I am a generalist quantitative researcher. I am open to volunteering and paid work. I welcome suggestions for posts. You can give me feedback here (anonymously or not).
Say 80,000 Hours uses marginal funding from Coefficient Giving (CG) to hire someone who costs 100 k$/year, and is x times more productive than the alternative hire. CG should fund 80,000 Hours until they are indifferent between granting 80,000 Hours 1 $ more, and saving 1 $. So the annual impact of 80,000 Hours' new hire should be similar to that resulting from donating 100*x k$/year to 80,000 Hours or CG?
There are a couple of well-known answers to that. The person hired in your place probably cares about the world too, and would go on to do something useful with their time instead (Ben Todd wrote about this in 2015). And in a hiring round, the top candidate is often a lot stronger than the next-best one (Rob Wiblin worked this through in 2019).
I liked Rob's analysis, but I put very little weight on it. Rob guessed the distributions for productivity. They are not based on any concrete empirical data.
The Tomasik post is interesting, but he assumes a theory of consciousness which rules out lots of theories many people (including myself) find plausible like psychophysical laws, type B physicalism, and more.
Do you think lack of consciousness implies a moral weight of exactly 0? If so, how are you defining consciousness? For any sharp definition, infinitesimal changes in the state of an organism would make them go from not conscious to conscious. Hereare related discussions.
On animals, my main view is that the vast majority of the effect of any near-term intervention is on animals rather than humans. I've come around to the idea that there are many more cost-effective animal interventions than THL, having donated to SWP and the Insect Institute.
Do you endorse moral weights in the ballpark of the sentience-adjusted welfare ranges presented in Bob's book? This would be compatible with the above. However, for such moral weights, it is unclear to me whether electrically stunning farmed shrimps increases or decreases animal welfare. Do you disagree?
GFI is a strong choice as well.
Is this because of the effects on farmed animals or soil invertebrates?
Thanks, Laura. I will link to your reply if I end up publishing a post. I am currently not planning to publish a post because it looks like you are going to make changes before you make more grants.
I do not know how much CCF's recommended allocation would change as a result of the marginal cost-effectiveness of AGF being updated to GiveWell's bar. However, the update seems very worth it to me due to taking little time (only one variable has to be updated), and GiveWell's goal of having their marginal cost-effectiveness match their bar.
Here is some context about what it means for an intervention to have a cost-effectiveness equal to 16 times GiveWell's benchark (your current assumption for the marginal cost-effectiveness of AGF). GiveWell's benchmark corresponds to paying 300 2024-$ for 1 unit of value (doubling the consumption of one of their target beneficiaries for 1 year). So GiveWell's current bar of 6 times their benchmark means they are willing to pay at most 50 2024-$ (= 300/6) for 1 unit of value. GiveWell assumes saving the life of someone with age 1 to 4 is worth 127 units of value. So GiveWell's current bar corresponds to saving someone with age 1 to 4 with 6.35 k$ (= 50*127). A cost-effectiveness of 16 times GiveWell's benchmark, 2.67 (= 16/6) times GiveWell's bar, corresponds to saving someone with age 1 to 4 with 2.38 k$ (= 6.35*10^3/2.67). GiveWell reports higher costs to save a life for the grants they made to their top charities in 2022-2024 (and the cost to save a life would be even higher for the last $ of such grants):
"In 2022-2024, we directed funding to the Malaria Consortium to support this program at an estimated average cost-effectiveness of $4,000 per life saved".
"In 2022-2024, we directed funding to the Against Malaria Foundation to support this program at an estimated average cost-effectiveness of $5,500 per life saved".
"In 2022-2024, we directed funding to Helen Keller Intl to support this program at an estimated average cost-effectiveness of $3,500 per life saved".
"In 2022-2024, we directed funding to New Incentives to support this program at an estimated average cost-effectiveness of $4,500 per life saved".
GiveWell says "We maintain a cost-effectiveness threshold [bar] at a level where we expect to be able to fully fund all the opportunities we find above it", as I have been assuming. So I am confident it would be better to set the marginal cost-effectiveness of GiveWell's All Grants Fund (AGF) to GiveWell's bar, 6 times their benchmark in May 2026, instead of the cost-effectiveness of all the grants they made in a year.
You are currently assuming AGF has a marginal cost-effectiveness of around 16 times GiveWell's benchmark (see my 1st comment in this thread), 2.67 (= 16/6) times GiveWell's bar in May 2026. This is a significant difference in the context of global health interventions, whose cost-effectiveness is less uncertain compared to that of interventions targeting animals, and decreasing catastrophic risks neglecting effects on non-target individuals. So I suggest you update your assumption about the marginal cost-effectiveness of AGF before CCF makes more grants.
I am considering publishing a post about this on October 28. Let me know if you update your assumptions.
It doesn't make sense to ask questions like, Does a computer program of a mind really instantiate consciousness? That question reifies consciousness as a thing that may or may not be produced by a program. Rather, the particles constituting the computer just move—and that's it. The question of whether a given physical operation is "conscious" is not a factual dispute but a definitional one: Do we want to define consciousness as including those sorts of physical operations?
The relevant question is how much animals' experiences are discounted relative to the global poor's experiences. If they're discounted the same amount, animal welfare remains ~1000x as cost-effective [ratio between the cost-effectiveness of corporate campaigns for broiler welfare and GiveWell's top charities neglecting effects on non-target individuals].
I got this estimate based on the sentience-adjusted welfare ranges Rethink Priorities (RP) initially presented, and neglecting effects on soil invertebrates. However, I have little idea about whether chicken welfare reforms increase or decrease welfare accounting for uncertainty in welfare comparisons across species, and effects on soil invertebrates. For the sentience-adjusted welfare ranges presented in Bob Fischer's book, which are similar to the ones RP initially presented, I think effects on soil invertebrates would be much larger than those on chickens. So, trusting the values in the book, and excluding interventions decreasing uncertainty, I would focus on increasing the welfare of soil invertebrates by increasing or decreasing agricultural land. I believe this can be achieved more cost-effectively by the Good Food Institute (GFI) or Giving What We Can (GWWC) than interventions improving the conditions of farmed animals. In reality, I favour interventions decreasing uncertainty about welfare comparisons across species, and effects on soil invertebrates.
I see. I wonder if any of the patients who has benefitted from DMT would be interested in appearing on podcasts. I suspect founders of orgs fighting cluster headaches, people leading the research, and people with cluster headaches who have personally benefitted would more easily be accepted as guests than someone hired for public-facing work who is not leading the research, and has not personally beneffited.
Hello Jim. I had understood you used data from GiveWell (this is mentioned in the section I linked above with your methodology). However, as far as I know, GiveWell has never said the cost-effectiveness of their marginal spending in 2025 matched the cost-effectiveness of all their grants considered together in 2025, which is what you are assuming (see the quote after my question in the comment above). Here is what they say in the post you linked.
In 2025, we generally considered funding opportunities that our research estimated to be at least 8x our cost-effectiveness benchmark. Overall, we estimate that the average cost-effectiveness of the money spent across all our grants was approximately double that: 16x our benchmark.
So GiveWell estimates the cost-effectiveness of all their grants considered together in 2025 was 16 times their benchmark. The cost-effectiveness of GiveWell's marginal spending in 2025 was lower than this. GiveWell prioritises the most cost-effective grants, and some grants had a cost-effectiveness lower than 16 times their benchmark.
The marginal cost-effectiveness of GiveWell's marginal spending in 2025 may have exceeded their bar. In principle, it could have been anything from 8 to 16 times their benchmark. In practice, I think it is close to 8 times their benchmark. Assuming they funded all grants with a cost-effectiveness higher than their bar of 8 times their benchark (considering all factors, not just the ones covered in the explicit cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA)), GiveWell granting more in 2025 would not have led to more grants with a cost-effectiveness higher than 8 times their benchmark (which would have been made anyway). It would have led to grants with a cost-effectiveness of around 8 times their benchmark (slightly below or above 8 times their benchmark because the distribution of the cost-effectiveness of the grants is not perfectly continuous).
Hi Lance. Thanks for sharing this story. I liked that you shared your thoughts very transparently.
Hi Brenton. Thanks for the honesty in the rants.
Say 80,000 Hours uses marginal funding from Coefficient Giving (CG) to hire someone who costs 100 k$/year, and is x times more productive than the alternative hire. CG should fund 80,000 Hours until they are indifferent between granting 80,000 Hours 1 $ more, and saving 1 $. So the annual impact of 80,000 Hours' new hire should be similar to that resulting from donating 100*x k$/year to 80,000 Hours or CG?
I liked Rob's analysis, but I put very little weight on it. Rob guessed the distributions for productivity. They are not based on any concrete empirical data.
Do you think lack of consciousness implies a moral weight of exactly 0? If so, how are you defining consciousness? For any sharp definition, infinitesimal changes in the state of an organism would make them go from not conscious to conscious. Here are related discussions.
Do you endorse moral weights in the ballpark of the sentience-adjusted welfare ranges presented in Bob's book? This would be compatible with the above. However, for such moral weights, it is unclear to me whether electrically stunning farmed shrimps increases or decreases animal welfare. Do you disagree?
Is this because of the effects on farmed animals or soil invertebrates?
Thanks, Laura. I will link to your reply if I end up publishing a post. I am currently not planning to publish a post because it looks like you are going to make changes before you make more grants.
I do not know how much CCF's recommended allocation would change as a result of the marginal cost-effectiveness of AGF being updated to GiveWell's bar. However, the update seems very worth it to me due to taking little time (only one variable has to be updated), and GiveWell's goal of having their marginal cost-effectiveness match their bar.
Here is some context about what it means for an intervention to have a cost-effectiveness equal to 16 times GiveWell's benchark (your current assumption for the marginal cost-effectiveness of AGF). GiveWell's benchmark corresponds to paying 300 2024-$ for 1 unit of value (doubling the consumption of one of their target beneficiaries for 1 year). So GiveWell's current bar of 6 times their benchmark means they are willing to pay at most 50 2024-$ (= 300/6) for 1 unit of value. GiveWell assumes saving the life of someone with age 1 to 4 is worth 127 units of value. So GiveWell's current bar corresponds to saving someone with age 1 to 4 with 6.35 k$ (= 50*127). A cost-effectiveness of 16 times GiveWell's benchmark, 2.67 (= 16/6) times GiveWell's bar, corresponds to saving someone with age 1 to 4 with 2.38 k$ (= 6.35*10^3/2.67). GiveWell reports higher costs to save a life for the grants they made to their top charities in 2022-2024 (and the cost to save a life would be even higher for the last $ of such grants):
I have listened to at least 2 episodes of these podcasts (I keep updated the list in the doc I just linked):
GiveWell says "We maintain a cost-effectiveness threshold [bar] at a level where we expect to be able to fully fund all the opportunities we find above it", as I have been assuming. So I am confident it would be better to set the marginal cost-effectiveness of GiveWell's All Grants Fund (AGF) to GiveWell's bar, 6 times their benchmark in May 2026, instead of the cost-effectiveness of all the grants they made in a year.
You are currently assuming AGF has a marginal cost-effectiveness of around 16 times GiveWell's benchmark (see my 1st comment in this thread), 2.67 (= 16/6) times GiveWell's bar in May 2026. This is a significant difference in the context of global health interventions, whose cost-effectiveness is less uncertain compared to that of interventions targeting animals, and decreasing catastrophic risks neglecting effects on non-target individuals. So I suggest you update your assumption about the marginal cost-effectiveness of AGF before CCF makes more grants.
I am considering publishing a post about this on October 28. Let me know if you update your assumptions.
Hi Ariel. You may be interested in Brian Tomasik's post Dissolving Confusion about Consciousness.
Relatedly, you may like this linkpost for Ethics without sentience. Facing up to the probable insignificance of phenomenal consciousness by François Kammerer.
I got this estimate based on the sentience-adjusted welfare ranges Rethink Priorities (RP) initially presented, and neglecting effects on soil invertebrates. However, I have little idea about whether chicken welfare reforms increase or decrease welfare accounting for uncertainty in welfare comparisons across species, and effects on soil invertebrates. For the sentience-adjusted welfare ranges presented in Bob Fischer's book, which are similar to the ones RP initially presented, I think effects on soil invertebrates would be much larger than those on chickens. So, trusting the values in the book, and excluding interventions decreasing uncertainty, I would focus on increasing the welfare of soil invertebrates by increasing or decreasing agricultural land. I believe this can be achieved more cost-effectively by the Good Food Institute (GFI) or Giving What We Can (GWWC) than interventions improving the conditions of farmed animals. In reality, I favour interventions decreasing uncertainty about welfare comparisons across species, and effects on soil invertebrates.
Hello. You may be interested in David Thorstad's series Instrumental convergence and power seeking.
I see. I wonder if any of the patients who has benefitted from DMT would be interested in appearing on podcasts. I suspect founders of orgs fighting cluster headaches, people leading the research, and people with cluster headaches who have personally benefitted would more easily be accepted as guests than someone hired for public-facing work who is not leading the research, and has not personally beneffited.
Hello Jim. I had understood you used data from GiveWell (this is mentioned in the section I linked above with your methodology). However, as far as I know, GiveWell has never said the cost-effectiveness of their marginal spending in 2025 matched the cost-effectiveness of all their grants considered together in 2025, which is what you are assuming (see the quote after my question in the comment above). Here is what they say in the post you linked.
So GiveWell estimates the cost-effectiveness of all their grants considered together in 2025 was 16 times their benchmark. The cost-effectiveness of GiveWell's marginal spending in 2025 was lower than this. GiveWell prioritises the most cost-effective grants, and some grants had a cost-effectiveness lower than 16 times their benchmark.
The marginal cost-effectiveness of GiveWell's marginal spending in 2025 may have exceeded their bar. In principle, it could have been anything from 8 to 16 times their benchmark. In practice, I think it is close to 8 times their benchmark. Assuming they funded all grants with a cost-effectiveness higher than their bar of 8 times their benchark (considering all factors, not just the ones covered in the explicit cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA)), GiveWell granting more in 2025 would not have led to more grants with a cost-effectiveness higher than 8 times their benchmark (which would have been made anyway). It would have led to grants with a cost-effectiveness of around 8 times their benchmark (slightly below or above 8 times their benchmark because the distribution of the cost-effectiveness of the grants is not perfectly continuous).