Thank you. Particularly the section with "It's typically legal for children of any age to work for their parents' business." is new to me. I will replace the examples.

My understanding is that there are often minimum age limits for minor employment with a blanket ban below a certain age. When I use the expression "child labour", I don't mean 17 years olds. But you're right that my phrasing isn't precise there. I also agree people won't mind children selling lemonades on their own. But in my conversations there was a general agreement that you shouldn't make your 10 years old child work full-time and you absolutely shouldn't employ any kid of that age as an employer.

Even less controversially, since there is agreement that early children's rights legislation was way below the acceptable standard, it serves as an example for "getting someone to do something less bad but still forbidden".

If taking a salary cut is considered as honest fulfilment of the GWWC pledge, I'm willing to take the pledge.

I work in an EA-funded non-profit. It seems inefficient to donate my income instead of taking a salary cut.

Thanks, many websites seem to report this without the qualifier "per quarter", which confused me.

This was super informative for me, thank you.

I'm confused by this section in this interview:
 

"Well, the simplest toy example is just going to be, imagine that you have some assessment that says, I think chickens are in a really bad state in factory farms, and I think that if we move layer hens from battery cages into a cage-free environment, we make them 40% better off. And I think that after doing this whole project — whatever the details, we’re just going to make up the toy numbers — I think that chickens have one-tenth of the welfare range of humans.

So now we’ve got 40% change in the welfare for these chickens and we’ve got 10% of the welfare range, so we can multiply these through and say how much welfare you’d be getting in a human equivalent for that benefit to one individual. Then you multiply the number of individuals and you can figure out how much benefit in human units we would be getting."

It doesn't seem to me that this follows. Let's assume the "typical" welfare range for chickens is -10 to 10. Let's also assume that for humans it's -100 to 100.  This is how I interpret "chickens have 10% of the welfare range of the humans". Let's also assume moving from cage to cage-free eliminates 50% of the suffering. We still don't know whether that's a move from -10 to -5 or -6 to -3. We also don't know how to place QALYs within this welfare range. When we save a human, should we assume their welfare to be 100 throughout their life?

This also makes it even more crucial to provide a tight technical definition for welfare range so that scientists can place certain experiences within that range.

Yeah, I think so.

Thank you for all your feedback Constance!

Assume that an agent A is doing something morally wrong, eg. fighting in a violent unjust war. You don't have power to stop the war altogether, but you can get the relevant state sign an agreement against chemical weapons and at least prevent the most horrific forms of killings. What could be deontological restrictions on negotiating with wrongdoers? My preliminary conclusion: It's good to negotiate for outcomes that are ex-ante Pareto superior even if they don't cease the constraint violations.