All of Otto's Comments + Replies

High impact startup idea: make a decent carbon emissions model for flights.

Current ones simply use flight emissions which makes direct flights look low-emission. But in reality, some of these flights wouldn't even be there if people could be spread over existing indirect flights more efficiently, which is why they're cheaper too. Emission models should be relative to counterfactual.

The startup can be for-profit. If you're lucky, better models already exist in scientific literature. Ideal for the AI for good-crowd.

My guess is that a few man-years work could have a big carbon emissions impact here.

Great work, thanks a lot for doing this research! As you say, this is still very neglected. Also happy to see you're citing our previous work on the topic. And interesting finding that fear is such a driver! A few questions:

- Could you share which three articles you've used? Perhaps this is in the dissertation, but I didn't have the time to read that in full.
- Since it's only one article per emotion (fear, hope, mixed), perhaps some other article property (other than emotion) could also have led to the difference you find?
- What follow-up research would yo... (read more)

9
Johanna Roniger
3mo
Thank you, Otto! * Yes, as Dan_Keys noted, they're in the dissertation on the very bottom of the document. I wrote the articles myself, to try to keep them relatively comparable. * Yes, there are most certainly other differences between the articles. That's why I asked participants to indicate the emotions they felt and also used this indicator for the statistical analysis. * On the one hand, I think it would be great to properly validate my findings (as some of it was rather exploratory) and investigate the mechanisms at play - there seems to be quite a bit to be discovered still e.g. regarding how to gather support for regulation, especially among republicans as they hold higher risk perceptions already but are less supportive of AI regulation. A pretest-posttest study with diverse demographics could also give very interesting additional insights. On the other hand, besides emotional appeal there is much more to explore regarding AI risk communication. For example how to most effectively convey the idea of x-risk through AI misalignment - with analogies, technical explanations, sample scenarios etc. But also which communicators, communication channels etc. * I find it hard to formulate solid recommendations from this study alone due to the limitations. Mostly, I would advise communicators to really be mindful about their intentions & potential effects of their messages. Hope more research gets done to give clearer guidance. All the best for your ongoing and future research, excited to read it once it's out.
4
Dan_Keys
3mo
It looks like the 3 articles are in the appendix of the dissertation, on pages 65 (fear, Study A), 72 (hope, Study B), and 73 (mixed, Study C).

Congratulations on a great prioritization!

Perhaps the research that we (Existential Risk Observatory) and others (e.g. @Nik Samoylov, @KoenSchoen) have done on effectively communicating AI xrisk, could be something to build on. Here's our first paper and three blog posts (the second includes measurement of Eliezer's TIME article effectiveness - its numbers are actually pretty good!). We're currently working on a base rate public awareness update and further research.

Best of luck and we'd love to cooperate!

Nice post! Yet another path to impact could be to influence international regulation processes, such as the AI Safety Summit, through influencing the EU and member states positions. In a positive scenario, the EU could even take a mediation role between the US and China.

It's definitely good to think about whether a pause is a good idea. Together with Joep from PauseAI, I wrote down my thoughts on the topic here.

Since then, I have been thinking a bit on the pause and comparing it to a more frequently mentioned option, namely to apply model evaluations (evals) to see how dangerous a model is after training.

I think the difference between the supposedly more reasonable approach of evals and the supposedly more radical approach of a pause is actually smaller than it seems. Evals aim to detect dangerous capabilities. What will ... (read more)

3
Tom McGrath
7mo
There's an important difference between pausing and evals: evals gets you loads of additional information. We can look at the results of the evals, discuss them and determine in what ways a model might have misuse potential (and thus try to mitigate it) or if the model is simply undeployable. If we're still unsure, we can gather more data and additionally refine our ability to perform and interpret evals. If we (i.e. the ML community) repeatedly do this we build up a better picture of where our current capabilities lie, how evals relate to real-world impact and so on. I think this makes evals much better, and the effect will compound over time. Evals also produce concrete data that can convince skeptics (such as me - I am currently pretty skeptical of much regulation but can easily imagine eval results that would convince me). To stick with your analogy, each time we do evals we thin out the fog a bit, with the intention of clearing it before we reach the edge, as well as improving our ability to stop.
5
Rafael Harth
7mo
My gut reaction is that the eval path is strongly inferior because it relies on a lot more conjunction. People need to still care about it when models get dangerous, it needs to still be relevant when they get dangerous, and the evaluations need to work at all. Compared to that, a pause seems like a more straight-forward good thing, even if it doesn't solve the problem.

Thanks for the comment. I think the ways an aligned AGI could make the world safer against unaligned AGIs can be divided in two categories: preventing unaligned AGIs from coming into existence or stopping already existing unaligned AGIs from causing extinction. The second is the offense/defense balance. The first is what you point at.

If an AGI would prevent people from creating AI, this would likely be against their will. A state would be the only actor who could do so legally, assuming there is regulation in place, and also most practically. Therefore, I ... (read more)

Hi Peter, thanks for your comment. We do think the conclusions we draw are robust based on our sample size. If course it depends on the signal: if there's a change in e.g. awareness from 5% to 50%, a small sample size should be plenty to show that. However, if you're trying to measure a signal of only 1% difference, your sample size should be much larger. While we stand by our conclusions, we do think there would be significant value in others doing similar research, if possible with larger sample sizes.

Again, thanks for your comments, we take the input into account.

Thanks Gabriel! Sorry for the confusion. TE stands for The Economist, so this item: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ANn9ibNo9SQ

Thanks for your reply. I mostly agree with many of the things you say, but I still think work to reduce the amount of emission rights should at least be on the list of high-impact things to do, and as far as I'm concerned, significantly higher than a few other paths mentioned here.

If you'd still want to do technology-specific work, I think offshore solar might also be impactful and neglected.

4
jackva
1y
I think the list here is optimized for engineers, i.e. people with backgrounds that are better at working on technology than lobbying, so this is likely the proximate reason it is not on the list (I had no input on the list). That said, whether working on emissions rights is a top priority after the recent reforms is a question that would require more work (I think it is plausible to say we are close to having maxed out on ambition, and also changes in emissions rights are primarily driven by changes in general climate policy support, it seems).

As someone who has worked in sustainable energy technology for ten years (wind energy, modeling, smart charging, activism) before moving into AI xrisk, my favorite neglected topic is carbon emission trading schemes (ETS).

ETSs such as implemented by the EU, China, and others, have a waterbed effect. The total amount of emissions is capped, and trading sets the price of those emissions for all sectors under the scheme (in the EU electricity, heavy industry, expanding to other sectors). That means that:

  1. Reducing emissions for sectors under an ETS is pointles
... (read more)
6
jackva
1y
Context: I've worked in carbon pricing / emissions trading systems for several years before joining FP and I am generally not shy to criticize efforts that have low additionality (indeed, I partially left that role because of impact concerns). 1. It is true that it *used to be true* that reducing emissions in EU ETS sectors had zero impact on European emissions because of the dynamics you outline (the so-called "waterbed effect").  However, this has not been true for several years now with the introduction of the Market Stability Reserve (MSR). Now everything is a lot more complicated, but at least the effect of "no effect" is somewhat mediated. 2. Maybe not from the activist community, but from economists and other policy wonks, there is a lot of attention to the EU ETS and there has just been a recent strengthening of the EU ETS. It is the one thing every economist agrees on. 3. Given Europe's low share of future emissions and high share of innovation capacity, the fact that actions do not matter much more for Europe (because of the partially existing waterbed effect) is not as damning as it sounds. A lot of actions can still be very important. For example. Germany's massive support for renewables is sometimes criticized to not have reduced emissions because it was in an EU ETS sector (electricity) at a time when the waterbed effect was still fully in place. While this is true, it kind of barely matters because by far the largest effects of these policies were indirect anyway, changing the global trajectory of solar and driving emissions reductions in sunnier countries unwilling or unable to make the initial investment that Germany and some other made to drive down the cost. Crucially, though, this waterbed effect does somewhat affect "local" prioritization, e.g. it is an additional reason to prioritize action based on global consequences (e.g. changing trajectory of early-stage technologies) because local emissions reductions matter even less than on emissio
Otto
1y13
2
1

I don't know if everyone should drop everything else right now, but I do agree that raising awareness about AI xrisks should be a major cause area. That's why I quit my work on the energy transition about two years ago to found the Existential Risk Observatory, and this is what we've been doing since (resulting in about ten articles in leading Dutch newspapers, this one in TIME, perhaps the first comms research, a sold out debate, and a passed parliamentary motion in the Netherlands).

I miss two significant things on the list of what people can do to help:

1... (read more)

3
Greg_Colbourn
1y
Great work you are doing with Existential Risk Observatory, Otto! Fully agree with your points too - have added them to the post. The Shavit paper is great btw, and the ideas should be further developed as a matter of priority (we need to have working mechanisms ready to implement).

Hi Vasco, thank you for taking the time to read our paper!

Although we did not specify this in the methodology section, we addressed the "mean variation in likelihood" between countries and surveys throughout the research such as in section 4.2.2. I hope this clarifies your question. This aspect should have been better specified in the methodology section.

If you have any more questions, do not hesitate to ask.

Hi Joshc, thanks and sorry for the slow reply, it's a good idea! Unfortunately we don't really have time right now, but we might do something like this in the future. Also, if you're interested in receiving the raw data, let us know. Thanks again for the suggestion!

Otto
1y14
2
0

I hope that this article sends the signals that pausing the development of the largest AI-models is good, informing society about AGI xrisk is good, and that we should find a coordination method (regulation) to make sure we can effectively stop training models that are too capable.

What I think we should do now is:

1) Write good hardware regulation policy proposals that could reliably pause the development towards AGI.
2) Campaign publicly to get the best proposal implemented, first in the US and then internationally.

This could be a path to victory.

Otto
1y18
7
0

Crossposting a comment: As co-author of one of the mentioned pieces, I'd say it's really great to see the AGI xrisk message mainstreaming. It doesn't nearly go fast enough, though. Some (Hawking, Bostrom, Musk) have already spoken out about the topic for close to a decade. So far, that hasn't been enough to change common understanding. Those, such as myself, who hope that some form of coordination could save us, should give all they have to make this go faster. Additionally, those who think regulation could work should work on robust regulation proposals w... (read more)

Great idea, congrats on the founding and looking forward to working with you!

Thanks Peter for the compliment! If there is something in particular you're interested in, please let us know and perhaps we can take it into account in future research projects!

Otto
2y13
0
0

I agree that this strategy is underexplored. I would prioritize the following work in this direction as follows:

  • What kind of regulation would be sufficiently robust to slow down, or even pause, all AGI capabilities actors? This should include research/software regulation, hardware regulation, and data regulation. I think a main reason why many people think this strategy is unlikely to work is that they don't believe any practical regulation would be sufficiently robust. But to my knowledge, that key assumption has never been properly investigated. It's t
... (read more)

Awesome initiative! At the Existential Risk Observatory, we are also focusing on outreach to the societal debate, I think that should be seen as one of the main opportunities to reduce existential risk. If you want to connect and exchange thoughts, that's always welcome.

Great idea to look into this!

It sounds a lot like what we have been doing at the Existential Risk Observatory (posts from us, website). We're more than willing to give you input insofar that helps, and perhaps also to coordinate. In general, we think this is a really positive action and the space is wide open. So far, we have good results. We also think there is ample space for other institutes to do this.

Let's further coordinate by email, you can reach us at info@existentialriskobservatory.org. Looking forward to learn from each other!

Enough happened to write a small update about the Existential Risk Observatory.

First, we made progress in our core business:  informing the public debate. We have published two more op-eds (in Dutch, one with a co-author from FLI) in a reputable, large newspaper. Our pieces warn against existential risk, especially from AGI, and propose low-hanging fruit type of measures the Dutch government could take to reduce risk (e.g. extra AI safety research).

A change w.r.t. the previous update, is that we see serious, leading journalists become interested in th... (read more)

Anyway I posted this here because I think it somewhat resembles the policy of buying and closing coal mines. You're deliberately creating scarcity. Since there are losers when you do that, policymakers might respond. I think creating scarcity in carbon rights is more efficient and much more easy to implement than creating scarcity in coal, but indeed suffers from some of the same drawbacks.

Possibly, in the medium term. To counter that, you might want to support groups who lobby for lower carbon scheme ceilings as well.

Hey I wasn't saying it wasn't that great :)

I agree that the difficult part is to get to general intelligence, also regarding data. Compute, algorithms, and data availability are all needed to get to this point. It seems really hard to know beforehand what kind and how much of algorithms and data one would need. I agree that basically only one source of data, text, could well be insufficient. There was a post I read on a forum somewhere (could have been here) from someone who let GPT3 solve questions including things like 'let all odd rows of your answer be... (read more)

3
Ada-Maaria Hyvärinen
2y
Hi Otto, I have been wanting to reply to you for a while but I feel like my opinions keep changing so writing coherent replies is hard (but having fluid opinions in my case seems like a good thing). For example, while I still think only a precollected set of text as a data source is unsufficient for any general intelligence, maybe training a model on text and having it then interact with humans could lead it to connecting words to references (real world objects), and maybe it would not necessarily need many reference points of the language model is rich enough? This then again seems to sound a bit like the concept of imagination and I am worried I am antropomorphising in a weird way. Anyway, I still hold the intuition that generality is not necessarily the most important in thinking about future AI scenarios – this of course is an argument towards taking AI risk more seriously, because it should be more likely someone will build advanced narrow AI or advanced AGI than just advanced AGI. I liked "AGI safety from first principles" but I would still be reluctant to discuss it with say, my colleagues from my day job, so I think I would need something even more grounded to current tech, but I do understand why people do not keep writing that kind of papers because it does probably not directly help solving alignment. 
Otto
2y12
0
0

If you want to spend money quickly on reducing carbon dioxide emissions, you can buy emission rights and destroy them. In schemes such as the EU ETS, destroyed emission rights should lead to direct emission reduction. This has technically been implemented already. Even cheaper is probably to buy and destroy rights in similar schemes in other regions.

3[anonymous]2y
there's some endongeneity in the policy though - policymakers probably respond to that kind of activity, especially if it happens at scale. 

Hi AM, thanks for your reply.

Regarding your example, I think it's quite specific, as you notice too. That doesn't mean I think it's invalid, but it does get me thinking: how would a human learn this task? A human intelligence wasn't trained on many specific tasks in order to be able to do them all. Rather, it first acquired general intelligence (apparently, somewhere), and was later able to apply this to an almost infinite amount of specific tasks with typically only a few examples needed. I would guess that an AGI would solve problems in a similar way. So... (read more)

2
Ada-Maaria Hyvärinen
2y
Hi Otto! I agree that the example was not that great and that definitely lack of data sources can be countered with general intelligence, like you describe. So it could definitely be possible that a a generally intelligent agent could plan around to gather needed data. My gut feeling is still that it is impossible to develop such intelligence based on one data source (for example text, however large amounts), but of course there are already technologies that combine different data sources (such as self-driving cars), so this clearly is also not the limit. I'll have to think more about where this intuition of lack of data being a limit comes from, since it still feels relevant to me. Of course 100 years is a lot of time to gather data. I'm not sure if imagination is the difference either. Maybe it is the belief in somebody actually implementing things that can be imagined. 

Thanks for the reply, and for trying to attach numbers to your thoughts!

So our main disagreement lies in (1). I think this is a common source of disagreement, so it's important to look into it further.

Would you say that the chance to ever build AGI is similarly tiny? Or is it just the next hundred years? In other words, is this a possibility or a timeline discussion?

2
Ada-Maaria Hyvärinen
2y
Hmm, with a non-zero probability in the next 100 years the likelihood for a longer time frame should be bigger given that there is nothing that makes developing AGI more difficult the more time passes, and I would imagine it is more likely to get easier than harder (unless something catastrophic happens). In other words, I don't think it is certainly impossible to build AGI, but I am very pessimistic about anything like current ML methods leading to AGI. A lot of people in the AI safety community seem to disagree with me on that, and I have not completely understood why.

Hi Ada-Maaria, glad to have talked to you at EAG and congrats for writing this post - I think it's very well written and interesting from start to finish! I also think you're more informed on the topic than most people who are AI xrisk convinced in EA, surely including myself.

As an AI xrisk-convinced person, it always helps me to divide AI xrisk in these three steps. I think superintelligence xrisk probability is the product of these three probabilities:

1) P(AGI in next 100 years)
2) P(AGI leads to superintelligence)
3) P(superintelligence destroys humanity)... (read more)

4
Ada-Maaria Hyvärinen
2y
Hi Otto! Thanks, it was nice talking to you on EAG. (I did not include any interactions/information I got from this weekend's EAG in the post because I had written it before the conference, felt like it should not be any longer than it already was, but wanted to wait until my friends who are described as "my friends" in the post had read it before publishing it.) I am not that convinced AGI is necessarily the most important component to x-risk from AI – I feel like there could be significant risks from powerful non-generally intelligent systems, but of course it is important to avoid all x-risk, so x-risk from AGI specifically is also worth talking about. I don't enjoy putting numbers to estimates but I understand why it can be a good idea so I will try. At least then I can later see if I have changed my mind and by how much. I would give quite low probability to 1), perhaps 1%? (I know this is lower than average estimates by AI researchers.) I think 2) on the other hand is very likely, maybe 99%, by the assumption that there can be enough differences between implement AGIs to make a team of AGIs surpass a team of humans by for example more efficient communication (basically what Russell says in Human Compatible on this seems credible to me). Note that even if this would be superhuman intelligence it could still be more stupid than some superintelligence scenarios. I would give a much lower probability to superintelligence like Bostrom describes it. 3) is hard to estimate without knowing much about the type of superintelligence, but I would spontanously say something high, like 80%? So because of the low probability on 1) my concatenated estimate is still significantly lower than yours. I definitely would love to read more research on this as well.

Thanks for that context and for your thoughts! We understand the worries that you mention, and as you say, op-eds are a good way to avoid those. Most (>90%) of the other mainstream media articles we've seen about existential risk (there's a few dozen) did not suffer from these issues either, fortunately.

Thank you for the heads up! We would love to have more information about general audience attitudes towards existential risk, especially related to AI and other novel tech.  Particularly interesting for us would be research into which narratives work best. We've done some of this ourselves, but it would be interesting to see if our results match others'. So yes please let us know when you have  this available!

3
PeterSlattery
2y
Hey Otto,  We have 580 responses from international data collected during the SCRUB project (though these responses may not all be complete). We collected them in Waves 5&6. You can see the questionnaires used for each wave in the Word files in the linked folder. 'GCR_' are the relevant variables. We also have 1400 domestic (Australian) responses. These are embargoed by our government partner. We can only get access by requesting the data for a paper (which we plan to do eventually). Let us know if you would be interested in collaborating on that.  Let me know if you have any questions.