All of Nikola's Comments + Replies

2
Yarrow Bouchard 🔸
Interesting! What changed your mind?

Some successor species are much "worthier" of inheriting the future than others. I expect that the type of AI that would violently take over control of civilization would be on the less worthy side (especially conditioning on sub-2035 AGI timelines), and that the type of society we'd design given lots of deliberation and care (possibly through a long reflection) would be much more worthy.

I think I'll pass for now but I might change my mind later. As you said, I'm not sure if betting on ASI makes sense given all the uncertainty about whether we're even alive post-ASI, the value of money, property rights, and whether agreements are upheld. But thanks for offering, I think it's epistemically virtuous.

Also I think people working on AI safety should likely not go into debt for security clearance reasons.

2
Vasco Grilo🔸
@Nikola[1], here is an alternative bet I am open to you may prefer. If, until the end of 2029, Metaculus' question about superintelligent AI: * Resolves with a date, I transfer to you 10 k 2025-January-$. * Does not resolve, you transfer to me 10 k 2025-January-$. * Resolves ambiguously, nothing happens. The resolution date of the bet can be moved such that it would be good for you. I think the bet above would be neutral for you in terms of purchasing power if your median date of superintelligent AI as defined by Metaculus was the end of 2029, and the probability of me paying you if you win (p1) was the same as the probability of you paying me if I win (p2). Under your views, I think p2 is slightly higher than p1 because of higher extinction risk if you win than if I win. So it makes sense for you to move the resolution date of the bet a little bit forward to account for this. Your median date of superintelligent AI is mid 2029, which is 6 months before my proposed resolution date, so I think the bet above may already be good for you (under your views). 1. ^ I am tagging you because I clarified a little the bet.

My median is around mid 2029, largely due to business-not-as-usual scenarios like treaties, pauses, sabotage, and war.

Thanks for sharing. Are you open to a bet like the one I linked above, but with a resolution date of mid 2029? I should disclaim some have argued it would be better for people with your views to instead ask banks for loans (see comments in the post about my bet).

Yup those conditions seem roughly right. I'd guess the cost to train will be somewhere between $30B and $3T. I'd also guess the government will be very willing to get involved once AI becomes a major consideration for national security (and there exist convincing demonstrations or common knowledge that this is true).

I'm guessing that open weight models won't matter that much in the grand scheme of things - largely because once models start having capabilities which the government doesn't want bad actors to have, companies will be required to make sure bad actors don't get access to models (which includes not making the weights available to download). Also, the compute needed to train frontier models and the associated costs are increasing exponentially, meaning there will be fewer and fewer actors willing to spend money to make models they don't profit from.

1
Peter
So it seems like you're saying there are at least two conditions: 1) someone with enough resources would have to want to release a frontier model with open weights, maybe Meta or a very large coalition of the opensource community if distributed training continues to scale, 2) it would need at least enough dangerous capability mitigations like unlearning and tamper resistant weights or cloud inference monitoring, or be behind the frontier enough so governments don't try to stop it. Does that seem right? What do you think is the likely price range for AGI?  I'm not sure the government is moving fast enough or interested in trying to lock down the labs too much given it might slow them down more than it increases their lead or they don't fully buy into risk arguments for now. I'm not sure what the key factors to watch here are. I expected reasoning systems next year, but it seems like even open weight ones were released this year that seem around o1 preview level just a few weeks after, indicating that multiple parties are pursuing similar lines of AI research somewhat independently. 

I get that it can be tricky to think about these things.

I don't think the outcomes are overdetermined - there are many research areas that can benefit a lot from additional effort, policy is high leverage and can absorb a lot more people, and advocacy is only starting and will grow enormously.

AGI being close possibly decreases tractability, but on the other hand increases neglectedness, as every additional person makes a larger relative increase in the total effort spent on AI safety.

The fact that it's about extinction increases, not decreases, the value o... (read more)

I think grant evaluators should take into account their intuitions on what kinds of research are most valuable rather than relying on expected value calculations.

 

In case of EV calculations where the future is part of the equation, I think using microdooms as a measure of impact is pretty practical and can resolve some of the problems inherent with dealing with enormous numbers, because many people have cruxes which are downstream of microdooms. Some think there'll be 10^40 people, some think there'll be 10^20. Usually, if two people disagree on how v... (read more)

6
Pablo
I don't think this is the case for all key disagreements, because people can disagree a lot about the duration of the period of heightened existential risk, whereas microdooms are defined as a reduction in total existential risk rather than in terms of per-period risk reduction. So two people can agree that AI safety work aimed at reducing existential risk will decrease risk by a certain amount over a given period, but one may believe such work averts 100x as many microdooms as the other because they believe the period of heightened risk is 100x shorter.

Yup, I'd say that from the perspective of someone who wants a good AI safety (/EA/X-risk) student community, Harvard is the best place to be right now (I say this as an organizer, so grain of salt). Not many professional researchers in the area though which is sad :(

As for the actual college side of Harvard, here's my experience (as a sophomore planning to do alignment):

  • Harvard doesn't seem to have up-to-date CS classes for ML. If you want to learn modern ML, you're on your own
    • (or with your friends! many HAIST people have self-studied ML together or taken
... (read more)

Check out this post. My views from then have slightly shifted (the numbers stay roughly the same), towards:
 

  • If Earth-based life is the only intelligent life that will ever emerge, then humans + other earth life going extinct makes the EV of the future basically 0, aside from non-human Earth-based life optimizing the universe, which would probably be less than 10% of non-extinct-human EV, due to the fact that
    1. Humans being dead updates us towards other stuff eventually going extincts
    2. Many things have to go right for a species to evolve pro-social tendenci
... (read more)

Nice to see new people in the Balkans! I'd be down to chat sometime about how EA Croatia started off :)

2
Dušan D. Nešić (Dushan)
Absolutely! Booked a meeting with you! :)

Building on the space theme, I like Earthrise, as it has very hopeful vibes, but also points to the famous picture that highlights the fragility and preciousness of earth-based life.

3
Linch
Oh yeah that's great.

Thank you for writing this. I've been repeating this point to many people and now I can point them to this post.

For context, for college-aged people in the US, the two most likely causes of death in a given year are suicide and vehicle accidents, both at around 1 in 6000. Estimates of global nuclear war in a given year are comparable to both of these. Given a AGI timeline of 50% by 2045, it's quite hard to distribute that 50% over ~20 years and assign much less than 1 in 6000 to the next 365 days. Meaning that even right now, in 2022, existential risks are... (read more)

3
AISafetyIsNotLongtermist
I'd be excited to see this, though agree that it could come across as too weird, and wouldn't want to widely and publicly promote it. If you do this, I recommend trying to use as reputable and objective a source as you can for the estimates.
3
Matt Boyd
The infographic could perhaps have a 'today' and a 'in 2050' version, with the bubbles representing the risks being very small for AI 'today' compared to eg suicide, or cancer or heart disease, but then becoming much bigger in the 2050 version, illustrating the trajectory. Perhaps the standard medical cause of death bubbles shrink by 2050 illustrating medical progress. 

Strongly agree, fostering a culture of openmindedness (love the example from Robi) and the expectation of updating from more experienced EAs seems good. In the updating case, I think making sure that everyone knows what "updating" means is a priority (sounds pretty weird otherwise). Maybe we should talk about introductory Bayesian probability in fellowships and retreats.

2
tlevin
Yes, true, avoiding jargon is important!

Great post, Joshua! I mostly second all of these points.

I'd add another hot take:

Both the return of fellowships and retreats mostly tracks one variable, and that is time participants spend in small (eg. one-on-one) interactions with highly engaged EAs. Retreats are good mostly because they're a very efficient way to have a lot of this interaction in a small period of time.  More in this here.

I agree, to clarify, my claim assumes infinite patience.

Skipping time to determine net positivity of experience

[inspired by a conversation with Robi Rahman]

Imagine that it’s possible to skip certain periods of time in your life. All this means is you don’t experience them, but you come out of them having the same memories as if you did experience them.

Now imagine that, after you live whatever life you would have lived, there’s another certain 5000 years of very good life that you’ll live that’s undoubtedly net positive. My claim is that, any moments in your life you’d prefer to “skip” are moments in which your life is net negative.

I wonder how many moments you'd skip?

2
mic
I've considered this before and I'm not sure I agree. If I'm at a +10 utility for the next 10 years and afterwards will be at +1,000,000 utility for the following 5,000 years, I might just feel like skipping ahead to be feeling +1,000,000 utility, simply from being impatient about getting to feel even better.

I think that it's relevant that, for some veg*ns, it would take more energy (emotional energy/willpower) not to be veg*n. For instance, having seen some documentaries, I am repulsed by the idea of eating meat due to the sheer emotional force of participating in the atrocities I saw. Maybe this is an indicator that I should spend more time trying to align my emotions to my ethical beliefs (which would, without the strong emotional force, point towards me eating animal products to save energy), but I'm not sure if that's worth the effort.

Maybe this implies t... (read more)

Thanks, you're completely right, that sounds negative. Changed the title to "Helping newcomers be more objective with career choice", which probably gets across what we're trying to get across better.

Strong agree with the idea that we should emphasize actions people are taking and avoid hero-worship-like phrases. I was mostly using my own mental shorthand when I said "superhuman" and forgot to translate to other-people-speak.

Regarding the makeup of fellowship groups, I think probably giving people an option to attend some socials which are generally attended by highly engaged people could be good? So that, if there's a lack of engagement in their cohorts, they can make up for it by finding a way to interact with engaged people somewhere else.

Haven't th... (read more)

They're standard deviations, updated the figures, thanks! I agree strongly, this is weak evidence at best.