All of MatthewDahlhausen's Comments + Replies

A common qualification added to the healthy patient case is that the killing and distribution could be done in a way with plausible deniability, or it is done in a remote setting where the doctor is the only one who would know what happened. The central challenge of the case is on means versus ends, so make whatever adjustments you need to avoid the evasive rejoinder that not killing is in fact the more utilitarian option.

But lets turn to the other case I gave: would you be ok with others engaging in human trafficking if they donated enough to reduce human... (read more)

I'm not drawing a metaphysical distinction between humans and animals. I care about welfare, full stop.

The difference is empirical, not metaphysical. Human suffering triggers compensatory responses from other humans that multiply the costs. People who learn hospitals might harvest organs stop going to hospitals. Communities that tolerate trafficking erode the trust structures enabling cooperation. Social fabric frays. These system-level effects make the total harm enormous and difficult to quantify. You can't reliably offset what you can't measure.

Farmed a... (read more)

MatthewDahlhausen
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40% ➔ 60% disagree

I think the question is quite similar to the case of a doctor killing a healthy patient to use their organs to save five other sick patients.

Or as another comparison, using trafficked people for personal ends but donating enough to reduce human trafficking elsewhere.

People, and non-human animals, are not simply reducible to means to serve utilitarian ends.

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Brad West🔸
But there are important consequentialist reasons that make the doctor killing patients fail in the real world. Once you live in a world in which people are being killed and the organs are being repurposed when they go to hospitals, people cease going to hospitals. On the other hand, the differences in treatments in farmed animals are not going to trigger responses from said farmed animals that lead to such knock-on effects. You can simply look at the welfare consequences. I think of it from the perspective I would have if I knew I would die and immediately be reborn as a chicken. Would I rather there be more Georges in the world who are vegan and do not contribute directly to the demand which causes my torture or Henrys who are omnivores and thus contribute directly to the torture, but donate an amount that neutralizes the effect and then some more? If we actually care about welfare of animals more than we care about moral purity, we would rather there are more Henrys than Georges. 

Just get a room air filter for your condo. There are different models and they are usually quite quiet unless on the highest setting. I can't hear mine on the two lowest settings (up to 100 CFM). UVC doesn't remove small particulates, which is the most serious air pollutant of concern from a health perspective for most homes.

Commercial buildings have to comply with locally required codes and standards. Code authorities could adopt some or all of ASHRAE Standard 241 in their jurisdiction just like they do with ASHRAE Standard 62.1 (ventilation) and 90.1 (energy).

Far-UVC produces ozone. That's inherent to the technology. That can be managed with ventilation, so places with already high ventilation rates where you don't want the added static pressure in the air supply from greater filtration are a good fit for UVC. In other places, in-room air cleaners tend to be cheaper to operate and maintain. The "best" technology depends on space constraints, ventilation rates, first cost, maintenance, etc. If far-UVC gets cheaper, I expect it will become more widely used. But I don't think it will fully dominate the space.

My po... (read more)

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Jason
Thanks! I may be thinking about it too much from the consumer perspective of owning a condo in a 100-year-old building, where the noise of filtration is a major drawback and the costs of a broader modernization of HVAC systems would be considerable. I haven't polled grocery store owners, but an owner would bear all the costs of improving air quality yet may capture few of the economic benefits. Although customers would care a lot in a pandemic, they probably wouldn't otherwise care in a way that increases profits -- and managers are incentivized toward short-term results. Cynically, most of their employees may not have paid sick time, so the owner may not even realize most of the benefit from reduced employee illness. (Of course, regulators could require compliance -- but that's not an awareness problem. So maybe the candidate intervention is lobbying?)

I know the FIRE community floats 25x your annual spend in savings as a target for retirement. At your income and "frugal even compared to those under poverty line", it would take you less than year to hit that target. Taking what you say as true, it means you are prioritizing one less year of working far more than altruistically helping others. That is discordant with the median attitude in the community, who imagine themselves working effectively half a decade or more solely for the benefit of others. I don't want to focus too much on the money. Its the r... (read more)

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Zoe L
"Its the relative self vs. others prioritization. That's a tension that is always going to exist between the FIRE community and the EA community." - I agree with this statement. However, do you think the selfish vs. altruistic trait is a bi-modal or a normal-ish distribution? My intuition is the latter, that most people want to do some good but are also somewhat selfish. This actually leads into outreach strategy. I'm not a community organizer but I know it's hard work, so kudos to you for doing the meta-work. I want to challenge the "success metric" for the outreach. It sounds like you're using "who's coming to a EA meetup" as a proxy. In my opinion, the real beneficiaries of the EA movement are other people, animals, and perhaps future non-biological sentient beings. So I think a better proxy metric would be something like "how much money donated to these beneficiaries" - one doesn't need to attend any EA meetup or know about this forum to donate to, e.g., the Humane League. Anecdotally, I have a few "self-interested libertarian" friends and I was able to convince them to donate to the Shrimp Welfare Project recently.  True/pure altruism is indeed rare but I believe most people are at least semi-altruistic. They (perhaps including me) may not be a good fit for the core EA community but they're open to support EA causes.

"Personally, my partner and I donate on average ~$10k USD every year (plus employer matching for the most part), which is only ~1% of my income". I think this is where the disconnect comes from. At a ~$1 million/yr income, it seems you are prioritizing early retirement and a luxurious lifestyle over EA causes and giving. That's normal preference expression for the ultra-wealthy. It's just going to seem discordant for many in EA making $50-$150k/yr and giving 10%+ who place (relatively) higher priority on giving. There's a difference between what you value ... (read more)

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Zoe L
Hi Matthew, I appreciate you trying to pin-point the root cause of my disconnect, but I'd like to push back a bit: "it seems you are prioritizing early retirement and a luxurious lifestyle over EA causes and giving" - yes to the "early retirement" part and no to the "luxurious lifestyle" part. I'm very frugal even compared to those under poverty line in US/Canada; however, I want to leave a large cushion for emergency since I'm stopping work at such a young age. If I have more intrinsic desire to work, I'd be much more open to work a normal 80k-hr career and donate a larger % of my income at an ongoing basis.  "Knowing many people in the movement - most do have an intrinsic altruistic motivation." - I don't find it unbelievable that people have an intrinsic altruistic motivation and I respect the EA community for their service. My critique is more so that EA seems to be focused on "how to" for the in-group (those already super into the EA concept) and less so on outreach to near-groups, let alone out-groups. In other words, how can EA turn 90% of people into semi-altruists instead of turning 1% of people into perfectly effective altruists? I think the 10% pledge in its current structure isn't very appealing to 90% of people.

If you are arguing for increasing agricultural land, there are many other ways to accomplish that. You could promote the use of biofuels. Suggest more people get horses as companion animals. Or many other methods. Hyper-focusing on eating cows is weird. At this point is seems like a way to self-rationalize that eating cows is not just ok but on net preferable.

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Vasco Grilo🔸
Brian Tomasik has a post listing ways of decreasing the living time of invertebrates. Buying beef directly from Brazil is the intervention there for which Brian estimated the highest cost-effectiveness, although Brian only estimated the cost-effectiveness of some. I have followed a plant-based diet for 6 years, and do not miss eating beef. I looked into the cost-effectiveness of buying beef given Brian's early research, and its massive land use requirements relative to other foods.

P1: "This 90 year old is about to send a spam message to 100 million people. That will cause ~2000 years of annoyance and suffering. They have only ~4 years of expected mediocre life left, so it would be better to kill them so they can't send the message."

P2: "Why not just take away their phone?"

You've proposed a false dilemma.

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Vasco Grilo🔸
I see. I think you are implying that I should not recommend increasing the consumption of beef to increase the welfare of soil animals even if these have negative lives because there are other interventions that increase their welfare more cost-effectively. I agree with this last part, but I still think there is value in sharing my belief that increasing the consumption of beef is better than decreasing it. I also discuss better options in the summary: * "I recommend funding the Centre for Exploratory Altruism Research’s (CEARCH’s) High Impact Philanthropy Fund (HIPF) over that ["increasing the consumption of beef"]. I estimated buying beef is 3.72 % as cost-effective as funding HIPF, and that this decreases 5.07 billion soil-animal-years per $ [whereas I estimate buying beef only decreaess 189 M soil-animal-years per $]". * "I am arguing for, by increasing cost-effectiveness, changes in food consumption which increase agricultural land, the most cost-effective global health interventions, and targeted research on whether soil animals have positive or negative lives".

Mild downvote here. The conclusions ("I recommend increasing the consumption of beef") do not not follow from the premises ("soil animals have negative lives"), even if true. And the premises are highly uncertain and speculative.

There are perhaps other ways to improve or mitigate soil animal lives, and certainly many other ways to increase agricultural land that do not involve killing and eating cows.

Because of that, it feels like the post is intentionally contrarian for the sake of aggravating others, rather than an earnest attempt to improve the lives of... (read more)

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Vasco Grilo🔸
Thanks for the comment, Matthew. I estimate buying beef decreases the living time of soil animals 164 billion times as much as it increases the living time of cows. Do you prefer decreasing the consumption of beef (relative to increasing it) because you believe the experiences of cows are over 164 billion times as intense as those of soil animals? If not, could you elaborate on your reasons for disagreeing with my recommendation?

I understand you are trying to recast the Christian dominion interpretation, but it is worth mentioning that as an ideology it has long been overwhelming opposed or indifferent to animal welfare. Most popular dominion interpretations are in the mold of Rene Descartes, who thought animals automatons. The dominion framing is so severe that the most popular shocking vegan film is named after it.

Furthermore, the modern animal welfare movement is highly correlated with atheism, or at least skeptical approaches to understanding our relationship with non-human a... (read more)

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Nnaemeka Emmanuel Nnadi
Your observation about the correlation between the modern animal welfare movement and secular or skeptical worldviews is astute and widely recognized. It's a valid point that for many, a non-religious framing of our relationship with animals feels more intuitive and less burdened by historical baggage. However, the effectiveness of any approach depends heavily on the cultural and social context. In many parts of the world, including in some communities within historically Christian nations, a significant portion of the population is deeply religious. For these individuals, a purely secular argument for animal welfare may not resonate as deeply as one rooted in their faith tradition. For someone whose worldview is shaped by their faith, demonstrating that compassion for animals is not only compatible with their beliefs, but is a core expression of them, can be a powerful motivator. This is where reinterpreting concepts like "dominion" comes in. It's not about ignoring the problematic history of the term, but about offering an alternative, faith-affirming understanding that emphasizes stewardship, care, and love for all of creation. Ultimately, a multi-pronged approach is likely the most successful. Secular arguments can be very effective for one audience, while faith-based arguments can open doors and change hearts in another. The goal is to reduce animal suffering, and to achieve that, we should use every tool at our disposal, in a way that is most effective for the specific audience we are trying to reach.  

It seems like a fundamental problem is the lack of a moral realist foundation, as "human intentions toward sentient beings" and "what is moral" are different things. Can someone recommend some reading on whether alignment is even a coherent ask, either from a moral realist or moral anti-realist perspective?

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Ronen Bar
And human deeds are very different from human states values.    I think research to define exactly what is a sentient centric AI, is one of the first important things to do, and it's possible 
MatthewDahlhausen
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64% disagree

The salient question for me is how much does reducing extinction risk change the long run experience of moral patients? One argument is that meaningfully reducing risk would require substantial coordination, and that coordination is likely to result in better worlds. I think it is as or more likely that reducing extinction risk can result in some worlds where most moral patients are used as means without regard to their suffering.

I think an AI aligned to roughly to the output of all current human coordination would be net-negative. I would shift to thinkin... (read more)

The USDA secretary released a strategy yesterday on lowering egg prices. Explained originally as a WSJ opinion (paywall). Summarized here without the paywall.

Five points to the strategy:

  • $500 million for a biosecurity program to limit transmission of avian flu
  • $400 million to farmers to recover after an outbreak
  • $100 million for vaccines
  • Look to ease regulations, especially overriding California Proposition 12 that banned the sale of eggs from caged hens.
  • Look to allow temporary imports of eggs

Key concerns:

  • Enacting a key-goal of the EATS act to overri
... (read more)

I'm curious where the non-cage free eggs are going. From my naive position, it seems like the grocery stores and restaurant chains listed here should cover a majority of egg use, and are well above 40% cage-free in aggregate. Do non-chain restaurants explain the difference? Hotels? Food manufacturers? Schools and other public places with cafeterias?

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Elijah Whipple
Interesting point! I was kind of thinking along the lines of ASuchy, like, I would guess that a big portion of people shop at Walmart? I like your thinking!
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ASuchy
I understand that in total corporate commitments cover about 70-80% of the US egg market.  The remainder 20-30% is more or less what you identify, non-chain restaurants and non-chain companies in other industries, where the time to do corporate work is probably not worth it and would be expected to shift following law making.  Many schools and cafeterias use third party catering companies like Sodexo, Compass, Aramark etc, that have cage-free commitments and are making solid progress on their commitments. If you're calculating the 40% aggregate by assuming that all the companies have equal market share, that can skew what is happening. The largest in each sector normally have the largest piece. And sector by sector by market share it is grocery stores, restaurant chains/caterers, manufacturing and then hotels. 

"The important question is whether eating meat and donating is morally better than eating meat and not donating. The answer to that seems like a resounding 'yes'"

Offsetting bad moral actions depends on 1) the action being off-settable, 2) the two actions are inseparable, and 3) presuming a rather extreme form of utilitarianism is morally correct.

In the case you provide, I think it fails on all three parts. The action isn't off-settable. Most moral frameworks would look at the two actions separately. Donating to an animal welfare charity doesn't first requi... (read more)

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Aidan Alexander
Sorry I've been unclear -- let me clarify: When we use the term 'offset,' we mean it in a quantitative sense - doing an amount of good for animals that's comparable in magnitude to the harm caused by one's diet. Whether this good deed makes eating meat ethically equivalent to not eating meat is a complex philosophical question that reasonable people can disagree on. But for someone who is going to eat meat either way (which describes most of our users), adding a donation that helps farmed animals is clearly better than not adding that donation. The calculator is simply a tool to help people understand what size of donation would create a comparable scale of positive impact to their diet's negative impact. We've found this framing resonates with people who care about animals but aren't ready to change their diet

Do you agree with Susan Wolf's claim in Moral Saints that we ought to consider non-moral values in deciding what we do, and those may be a valid reason to not given more to the worst off? I presume you've written about it before on your blog or in a paper.

A related question is: do you think the gap is greater between our actions and what we think we ought to do, or between what we think ought to do and what we ought to do in some realist meta-normative sense? Is the bigger issue that we lack moral knowledge, or that we don't live up to moral standards?

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Richard Y Chappell🔸
I'm open to the possibility that what's all things considered best might take into account other kinds of values beyond traditionally welfarist ones (e.g. Nietzschean perfectionism). But standard sorts of agent-relative reasons like Wolf adverts to (reasons to want your life in particular to be more well-rounded) strike me as valid excuses rather than valid justifications. It isn't really a better decision to do the more selfish thing, IMO. Your second paragraph is hard to answer because different people have different moral beliefs, and (as I suggest in the OP) laxer moral beliefs often stem from motivated reasoning. So the two may be intertwined. But obviously my hope is that greater clarity of moral knowledge may help us to do more good even with limited moral motivation.

It's difficult to pinpoint a definition of conservatism. Modern politics tends to follow in the Burkean conservatism tradition. One of the animating forces is the belief that hierarchy is necessary for a just an prosperous society. It is to varying degrees a "might makes right" value system, summed up in this quote by Plato: " ...nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker; and in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, that ... (read more)

I think it is more likely than not that failure to pass this bill as is was net harmful.

  • Ozone air cleaners are a significant source of indoor air pollution, producing indoor particulate levels just slightly less than second hand smoke. Particulates account for 85%+ of morbidity from indoor air pollution in residences. There is a serious harm in keeping these air cleaners on the market. All major health and air quality organizations oppose them. But there is no ban on their sale, so they remain available to uninformed customers. Killing this bill keeps a
... (read more)
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G_Klw
Hi Matthew, thanks for the clear and thoughtful response. I just want to emphasize first that my team really hoped this bill would pass, with our amendment, but the political process didn't allow for that. Regardless of our intentions, it's reasonable for you to still identify harm in the outcome.  All my arguments were laid out in the post--I'd guess we just have different grounding assumptions about, among other things: the importance of preparing to fight future airborne superspreading-driven pathogens, the potential for far-UV to become a cheaper and more accessible consumer product than longer wavelengths, the potential relative impact of far-UV vs alternatives like filtration, the impact that far-UV could have on pathogens in an already reasonably-ventilated room, and the value of investing in far-UV equipped with scrubbers. Of course, I just said "potential" and "could" a lot above. You're right that the benefit was uncertain. As I wrote, I had serious concerns during this effort, but we couldn't avoid acting under uncertainty.  I also want to emphasize that far-UV is in a particularly vulnerable development stage relative to its potential value, but we're fighting to improve indoor air quality broadly, not just focusing on far-UV. 1Day Sooner's current IAQ project is more focused on filter implementation.

You can buy whey made from precision fermentation (PerfectDay). That changes several elements of your post, particularly the claim that whey is necessarily not vegan.

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MichaelDickens
I spent some time looking into this since it was not obvious to me how to buy from Perfect Day. Looks like the only retail partner who sells their whey protein powder is Myprotein, most retailers sell things like ice cream.

"we are biologically programmed to not care when eating animal flesh" this isn't obvious or intuitive to me. It seems like our attitudes toward eating animals are largely culturally conditioned. Regardless, even if it is "innate", a personal insensitivity to animals is not a moral reason to treat them as interchangeable, expendable, or offsetable.

It seems your justifications for offsets are bit of fanatic consequentialism and a belief that animals do not deserve similar moral status as humans.

Two points in response. First, many vegans were similarly callou... (read more)

A useful test when moral theorizing about animals is to swap "animals" with "humans" and see if your answer changes substantially. In this example, if the answer changes, the relevant difference for you isn't about pure expected value consequentialism, it's about some salient difference between the rights or moral status of animals vs. humans. Vegans tend to give significant, even equivalent, moral status to some animals used for food. If you give near-equal moral status to animals, "offsetting meat eating by donating to animal welfare orgs" is similar to ... (read more)

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sammyboiz🔸
Are people here against killing one to save two in a vacuum? I thought EA was very utilitarian. I think intuitively, causing harm is repulsive but ultimately, our goal should be creating a better world.    To your "animal" to "human" swap, it's hard to give "would you kill/eat humans if you could offset" as an double standard since most self-proclaimed utilitarians are still intuitively repulsed to immoral behavior like causing harm to humans, cannibalism, etc. On the other hand, we are biologically programmed to not care when eating animal flesh, even if we deem animal suffering immoral. What this means is that I would be way to horrified to offset killing or eating a human even if I deem it moral. On the other hand, I can offset eating an animal because I don't intuitively care about the harm I caused. I am too disconnected, biologically preprogrammed, and cognitively dissonant. Therefore, offsetting animal suffering is not repulsive nor immoral to me.
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Marcus Abramovitch 🔸
This comment is extremely good. I wish I could incorporate some of it into my comment since it hits the cognitive dissonance aspect far better than I did.  It's near impossible to give significant moral weight to animals and still think it is okay to eat them.

Maximization is not as simple as choosing the single action the produces the most benefit; actions are not necessary exclusive. If I go to the grocery store, I don't only by beans because I think they have the highest nutritional value per dollar. I buy other things too, and need to be because beans alone are insufficient. One can donate to animal welfare charities and be vegan; those aren't exclusive.

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sammyboiz🔸
Im confused what other goal there is beside the maximization of expected utility. As for being exclusive, I argue that effort needs to be prioritized according to importance.

Can you elaborate on why you think we will never eradicate factory farming? You point to near-term trends that suggest it will get worse over the coming decades. What about on a century long time scale or longer? Factory farming has only been around for a few generations, and food habits have changed tremendously over that time.

I think it's important to consider how some strategies may make future work difficult. For example, Martha Nussbaum highlights how much of the legal theory in the animal rights movement has relied on showing similarities between hum... (read more)

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ElliotTep
Hi Matthew, I think my analogy isn't claiming that we shouldn't try to end malaria because it will always be with us, but rather that we shouldn't view ending malaria as making a small dent in the real fight of ending preventable deaths, but that rather we should view it as a big win on its own merits. In fact I think ending cages for hens in at least Europe and the US is a realistic goal. I think we might never eradicate factory farming. I think it's plausible that we end factory farming with some combination of cultivated meat, moral circle expansion, new generations having more progressive views, and who knows what AGI might bring to the table. I just don't think that it's inevitable. I do agree that on the timescale of centuries things get very hard to predict. My post is more aimed at discussions that focus on ending factory farming in our lifetime.   

ASHRAE has long had standards and working groups on UVC, and recently published standard 241 on Control of Infectious Aerosols. The goal is to reduce transmission risk, not to support any one particular technology. Filtration is usually cheaper than Far-UVC and easier to maintain for the same level of infection control. Far-UVC/UVC is better in some niches, particularly in healthcare settings that require high air flow rates.

I suggest getting involved in ASHRAE and the research community that has been working on and developing standards for infection contr... (read more)

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Jason
Do you think the general superiority of filtration over Far-UVC is likely inherent to the technologies involved, or would the balance be reasonably likely to change given further development of Far-UVC technologies? In other words, is it something like solar, which used to be rather expensive for the amount of output but improved dramatically with investment, economies of scale, and technological progress? (Of course, we could improve filter technology as well, although it strikes my uninformed eyes as having less potential room to improve.)
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G_Klw
I have colleagues in other organizations who are involved in ASHRAE; one contributed to the development of 241! 241 is great, and to be very clear, my job is not to promote far-UV, it is to promote indoor air cleaning. Far-UV gets a lot of attention in my social circles because it is exciting and new, and people have a lot of questions about that specifically--this post is meant for the very narrow case of answering questions I've directly gotten about far-UV.

You elsewhere link to this post as a "clear example of a post that would be banned under the rules". That post includes the following argument:

People act like genetic engineering would be some sort of horrifying mad science project to create freakish mutant supermen who can shoot acid out of their eyes. But I would be pretty happy if it could just make everyone do as well as Ashkenazi Jews. The Ashkenazim I know are mostly well-off, well-educated, and live decent lives. If genetic engineering could give those advantages to everyone, it would easily qualify

... (read more)

Topical relevance is independent of the position one takes on a topic, so the rule you're suggesting also implies that condemnations of race science are spam and should be deleted. (I think I'd be fine with a consistently applied rule of that form. But it's clearly not the OP's position.)

A clear example of a post that would be banned under the rules: why-ea-will-be-anti-woke-or-die.

Reducing chronic health risks from indoor air pollution (mostly PM 2.5) generally entails different strategies than reducing infection risk from aerosols. Filtration can address both, but the airflow rates and costs can be quite different. UVC won't do anything about PM 2.5, and may contribute to it with ozone formation.

I recommend reading the supporting literature and history behind ASHRAE Std 62.1 and Std 241, which cover ventilation and control for infectious diseases in buildings. There are also several recent studies by the National Academies on air p... (read more)

Meta level question:

How does Manifest have anything to do with Effective Altruism, and why is this on the EA forum?

Shouldn't this post be on some other other channel internal to Manifest and the forecasting community?

It get there are some people that went to Manifest that are also in the EA movement, but it seems like the communities are quite distinct and have different goals. From comments and conversations, it seems pretty clear to me that this Manifest community has a strong hostility towards even considering the reputational risks platforming racist s... (read more)

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Jason
If you have any good ideas on how to build a reputational firewall, I think most of us would be all ears. I think most of the discussants would be at least content with a world in which organizations/people could platform whoever they wanted but any effects of those decisions would not splash over to everyone else. Unfortunately, I think this is ~impossible given the current structure and organization of EA. There is no authoritative arbiter of what is/isn't EA, or is/isn't consistent with EA. Even if the community recognized such an arbiter, the rest of the world probably wouldn't.

I think that longtermism relies on more popular, evidenced-based causes like global health and animal welfare to do its reputational laundering through the EA label. I don't see any benefit to global health and animal welfare causes from longtermism. And for that reason I think it would be better for the movement to split into "effective altruism" and "speculative altruism" so the more robust global health and animal welfare causes areas don't have to suffer the reputational risk and criticism that is almost entirely directed at the longtermism wing.

Given ... (read more)

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Richard Y Chappell🔸
Ok, so it sounds like your comparisons with GiveWell were an irrelevant distraction, given that you understand the point of "hits based giving". Instead, your real question is: "why not [hire] a cheap developer literally anywhere else?" I'm guessing the literal answer to that question is that no such cheaper developer applied for funding in the same round with an equivalent project. But we might expand upon your question: should a fund like LTFF, rather than just picking from among the proposals that come to them, try taking some of the ideas from those proposals and finding different (perhaps cheaper) PIs to develop them? It's possible that a more active role in developing promising longtermist projects would be a good use of their time. But I don't find it entirely obvious the way that you seem to. A few thoughts that immediately spring to mind: (i) My sense of that time period was that finding grantmakers was itself a major bottleneck, and given that longtermism seemed more talent-constrained than money-constrained at that time, having key people spend more time just to save some money presumably would not have seemed a wise tradeoff. (ii) A software developer that comes to you with an idea presumably has a deeper understanding of it, and so could be expected to do a better job of it, than an external contractor to whom you have to communicate the idea. (That is, external contractors increase risk of project failure due to miscommunication or misunderstanding.) (iii) Depending on the details, e.g. how specific the idea is, taking an idea from someone's grant proposal to a cheaper PI might constitute intellectual theft. It certainly seems uncooperative / low-integrity, and not a good practice for grant-makers who want to encourage other high-skilled people with good ideas to apply to their fund!

A butterfly flaps its wings and causes a devastating hurricane to form in the tropics. Therefore, we must exterminate butterflies, because there is some small probability X that doing so will avert hurricane disaster.

But it is just as easily the case that the butterfly flaps prevent devastating hurricanes from forming. Therefore we must massively grown their population.

The point being, it can be practically impossible to understand the casual tree and get even the sign right around low probability events.

That's what I take issue with - it's not just the nu... (read more)

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Mo Putera
Worth noting that even GiveWell doesn't rely on a single EV calculation either (however complex). Quoting Holden's 10 year old writeup Sequence thinking vs. cluster thinking:

I do think there are things worth funding for which evidence doesn't exist. The initial RNA vaccine research relied on good judgement around a hypothetical, and had a hard time getting funding for lack of evidence. It ended up being critical to saving millions of lives.

I think there are more ways some sort of evidence can be included in grant making. But the core of the criticism is about judgement, and I think a $100k grant for 6 months of video game developers time, or $50k grants to university student group organizers represent poor judgement (EAIF and ... (read more)

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Linch
Presumably there's some probability X of averting doom that you would consider more important than 25 statistical lives. I'd also guess that you'd agree that this is true for some rather low-but-nonPascalian probabilities. Eg, I predict that if you thought about the problem even briefly, you'd agree the above claim is true for X=0.001%, not just say 30%.  (To be clear I'm definitely not saying that the grant's effect size is >0.001% in expectation).  So then the real disagreement is either a) What X ought to be (where I presume you have a higher number than LTFF), or b) whether the game is above X.[1] Stated more clearly, I think your disagreement with the grant is "merely" a practical disagreement about effect sizes. Whereas your language here, if taken literally, is not actually sensitive to the effect size. 1. ^ (My own guess is that the grant was not above the 2022 LTFF bar, but that's an entirely different line of reasoning). And of course implicitly I believe the 2022 LTFF bar was above the 2022 GiveWell bar by my lights.
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Richard Y Chappell🔸
I mean, there are pretty good theoretical reasons for thinking that anything that's genuinely positive for longtermism has higher EV than anything that isn't? Not really sure what's gained by calling the view "crass". (The wording may be, but you came up with the wording yourself!) It sounds like you're just opposed to strong longtermism. Which is fine, many people are. But then it's weird to ask questions like, "Can't we all agree that GiveWell is better than very speculative longtermist stuff?" Like, no, obviously strong longtermists are not going to agree with that! Read the paper if you really don't understand why. I really don't think it's fair to conflate speculative-but-inherently-innocent "bets" of this sort with SBF's fraud. The latter sort of norm-breaking is positively threatening to others - an outright moral violation, as commonly understood. But the "reputational harm" of simply doing things that seem weird or insufficiently well-motivated to others seems very different to me, and probably not worth going to extremes to avoid (or else you can't do anything that doesn't sufficiently appeal to normies). Perhaps another way to put it is that even longtermists have obvious reasons to oppose SBF's fraud (my post that you linked to suggested that it was negative-EV for longtermist goals). But I think strong longtermists should generally feel perfectly comfortable defending speculative grants that are positive-EV and the only "risk" is that others don't judge them so positively. People are allowed to make different judgments (as long as they don't harm anyone). Let a thousand flowers bloom, and all that. Insofar as your real message is, "Stop doing stuff that looks weird, even if it is perfectly defensible by longtermist lights, simply because I have neartermist values and disagree with it," then that just doesn't actually seem like a reasonable ask?

The post-hoc rationalization is referring to the "Note that this grant was made at the very peak of the period of very abundant (partially FTX-driven) EA funding where finding good funding opportunities was extremely hard."

If it wasn't a good opportunity, why was it funded?

Why does "infrastructure" and longtermist funding rely so heavily on pascal-mugging with evidence-free hypotheticals?

I can easily craft a hypothetical in the other direction on the video game. Perhaps funding such a game reinforces the impression that EA is a self-serving cult (as Steven... (read more)

6
Richard Y Chappell🔸
To answer your second question: I think it's in the nature of seeking "systemic change" that it depends upon speculative judgment-calls, rather than the sort of robust evidence one gets for global health interventions. I don't think that "crafting a hypothetical" is enough. You need to exercise good judgment to put longtermism into practice. (This is a point I've previously made in response to Eric Schwitzgebel too.) Is any given attempt at longtermist outreach more likely to sway (enough) people positively or negatively? That's presumably what the grantmakers have to try to assess, on case-by-case basis. It's not like there's an algorithm they can use to determine the answer. Insofar as you're assuming that nothing could possibly be worth doing unless supported by the robust evidence base of global health interventions, I think you're making precisely the mistake that the "systemic change" critics (mistakenly) accuse EA of. That doesn't sound like post-hoc rationalization to me. They're just providing info on how the funding bar has shifted. A mediocre opportunity could be worth funding when the bar is low (as long as the risks were also low).

"I was a fan of Effective Altruism (almost taught a course on it at Harvard) together w other rational efforts (evidence-based medicine, data-driven policing, randomista econ). But it became cultish. Happy to donate to save the most lives in Africa, but not to pay techies to fret about AI turning us into paperclips. Still support the idea; hope they extricate themselves from this rut." - Steven Pinker

I think the pile-on of post-hoc rationalizations trying to defend or excuse this grant is evidence of the rot in EA in captured in Steven Pinker's comment. Pe... (read more)

7
Linch
I have empathy towards your position, but I think Pinker's quote aged very poorly in 2024, to put it mildly. My guess is it'd be obvious enough to even Pinker by 2029, but the future is hard and we shall see.

In my comment, I wrote:

it seems prima facie reasonable to think both that (i) a computer game could reach a different audience from youtube videos, and (ii) raising awareness of key longtermist issues is a helpful first step for making broader progress on them.

This seems like the opposite of a "post-hoc rationalization"? I'm drawing on general principles that I apply similarly to any like case. I just think it's very hard to assess which speculative longtermist efforts are genuinely good bets or not, and even silly-sounding ones like a computer game could,... (read more)

"A cost-effectiveness of decreasing GHG emissions of 3.41 tCO2eq/$, with a plausible range of 0.182 to 31.4 tCO2eq/$."

This is not a credible number, and Founders Pledge as of several years ago said they no longer stand behind the cost-effectiveness calculation you link to in your post.

It is based on an assumption that CATF nuclear advocacy will result in cheap enough reactors to replace coal in thermal electric power production. That is not credible now, and it wasn't at the time when the BOTEC was made. Note the 0.5%/1%/2% assumptions that nuclear will d... (read more)

jackva
While I think it is a mistake to motivate this estimate with a 2017 BOTEC (here we agree!), it is also mistaken to claim that such a range – spanning more than two OOMs and high and fairly low cost-effectiveness – is implausible as a quite uncertain best guess. As discussed many times, CCF grantmaking does not rely on 2017 BOTECs and neither does my best guess on cost-effectiveness (Vasco operationalized it one specific way I am not going to defend here, I am just defending a view that expected cost-effectiveness is roughly in the 0.1 USD/t to to 10 USD/t range). Why an estimate in this range seems plausible This seems plausible for many reasons, none of which depending on the specific BOTEC: I. Outside-view multiplier reasoning * (1) It is clearly possible to reduce tons of CO2eq for USD 100/t through direct and high-certainty action. * (2) If you only assumed a conventional advocacy multiplier – of the form that many EA orgs assume when modeling policy work (e.g. OP) and that is well-substantiated by empirical political science research and many studies on successes in philanthropy – you would assume a 10x multiplier. * (3) You now “only” need another 10x multiplier to get to USD 1/t and there seem many plausible mechanisms to get there – e.g. focusing on actions with transformative potential such as innovation, avoiding carbon lock-in etc. or – more meta – driving in additional funding from other donors / foundations when supporting early-stage organizations. * (4) Obviously, one also needs to discount for things like funding additionality, execution risk. Etc. * (5) This will result in a very uncertain range, but it is well-approximated by what Vasco has chosen to model this. Note that these are overall quite weak assumptions and, crucially, if you do not buy them you should probably also not buy the cost-effectiveness analyses on corporate campaigns for chicken welfare. II. Observations of grants and inside-view modeling * (1) While I generally p
Vasco Grilo🔸
Thanks for the comment, Matthew. What is your best guess for the expected marginal cost-effectiveness of CCF? For the purpose of this analysis, it does not matter much whether it is 10 % or 10 times that I assumed, because I think in this case the qualitative conclusions would be the same. You may be right that Founders Pledge no longer stands behind the cost-effectiveness analysis (it would be helpful if you could link to where they say that). However: ---------------------------------------- Interesting. In that case, GiveWell's interventions would be better than CCF, and corporate campaigns for chicken welfare would be many orders of magnitude more cost-effective than CCF. Great point! I do think this is a major source of error in cost-effectiveness analysis, and quantitive analyses more broadly: ---------------------------------------- Note the goal is decreasing cumulative deaths rather than GHG emissions. I think there is no difference if one conditions on a given emissions trajectory, but the goals may come apart accounting for uncertainty in the emissions trajectory. It is more valuable to decrease emissions in scenarios where emissions and temperature are higher, and nuclear power may be specially valuable here if those are scenarios where renewables did not scale as much as is currently anticipated. I agree all of these are useful. Just one note. I often use probability distributions in my analyses, but at the end of the day one has to compare interventions by boiling down their cost-effectiveness distributions to a single number corresponding to the expected cost-effectiveness. If one decides to fund A over B, one is implictly saying the expected cost-effectiveness of A is higher than or equal to that of B. This is one reason I do not conclude CCF is better than TCF even though I estimated the cost-effectiveness of CCF is 3.28 times as high. However, I think one can robustly conclude that corporate campaigns for chicken welfare are more cost-effe

Pointing to white papers from think tanks that you fund isn't a good evidentiary basis to support the claim of R&D's cost effectiveness. As with most things, the details matter quite a bit. The R&D benefit for advanced nuclear since the 1970s has yielded a net increase in price for that technology. For renewables and efficiency, the gains were useful until about the early 00s. After that, all the technology gains came from scaling, not R&D. You can't take economy wide estimates for energy R&D funding and apply them to a specific federal bi... (read more)

Pointing to white papers from think tanks that you fund isn't a good evidentiary basis to support the claim of R&D's cost effectiveness.

 

I cite a range of papers from the academia, government, and think tanks in the appendix. You don't cite anything either those are just like... your opinions no? 

The R&D benefit for advanced nuclear since the 1970s has yielded a net increase in price for that technology

Are you saying the more we invest in R&D the higher the costs? I agree that nuclear is getting more expensive on net but that can stil... (read more)

(For those in the comments, you can track prior versions of these conversations in EA Anywhere's cause-climate-change channel).

  1. Last time I checked, GG's still linked to FP's CATF BOTEC on nuclear advocacy. Yes, I understand FP no longer uses that estimate. In fact, FP no longer publishes any of its BOTECs publicly. However, that hasn't stopped you from continuing to assert that FP hits around $1/ton cost-effectiveness, heavily implying CATF is one such org, and its nuclear work being the likely example of it. The BOTEC remains in FP's control, and it ha

... (read more)

"This bravado carries over into the blunt advice that MacAskill gives throughout the book. For instance, are you concerned about the environment? Recycling or changing your diet should not be your priority, he says; you can be “radically more impactful.” By giving $3,000 to a lobbying group called Clean Air Task Force (CATF), MacAskill declares, you can reduce carbon emissions by a massive 3,000 metric tons per year. That sounds great.

Friends, here’s where those numbers come from. MacAskill cites one of Ord’s research assistants—a recent PhD with no obviou... (read more)

jackva
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I agree with you that the 2018 report should not have been used as primary evidence for CATF cost-effectiveness for WWOTF (and, IIRC, I advised against it and recommended an argument more based on landdscaping considerations with leverage from advocacy and induced technological change). But this comment is quite misleading with regards to FP's work as we have discussed before:

  1. I am not quite sure what is meant with "referencing it", but this comment from 2022 in response to one of your earlier claims already discusses that we (FP) have not been using that e
... (read more)

Given the differentiation between normative and factual beliefs, I'm having a hard time parsing the last sentence in the post: "It is hard to maintain tragic beliefs. On the face of it, it makes the world worse to believe them. But in order to actually do as much good as we can, we need to be open to them, while finding ways to keep a healthy relationship with tragedy."

Is the "worseness" a general worseness for the world, or specific to the believer? Does doing the most good (normative claim) necessarily require tragic beliefs (factual claim)? What is a "h... (read more)

3
Toby Tremlett🔹
These are really valuable comments and I'm sure they'll result in an edit (for one thing I'd like better examples of tragic beliefs, and making them explicitly normative might help.) I'll respond properly when I have time, thanks! 

There are two kinds of belief. Belief in factual statements, and belief in normative statements.

“Insect suffering matters” is a normative statement, “people dying of preventable diseases could be saved by my donations” is a factual one. A restatement of the preventable disease statement in normative terms would look like: "If I can prevent people dying of preventable diseases by my donations at not greater cost to myself, I ought to do it."

I think tragic beliefs derive their force from being normative. "Metastatic cancer is terminal" is not tragic because ... (read more)

1
MatthewDahlhausen
Given the differentiation between normative and factual beliefs, I'm having a hard time parsing the last sentence in the post: "It is hard to maintain tragic beliefs. On the face of it, it makes the world worse to believe them. But in order to actually do as much good as we can, we need to be open to them, while finding ways to keep a healthy relationship with tragedy." Is the "worseness" a general worseness for the world, or specific to the believer? Does doing the most good (normative claim) necessarily require tragic beliefs (factual claim)? What is a "healthy relationship with tragedy"? Where does the normative claim that we should have only healthy relationships with tragedy derive its force? If we can't have a "joyful" flavor of righteousness, does that mean we ought not hold tragic beliefs? Personal feelings about tragic beliefs are incidental; for someone with righteous beliefs, whether or not they feel joy or pain for having them seems irrelevant. Though we can't say with any certitude, I doubt Benjamin Lay had his personal happiness and health in the forefront of his mind in his abolitionist work. Perhaps instrumentally. Should Benjamin Lay ought to not have lived in a cave, even if that meant compromising on acting out his tragic beliefs?

I suggest being highly skeptical of the work coming from the Copenhagen Consensus Center. It's founder, Bjorn Lomborg, has on several occasions been found to have committed scientific dishonesty. I wouldn't use this report to make an determinations of what are the "best investments" without independently verifying the data and methodology.

4
Vasco Grilo🔸
Thanks for commenting, Matthew! For reference, readers interested in digging further into Bjorn's case can search for "Cases Nos. 4, 5 and 6" in this report. Here is a relevant passage: For what it is worth, none of the papers has Bjorn as one of authors, and all were published in a peer-reviewed journal. I would say that checking the methodology of papers makes sense in general to see how much one can trust their conclusions, regardless of who are the authors.

Down-voted, because I think the argument's premises are flawed, and the conclusions don't necessarily follow from the premises. It relies heavily on a "fruit of the poison tree" idea that because EA gets resources from civilization, and civilization can create the tools of its destruction, EA is inherently flawed. That is nonsense. The argument could be used to dismiss any kind of action that uses resources as being morally corrupt and ineffectual. Surely at the margin there are actions that reduce existential risk more than promote it.

I watched the video and then downvoted this post. The video is a criticism of EA and philanthropy, but there isn't anything new, thoughtful, or useful. I would have upvoted if I thought the criticism was insightful. We've had much better left-wing criticism of EA before on the forum.

Adam and Amy make basic mistakes. For example at 15:30, Adam says that GiveWell recommends funding AI alignment work, and that caused him to become critical because they weren't also recommending climate change mitigation. Adam treats GiveWell, SBF, and the entire EA movement a... (read more)

3
Jason
I think keeping people aware of criticism is worthwhile, but this would be better as a quick take than a full post because it's the same old stuff. Some criticism isn't worthy of even a quick take, but the author's bio has enough to justify one here, especially since she just published a book on the topic and seems to be on a marketing campaign.

GiveWell has dozens of researchers putting tens of thousands of hours of work into coming up with better models and variable estimates. Their most critical inputs are largely determined by RCTs, and they are constantly working to get better data. A lot of their uncertainty comes from differences in moral weights in saving vs. improving lives.

Founders Pledge makes models using monte carlo simulations on complex theory of change models where the variables ranges are made up because they are largely unknowable. It's mostly Johannes, with a few assistant resea... (read more)

Founders Pledge saying they can offset a ton of CO2 for $0.1-1 is like a malaria net charity saying they can save a life for $5.

Both are off by at least an order of magnitude. You should expect to spend at least $100/ton for robust, verifiable offsets. That brings your offset cost to $3,500 not $35.

2
MHR🔸
Do you have views on Tradewater as an offset provider? Their claim is that they can offset at $19/ton, and Giving Green seemed to think that was credible a couple years ago. 
3
Luke Eure
Thanks - maybe I'm giving them too much trust. In their impact report they say "We’ve granted out $14.89m in total and we estimate that it will avert 102m tonnes in CO2-equivalent emissions." I would not give too much credence to that from a non-EA aligned org, but I've been giving them decent credence with regards to counterfactual impact reporting since they're EA aligned. You're saying I should treat their reports less like givewell reports, and more like I would treat a random non EA charity. Any particular arguments for why? Or is it just that you wouldn't take the prior of assuming that they are at the evaluation quality of givewell? (Or maybe you don't trust givewell on this either)

Yes, I see your point. I used the video-of-torture instead of direct torture example to try to get around the common objections of demand-elasticity and psychological distance.

I think the space for refuge in the psychological difference is a lot smaller than may seem. Let's try another example.

Let's consider that you purchase a piglet that you keep in a dark, confined cage for 6 months and then slaughter. Would you have done something wrong in the psychological sense for being so personally responsible for it's life through slaughter? Is that still vastly... (read more)

"Of course, some mistakes are more egregious than others. Perhaps many reserve the term ‘wrong’ for those moral mistakes that are so bad that you ought to feel significant guilt over them. I don’t think eating meat is wrong in that sense. It’s not like torturing puppies..."

But it is a lot like torturing puppies. Or at least it is a lot like paying puppy torturers for access to a video of them torturing puppies because you get enjoyment out of watching the torture. The mechanized torture of young animals is a huge part of factory farming, which you support by buying meat.

You elided the explanation of the difference, which is psychological rather than metaphysical (just like the difference between failing to donate more to charity vs failing to save a child drowning right before your eyes).

The metaphysical commonality explains why both are very unjustified.  The psychological difference explains why one, but not the other, warrants especially significant guilt / blame.

Are you recommending people restrict their CATF donations, or give to CATF unrestricted?

How did CATF's net harmful work on 45Q influence your recommendation of CATF this year?

5
Dan Stein
Thanks so much for the engagement. We at Giving Green share your concern around some of CATF's activities around carbon capture, though I wouldn't go as far as to say that CATF's work on 45Q is "net harmful". Instead we acknowledge there are tradeoffs from CATF's strategy in this sector that have uncertain overall impacts. We have noted this element as a "Key Uncertainty" in our report. The relevant text is copied at the bottom of this post.  Our recommendation of CATF was primarily based on our assessment of their work in Shipping/Aviation and Enhanced Geothermal, which were two of our focus areas this year. However, we are not specifically recommending restricted donations for two reasons: 1. We think that CATF is an overall strong organization with many important work streams, all focused on climate change mitigation. In these cases, we have a strong bias toward unrestricted funding, as it allows the greatest flexibility for our recommended organizations.  2. For an organization like CATF that receives a lot of unrestricted funding, recommending restricted funding can be mostly meaningless, since the organization can always funge a restricted donation with unrestricted money.    From the 'Key Uncertainties' Section of our Deep Dive on CATF "Advocacy for incentives for power sector CCUS and captured CO2 storage via EOR: CATF’s advocacy for enhancements to the US Section 45Q tax credit included continued eligibility for power sector applications of carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS). There is concern that the tax incentives may extend the life of US coal and natural gas-fired power plants. One analysis suggests that 45Q could increase the operating years of an otherwise end-of-life coal plant into the 2040s, resulting in at least 6 million metric tons of additional CO2e emissions. CATF claims that it foresees little deployment of CCS in the US power sector but that the plants that use it will help bring down its cost through learning by doing,

I've noticed this too, in two ways.

First, is that the EA community tends to prefer information from "EA-aligned" people on a topic, rather than from academic experts in that topic. I've noticed this in climate change mitigation, air quality, and aerosol-based disease transmission (topics I'm an expert in). I presume that same issue is in other cause areas as well.

Second, the EA shift from global health and animal causes towards longtermism-focused efforts has corresponded with less reliance on RCTs and provable statements towards unprovable claims from arg... (read more)

2
Karthik Tadepalli
Strong +1 on the first point. EA folks have done good work in these areas but it's swamped by the good work done by outsiders that I never see referenced.

This post is a copy of your (Berkeley Institute for Young Americans) statement on Intergenerational Fairness Day. It'd be worth changing it to a linkpost, as it seems the EA forum is not the primary intended audience for the statement.

I'm presuming posting this on the EA forum is an invitation for consideration and engagement.

Here's my short summary:

  • young people face serious risks, including societal/ecosystem collapse
  • this is largely the fault of neoliberalism, which has created a destabilized and insecure future
  • social safety nets haven't adapted to th
... (read more)

Besides two fully remote roles, all the job listings are in either the SF Bay or London/Oxford. Are EA organizations this heavily geographically concentrated? Or is this update newsletter simply not capturing job listings from EA organizations based in other places?

6
G_Klw
There is heavy geographic concentration, but the secondary concentrations include Boston, DC, and NYC in my vague sense of things. It looks like organizations are self-added to the newsletter, so these are just the ones that have volunteered to provide updates. I can say that we're hiring for roles with a DC preference: 1daysooner.org/jobs. 
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