All of VictorSintNicolaas's Comments + Replies

blockchain but without the money

 

You can either:
(1) take a smart contract platform and remove the currency and financial applications. 
(2) take a smart contract platform and replace the native currency by a fully fiat backed collatoral. You keep the money, but at least the issuance is state-controlled.

What remains is a permissioned blockchain system (hyperledger, multichain) where you can still reach consensus on state. Multichain has a lot of great articles on this: https://www.multichain.com/blog/2016/03/blockchains-vs-centralized-databases/

Thanks, I appreciate the discussion. :)

> A high level of participation would change how spending and taxation happen.

Absolutely. Unfortunately many people don't see it's worth the effort, arguably very rationally so (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rational_ignorance) and high participation often only comes from elites (https://stukroodvlees.nl/de-participatie-elite-en-de-participatieparadox/).

From the mechanism design corner, sortition (for voting, referenda, any political discussion) might help: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sortition

Or we can all just ... (read more)

Thanks for your comment Noah!

Firstly, fully agree that wealth equality is a prerequisite to achieving efficiency. So much indeed that economists often optimize for both.

Some of the mechanisms from the article are actually not "budget-balanced", for example the much-hyped quadratic funding requires a matching fund - which can be raised through progressive taxation. Note that at this point the terms "private" and "public" break down a bit, in theory the taxes could be collected entirely through private coordination, without requiring a public government body... (read more)

1
Noah Scales
1y
Thank you for the reply, Victor. I'm learning quite a bit here. In general a belief in efficiency through competition is not one that I agree with, and neither is belief in provision of public goods through private unregulated entities. However, having ideas and models of creative alternatives to existing systems is important, to create contrast and encourage deeper analysis of the existing system. Also, in case the existing system fails for any reason, understanding what else is possible, and what the limitations are, seems desirable. I consider the design of the US political system as a mechanism to reflect and serve public preferences, but also temper those preferences over time and across common groupings of interests. Unfortunately, participation in the system is low, and its results would be different if political participation in the country were higher. A high level of participation would change how spending and taxation happen. That would, in theory, improve the overall satisfaction with government spending on public goods. If you disagree with any of that, let me know, so I can gather information. Anyway, I appreciate your post, and want to take a few notes about the ideas you proposed here (something I think to do frequently for others' posts to the forum, actually).

Great initiative! Slight nuance to Chris Leong 's earlier comment. Though I'm not an expert, I would just caution for standards-setting bodies hastingly standardizing a losing standard, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protocol_Wars

Your encryption standards examples feel like a great comparison of the way to go

As someone not active in the field of AI risk, and having always used epistemic deference quite heavily, this feels very helpful. I hope it doesn't end up reducing society's efforts to stop AI from taking over the world some day.

On the contrary, my best guess is that the “dying with dignity” style dooming is harming the community’s ability to tackle AI risk as effectively as it otherwise could

I wrote down some thoughts on the trade-offs one encounters when balancing profitability and other values: https://victorsintnicolaas.com/articles/11.html

Very much interested in other material!

Thanks for your thoughts! 

it seems that in general more indirect democracy functions better due to the fact that voters have little incentive to cast informed votes, whereas representatives are incentivized to make informed decisions on voters behalf.

To let voters cast more informed votes, there's a whole movement around deliberation. You can argue that increases costs for voters, but I think the trade-off is unclear and likely context dependent.

The books are great pointers, will have a look at the research referenced!

1
FlorianH
3y
From what I read, Snowdrift is not quite "doing this", at least not in as far as the main aim here in Mutual Matching is to ask more from a participant only if leverage increases! But there are close links, thanks for pointing out the great project! Snowdrift has people contribute as an increasing function of the # of co-donors, but the leverage, which is implicit, stays constant = 2, always (except for those cases where it even declines if others' chosen upper bounds are being surpassed), if my quick calculation is right (pretty sure*). This may or may not be a good idea with +- rational contributors (either way, I btw think it would be valuable for transparency to indicate this leverage explicitly to readers of the snowdrift page, it's a crucial factor for donors imho). Pragmatically it may turn out to be a really useful simplification though. Here instead, Mutual Matching tries to motivate people by ensuring that they donate more only as leverage really increases. I see this as key innovation also relative to Buchholz et al. (maybe worth looking at that paper, it might be closer to snowdrift, as it also does not make donations directly conditional on leverage I think, tbc). As I discuss, this has pros and cons; the main risk being that the requested donation increases quickly with the leverage and thus with the # of participants. Thanks to your links I just saw also the Rational Street Performer Protocol, which I should also look at, even if it equally seems to focus on donating more as more is given in total, rather than like here explicitly as leverage is increased; it makes the timing question very explicit, which is a dimension I have here not much looked at yet. Will expand the text & make the connections to both asap! *snowdrift: Each gives 0.1 ct per participant, meaning for 1000 (or 5000) you give 1$ (or 5$) and thanks to you all these others give 1$ (or $5) more in total than without you, i.e. extra leverage of constantly 1 in addition to your own c

There is a lot of information in your post to digest, but I'll focus on what seems to me your biggest point: "public goods are treated like consumables and not investments"

The way I see it, people can consume private and public goods, just like they can invest in providers of private or public goods.  If you want to invest in providers whose main purpose is to provide public goods, there are already a number of possibilities:

  • Buying government bonds
  • Buying shares of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations / cryptocurrencies

Perhaps you can blur the legal ... (read more)

1
RowanBDonovan
3y
Government bonds, of course! Yes, I should mention those as a precedent. :-) DAOs with a promising mission: Yeah, but those don’t seem so different from social enterprises or even most companies that provide an important product. Raphaël Mazet: Interesting, thanks! It’d be great to get input on that question.

Thank you for the swift reply!

I was actually looking for pledges which do not list donating to EA charities as part of the pledge requirements.  Apologies for not stating this context clearly enough!

Glad to see the same excitement I (and likely many others) feel about crowdsourcing platforms! 

Here are more crowdfunding and coordinating platforms to learn from, look at and discuss with: https://wiki.snowdrift.coop/market-research/other-crowdfunding

1
DC
3y
The URL has a period at the end that needs removing. :)

Thank you for the write-up, I just published a related article on the topic today which lists other mechanisms besides quadratic funding which can potentially help grow public goods markets.

Having said that, quadratic funding still gained the most traction and promise so far. In the article above I mention various adjustments which can incentivize longer-term public goods production. There also exists an adjustment to account for public bads: "negative contributions",  though those created some negative sentiments in a recent experiment.

Very cool! Finally had time to read the reports. Would there be any utility in cross-posting this information in OPP's Notable Lessons (or all on Forethought) ? It should appeal to the same audience as Philanthropy's Success stories.