choice of priorities rather than EA at the broadest level. I would prefer it if such critics embraced the EA framework explicitly and made the case that their cause area or philosophy is actually the most EA, if this is pretty much what they are doing.

There's a lot of conflation between what the EA community is prioritizing at any given point and EA as a philosophy to guide moral behavior. I think this conflation probably does a lot of damage to EA's ability to proliferate.

I didn't downvote, but the initial title seems to suggest that Effective Altruism and socialism would be at odds. I don't really think that EA and socialism are at odds, nor any ideology per se. If we have different views within EA about what forms of government, etc. are likely to produce flourishing within EA, we would expect EAs who have different political beliefs. To be clear, you made clear in your post that you can be committed to different beliefs and still be EA, but the top level framing I found a bit jarring. Generally, a lot of the arguments that purport to be against EA are arguments against some cause prioritizations or perspectives on how to do the most good, which seem like they might make more sense within the tent of EA.

Thanks, Jason — this is exactly the kind of scrutiny I think the idea needs.

On your core point: I basically agree with your descriptive read. Looking at Thankyou’s ~4–5% donate-able margin or Newman’s ~5% donations on ~5% net margins does not scream “these businesses are crushing the for-profit competition.” When I talk about large profit uplifts, I’m not claiming we already see that in their published numbers; I’m saying the mechanism (thin margins + modest stakeholder advantages) could plausibly generate big differences if we ever set this up deliberately and at scale. What we actually have today are a handful of pioneers operating under lousy conditions: low category awareness, no shared certification, and a chronic capital misfit (too “weird” for normal investors, too “businessy” for most philanthropy). In that world, you’d expect “survive and sometimes do well,” not “obvious margin dominance.”

I also think you’re right to flag survivorship and the Paul Newman effect. Newman’s Own probably got a brand tailwind few founders can replicate, and we don’t have good public data on the PFG attempts that fizzled. That’s partly why the article opens by saying “the basic math is compelling, what we lack is rigorous measurement.” I’m using Thankyou/Newman’s as existence proofs (“this can work at all”), not as clean evidence that the multiplier is already realized in the wild.

On the Kraft question and capital: I don’t think the story has to be “small PFG beats the global leader on day one.” The more realistic path I have in mind is stepwise:

• First, PFG companies grow with philanthropic and mission-aligned capital in niches where capital requirements are tractable and stakeholder preference is strong (ticketing, insurance distribution, hated-fee services, values-expressive categories, etc.). At that stage, the relevant comparison really is similarly sized “profit-for-yacht” firms, not KraftHeinz.
• Then, if they show normal or better cash-flow performance, they can access ordinary credit markets. Banks and lenders care about coverage ratios and default risk, not whether residual profits go to a foundation or to a family office. A PFG firm with solid EBITDA and a boring business model can still borrow to expand, even if 100% of distributable profits ultimately go to charity.
• Only much later do we get to the level where you’re buying or competing head-to-head with a Kraft-scale incumbent. At that point, you’d likely be using a mix of philanthropic equity, retained earnings, and conventional debt — not trying to fund a $50B play entirely out of grants.

So I’m not claiming “PFG firms are already out-earning Kraft” or that we have tidy margin graphs to prove a large edge. I’m claiming: (a) we have decent evidence that stakeholder preferences exist at parity and can matter; (b) the margin arithmetic makes it at least plausible that, in the right contexts, this could translate into big differences in distributable profits; and (c) given that, it’s rational for philanthropists to run some careful, sector-specific experiments rather than either assuming PFG can’t compete or assuming it already does. If those trials show no advantage once you control for capital and sector, I’ll happily update. Right now, the main thing I’m arguing against is staying forever in exactly the “anecdata vs intuition” uncertainty you’re highlighting.

On another note, it might be worth engaging, potentially on their community forum, to see where your cruxes are regarding vaping as harm reduction and determine whether there are any areas where your perspectives could inform each other or there is common ground.

Thanks for the thoughtful reply — and yes, I do think this is a pretty serious concern for trust and scale.

The core issue, as I see it, is that for the “we’re neutralizing opposing political donations” story to really hold, donors should be doing something like:

“This is money I was otherwise going to use to support the specific zero-sum political cause indicated (or a very close substitute), and I’m now redirecting it instead.”

One concrete way to reinforce that would be a short pledge at checkout, e.g.:

“I understand that DuelGood only works if donors genuinely redirect money they would otherwise have used to support the indicated political cause (or a very similar one). I pledge that this donation meets that description.”

You could then reserve the strongest “duel/neutralization” framing and stats for donors who sign that pledge, and be transparent about that in the FAQ.

I’d really love to see DuelGood work — turning political deadlock into bednets is a very compelling vision.

My apologies for not having followed the links in your post in the first place.

I think this criticism could apply if we were suggesting moving funds from the "donations" bucket of one's financial decisions to one's "savings" bucket.  Less so if we are suggesting moving funds from the "personal consumption" bucket to "savings" bucket.

I think maybe a brief video explaining the zero-sum nature of a lot of political giving, and a brief explanation of a better path forward might be helpful.

One concern I have is how this might be pretty gameable to not reflect someone's counterfactual donation decisions.

For instance, say that I am going to donate anyway to GiveWell's Top Charities Fund, but I also have other political preferences (say promoting second amendment rights in the United States). Now, instead of just donating directly to GiveWell's Top Charities Fund, I can use DuelGood to donate to GiveWell, while neutralizing the donations to a gun safety organization. 

This possibility, that your DuelGood contribution may not actually be neutralizing spending by the opposing cause, seems like it could prompt some serious concern (even if, in fact, people were being honest and using it for counterfactual donations).

EDIT: This sort of setup where two people agree not to fund causes where they oppose each other seems like it would work very well if the two people trust each other. How can DuelGood create this degree of trust in a scalable way between strangers?

EDIT2: second amendment is the right to bear arms, not first!

I haven't looked into this topic much, but I know reducing the harm from cigarette smoking is one of the priorities of the School for Moral Ambition. Perhaps they would be interested in substitution of cigarette smoking for vaping as part of the approach?

https://www.moralambition.org/