If I understand correctly, your question is whether EA is specifically worse than other organisations, rather than whether being on a par with other organisations is also very bad in this regard?
Because I get the impression that some people simply say that EA is bad, but don’t necessarily rule out the possibility that others are bad too.

I reckon it might be important to know whether the EA is actually performing worse, so the question does seem important to me, because one of the possible answers would be significant. 
(For example, learning more from organisations that are doing better, etc.)
Even if everyone is doing very poorly, performing worse than everyone else is still very important information, even if performing just as well is by no means satisfactory.
I imagine this might be part of your approach?

For my part, I don’t have enough reliable data to form a proper opinion on this specific issue, and indeed the question seems difficult to answer based on the data: a very high reporting rate compared to others within an organisation could mean that it handles reports much better (in terms of spaces for discussion, reception, listening, procedures, etc.), and so ultimately is a better-run organisation; but the opposite could also be true: it might mean that it performs worse, whilst managing reports in much the same way as others.

Furthermore, better care, better facilities, a better reporting policy, better responses to these reports, etc., could (in theory) well coincide with an underlying greater tendency to commit assaults. I don’t think these necessarily contradict each other? Even if they might, there may be an argument to be made for that.
And in that case, identifying the reporting mechanisms would not be enough to reduce the actual number of cases.
However, in that case, I imagine the number of reports would be particularly high, so it would still serve as a warning.

I can't help feeling that these measurement issues are skewing the data in all sorts of ways,
but I still believe it’s important to make progress on this issue; it’s not a case of saying “we can’t answer” definitively and thus stopping the discussion.

However, why are you making this post?
I don’t get the impression you’re creating this post to say “let’s ask ourselves whether EA is worse, because it would be important if it is, and here’s the data I’ve been able to gather so far”, but rather with an idea that strikes me as “hey, it’s not that bad, is it?”^[1], which is completely different and, moreover, isn’t very epistemologically humble given the complexity of the subject regarding the data.

I also think that’s why there are so many critical comments, because if you’d simply asked a specific comparative question whilst being perfectly clear about your aims and what you meant, I don’t think there would be any such comments, or at least far fewer of them. (I may be wrong; that’s just my current view.)

Because I’m not sure if you’ve realised that saying ‘others are worse’ or ‘others aren’t any better’ is often used to downplay one’s own behaviour. It’s a very common argument, and your article doesn’t seem at all cautious on this point, for several reasons mentioned here, which personally leads me to believe that this is the underlying motivation. (I may be wrong,I hope so, at least, but I’m mentioning this out of honesty and because I think this information is useful when writing posts.)

Which in no way detracts from the relevance of the issue (in the event that it is indeed worse).

1. ^{^}

   the elements in question are: the article’s title and the way it is written, mixing comments that say it’s bad with comments that say it’s worse, even though the two have nothing to do with each other.

Thank you for this post, I find it interesting and it ties in with some questions I had already asked myself.

Firstly, I would say that my reflections have led me to consider a form of opposition between consequentialist veganism and deontological veganism, in the sense that the consequences for animal suffering will most likely remain unchanged if a vegan eats 10g of cheese in a year, or even meat, so for me this should not have much impact from a consequentialist point of view. Of course, this is just an example, and one could argue that doing this, given human psychology (at least mine), greatly increases the likelihood of doing it again because the boundary becomes quite intangible, thereby increasing the consequentialist risk.
My example is imperfect, but I simply want to point out an idea of consequences, and it seemed relatively relevant to me.

An analogy I like is that of ecology.
For example, let's say we want to have an impact on climate change. 
One approach I like and which seems reasonable to me is to calculate the CO2 equivalent cost of each action likely to have a significant cost and ensure that at the end of the year we are around <2-3 tonnes of CO2 equivalent (tCO2eq), or another target if necessary or specific.
This could also include donations to high-impact organisations, as mentioned in this comment, even if this becomes more difficult to quantify.

A conceptual way of approaching this for veganism, because unfortunately quantifying suffering and the intensity of suffering is a complicated and rather difficult subject, even if I try to approximate it qualitatively, would be to replace the target of [<2-3 tCO2eq/year] with a target of [less than so much intense animal suffering].
Unfortunately, without quantification, we cannot do this as neatly, and so a final target is difficult to visualise clearly, but at least as a representation it speaks to me and I try to visualise it.

This last paragraph leads me to my second point:

Secondly, this sentence struck me:

We don't expect human rights activists to avoid all forms of exploitation and cruelty as far as possible to qualify as human rights activists.

Because I also had the opposite thought: I find it unfortunate that there is no term to describe trying to be ‘exemplary’ (which could be consequentialist, as mentioned above, so I realise that this is not exactly the idea behind this quote) from a humanitarian point of view. 
We could invent the term 'hugan' or ‘ethan’, I don't know? (Perhaps this already exists and I am not aware of it?)
And so the idea would also be not to consume products whose production chain involves a lot of human suffering, or to donate to high-impact charities, or other things that do not increase or decrease human suffering in the world. 
And to have a term of identity associated with this, which is rather strict in terms of consequence, which seems to me to be a good idea of the concept of ‘vegan’, if it is made consequentialist.

This kind of ‘an’ concept seems interesting to me for creating a kind of strong behavioural representation on a given cause.

Another thing I thought about when I read this sentence:

We're missing many ideologically aligned people who don't satisfy the behavioural standard.

is that there is a word for this, which is ‘anti-speciesist’, I think?

Perhaps it would be interesting to create notions of intensity? A bit like there are vegetarians and vegans?