When I wrote this post, pauseAI and similar were much less of a thing

I agree, this seems broadly accurate. I suppose I should have clarified that your post was perhaps true at the time, but in my view, has since become false if one counts AI pause as a "core action relevant point" of EA.

I just think if you told people "there's this new technology that could cause human extinction, or be a really big deal and save many lives and cause an age of wonders, should we be slow and cautious in how we develop it" most people would say yes?

I believe that people's answers to questions like this are usually highly sensitive to how the issue is framed. If you simply presented them with the exact quote you wrote here, without explaining that "saving many lives" would likely include the lives of their loved ones, such as their elderly relatives, I agree that most would support slowing down development. However, if you instead clarified that continuing development would likely save their own lives and the lives of their family members by curing most types of diseases, and if you also emphasized that the risk of human extinction from continued development is very low (for example, 1-2%), then I think there would be a significantly higher chance that most people would support moving forward with the technology at a reasonably fast pace, though presumably with some form of regulation in place to govern the technology.

One possible response to my argument is to point to survey data that shows most people favor pausing AI. However, while I agree survey data can be useful, I don't think it provides strong evidence in this case for the claim. This is because most people, when answering survey questions, lack sufficient context and have not spent much time thinking deeply about these complex issues. Their responses are often made without fully understanding the stakes or the relevant information. In contrast, if you look at the behavior of current legislators and government officials who are being advised by scientific experts and given roughly this same information, it does not seem that they are currently strongly in favor of pausing AI development.

TL;DR If you believe the key claims of "there is a >=1% chance of AI causing x-risk and >=0.1% chance of bio causing x-risk in my lifetime" this is enough to justify the core action relevant points of EA. This clearly matters under most reasonable moral views and the common discussion of longtermism, future generations and other details of moral philosophy in intro materials is an unnecessary distraction.

I think the central thesis of this post—as I understand it—is false, for the reasons I provided in this comment. [Edit: to be clear, I think this post was perhaps true at the time, but in my view, has since become false if one counts pausing AI as a "core action relevant point" of EA]. To quote myself:

Let's assume that there's a 2% chance of AI causing existential risk, and that, optimistically, pausing [AI progress] for a decade would cut this risk in half (rather than barely decreasing it, or even increasing it). This would imply that the total risk would diminish from 2% to 1%.

According to OWID, approximately 63 million people die every year, although this rate is expected to increase, rising to around 74 million in 2035. If we assume that around 68 million people will die per year during the relevant time period, and that they could have been saved by AI-enabled medical progress, then pausing AI for a decade would kill around 680 million people. 

This figure is around 8.3% of the current global population, and would constitute a death count higher than the combined death toll from World War 1, World War 2, the Mongol Conquests, the Taiping rebellion, the Transition from Ming to Qing, and the Three Kingdoms Civil war. 

(Note that, although we are counting deaths from old age in this case, these deaths are comparable to deaths in war from a years of life lost perspective, if you assume that AI-accelerated medical breakthroughs will likely greatly increase human lifespan.)

From the perspective of an individual human life, a 1% chance of death from AI is significantly lower than a 8.3% chance of death from aging—though obviously in the former case this risk would apply independently of age, and in the latter case, the risk would be concentrated heavily among people who are currently elderly.

Even a briefer pause lasting just two years, while still cutting risk in half, would not survive this basic cost-benefit test. Of course, it's true that it's difficult to directly compare the individual personal costs from AI existential risk to the diseases of old age. For example, AI existential risk has the potential to be briefer and less agonizing, which, all else being equal, should push us to favor it. On the other hand, most people might consider death from old age to be preferable since it's more natural and allows the human species to continue.

Nonetheless, despite these nuances, I think the basic picture that I'm presenting holds up here: under typical assumptions [...] a purely individualistic framing of the costs and benefits of AI pause do not clearly favor pausing, from the perspective of people who currently exist. This fact was noted in Nick Bostrom's original essay on Astronomical Waste, and more recently, by Chad Jones in his paper on the tradeoffs involved in stopping AI development.

Using the data cited in your source (the Distributional Financial Accounts (DFA) provided by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors), it seems to me that the growth in the share of wealth held by the top 0.1% has not been very fast in the last 20 years—growing from around 10-11% to around 14% over that period. In my opinion, this is a significant, albeit rather unimportant trend relative to other social shifts in the last 20 years.

Moreover, this data does not include wealth held in social insurance programs (as I pointed out in another comment). If included, this would presumably decrease the magnitude of the trend seen in this plot, especially regarding the declining share of wealth held by the bottom 90%.

I could sympathize with the frustration, but I feel like I'm being attacked in a way that's pretty unfair.

Sorry if my previous comment came across as rude or harsh—that wasn't my intention. I didn't mean to attack you. I asked those questions to clarify your exact claim because I wanted to understand it fully and potentially challenge it depending on its interpretation. My intent was for constructive disagreement, not criticism of you personally.

I find your other papers you linked in other comments interesting. That said, I don't see them changing my main argument much.

Your main argument started with and seemed to depend heavily on the idea that inequality has been increasing. If it turns out that this key assumption is literally incorrect, then it seems like that should significantly affect your argument.

Your point about the top 1%'s rising income share uses pre-tax and transfers data, which can be misleading here because the discussion is specifically about how much income rich people actually control and can redirect towards their desired ends. Post-tax and transfer measures are more informative in this context since they directly reflect the resources individuals genuinely have available after taxes and redistribution. In other words, taxes and transfers matter because they substantially reduce the actual amount of wealth the rich can freely use, donate, or influence society with. Ignoring this gives a distorted picture of how much power or control rich people practically possess, which is central to the original discussion.

Other studies have notably not found meaningful increases in the top 1%'s income share after taxes and transfers are taken into account:

It's worth noting that much of the reported increase in wealth inequality since 1989 seems to be explained by the rising share of wealth held via social insurance programs. Catherine et al. notes,

Recent influential work finds large increases in inequality in the U.S. based on measures of wealth concentration that notably exclude the value of social insurance programs. This paper shows that top wealth shares have not changed much over the last three decades when Social Security is properly accounted for. This is because Social Security wealth increased substantially from $7 trillion in 1989 to $39 trillion in 2019 and now represents 49% of the wealth of the bottom 90% of the wealth distribution. This finding is robust to potential changes to taxes and benefits in response to system financing concerns.

Since both ordinary private wealth and social insurance programs are similar in that they provide continuous streams of income to people, I think it's likely misleading to suggest that wealth inequality has gone up meaningfully in recent decades in the United States—at least based on the reported datasets that presently exist.

Social insurance income streams are especially relevant in this context because they directly affect how much real economic power and control people have in practice. Ignoring social insurance thus exaggerates how concentrated real economic power actually is, since it underestimates the resources available to the broader population.

That said, inequality statistics are quite contentious in general given the lack of reliable data on the exact variables we care about, so I'm not highly confident in this picture. Ultimately I'm unsure whether inequality has remained roughly constant over the last few decades in the sense we should care about.

It seems like recently (say, the last 20 years) inequality has been rising.

When you say inequality has been rising, do you mean income inequality or wealth inequality? What's your source for this claim?

[Edit: reworded to be less curt and harsh]

I tentatively agree with your statement that,

To me, it seems much more likely that Earth-originating intelligence will go extinct this century than, say, in the 8973th century AD.

That said, I still suspect the absolute probability of total extinction of intelligent life during the 21st century is very low. To be more precise, I'd put this probability at around 1% (to be clear: I recognize other people may not agree that this credence should count as "extremely low" or "very low" in this context). To justify this statement, I would highlight several key factors:

1. Throughout hundreds of millions of years, complex life has demonstrated remarkable resilience. Since the first vertebrates colonized land during the late Devonian period (approximately 375–360 million years ago), no extinction event has ever eradicated all species capable of complex cognition. Even after the most catastrophic mass extinctions, such as the end-Permian extinction and the K-Pg extinction, vertebrates rebounded. Not only did they recover, but they also surpassed their previous levels of ecological dominance and cognitive complexity, as seen in the increasing brain size and adaptability of various species over time.
2. Unlike non-intelligent organisms, intelligent life—starting with humans—possesses advanced planning abilities and an exceptional capacity to adapt to changing environments. Humans have successfully settled in nearly every climate and terrestrial habitat on Earth, from tropical jungles to arid deserts and even Antarctica. This extreme adaptability suggests that intelligent life is less vulnerable to complete extinction compared to other complex life forms.
3. As human civilization has advanced, our species has become increasingly robust against most types of extinction events rather than more fragile. Technological progress has expanded our ability to mitigate threats, whether they come from natural disasters or disease. Our massive global population further reduces the likelihood that any single event could exterminate every last human, while our growing capacity to detect and neutralize threats makes us better equipped to survive crises.
4. History shows that even in cases of large-scale violence and genocide, the goal has almost always been the destruction of rival groups—not the annihilation of all life, including the perpetrators themselves. This suggests that intelligent beings have strong instrumental reasons to avoid total extinction events. Even in scenarios involving genocidal warfare, the likelihood of all intelligent beings willingly or accidentally destroying all life—including their own—seems very low.
5. I have yet to see any compelling evidence that near-term or medium-term technological advancements will introduce a weapon or catastrophe capable of wiping out all forms of intelligent life. While near-term technological risks certainly exist that threaten human life, none currently appear to pose a credible risk of total extinction of intelligent life.
6. Some of the most destructive long-term technologies—such as asteroid manipulation for planetary bombardment—are likely to develop alongside technologies that enhance our ability to survive and expand into space. As our capacity for destruction grows, so too will our ability to establish off-world colonies and secure alternative survival strategies. This suggests that the overall trajectory of intelligent life seems to be toward increasing resilience, not increasing vulnerability.
7. Artificial life could rapidly evolve to become highly resilient to environmental shocks. Future AIs could be designed to be at least as robust as insects—able to survive in a wide range of extreme and unpredictable conditions. Similar to plant seeds, artificial hardware could be engineered to efficiently store and execute complex self-replicating instructions in a highly compact form, enabling them to autonomously colonize diverse environments by utilizing various energy sources, such as solar and thermal energy. Having been engineered rather than evolved naturally, these artificial systems could take advantage of design principles that surpass biological organisms in adaptability. By leveraging a vast array of energy sources and survival strategies, they could likely colonize some of the most extreme and inhospitable environments in our solar system—places that even the most resilient biological life forms on Earth could never inhabit.

In my comment I later specified "in [the] next century" though it's quite understandable if you missed that. I agree that eventual extinction of Earth-originating intelligent life (including AIs) is likely; however, I don't currently see a plausible mechanism for this to occur over time horizons that are brief by cosmological standards.

(I just edited the original comment to make this slightly clearer.)

In my view, the extinction of all Earth-originating intelligent life (including AIs) seems extremely unlikely over the next several decades. While a longtermist utilitarian framework takes even a 0.01 percentage point reduction in extinction risk quite seriously, there appear to be very few plausible ways that all intelligent life originating from Earth could go extinct in the next century. Ensuring a positive transition to artificial life seems more useful on current margins.