[link] Centre for the Governance of AI 2020 Annual Report

I think you might have accidentally linked to the 2019 report. The 2020 report seems to be here https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/govai/govai-2020-annual-report/

What’s the low resolution version of effective altruism?

(rough note) This seems to have strands of: 'rich people focused' 'rich people are more moral' 'E2G focus'

What’s the low resolution version of effective altruism?

Nice! Could you do a version which is 70% lower resolution? 😁

What’s the low resolution version of effective altruism?

It might be that SF has more people who are kinda into EA such that they donate 10% to givewell, diluting out the people who are representative of more extreme self sacrifice

What’s the low resolution version of effective altruism?

Interesting about the idea that EA let's people off the moral hook easily: 'I'm rich so I just donate and I've done my moral duty and get to virtue signal'

It's interesting how that applies to people who are wealthy, work a conventional job, and donate 10% to charities, but doesn't seem like a valid criticism against those who donate way more like 50%+. That normally seems to be met with the response "wow that's impressive self sacrifice!". Same with those who might drastically shift their career

What’s the low resolution version of effective altruism?

'Charity for nerds' doesn't sound like an awful low res version compared to others suggested like 'moral hand-washing for rich people'.

'Charity for nerds' has nice properties like:

  • it's okay if you're not into EA (maybe you're just not nerdy enough), compared to 'EA things you're evil if you don't agree with EA'
  • selects for nerdy people, who are willing to think hard about their work
What’s the low resolution version of effective altruism?

Tyler Cowen's low resolution version: "COWEN: A lot of giving is not very rational. Whether that’s good or bad, it’s a fact. And if you try to make it too rational in a particular way, a very culturally specific way, you’ll simply end up with less giving. And then also, a lot of the particular targets of effective altruism, I’m not sure, are bad ideas. So somewhere like Harvard, it has a huge endowment, it’s super non- or even anti-egalitarian. But it’s nonetheless a self-replicating cluster of creativity. And if you’re a rich person, Harvard was your alma mater, and you give them a million dollars, is that a bad idea? I don’t know, but effective altruists tend to be quite sure it’s a bad idea." from https://conversationswithtyler.com/episodes/patrick-collison/

Seems mostly focused on the idea of 'EA tries to shift existing philanthropy to be given using more rational decision making procedures' 

Strong Longtermism, Irrefutability, and Moral Progress

Thanks for the reply and taking the time to explain your view to me :)

I'm curious: My friend has been trying to estimate the liklihood of nuclear war before 2100. It seems like this is a question that is hard to get data on, or to run tests on. I'd be interested to know what you'd recommend them to do?

Is there a way I can tell them to approach the question such that it relies on 'subjective estimates' less and 'estimates derived from actual data' more?

Or is it that you think they should drop the research question and do something else with their time, since any approach to the question would rely on subjective probability estimates that are basically useless?

Strong Longtermism, Irrefutability, and Moral Progress

Thanks for taking the time to write this :)

In your post you say "Of course, it is impossible to know whether $1bn of well-targeted grants could reduce the probability of existential risk, let alone by such a precise amount. The “probability” in this case thus refers to someone’s (entirely subjective) probability estimate — “credence” — a number with no basis in reality and based on some ad-hoc amalgamation of beliefs."

I just wanted to understand better: Do you think its ever reasonable to make subjective probability estimates (have 'credences') over things? If so, in what scenarios is it reasonable to have such subjective probability estimates; and what makes those scenarios different from the scenario of forming a subjective probability estimate of what $1bn in well-target grants could do to reduce existential risk?

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