Research related to the research OP mentioned found that increases in carbon emissions also come with things that decrease (and increase) suffering in other ways, which has complicated the analysis of whether it results in a net increase or decrease in suffering. https://reducing-suffering.org/climate-change-and-wild-animals/ https://reducing-suffering.org/effects-climate-change-terrestrial-net-primary-productivity/ 

Yes, a similar dynamic (relating to siding with another side to avoid persecution) might have existed in Germany in the 1920s/1930s (e.g. I imagine industrialists preferred Nazis to Communists). I agree it was not a major factor in the rise of Nazi Germany - which was one result of the political violence - and that there are differences.

I would add that it's shunning people for saying vile things with ill intent which seems necessary. This is what separates the case of Hanania from others. In most cases, punishing well-intentioned people is counterproductive. It drives them closer to those with ill intent, and suggests to well-intentioned bystanders that they need to choose to associate with the other sort of extremist to avoid being persecuted. I'm not an expert on history but from my limited knowledge a similar dynamic might have existed in Germany in the 1920s/1930s; people were forced to choose between the far-left and the far-right.

Given his past behavior, I think it's more likely than not that you're right about him. Even someone more skeptical should acknowledge that the views he expressed in the past and the views he now expresses likely stem from the same malevolent attitudes.

But about far-left politics being 'not racist', I think it's fair to say that far-left politics discriminates in favor or against individuals on the basis of race. It's usually not the kind of malevolent racial discrimination of the far-right - which absolutely needs to be condemned and eliminated by society. The far-left appear primarily motivated by benevolence towards racial groups perceived to be disadvantaged or are in fact disadvantaged, but it is still racially discriminatory (and it sometimes turns into the hateful type of discrimination). If we want to treat individuals on their own merits, and not on the basis of race, that sort of discrimination must also be condemned.

I'm skeptical about the value of slowing down leading AI labs primarily because it likely reduces the influence of the values of EAs in shaping the deployment of AGI/ASI. Anthropic is the best example of a lab with people who share these values, but I'd imagine that EAs also have more overlap with the staff at OpenAI and DeepMind than actors who would catch up because of a slowdown. And for what it's worth, the labs were founded with the stated goal of benefiting humanity before it became far more apparent that current paradigms have a high chance of resulting in AGI with the potential of granting profit/power to their human operators and investors.

As others have noted, people and powerful groups outside of this community and surrounding communities don't seem to be interested in consequentialist, impartial, altruistic priorities like creating a positive long-term future for humanity, but are instead more self-interested. Personally I'm more downside-focused, but I think it's relevant to most EAs that other parties wouldn't be as willing to dedicate a large amount of resources towards creating large amounts of happiness for others, and because of that, the reduction of influence of the values of EAs will result in a considerable loss of expected future value.

Thank you for bringing attention to fetal suffering - especially the possibility of suffering of <24 weeks fetuses.

Others have already pointed out that the interventions of applying anaesthetics to fetuses has issues of political tractability, but I think there's also a dynamic that could result in backfire on moral circle expansion efforts to include fetuses and/or other "less complex" entities.

Most people haven't spent time thinking about whether simpler entities can suffer and haven't formed an opinion so it seems like they're particularly susceptible to first impressions. The suggestion that less developed fetuses can suffer would likely imply to them that early abortions are wrong. People who don't like this normative implication might decide (probably unjustifiably) to think less developed fetuses and by extension other "less complex" entities cannot suffer to absolve themselves of acting in ways that might increase fetal suffering. "Early abortions are not wrong -> early fetuses cannot suffer -> anything of "lower complexity" cannot suffer". On the other hand, first introducing the ideas abstractly and suggesting that we should care about simple entities "in general" sidesteps this and could lead people to eventually care about fetal suffering in an, admittedly indirect, but less politically charged way.

So between two strategies, (1) advocate for lower complexity entities in general, and (2) advocate for less developed fetuses, those concerned with moral circle expansion to fetuses and/or other simpler entities should probably focus on the first strategy.

(Personally, I'd prefer if people accepted that they act in ways that might increase suffering, while simultaneously aim to decrease suffering.)

I think there's a connection that results from how both theories dissolve the concept of qualia. Eliminativism does this by saying qualia is actually physics and panpsychism (in its most expansive forms) does this by saying all physics has qualia. Both theories effectively make the "suffering" label less exclusive - and more processes would have a higher probability of being correctly associated with that label (unclear whether probability is the right word in the case of eliminativism). With panpsychism, processes are conscious and the only remaining question is whether they also suffer. With eliminativism, the distinction between "what we usually take to be suffering processes" and "other processes" is blurred and we're more permissive of some members of the latter being considered the former, or with a probabilities framing, less certain that some members of the latter is not the former. (Although, I guess alternatively the uncertainty can go the other way and we might be more skeptical of processes being suffering processes. But most people already put zero weight or very little weight on particles suffering so it seems like the uncertainty/blurred distinction should increase it?)

This seems similar to how empty individualism and open individualism are related. They both dissolve the common-sense concept of personal identity featured in closed individualism. Personal identity ceases to be "special": open individualism merges everyone and empty individualism atomizes everyone into individual-moments.

Tomasik also offers an analogy of how the concept of élan vital was dissolved in another article. As I understand it, the concept was eliminated with advances in knowledge of biochemistry. But alternatively people could have also said "actually everything is pretty similar to stuff we consider alive - let's just say everything falls under the term 'alive' then" (while not making any unscientific claims; it just means expanding the definition of "alive" to include everything) and élan vital would be similarly dissolved. The final result seems similar and the concept doesn't distinguish processes from one another in a way previously thought as meaningful.

A while back I wrote that I agreed with the observation that some of (new wave) EA’s norms seem similar to those of the religion imposed on me and others as children. My current thinking is that there may actually be a link connecting the culture in parts of Protestantism and some of the (progressive) norms EA adopts, along with an atypical origin that probably deserves more scrutiny. The "link" part might be more apparent to people who've noticed a "god-shaped hole" in the West that makes some secular movements resemble certain parts of religions. The "origin" part might be less apparent but it's been discussed by Scott Alexander before. So, this theory isn't all that original.

Essentially: Puritans, as one of four major cultures originating from the UK, exert huge founder effects on America, which both influences parts of itself as well as other countries for better or worse → Protestant culture gradually changed to be more socially judgmental in some ways etc. → More recently, people increasingly reject the existence of a God but keep elements of the culture of that religion → EA now draws heavily from nth generation ex-Protestants/Protestant-adjacents who also tend to be more active in trying to change society (other people's actions) and approach it with some of the same inherited attitudes

That is one causal chain but a tree might show more causes and effects. For example, the Puritan founder effects probably also influenced modern academia (in part, spearheaded by a few institutions in New England) which again, EA heavily draws from. Other secular institutions might also be influenced by osmosis, and produce downstream effects.

It seems difficult to believe these attitudes just disappeared without affecting other movements, culture, and society. The Puritan legacy also seems to have a track record of being quite influential.

From the study it looks like participants were given a prompt and asked to "free-list" instead checking boxes so it might be more indicative of what's actually on people's minds.

The immoral behaviors prompt being:

The aim of this study is to learn which actions or behaviors are considered immoral. Please provide a list of actions and behaviors which, in your opinion, are immoral. Please list at least five examples. There are no correct answers, we are just interested in your opinion.

My impression is that the differences between the American and Chinese lists (with the Lithuanian list somewhat in between) appear to be a function of differences in the degree of societal order (i.e., crime rates, free speech), cultural differences (i.e., extent of influence of: Anglo-American progressivism, purity norms of parts of Christianity, traditional cultures, and Confucianism), and demographics (i.e, topics like racism/discrimination that might arise in contexts that are ethnically diverse instead of homogenous).